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The thesis analyzes the Muslim presence and representations of Islam
among the Meru people of Kenya in the 20th century. The circumstances
leading to the establishment of pioneer Muslim communities by the
'Swahili', the Nubians and the Mahaji, in Meru are examined. The rejection
or acceptance of Islam by the people of Meru is linked to theories of
conversion. The main emphasis is on the local manifestations of Islam. Case
material from Meru town and the neighbouring areas is cited.
Local representations of Islam and Muslim identity are analyzed in relation
to the oppositional dyad of Dini / Ushenzi. The thesis argues that the
opposition of Dini to Ushenzi has continuously impinged upon the local
manifestation of Islam in Meru. Examples of how this stereotyped notion
is transposed from its coastal cultural milieu and applied in a 'fossilized'
form by Muslims in Meru are given.
The shift in the early 1960s from the previous emphasis on distinctions
between the three Muslim groups, to the need for a common Muslim
community identity, is linked to the post-independence social-economic
crisis that threatened the presence of Islam in Meru. The mechanics of the
construction and consolidation of an urban Muslim community identity are
examined. The analysis of the internal dynamics of the emergent urban
Muslim community focuses on the notion of the propriety of religious
practice and behaviour.
An examination of the influence of Tabligh during the last decade, (1980-
1990) reveals an increase in the Muslim activities in Meru. Throughout the
1980s Islam spread slowly, almost unobtrusively, in the rural areas in the
northern part of Meru. The analysis of the forces underpinning this process;
and the resultant dilemma of conflicting identities of individual converts
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1INTRODUCTION
Islam, as embodied in the Quran, the Sunnah, that is the deeds and
sayings of the Prophet as represented in the Hadith and actualized
through the Sharia, is canonical. But over the centuries, Islam has become
part of the culture of many different peoples, with the result that
representation and "manifestation of the Muslim content of each culture is
a function of a process of Islamization".' These various manifestations of
Islam range from the clerical traditions in West Africa, the Islamization and
'Somalization' in the Horn of Africa, to Swahilization in East Africa. And
even within this broad regional demarcation, there are peculiar micro-
regional or ethnic representations of the one and universal Islam, patterned
on the historical and cultural contingencies of a given society in time and
space.
The various aspects of the conversion of African peoples to both Islam
and Christianity have received reasonably adequate attention and now long
bibliographies on anthropological, sociological, historical, theological,
psychological, and even psychoanalytical perspectives of conversion are
available. A survey of these studies indicates that the social institutions and
the social structures are crucial to the adoption of Islam by an African
community, though these factors alone do not account for the acceptance of
Islam by one community and its rejection by another. Therefore broad
generalizations cannot fully account for the varied modes of the diffusion of
Islam in Africa and the function of such studies as the extended debate2
between Robin Horton and Humphrey Fisher, as the latter suggests, is "to
propose general principles, leaving it to the regional and other experts to
1 R. L. Bunger, 1975:2.
2 R. Horton, 1971, 1975 and H. Fisher, 1971, 1974, 1985.
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decide whether the principles fit the circumstances of this or that particular
case."3
Lewis observes that once a community has come into contact with
Islam either through trade or migration, the diffusion of Islam or lack of it
will be contingent upon "other attendant variables.., associated with
population pressure...tribal expansion; prevailing patterns of economic
interests and tribal ethos and al"4 Therefore, it is necessary, he
argues, to look at the social-economic changes that affect conversion to
Islam, for Islam provides for both the individual and the group, a form of
identity where social changes are taking place.
Bunger subscribes to the same view in his study of the Pokomo, in
which he identifies three variables in the process of Islamization: the
traditional culture of those who convert to Islam; the culture of the group
who introduce it; and the precise nature of the contact. 5
 Each society is
unique in its contact with Islam and even where the said variables are
similar, differences are not lacking. Therefore, each case merits its own
study and analysis of the function of these variables at the time of its
encounter with Islam, in order to bring out the aspects which shape its
reaction and determine the outcome. For instance, it is within Bunger's
second variable, that is the culture of those who introduce Islam, that we
could locate the cultural traits which the coastal Muslim pioneers brought
with them to Meru in the interior of Kenya, far from the coast.
H. Fisher, 1985:154.
' I. M. Lewis, 1966:33.
R. L. Bunger, 1973:2.
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According to Bergman, the coastal societies function through "a sort
of coastal meta-cosmology" whose "key oppositional dyads. ..are
ustaarab/nyika (Arabness/civilization and town/bush), Muslim/mshenzi
(pagan or savage), waungwana/watumwe (freemen/slaves)". 6 This coastal
meta-cosmology is brought to bear upon the encounter between the Muslim
pioneers and the Meru people. The oppositional dyad, to borrow Bergman's
terminology, of Dini (Islam)/ushenzi (paganism or savagery), becomes the
most functional element not only of the relationship between the various
groups; it is transposed from the coastal cultural milieu and applied in
different circumstances in Meru. An analysis of the process of reproducing
Swahili culture and identity through the enactment of the struggle between
dini and ushe nzi , gives an insight into the formation of the pioneer migrant
Muslim communities and the process through which they forged a common
Muslim community identity; and the trend since the beginning of the 1980s,
of the Tabligh-borne conversion devoid of tangible elements of Swahili
culture, that is now discernible in some rural areas of Meru district.
Differences between the Muslim groups in Meru and the expression
of separate identities is the key question informing my analysis of the
representation of Islam in Meru. In this study which focusses on Islam in
both rural and urban Meru, it is borne in mind that in reality,
there is not one but many communities of Islam... and many who
regard themselves as Muslims are scarcely accepted as such by those
that they take to be their co-religionists.7
The diversity of Islam is given an interesting analysis by Launay in
his study of the Dyula of Cote d'Ivoire, West Africa. It is necessary to state
Launay's thesis here before I proceed to examine the representation of
Islam in Meru.
8 J. Bergman, 1988:3.
I. M. Lewis, 1966:75.
4He starts by identifying the problem of finding
a framework in which to analyze the relationship between this single
global entity, Islam, and the multiple entities that are the religious
beliefs and practices of Muslims in specific communities and
moments in history.8
The notion of Islam, he suggests, is defined not so much by consensus
among those who identify themselves as Muslims, as by cleavages, social
and religious cleavages that mark them off from others. A way around this
problem is to "posit the existence of multiple Islams", which on the other
hand would be theologically untenable. Disagreement between the various
Muslim communities is premised on the existence of single true Islam, but
even then each group holds its own practices to be consistent with the one
true Islam and that of another, if it is different, to be inconsistent. Thus
they define their own reflection of Islam with reference to others. In the
case under study, each of the Muslim groups in Meru defined itself with
reference and in opposition to others: the Swahili in opposition to the
mahaji saw themselves as the standard bearers of the faith, and the town
Muslims felt that they were better than the rural Muslims. Here, Islam is
interpreted within the context of the culture in which it is introduced.
I am arguing that the elements of the coastal Swahili system of
inequality that I have identified as 'fossilized' notions of ushenzi and
dini I ungwana shaped the ideas of Islam that were imported into Meru. At
the coast, these concepts have now changed since the system of social
stratification has also changed. Indeed the use of such terms these days
might provoke violence at the coast, but in Meru people still speak of
ushenzi in everyday contexts. Dini, as I will illustrate in this thesis, is
continually challenged by ushenzi. Ushenzi, which can assume a variety of
forms, is seen as a potentially destructive threat to dini. Ushenzi is fluid
8 R. Launay, 1992:6.
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and difficult to pin down to specific actions: for instance, during the early
period it was seen as an act of ushenzi for a Muslim to be initiated into the
Meru council of elders known as njuri, but nowadays if one was a member
of njuri before conversion to Islam, one can participate in njuri activities as
long as they observe the distinction between halal and haram meats during
the njuri feasts. This is a rationalization which is not supported by any
theological argument and opposition to ushenzi does not change, only the
definition has acquired a certain degree of elasticity that can be altered to
suit the various circumstances.
As will be shown in this thesis, for example in Nchulubi's case,
ushenzi has its own forces but dini has more power to counter it. Islam is
presented as a powerful force and it is to this force that people resort in
search of remedies or protective charms. The decision to consult with a
sheikh does not depend on the individual's understanding of Islam, it is not
seen as a search in the realm of beliefs and practices and that is why I
suggest that it is not 'mixing' on their part.
Defining Conversion
In recent years, Islam in Africa has attracted a great deal of
attention from scholars in a wide variety of disciplines, with the result that
conversion to Islam in the African context has become, to some extent, a
matter of definition. The definition of what actually constitutes conversion
may seem, on the surface, rather more clear-cut than it really is. This point
will be illustrated below when we examine what conversion to Islam means
to an individual Muslim living in rural Meru. Before examining the Meru
case in detail, therefore, it is worth noting certain relevant definitions of
conversion. In his book on the subject, Nock defined conversion as
the reorientation of the soul of an individual, his deliberate turning
from indifference or from an earlier form of piety to another, a
turning which implies a consciousness that a great change is
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involved, that the old was wrong and the new is right. It is seen at
its fullest in the positive response of a man to the choice placed
before him by the prophetic religions.9
To define what he calls adhesion as opposed to conversion, he posits a
situation in which different racial and religious groups, as a result of an
interactive process over a period and in a given area, are exposed to mutual
influence - "blending of strains".' 0 The borrowing of various cultural
elements that results from such a relationship leads to "fusion". He sees
this fusion as not leading
to any definite crossing of religious frontiers, in which an old
spiritual home was left for a new once and for all, but to men's
having one foot on each side of a fence which was cultural and not
creedal. They led to an acceptance of new worships as supplements
and not as substitutes, and they did not involve the taking of a new
way of life in place of the old. This we may call adhesion in
contradistinction to conversion."
Nock's idea of limiting conversion to prophetic religions which
exclusively require total, unqualified commitment by the individual convert,
and adhesion to non-prophetic religions, in which there is less commitment
and hence no "crossing of religious frontiers", lays itself open to criticism.
First, the choice that he posits as openly presented to the potential convert
by the requirements of a prophetic religion may not necessarily be as stark
as Nock maintains. His supposition holds more for Christianity - the
proselytization of Africa by the Christian missionaries, whose religion
demanded a reorientation of the convert's soul and a deliberate, complete
turning, not "from indifference or from an earlier form of piety" 2
 (to
A. D. Nock, 1933:7.
10 Ibid., p.6.
"A. D. Nock, 1933:6-7.
12 Ibid., p.7.
7borrow Nock's terminology) but from an earlier condition of 'paganism',
'heathenism' and 'sin', to a new salvation through Christ - than it does for
Islam in Africa. This is not to say that Islam demanded of its converts less
commitment than did Christianity; the point is, while the Christian
missionaries sought to secure "sufficient control over the minds" of the
native through the boarding school system in Meru,' 3 the Muslims were
more inclined to be satisfied with the individual convert's acceptance of
Islam as sufficient to effect change from a condition of ushenzi to dinL14
The second dimension to the definitional complexity arises from the
summary dismissal of other religions as non-prophetic. Nock's dichotomy
between prophetic and non-prophetic religions, and the different patterns
of response that he attributes to each of them, are not borne out by the
facts of the spread of Islam in East Africa and many other places.' 5
 The
acclaimed 'domestication' and accommodation of Islam in Africa (though the
use of these concepts has its own problem, as will be explained later) seems
to me to be an endorsement of Nock's idea of "new worships as useful
supplements", even in such a prophetic religion as Islam. His dichotomy
nms into difficulties when it is applied to the cases of converts who, as we
shall see in Meru for instance, have adopted Islam, and yet have not made
any definite changes in their life. This point will be explored further to
determine whether this dichotomy holds for the process of religious change
that takes place in Meru; but before that, it is useful to present two other
types of conversion.
13 The use of boarding school system as a vehicle for evangelization in Meru is
alluded to in chapter 2, p.116.
' This can be supported by Sheikh Ahmed's reference to the category of
Muslims that he termed Inshallah, he hoped that their children in future would
be better Muslims. See chapter 6, p.275.
15 Levtzion (1979:19) too, observes that the of expansion of Islam in West
Africa is largely through the process that Nock defines as adhesion.
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Levtzion distinguishes between "communal" and "individual"
conversion. In communal or group conversion,
Islam was adopted by ethnic groups in their own milieu, while
maintaining their own cultural identity. There was hardly a break
with the past traditions and pre-Islamic customs and beliefs
survived. In this process more people came under the influence of
Islam, but they took longer to cover the distance from the former
religion to Islam, viewed as a continuum from nominal acceptance of
Islam to greater conformity and commitment.'6
While in the process of individual conversion,
every convert had the personal experience of breaking off from his
own society against social and moral pressures. Along this pattern,
conversion was a rather slow process, involving individuals and small
groups. 17
Levtzion attributes the difference between the spread of Islam in
West and East Africa to the distinction between these two forms of
conversion. In West Africa, to which he ascribes the communal form, groups
maintained their previous cultural identity. In East Africa "where Islam
implied swahilization", converts "not only accepted a new religion, but also
a new cultural and ethnic identity", as they "left their own tribes and joined
the only known Muslim community, that of the Swahili".'8
 He suggests
that the two patterns of conversion correspond to Nock's adhesion and
conversion.
In this parallel between East and West Africa, Levtzion's implication
that Swahili is an ethnic identity, and therefore those who become Muslim




acquire a new ethnic identity, calls for a rejoinder. Swahilization in East
Africa is a complex phenomenon. Even on the coast where it is believed that
the Swahili proper are found, many of the groups that are labeled 'Swahili'
by others do not call themselves Swahili. They identifr themselves by their
own 'tribal' or town names, and not by the "generic term 'Swahili" which,
according to Salim, has been imposed on them first by Arabs and later
European colonialists; an identity which some of them have accepted in
addition to their own 'tribal' names but not in place of them. 19 Salim states
categorically that "Swahili... is not a tribe but a generic or umbrella term
covering a wide spectrum of identifiable groups that are not linked by any
common descent or lineage..
It is true to say that Islamization implied Swahilization (until very
recently as we will see in Meru), but in view of the varying definitions of
the Swahili, and the diversity of groups included, Levtzion's claim that
Swahilization in East Africa conferred upon the Muslim converts a new
ethnic identity is only partly true. On the one hand, the available data on
the process of Swahilization of various peoples, support this claim, for
instance those Wanyamwezi, Manyema and others that I will refer to in
this study as constituting the Swahili had been Swahilized and Islamized
and as Hobley notes, "had lost all connection with their particular tribe".2'
On the other hand, not all Muslim converts acquired a new ethnic identity
after conversion, for instance the converts in Meru were labelled 'Swahili'
by their non-Muslim relatives and 'mahaji' by the Swahili. But they
themselves were well aware of the fact that they could not be Swahili, they
were Meru converts to Islam and we can even say that the term mahaji was
ascribed to this group since they had actually been converted. Indeed they
resented the appellation Swahili, perhaps due to pejorative connotations
19 A. I. Salim, 1985:216.
20 Ibid., p.216.
21 C. Hobley, 1928:187.
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that I discuss in the thesis.22 Though they emerged as a group of converts
in Majengo and tried to emulate the Swahili in their cultural practices, they
cannot be said to have changed their ethnic idenfity.
Also it is only partly true that converts 'qeft their own tribes and
joined" a Muslim community, as Levtzion supposes. Some left their villages
and joined the Majengo Muslim communities founded in many towns in
Kenya, and the prevalence of Majengo areas in towns today is a testimony
to this process. But there were other Muslim converts in many places who
did not assume the form of a cohesive group and remained within the local
social network. Becoming Muslim and acquiring some external trappingcof
the Swahili culture, did not (and still does not) confer on such people a new
ethnic identity. For example, during the fieldwork, I asked a number of
Muslims whether they see themselves as Swahili since they were Muslim
and almost all of them objected to the appellation. Some explained that the
term 'Swahili' (Athoiri in Kimeru) was used derogatorily by others to refer
to Muslims in the area.
22 For the discussion on the pejorative connotations of being a Swahili in Meru,
see chapter 2, p.103 and 6, p.291.
Perhaps it is necessary to say what I mean by 'ethnic' and what I .take to
be the difference between the two terms. The term 'ethnic' has the connotation of
a people that is linked by a shared national racial or tribal bond, and in this
particular case, I agree with Salim that 'Swahili'is not a tribe but a generic term
used for a variety of groups of people who have accepted Islam. And culture is
shared by members of an ethnic group, it is what makes then an ethnic group.
Thus in a sense, an ethnic group is a cultural group, though a cultural group is
not necessarily an ethnic group. For instance members of the 'Pagan Cult' in
Britain could be defined as a cultural but not an ethnic group. From this
perspective, I would suggest, it is erroneous to define the Muslims in the war-torn
former Yugoslavia of the 1990s as an ethnic identity. They were either Serbs or
Croats before they became Muslim. But for them 'Muslim' has come to denote an
ethnic group. This may be a far-fetched example, but what I mean to illustrate is
that the two are in a sense one and the same thing, and yet different in another.
For an application of Weber's distinction between ethnic group and community
for an analysis of the Swahili of Mombasa, see M. J. Swartz, 1979:29-30 (citing M.
Weber 1961:306).
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Others pointed out what they saw as a contradiction in terms - that
a Meru Muslim who has no connection with the coast whatsoever, and in
certain cases (which are now on the increase) one who cannot even speak
Kiswahili, should be labelled 'Swahili'. The cases of the two women converts
and fervent Muslims - Nchulubi and Rabiya - do not show any signs of
ethnic or cultural changes. Theirs and other similar cases discussed in the
thesis, support Salim's claim that the term is usually imposed by outsiders
on people who identifSr themselves otherwise. The fluidity of the concept of
Swahilization supports the assertion that Swahili cannot be regarded as an
ethnic identity. There are examples of converts who left their own people
to join the Swahili-Muslim community and hence acquired a new ethnic
identity, and also there are counter examples of where the acquisition of
elements of Swahili culture through conversion did not result in a change
in ethnic identity.
From a different perspective, Peel in his comparative study of the
Ijebu of Nigeria and the Baganda of Uganda, defines conversion as:
The process by which the primary religious identification of people
changes. Despite some dramatic moments this process is drawn out
over several decades; and in its later stages it is as much concerned
with the "domestication" of the world religion and with the formation
of indigenous traditions of Islam and Christianity as it is with the
"conquest" of the local society by the world religions.24
The nature and implications of this process of identification, that is
whether or not people are called Muslims, are illustrated by the rural case
studies that I have presented in this thesis. The conflict between Muslim
and other identities is seen in the attempt by some of the women to conceal
their Muslim identity when it is necessary to do so. A good number of new
converts in the rural areas in Meru, particularly women, prefer to conceal
24 J D. Y. Peel, 1977:108.
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their Muslim identity because such an identity in an area where Muslims
constitute a small insignificant minority, is most likely detrimental to their
social status. That Muslims in Meru are seen as 'Swahili' in the eyes and
estimation of others is one thing, but it is quite a different matter whether
or not they see themselves as such. That the two levels of recognition are
quite different and bear different consequences, cannot be over-stressed.
Until recently, many western scholars attributed an undue virility to
Islam in the process of its spread in Africa. To cite but a few examples, von
Grunebaum's title to his essay -'Islam: its Inherent power of Expansion and
adaptation', bespeaks of the momentum attributed to Islam. In this work,
von Grunebaum suggested that it was the universality of Islam which, on
the one hand,
facilitated the integration into the community of as yet alien
communities by allowing them to carry over into their existence as
Muslims much of their traditional way of life; on the other hand, it
provided the community with a norm that was all the more readily
acceptable because to a large extent there was no insistence on full
compliance.26
In this passage, Islam is presented as if it were in control of the contact
situation in each case, there with open arms to receive alien communities,
and allow them to come 'as they were' by making least demands on them,
so to say.
I have shown in chapter 6 (pp.293-294) how some local women hide their
'religious clothes' in their bags when going to the Markaz for Friday prayers, for
fear of being recognized by other people as Muslims, until they approach the
mosque. Muslims have a low esteem in this area and therefore some of them,
particularly men, perform magic for gullible people, which lends credibility to their
social status. For instance certain Muslim individuals are known for their skill in
'reading for' their clients - the most sought after service is 'reading for' property
to keep off' potential thieves or vandals, since many local people believe in the
efficacy of the protective 'reading' by Muslims.
26 G. E. von Grunebaum, 1964:13.
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It is this capacity (to receive new adherents as they are) which, according
to Alpers)becanhe an important factor in the expansion of Islam in East and
Central Africa.27
Lewis too, subscribes to this idea of Islam's adsorptiveness by
suggesting that "as long as traditional beliefs can be adjusted in such a way
that they fall within a Muslim schema", Islam does not require its new
adherents to abandon all their former practices. From yet a different
perspective, Oliver reinforces the idea of the strength of Islam vis-a-vis the
African traditions by suggesting that:
both Christianity and Islam found a point d'appui in the notion of
Supreme Being, which lay in the dim background of most of the
tribal religions of East Africa. But it is more probable that had the
element of monotheism been in fact a considerable one, African
beliefs would have offered a stouter resistance than they did.29
According to him, the over-riding importance attached to the ancestral cults
and reverence for the traditional practices, weakened the notion of
monotheism among traditional African societies.
But recently, voices disclaiming this attitude began to be heard: both
Peel and Sanneh speak of 'domestication' but Sanneh gives a different
perspective on the relationship between Islam and African traditional
practices. He points to a "fundamental incongruity" in that Islam, on the
one hand, is inflexible and on the other, it is open and lacks a controversial
attitude to religious options. He goes on to argue "that traditional Africa
sustained Muslim impact by investing the new religion with its own
27 E. A. Alpers, 1972:173.
I. M. Lewis, 1966:60.
29 R. Oliver, 1965:204.
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identity, not by yielding to it". 3° He sees the Islamic influence in a
traditional African setting, where it is naturally in a minority status, as
being mitigated by the local customs: the local converts observe the exterior
elements but remain indifferent to the inflexible Muslim law and theological
issues. Thus, he concludes, it is the African tradition, rather than Islam,
which is 'flexible'.
Attributing to Islam that great flexibility which has been associated
with it, denies the African traditional communities a "crucial element of
their heritage".3 ' Sanneh concludes that Islam does not have the force that
the reformers and the Western scholars have claimed for it. He is making
a strong case for the potential of the African traditional religions and
practices. He refutes claims for Islam's flexibility, religious appeal, and
potential to accommodate itself, and the weakness of the African traditional
religions when confronted by a 'monotheistic' powerful Islam as presented
by Grunebaum and Oliver, for instance.
THE FIELDWORK
A single approach, whether historical, sociological or
phenomenological, would not be adequate to provide an in-depth study of
Islam among the Meru because of the variety of aspects being examined.
Therefore an interdisciplinary approach has been employed that uses the
methods of the sociologist and historian: interviews, participant observation,
an examination of oral traditions and a study of historical documents.
Initially, I approached the Meru's most prominent Muslim leader who
helped to organize interview sessions with the leading individuals and
founding pioneers in Meru town. The only problem with this was that after
30 L. Sanneh, 1980:2.
31 Ibid., p.6.
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three months, I noticed that some people were unwilling to be interviewed
or even bluntly refused to see me. When I probed further, I learnt that since
I had been introduced at the Friday mosque by this leader, it was assumed
by his political opponents that I was in his political camp, and as a result
they would not see me. However, as I came to know more people during a
period of eight months of initial fieldwork, it became clear to all that
research was my sole purpose and gradually I was accepted and became
more welcome in their homes. Outside the town where Muslims are few and
far between, the mosque was the meeting point, though I visited many at
their homes.
Some criteria must be used in determining the sort of people to be
interviewed, so Muslim leaders, men and women, the sheikbs and imams,
and some of the prominent Muslims in the district were sampled on the
basis of their roles and activities within the Muslim communities. It was
not difficult to identify potential informants in a community where everyone
is known to everyone else and certain individuals are known for their
knowledge of specific issues. Also the oldest members of the community are
well known to virtually all the residents of a given locality;- therefore, after
giving the reasons for my visit to someone, I was directed to a potential
informant who was either a founding pioneer, a 'learned' sheikh, an anti-
maulid activist or even a politician. Soon I had a long list of potential
informants.
Old Muslims, men and women, were sampled on the basis of their
knowledge of the history of the Meru Muslim communities and also their
role in the establishment of these communities. In this category are some
of the surviving Muslim pioneers or their descendants who could trace their
family histories and then explain the circumstances which led to their
migration and eventual settlement in Meru, or their absorption into the
Muslim communities as the case may be. Key persons such as the
madarasa teachers and madarasa committee members constituted another
16
category of informants. Also certain individuals, both Muslim and
non-Muslim, are reputed for their knowledge of events and general
awareness. Some of whom were retired civil servants and occasionally kept
diaries or a few other records, either personal or official, which were
sometimes useful to the study.
After identifying a potential informant, I would visit her/him either
at home, or at their place of work or at the mosque. Places of work varied
from the government office, the shop, to the farm. On one occasion, I
conducted a three-hour interview with a prominent Muslim in a stone
quarry, where he was supervising the chipping of stones for the
construction of the local tea factory, for which he was the chairman. On
another, I interviewed a local sheikh while he worked in his coffee field. The
significance of such interviews lies in the fact that the interviewees did not
feel that I was taking too much of their time, and therefore they were quite
relaxed and divulged much information in long informal conversations. In
this way, I got more information than I did in formal interviews, where the
respondents might choose the questions that they would like to answer and
the way to answer them.
Group interviews were conducted whenever it was possible-, for
instance, I went to several Baraza, a meeting place where the men often sit
and chat. Here (though it was difficult for me being a woman to sit together
with men) I managed to interview two or three men together and
occasionally they disagreed on certain points, which for me turned out to
be importantin that the difference in opinion reflected various dimensions
or interpretations of a particular issue. However, this was not always the
case: one day, I visited the homestead of the first man in Igembe to work
for Edward Butler Home, the colonial administrator who conquered the
Meru and brought them under colonial rule. I went to the house of the
second son and sat down for a cup of tea before the interview, but soon
news reached two neighbouring homes and his two brothers, accompanied
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by another Muslim pioneer, arrived within a half an hour of my arrival. My
intention was to interview Saleh, one of the three sons, so I started the
interview and the conversation flowed smoothly for about ten minutes, then
Said, the oldest of the three brothers, interjected pointing out that his
brother was quite young when the particular incident that we were
discussing happened, therefore, he (Saleh) did not remember all the details,
and in his brother's opinion, his answer missed out some important details.
Soon, they engaged in a heated debate, first about the ability to remember
things at a certain age; and also the details of the incident in question.
Then it was suggested that the oldest brother should, according to the local
custom, be allowed to speak first while others listen. But the youngest
objected, arguing that since he was a 'learned' Sheikh and hence the most
knowledgeable of all of us in the group, he should be the one to speak, not
only from his own experience, but also on behalf of his brothers, in spite of
the fact that they were older than him. When I intimated my wish to cancel
the interview, consensus prevailed that I continue to talk to Saleh, but
arrange a separate interview for each of the other three. At that, they left
us.
I conducted interviews with the help of a questionnaire which was
only followed as a guide in order to avoid extending the discussion further
than was useful for the study. The questions were open-ended in order to
give the respondents a chance to explain their answers in an informal
conversation. In this way it would be possible for me to sift through, and,
like a gold-digger, pickthe salient points of the conversation which are
relevant to the study. Because of its flexibility, the interview allows room
to deviate from the set pattern of questions, and if need be to probe further
into areas which might be vague or relevant to the study. This method also
allows immediate cross-checking of information. Thus the interview method
has its own advantages, the researcher becomes familiar with the research
setting, the memory of the interviews and observations, for instance, during
the quarry and the coffee field interviews which I have mentioned above,
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the discussions that were going on among the workers gave valuable insight
into the concerns of the local Muslims: one man said that his wife had
joined a local women's self-help group and he did not like it because its
members were not Muslims. He went on to explain what, in his opinion,
was the best way to relate with non-Muslims. If I had approached this man
and asked him what he thought about the relationship with non-Muslims,
he might have responded in a different way; during this time, he was
talking to his friends, giving them his honest opinion.
In my attempt to understand the various aspects of Islam in this
area, I visited homes of Muslims in the town, the rural trade centres, and
other rural areas. I attended such ceremonies as Arubaini, the feast held
forty days after the death of an individual, women's group meetings, and
other events organized by or for Muslims. For instance, one day I attended
a fund-raising event organized by a local prominent Muslim leader to raise
money for the Muslim youth football club to buy balls and other equipment.
His wife prepared ufi, porridge and other foodstuffs which were sold to
those present. Since I was also participating, I bought two hundred shillings
worth of food for the elderly women, a gesture which was highly appreciated
in the Kenyan spirit of Harambee. 82 Though this was an impromptu
meeting, they managed to raise one thousand and five hundred shillings.
During my visits to different homes, I noticed that in some of them
there is plenty of Swahili Islamic paraphernaliawhereas in others there is
hardly any tangible Islamic evidence. This variation in the diffusion of
Swahili culture in the region reflects, as I will illustrate in this thesis, the
disparity of Islamic appropriation.
32 Harambee is the political philosophy which has seen Kenya through much
of its development. It means "pull together" in order to lift something up. It was
introduced by the late president Mzee Jomo Kenyatta soon after independence.
Harambee is conducted whenever and wherever money is needed, be it for an
individual's hospital bill, for an individual's education abroad, or for the
construction of public health centre or a school, people always contribute willingly.
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I also attended different mosques on several occasions during which
I observed some important aspects: for instance, I found that it was only in
one mosque that the Friday Khutba, or sermon was read in Arabic and
Swahili by the Imam, and then translated into the local language by one of
the youths who, during his long stay in Mombasa, had converted to Islam
and learnt to read the Qur'an in Arabic.
The interview method was the main method used to obtain the data.
Some relevant data was also found in the historical documents of the
colonial administrators who wrote copiously to their superiors about
matters of day to day administration. The bulk of these are contained in the
District Annual Reports, Handing-Over Reports, Political Recordbooks and
District Files with official correspondence. which are well preserved in the
Kenya National Archives (K.N.A.). While these documents do not deal with
Islam, they contain general information about the 'natives', and are useful
in fixing precise dates and details of some of the events which affected the
Muslims in one way or another, a good example being the details about the
demolition of the old Muslim village, found in the district Annual Reports,
and other files containing documents on issues related to the municipal
administration.
Another important source is the writings of the early missionaries,
and administrators who tried to describe the traditional social structures
which they encountered. One good example is the writings of District
Commissioner, H.E. Lambert who wrote extensively about the Meru country
and its people. His papers cover many aspects of Meru culture and history
and are deposited in the University of Nairobi Jomo Kenyatta Memorial
Library Archives. Loughton, a methodist missionary who worked at Kaaga,
the first Methodist station in the area, also wrote about the Meru culture
before the colonial intrusion. But these documents have to be studied with
caution because many of the pioneer Europeans did not take time to
understand the significance of the concepts behind beliefs and practices of
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the African peoples and consequently they either misrepresented them in
their writings or condemned them wholesale as evil and barbaric. In
addition, several sources in the London Public Records Office provided some
valuable information.
Use of non-English Terms
The interviews were conducted in Kiswa}iili and Kimeru and
whenever references to the Quran were made, they were in Arabic. I have
translated the interview texts into English and where necessary I have
retained Kiswahili or Kimeru words and phrases either when the suggested
English equivalents are inadequate or do not reflect the concepts embodied
in the particular terms. Whenever Swahili words are used, the meaning is
given according to the Standard Swahili-English Dictionary, and more
importantly, the context in which they are used. This is important because,
as I shall illustrate in the thesis, many of them have acquired contextual
meanings which may be quite different from their original dictionary
definitions.
When discussing case studies and interviews, I write Arabic names
of people as they are pronounced, that is the local version of the Arabic
names. For the definition of Arabic words and concepts to which reference
is made in the thesis, I have used the Encyclopedia of Islam. No attempt
has been made to replace such commonly used Arabic words as Hajji, or
Khutba with English equivalents, though their meanings are given
alongside. For references to the Qur'an, I have used Yusuf Au's The Holy
Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary. Finally, names of places that
have been mentioned in the thesis are shown in the maps.
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THE MERU PEOPLE
The term Meru (pronounced as miiru) generally refers to both the
Kimeru-speaking33 people, and the administrative unit or district which
they occupy and the major town which serves as the district headquarters.
However, the people prefer to call themselves Ameru. Meru district is
located in the area adjoining the eastern slopes of Mt. Kenya, on the
highlands east of the Rift Valley, some 250 kilometres north-east of Nairobi.
The Meru ethnic group comprises the following congeries: Igembe, Tigania,
Imenti, Igoji, Mwimbi, Muthambi, Tharaka and Chuka. All together they
number about 1.3 million. 34
 The mutually intelligible dialects of Kimeru,
the language spoken by the Meru peoples, correspond to these sub-groups.
The relations between the various sub-groups were governed by ichiaro,
loosely translated as blood brotherhood or ritual alliance.35
 Recently, in
1992, the district was divided into two districts and one sub-district:
Tharaka-Nithi, Meru and Nyambene district, but it is clear that Meru Town
will continue to serve as an important centre for trade and communication
networks with other districts to the drier northern parts of the Eastern
Province.
In Kiswahili and many other languages in the widely popularized Bantu
linguistic classification, KI- is prefixed to differentiate a language from its
speakers, for emple, Ki-Swahili for the Swahili language. The same applies to
the use of Kimeru and Ki-Nubi in the thesis.
Economic Survey 1991, Ministry of Planning and National Development,
Narobi, May 1991.
J. A. Fadiman, 1976:16-18.
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Cosmology and World View
Before the advent of both Islam and Christianity, the Meru had a
well developed concept of God, Murungu, whose abode was atop the highest
peak of Kirimara or Mount Kenya and Njaambene, the ridge of mountains
lying between Tigarna and Igembe. Kirimara means "the one with patches",
in this case white patches of snow. The mountain is a spectacle to behold
in the early morning of a bright day when the clouds uncover the peaks.
The European explorers and 'discoverers' of the African mountains and
rivers, were also fascinated by the snow-capped tropical mountain situated
on the Equator, when they "discovered" it in 1849. The Meru invoked the
Ngai e-Kirimara, that is the God of Kirimara and Ngai e-Njaambene or the
God of Njaambene. Baikiao describes in detail the religious symbolism of
both mountains to the Meru people.36
Njaambene which is almost at the centre of Meru country is a very
significant sacred place for it is there that the offering of the most
important sacrifices for a section or the whole of Meru takes place.
Njaamba means male, strong and masculine. Baikiao argues that the name
of the mountain means the male, the strong one. He extends the symbolism
further by quoting a Meru prophet who told him that "Njaambene is the
male organ on earth".37 However, the point here is not to question the
historical validity of this assertion, but to illustrate the special religious
significance of Njaambene to the Meru people. There are a host of other
sacred places and things: rivers, swamps, animals, plants, colours; and
numerous auspicious occasions.
36 J• M. Baikiao, 1977:130-132.
J. M. Baikiao, 1977:133.
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The ancestors are also central to the Meru practices. The spirits of
the ancestors maintain contact with the living and their presence continues
to be experienced as they safeguard the Meru customs. By violating the
customs, one automatically renders oneself ritually impure, muiro, a
condition which causes calamity to the victim and those related to her or
him, if the prescribed purification procedure is not adhered to.
The most important religious and public office was that of
Muwe(gwe). He was revered and consulted by the people when the need
arose. According to Baikiao, "the greatest degree of priestly powers was in
the Mugwe"38 who came from designated clans which were historically
connected with the myth of origin, the migration and settlement of the
Meru in their present country.39 It is difficult now to get authentic
information about the office of Muwe because the myth and secrecy that
surround itae compounded by the fact that the office is now extinct. The
early European missionaries like Bernardi, who wrote about the Muwe,
erroneously assumed that he was a prophet and, accordingly, titled his
study of this great religious office The Mugwe: A Failing Prophet.4°
Prophets were in a category of their own. They spoke to God and their main
duty was to predict the future and warn the people of the impending
danger: for example, the advent of the Europeans had been foretold several
38 J. M. Baikiao, 1977:158.
Previous studies on the myths of origin of the Meru say that they migrated
from Mbwa, an Island off the East African coast and arrived in their present
country in the 1730s (J.Fadiman, 1976a:139:168). also see E.B.Horne (1918) in
Meru Political Recordbook, K.N.A. DCIMRU/IJ1. But A. M. M'Imanyara (1992:1-
76) has restated the theory of origin and migration of the Meru, tracing the
history of the Meru to North-East Africa along the Nile valley, from where, he
argues, they moved towards their present country in 1400. he has assembled and
analyzed new evidence to show that the popularized Mbwa tradition does not refer
to an Island off the East African coast, but to the conquest of the Meroe Kingdom
by Axum in Al) 350 and captivity of its inhabitants by Red People, nicknamed
Nguu Ntune by the ancestors of the Meru.
40 B. Bernardi, 1959.
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generations before. The prophets predicted total destruction by the invaders
and explained that their power would be irresistible. The effect of this
prophecy will be illustrated later in the discussion about the arrival of
Edward Butler Home, the British administrator who conquered the Meru.
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS
Chapter one describes the opening of Meru as an administrative
station and the establishment of the pioneer Muslim communities. The
foundations of Islam in Meru are discussed here in a historical perspective.
In chapter 2, the concepts of ungwana and ushenzi are traced to the
coast and the representation of Islam in Meru is discussed in the light of
the struggle between dini and ushenzi. In addition, some elements of the
Meru culture are explained and the last part of the chapter shows how the
initial response of the Meru people to Islam was shaped by these, and
examines the role of other extraneous factors such as the government
attitude in which Christian missionaries found support and the Muslims
disfavour.
Chapter 3 explores the emerging urban Muslim community identity
in the face of the social changes, resulting from the nationalist struggle, and
the impact of the newly achieved independence on the Muslims in Meru.
Here the re-definition of the old concept of birth in the faith and the new
meaning with which it is charged in order to forge Muslim unity in the face
of an external threat, is analyzed. The dissolving of the hitherto clear social
boundaries is related to re-definition of the Muslim community in relation
and opposition to others.
Chapter 4 discusses attempts to penetrate this emerging Muslim
community by the cult of Sheikh Hussein of Bale. Due to the notion of birth
in dini, it fails to entrench itself in the urban Muslim community, but
25
succeeds, albeit briefly in the rural areas of Igembe where Muslims are few
and far between, without the social and religious network that is the
foundation of the urban Majengo Muslim community.
Chapter 5 examines the social-religious network that makes Majengo
a cultural Island, underpinned by the 'fossilized' Swahili notions of dini and
civility. The spatial significance of Majengo in facilitating community
construction, enhancing the process of Swahilization and thus Islamization,
is analyzed.
Chapter 6 completes the picture of Islam in Meru by examining,
through the various case studies, the perception and practice of Islam
outside the enclaves of Majengo and Mimi in Meru town. The practices of
the rural Muslims are examined in the context of the local culture and the
conflicting identities (Muslim and other) are highlighted. The role of
Tabligh and the recent spread of Islam are explored, focussing on the type
of Islam that is represented in these areas.
In chapter 7, conversion to Islam is placed within a theoretical
perspective. The local representation of Islam is analyzed in the light of the
debate between Humphrey Fisher and Horton, with a view to testing the
applicability of the three-stage theory of conversion th the case of Meru.
	3 1 0E	 4'O°E
/SUDAN •.'











V	 I 'I-'	 I
•'	 i	 1	 1	 WAJIRI ••





•L,r....	 I	 \.., % SAMBURU
'/	 ISIO LO
-	 1MARKW(T	 /.1UNGOA'1 , ( BARIN q0 /	 -
U$IA	 ' •-Z. UASIN I'rSISHU	 /....(KAKAUEGA '	 LAIKIPIA	 N r 0•r3'1 ,,	 _•-	 IN'rANDARUAj	 ••••	 I	NAKURU	 'NYERIU	
_.	 KRICHO "
	 %	 KIRINYASA	 GARISSASOUTH	 ,_-V' '	 '	 CNCUI	
•\WNYANZA '	 ict	 I
'13	 r-. KIAM!U	 1	 •\.
I.	 / I. 
• '-j'	 •'NAROK	 /	 KITUI	 !
1	
(	 POBl	 c












____	 /LEGEND	 4	 ?	 --
____	 KILIFI	
0 C E A NI
____	 TAITA	 I__ _	 The Sludy Area
tInternational Boundary 	




District Boundary	 s.,	 KWALE	 0 40 BO 120 MS
	
N	 L..L—' tII











































/1,	 If I	 I-)
1!	 -.	 .—I.













fi I-I t\II	 ••)3b )(	 " •(	 )•	 •	 im





	 -	 A	 •	 '
-I•	 -	 r'	
_) •\ E_j z j • /• C%i	 ."••








'	 0	 -. /
••- L1.5•i	 ---'	 ..	 '•-	 .—•g- -
,	 -I	 oo	 •	 /•
•	 '•	
• I'(--S




























FOUNDATIONS OF MUSLIM PRESENCE IN MERU
The Opening up of the Bom&
Diffusion of Islam was the unintended result of the establishment of
colonial administrative stations inland. In the African quarters of these
stations developed the settlements which came to be known as Majengo.2
These Majengo, now found in almost every town in Kenya, formed the
nucleus of the African Muslim communities, as we shall demonstrate with
reference to Meru. The first station to be opened in what was then Kenya
province was Fort Hall, now Murang'a,3 which was occupied in 1900. In
1906, an expedition was sent to Embu and after the ensuing encounter, the
Embu resistance was broken and a station was opened. To control the
communities still further to the north on the eastern slopes of Mount
Kenya, Edward Butler Home, then Acting District Commissioner, moved
towards Meru in 1908. The psychological weight of the prophecies 4 which
1 The Standard Swahili-English Dictionary defines Boma as "any kind
of raised structure for defensive purposes". Boma also means a homestead,
but in the context of the administrative centres that were opened inland, it
means station.
2 Majengo means buildings, but most of the African quarters in many
Kenyan towns, initially occupied by Muslims are now known as Majengo.
The Majengo social network will be discussed in chapter 5, pp. 206-2 12.
G. St. J. Orde-Brown, 1925:33.
4 Oral accounts say that the coming of the Europeans to Meru had been
predicted beforehand. My informants said that the Meru prophets predicted
total destruction by the invaders and explained that it was not possible for
the Meru people to forestall the impending calamity. However, it was
against the Meru warriorhood to submit to an enemy, so when the
Europeans arrived, a conflict arose between the elders and the warriors.
The latter were thoroughly enraged by the prophecies which they considered
to be defeatist, but the elders maintained supremacy over the "hot-blooded"
youths and their wisdom revealed the futility of mass action. According to
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had predicted the coming of the white man, were apparently now being
fulfilled, and the defeat of the Embu in the previous year, convinced the
Mwimbi (one of the 9 sections that comprise the Meru ethnic group) of the
futility of resistance.
In May 1908, Home arrived with two officers and a company of 3
King's African Rifles and camped at Mwitari's. 5 On 4th June, Home and
the K.A.R. made their permanent camp, that came to be known as Boma at
the edge of the surrounding forest. Part of the ridge was covered by a forest,
which was believed to be inhabited by spirits and so he was allowed to
camp there by the Meru elders in the hope that he would be dealt with by
both the spirits and the fierce Maasai who raided the area occasionally.6
It was also hoped that the white man would soon leave the area since it had
not dawned on the Meru that Home's mission and settlement were of a
more permanent nature than the 'passing visitor' that they imagined he
was.7
the prevailing social order the supreme council of elders, njuri , had the final
word on matters of national importance, therefore, they prevailed on the
"hot-blooded" warriors and ruled out an outright war. For more information
on the Meru encounter with the European colonialists, see J. A. Fadiman
(1979:12-34). W. A Chariler (1896:242-261) describes the Meru social
political structure prior to the conquest and introduction of Western
influence.
See Political Record Book 1908 and District Annual Report 1908,
K.N.A. DCIMRU/1J1.
A. J. Fadiman, 1979:37.
to D.0 Meru 14/111929 in K.N.A. DCIMRU/4/2. Home's camp
was called Mutindwa jwa Kangangi by the local people. Kangangi, the
wanderer, was the name given to Home by the Meru people and the one by
which he was known throughout the district.
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Home established his headquarters at a place which he considered
strategic for his administrative purposes. The station buildings were erected
by local labour under the supervision of the district commissioner (D.C.).
and by 1912, it was reported that:
They consist of the District Commissioner's house, (a new two storied
log building erected during the past year), two Assistant District
Commissioners' houses, two clerks' houses, Sub-Assistant Surgeon's
house, dispensary, six hospital huts, two offices, goal, store, police
lines, guard room, goal warder's lines, Tribal Retainers' lines, porters'
lines and houses of office staff.8
It is here in the boma, and by the occupants of these quarters, that
the first seeds of Muslim presence in Meru were sown. This will be
illustrated by the gradual transformation of the porters' lines into what
came to be known as the "Swabili village" in the district annual reports. No
sooner was the construction completed than Home began to make his
presence felt, by ruthlessly crushing any resistance to his imposed
authority, though the inhabitants of Tharaka and Tigania areas of the
district continued to cause "a great deal of trouble."9
In order for Home and his administration to establish firm control
over the rather large Meru administrative unit, it became necessary for a
second station to be opened at Maua in Igembe in the northern part of the
district. By the proclamation of 13th March 1911, the boundaries of the
township were defined under the "East African Outlying Districts
Ordinance" of 1902 and the Governor excluded the township of Meru from
8 Annual Report On Meru District for the Year 1912, K.N.A.
DCIMRU/1i1, p.26.
Home ordered a half A Company of his accompanying K.A.R. to carry
out punitive measures to subjugate Tigania and Tharaka, both of whom
presented organized military resistance to him, H.C. Moyse-Bartlett
1956:204-29.
29
"the Native Reserve"0. After it was declared a trade centre, Meru
township was enlarged, more land was obtained by paying compensation to
the people living in the immediate vicinity. When Meru was gazetted as a
township in May of the same year (1911), it comprised an area of "a radius
of one mile from the government flag-staff' and the township rules were
thereafter applied to this area - about four hundred acres. 1 ' In 1914, the
township was surveyed with the object of canceling the original gazette
notice. Again, it was deemed necessary to acquire more land and the
neighbouring Meru people were compensated and promised that no more
land would be taken from them in future.'2
At the same time, an area to the west of the station was reserved for
the European location; and provision made for the African general produce
market, butter market and cattle market. This arrangement was considered
satisfactory except for the "proximity of native markets to the D.C's
house."3
 The gates of the boma were kept by twenty to thirty warriors,
whose duty was to ensure that unauthorized persons were kept out of the
station. At the same time, they served as messengers and letter carriers,
the latter being an essential service in the absence of the postal system in
the district. Indeed it was not until 19 16/17 that the Telegraph finally
passed through Meru, from western Kenya to Northern Frontier District via
Archer's Post.
10 Provincial Commissioner Nyeri to D.0 Meru, 9/6/1948 in K.N.A. DC/
MRU/2/9/2
' 1912-13 Annual Report, K.N.A. DCIMRU/Ii1.
'2 E B. Home to D.0 14/111929, DCJMRU/4/2.
13 Annual Report, 1912/1913, DCIMRU/1J1.
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The Governor's decision to exclude the township of Meru from "the
Native Reserve", that is the rest of the district, and the application of the
township rules, restricted the movement of people in and out of the station,
and thus facilitated the creation of enclaves in the station.
From 'Porters' Lines" to "Swahili Village"
Besides the KA.R. company, Home was accompanied by a host of
colonial servants: police, clerical officers, and others, all of whom were
settled in the boma, to perform various tasks for the realization of the
conquest of the people of Meru and the establishment of British rule on the
Eastern slopes of Mt. Kenya and beyond. Of these, the porters played a key
role in providing the much needed transport for the administration.' 4 In
this section, I shall show how the "porters lines", in the boma layout
described above, metamorphosed into the "Swahili village".
Within less than a year of opening up the station, even before its
boundaries were defined, a number of traders' 5 flocked in and set
14 Porterage had become "a very lucrative profession before the advent
of the rail for it was the only viable means of transport" (Y. A. Nzibo
1986:23). W. A. Chanler (1896:5) also observes that "the use of Wapagazi,
porters had been of prime importance in the opening up of East Africa".
Further information about this class of people, whose place in the history
of East Africa has been relegated to that of the unsung heroes, in spite of
the ordeals through which they went on those long and treacherous
journeys, bearing on their shoulders both the loads and the famous
'discoverers' of the African mountains and rivers, is provided by C. Hobley,
1928:187.
' Osman Yakub, for example, claims to "have been trading at Meru
since 1909 (nearly 40 years after),.., dealing in country produce and general
merchandise - mostly for the requirement of Africans. The first time, Mr.E.
B. Home, the then Commissioner, established a Boma at Meru, I went
there and started my shop..." Osman Yakub writing to the D.C., regarding
allocation of a business plot, 9th march, 1949, DCIMRU/2/9/2. Some of the
other Asian traders were Mohammed Moti, Habib Ahmed, Jamal brothers,
Rahmtula Abmed, Gani Kassam, Ibrahim Abmed, Arbi Hasham, Omar
Ismali, Ayub Yakub, Au Mohammed Tayab, Adam Noor Mohammed, Ahmed
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themselves up. Reporting on the progress of the station in 1912, the D.C.
noted that there were "35 Asiatics and 100 Mohammedan Africans" 6 The
population at the station was growing so fast that the number of resident
Africans rose to 320 by the end of the year. Of these, 100 were employed in
the government service, the majority of the remainder being engaged in
trade of a "general nature". It is useful for us to note that, from the outset,
there are distinct features reflecting the distinct sections of the population
in the boma: the "police lines"; the army quarters; and the "porters' lines".
As each of these "lines" and quarters evolved into a separate settlement, we
see the genesis of Muslim presence in Meru. That the D.C.'s report notes
the presence of 100 African Muslims out of the official figure of 320
Africans, cannot go unnoticed - it suggests that 3 1.3% of the African
population in the station at that time was Muslim.
On arrival at the site, there were hardly any women among Home's
men, but soon they arrived and out of the 320 Africans in the station, 90
were women. This rapid increase of women accords with Cohen's
observation that
A sizeable and stable stock of women is always necessary to ensure
stability of settlement. Women provide sexual services and
companionship for men, maintain households, bear children and run
special trades. It is for this reason that sociologists have measured
the stability of migrant communities in African towns by the
proportion of women to the men in them.'7
Waiji and Bechar Dhanji, among others. Annual Report, 19 15-16,
DCIMRU/IJ1. Also see DCIMRU/4/2.
'6 Annuai Report, 19 15-16 DCIMRU/1I1.
' A. Cohen, 1969:51.
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Following Cohen, then we can say that the station was becoming
increasingly stable as the number of resident women rose steadily. Who
then were these Africans? Once the colonial authority was established, the
bulk of the workforce was obtained from the traditionally Muslim coastal
towns of Lamu, Malindi and Mombasa.' 8 In addition to these, there were
people from the interior of Tanzania, especially the Nyamwezi; and others
from as far as the Congo, Malawi (then Nyasaland) and the Comoro
Islands,'9 all of whom had been Islamized and evidently Swahilized over
the years.2° On arrival in Meru, these diverse groups of people were
allocated separate residential quarters, either as police, the K.A.R.
servicemen, or the miscellaneous group in the porters' lines. It is to the
latter that the label "Swahili" came to be attached, both by themselves and
the colonial administrators. Their Swahili identity and its implications for
Islam in Meru is examined in chapter 2 and therefore, at this point I shall
not enter into the debate on the definition of Swahili. However, the point
that needs emphasizing here is that all Swahili in Meru are Muslims, and
therefore, when I speak of Swahili I am speaking of Muslims.
Within a period of three years, the porters' lines assumed the shape
of an organized settlement and became known as the "Swahili village". The
district annual report shows that, by 1912, 21 plots in this area had been
let out to the Swahili. In the adjoining area, 11 plots were let out to the
"Asiatics". 2 ' The K.A.R. and the police, each had their own "lines", as they
were then called.
18 Y. A. Nzibo, 1986:123.
19 C. Hobley, 1928:187.
20 The process of Swahilization is dealt with later on in the thesis, see
chapter 2, p.80.
21 These Asiatics were the Indian traders mentioned above. The terms
"Asians" and "Indians" are usually applied with reference to people of
Indian and Pakistan origin, and are used interchangeably in Kenya.
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In 1913, three more plots were "taken up for Swahili houses,
necessitating the starting of a new line of these" •22 The important point for
our purpose is that. the steady growth of the population in the settlement
was contemporaneous with the emergence of a definite Swahili character.
When these new houses are added, the Swahili population gained not only
three more individuals or families, but any number of people that could
possibly occupy the three houses on the newly acquired plots. It was the
humbler counterparts of the great Zanzibari, old Mombasa town and Lamu
waterfronts which inspired the Swahili house 23 that is now prevalent in
Majengo far from the coast in many inland towns of Kenya. A distinction
should be made here between the complex Swahili stone house found in the
old coastal towns and the simple more typical Swahili type of house, found
in Majengo in the inland towns.
Before entering into the analysis of the formation of Majengo in
Meru, a brief description of both the physical features and the social
network of Majengo in general, may provide a sociological framework in
which the formation and the development of Meru Muslim settlements can
be understood, for in them one finds both the local and the coastal elements
woven into a culture that is identified with, and unique to every Majengo.
It must be emphasized here that Majengo are a common
phenomenon in many urban centres in the interior. Life in a Majengo is
quite different from that of its environs, in fact peculiar to itself. The
Majengo phenomenon can be traced to the latter part of the nineteenth
century.
22 Aual Report 1913-14, DCIMRU/1J1.
J. de V. Allen, 1979 (passim) has given an interesting analysis of the




as soon as urban settlements were established in the interior
during the second half of the nineteenth century they adopted
a recognizably Swahili character.. 24
It is to the more glorious settlements of the 18th century, that these
owe their 'Swahuliness'. The key feature of the ancient coastal settlements
was the spatial unit known as mtaa (plural mitaa). In its literal sense
the word mtaa means 'piece' or 'portion' but when used for units of
settlements it may be translated both as 'ward' or 'quarter' and also as
'moiety' or 'deme'. 26 Originally, the mtaa system reflected kinship affinities
and extended horizontally in order to accommodate the ever- increasing
relatives of the mtaa heads, who were at the same time lineage heads.
Gradually the mtaa lost its kinship features and lineage heads were
replaced by community representatives to the town council. 27 In its
function, the pre-mneteenth century mtaa was a unit of social organization.
In his study of the Swahili neighbourhood groups in Ujiji, a town in the
interior of Tanzania, Hino raises some interesting points on the functions
of these groups. He observes that three or four households make the
smallest unit of neighbourhood, whose relationship is based on the common
use of the ua, backyard of the Swahili-style house found in Ujiji. There are
cordial relations among the ua users, who refer to one another fondly as
ndugu, brother for men and shemeji, brother's wife for women; and "they
are aware of the fact that joint usage of ua means intimacy of
members"28
24 J• de V. Allen, 1980:325.
25	 concept and function of mtaa with regard to Majengo is discussed
in chapter 5, pp.238-239.
26 J• Middleton, 1993:56.
27 J de V. Allen, 1979:4.
S. Hino, 1971:13.
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Social functions of ua moja, common/shared backyard groups include
giving such mutual help as borrowing and lending money and cooperation
and assistance during wedding ceremonies.
Ujiji differs from Meru in some important respects: owing its
establishment to the trade routes, it is not a colonial creation and its
relations with the coastal Arabs predate the colonial administration in the
interior of Tanzania. In this 19th century Swahili (Muslim) settlement, the
concept of mtaa, and to a certain extent its functions, are replaced by ua.
There are two possible explanations for this: first, as Allen notes that mtaa
has already lost its kinship affinities; 29 and the second reason, is that the
pioneers of this upcountry settlement were diverse communities finding
convergence in Islam and Swahili culture as Muslims and not as members
of specific lineages.
However, the twentieth century Majengo, though "recognizably
Swahili"3°
 in character, appears to be a poor replica of its predecessor.
Certain symbols are carried over and employed in the new settlements,
even when the ideas these symbols seek to express bear no semblance with
the original concepts. An example is mtaa, which is now applied to rows of
houses in a Majengo. Though the term has long lost its original meaning
and function as a social unit, one hears it being used in every-day
conversation with reference to rows of houses not only in a Majengo, but
also in the rural trade centres, by individuals who have probably only heard
the word and perhaps are not cognizant of its historical and social
implications. The concept of mtaa has continued to change, and now to
many people it has acquired pejorative meanings. This is especially so
because Majengo is no longer exclusively Swahili: many other residents,
especially women in search of cheap accommodation, have invaded almost
J. de V. Allen 1979:4.
° J. de V. Allen, 1980:315.
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every Majengo, with the result that the Majengo have become congested
residential areas.
To a casual observer, one Majengo is like any other: rows of mud-
walled houses with rusty tin roofs, occupied by leso31 and buibui-clad32
women; narrow dusty littered alleys, where walk a turbaned sheikh, a
madrasa teacher and the rest of the menfolk in cap, kanzu (long shirt) and
sandals; while the children, clearly oblivious of their surroundings, play
happily in the open sewers in front of the houses. One or two small shops
are kept open to supply such basic commodities as cigarettes (as most of the
elderly women smoke), sugar, salt, etc.; while a number of women sell
vegetables and vitumbua, a kind of doughnut, in front of their houses. But
a closer sociological examination of these apparently similar features, would
reveal that each Majengo has its peculiar characteristics owing to such
factors as, for instance, the social-economic set-up of the resident
communities; and more importantly, the historical background to their
establishment. Even within Meru itself, the three settlements differed in
several respects to which we shall allude as we go along. Therefore, one
cannot make substantive generalizations about them, each one merits its
own study. Be that as it may, one can generally say that, since all Majengo
have been founded by the so-called Swahili, and since they are occupied
mainly by Muslims, though many other people, especially women, have
always found solace there, they are separate cultural entities.
It may appear as if this cultural distinction is being threatened by
the stream of low-wage earners, the unemployed and women, for whom the
31 Leso is a piece of cotton coloured cloth. Two pieces of cloth, are worn
by Swahili women, one is wrapped around the waist to cover the lower part
of the body, and the other is used to cover the head and the shoulders.
32 Bui bui is a black cloak and veil worn by Muslim women in Kenya. It
originated in Hadhramaut and by 1910, it was becoming increasingly
popular in Mombasa. It gave its users a sense of respectability, see M.
Strobel, 1975:70-72.
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Majengo in big towns have become focal points, owing to the availability of
cheap alternative accommodation there. Another pull factor is the ease with
which the new arrivals are almost naturally integrated into the resident
community. Yet it is this process of integration and assimilation of new-
comers, which ensures not only the survival, but also the growth of the
Swahili culture in these settlements. Even without necessarily converting
to Islam, many of the newcomers adopt the Swahili material culture: mode
of dress, types of food, and with the adoption of the Swahili language, which
is the lingua franca in the multi-ethnic urban society, they begin to use
such Islamic expressions as wallahi , thus accentuating the dominance of the
Swahili-Islamic character ofMajengo. As will be shown later, Salim queries
Allen's suggestion that one can become a Mswahili without being a Muslim,
in other words, the possibility of divorcing Swahili culture from Islam.33
As has been said above, Majengo are built of mud-and-wood,
originally roofed with madebe, open flattened tins. Most of the original
houses still stand in many Majengo, even in Pumwani in Nairobi, though
demolition has been haunting Pumwarn for more than two decades. Bujra
aptly describes Pumwani, which is the first of them and has, therefore,
continued to serve as the prototype for other Majengo in the interior thus:
Pumwani stands incongruously from its surroundings looking
more like a coastal village than a city housing area.34
Each Swahili settlement, as Middleton observes, sees itself as "being on
another level a separate Umma, a sacred centre set in the wilderness of
unbeievers".35




Amongst the wood-and-mud structures in almost any Majengo, one
finds a magnificent stone mosque building, 36 with its beautiful, usually
white minarets 37 and green domes towering over the rusty tin roofs of the
settlement. The contrast between the impressive building and its humble
neighbourhood is striking. 38 However, each Majengo has its peculiar
characteristics and even within the same region, one observes certain
disparities among the resident Muslim communities.
The influence of the Swahili house is perceptible even on
non-Muslims from the interior, who travelled to towns in the early days and
on return home, constructed 'square houses' in imitation of the Swahili
houses in which they had lived either in Pumwarn in Nairobi or in any
other town. The ability to build a 'square house' in the rural areas in the
early days was a source of prestige and one automatically acquired a higher
social status among one's neighbours. Gradually the 'square houses'
replaced the traditional round mud-and-thatch houses in many parts of
Meru.
The mud-and-wattle type of Swahili house that is found in all
Majengo, normally has four or more rooms divided by a corridor running
through to the back of the house, connecting the front and rear entrances.
In these rooms, whole families lived and as was the custom, in Meru, the
Swahili residents, most of whom had married local women, were visited by
their wives' relatives from the rural areas, who would live with them for
36 Each of these mosques has it own history. Some of them have been
constructed with assistance from foreign donors through the Islamic
Foundation. Others have been built either by individuals or through the
collective efforts of the local residents.
A. A. Mazrui and Zirimu, P. (1990:50) say that "the minaret on its
own embodies not just worship but also aesthetics, architecture, and a sense
of geography".
38 P. Garlake (1966:3) too, observes that a mosque could be the only
stone building in a mud-and-thatch settlement.
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quite some time before returning to their villages. In a number of cases, the
rural visitors, finding the town life better, would not return to the village.
From accounts given by my informants, it is also evident that many
relatives and friends of the Swahili pioneers travelled a long way to join
them and a number of these would settle down and try to find jobs or
engage in trade, thus helping to swell the Swahili Muslim population, which
by 1915 was clearly well established within Meru township.
As more workers, traders and all sorts of people came into the
growing town, the demand for accommodation increased tremendously.
Consequently, two to three "out-houses" were attached to the main houses.
These out-houses were mostly rented out to tenants together with some of
the rooms in the main houses. The out-houses were popular in the Swahili
village mainly because it was the only way of acquiring extra rooms and
thus an extra source of income, on the same plot of land. Plots were
allocated to certain categories of people, and even then certain criteria, as
we shall illustrate with regard to the Nubian village, were applied, making
the process rather tedious. Therefore, in spite of the additional out-houses,
the number of the original plots and houses remained unchanged in the
official records, but an examination of the population figures tabulated in
the D.C.'s report,39
 shows that the number of residents was far greater
than the official number of houses could possibly accommodate. It is
therefore clear that the official number of houses was not representative of
the actual resident population in the settlement which had came to be
known as the Swahili village by 1912.
The haphazard construction of out-houses posed a health hazard
which continually incurred the wrath of almost every medical officer who
served in Meru. In one of the reports it is reported that
1925 Annual Report DCIMRU/1i2 shows that there were 29 officially
allocated plots which were all occupied by Swahili houses, with a resident
population of 299 persons.
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The Swahili, Nubians, etc. live in houses built on the Swahili
principle. The Swahili practice of surrounding each house with a
fence of sorts and of building a collection of smaller huts at the rear
of the main house has to be condemned. Plans of houses and
buildings to be erected are not submitted to the medical officer, and
as a result, Europeans, Indians, natives, are free to erect any
buildings.40
The existence of a sizeable Swahili community at this time was
acknowledged by the D.C. in his observation that during the First World
War, "the Swahili population responded loyally to the demand for stretcher-
bearers with the carrier corps.. It has been stated above that the
members of the group that was designated 'Swahili' came from various
ethnic backgrounds, but concepts deriving from the coastal Swahili culture
formed the basis for the creation of a community for which Islam reinforced
unity and gave a sense of identity.
The definition of the Swahili has intrigued scholars, Allen and Salim,
among others, have tussled with it for years, producing long treatises but
showing no signs of consensus on who these "elusive"42 people or peoples
are. In her study on the Swahili medicine, Becklerg doubtfully refers to
them as "Swahili, if at all.. .",' it is this feeling of doubt which seems to
dominate the minds of the Swahili historians, for so far none has come up
with a satisfactory definition.44
° Annual Medical Report, 1926 DCIMRU/1i2.
41 Annual Report, 1915-16 DCIMRU/1J1.
42 A. I. Salim, 1985:215.
S. Beckerleg, 1990:24.
' For more information on the long search for a satisfactory definition
of the Waswahili and their identity, which A. I. Salim (1985 passim) has
aptly summed up as "elusive", see J. de V. Allen, who has written more
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The Indian Bazaar
By 1912 there was a significant Asian population, a number of them
having arrived in Meru soon after the opening up of the station. Nearly all
of them were traders, apparently trying to cash in on the new station. The
D.0 reports that
in spite of the fact that the roads are not yet finished, Indians'
wagons have arrived in Meru from Nyeri and Archer's Post and from
Meru have journeyed to Fort Hall via Embu. This shows the
keenness of the Indians on wagon transport.. .
They put up shops which served as residential-cum-business premises
in the area that came to be known as the "Indian bazaar", close by the
Swahili location. It seems, at that time, that there was pressure on the
administration (from the traders) to increase the size of the bazaar but the
D.0 objected, feeling that "all sections of the township community"46
should be content with the available amenities. So far, the township was
being maintained in clean and sanitary condition, as four men were paid by
the Swahili and the Indian communities for sweeping and cleaning their
location.47
 It is necessary to point out that at that time (1912), there were
only two officially designated residential "locations" within the township -
extensively on the subject than any other scholar: 1973, 1974, 1976a, 1976b,
1979, and his most recent work titled Swahili Origins, published
posthumously in 1993. Also see C. Eastman 1971:228-236, W. Arena,
1975:425-38. J. Middleton, 1992:2 adds that the non-linguistic criterion for
defining the Swahili is that they have long been Muslims.
Annual Report, 19 16-17, DCIMRU/lJ1.
46 Annual Report, 1911-12912, DCIMRU/1i1.
47 Annual Report, 1915-16, DCIMRU/1J1.
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the K.A.R. and the police had their own separate quarters, which were
referred to as "lines" in contrast to the Swahili and Asian "locations".
A mosque situated at one end of the location, was used by both the
Swahili and the Sunni Asians. In 1915, the road through the Swahili and
Asian area was widened to a hundred feet, with the result that the houses
of the Swahili were moved back and rebuilt. The boma, as the station was
stifi called, was slightly enlarged at the south-western corner by clearing
the bush; and "Askaris' lines are moved and rebuilt on the new township
site".
A few of the Asians were in government service as clerks to the
administration and the K.A.R.; others included the Sub-Assistant Surgeon,
the post master, and the labour recruiters and their families. Though it is
certain that the majority of the Indians were Muslims, reliable information
is not available on their sectarian distribution. The records show that both
the Ismailis and the Ahmadis had separate mosques: the "Ahamediyya
Mosque building, Plot No. 20".
After the First World War, the D.C., basing his observation on the
general effects of the war on the district, reported that:
the Indians.. .do not seen to be on very good terms with one another.
This would appear to be due to the fact that, owing to lack of trade,
competition is very keen, and this seems to affect their social as well
as business relations.50
Construction of Roads and buildings, 1911-25, DCIMRU/4J1.
49 Osman Yakub to D.C. 9th March, 1948 DCIMRU/2/9/2.
50 Annual Report, 1920-2 1, DCIMRU/IJ1.
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On the contrary, my informants were of the opinion that the tension
between the Indians was religious rather than commercial - the Abmadis
faced stiff opposition from the Sunnis, and this was couched in terms of
trade rivalry.51 One informant explained that it was due to this rivalry
that some prominent Sunnis exercised their influence on the administration
during the allocation of plots in the new township plan, with the result that
the Abmadis were not allotted a new site for their mosque; while the
Isamailis received sympathetic consideration, when the area occupied by
their mosque was taken up for the new class B business area:
Ma Khan Mosciue. This is on a plot held on Temporary Occupation
Licence free of rental. The building is made of C.I.sheets on wooden
framework on piles, and I do not think there will be any difficulty
about getting the local Ismaili Khoja Community to agree to move it
to another site, possibly with payment in compensation for
disturbance by the Local Native Council.52
As I have said above, the Indians were "keen" to link the new station
with others, in a trade network. The main items of trade were hides and
skins, bees-wax, ghee, livestock and cloth. The Bazaar, like the Swahili
village, soon became the subject of condemnation by almost every Medical
Officer, for instance, in the 1926 report on the sanitation of the township,
the Bazaar is described thus:
' Interview with Mwanaidi and Haniza, Makandune, December 1991.
52 D.C. to The Hon. Ag. Provincial Commissioner, Central Province,
Nyeri, 2nd March 1939 in DC/MRU/219/2.
Townships and Trading Centres, DCIMRU/4/2.
44
The Indian dukas consist of dark badly ventilated and overcrowded
tin and wooden shanties which are held on a temporary occupation
licence. The town planning scheme submitted two years ago has not
materialized and it seems unlikely that anything will be done for
some time. This uncertainty as to the future of the Bazaar prevents
the duka owners who are.., more disinclined than ever to effect any
improvements in their dwellings.TM
In spite of these reports, the sanitary condition of the Bazaar did not
show any signs of improvement, and once again in 1931, it was said to be
a model of insanitation". It seems that it was not possible to improve the
condition of the Bazaar, which the officer describes rather tendentiously, "as
the worst in Kenya" by 1939. Though each time the township development
plan had been drawn, discussed and then left in abeyance, the situation was
later complicated by the numbers:
the real problem will be what to do with the surplus Indian
population. These people will have to live somewhere and many of
them are too poor to acquire plots in the new bazaar or elsewhere.55
This is a testimony to the presence of a relatively large number of Asians
in Meru. My informants are unanimous that the greater majority of them
were Muslims of both Shia and Sunni branches of Islam. Ten years later,
what was referred to as the "Indian Shopping Centre" was said to be "some
34 shops built of temporary materials" and to "constitute a statutory
nuisance and contravene the majority of the regulations of the Township
Ordinance".56
Medical Officer of Health on Sanitation, in Annual Report, 1926.
Annual Report, 1939, DCIMRU/2/9/2.
56 D.C. to the Provincial Commissioner, Nyeri, 12th February, 1949 in
DCIMRU/2/9/2.
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However, it was not until 1954 that the Bazaar was moved to the
new site. For our purpose, these developments had a significant effect on
the Muslim community: the sectarian mosques of the Ismailis and the
Ahmadis were not rebuilt in the new township site, with the result that the
influence of these groups gradually dissipated. During my enquiry, I was
told that there is no Abmadiyya family in Meru now, most of them having
moved to Nairobi during the mid 1950s; while a few others who lingered on,
left during the country-wide Indian exodus of the early 197Os. Two
Ismaili families are still there but I was unable to get any information
about their relationship with the Sunnis, that is whether, in the absence of
an Ismaili mosque (Jamatkhana) they pray in the Sunni Jamia mosque, or
any other of the five mosques in the Meru municipality.
From 'N.F.D. Ridge' to Nubian Village
As it was said in the introduction, it is necessary to describe and
define the groups that not only came to form the Muslim settlements in the
town, but also became, and remained, the nucleus of the Muslim influence
in Meru. I describe these 'villages' in the order in which they were formed;
in this section, therefore, we shall recapitulate the formation of the K.A.R.
cantonments and operations in Meru, as they are inextricably linked with
the formation of the "Nubian village"; the emergence of the Nubian Muslim
community, and its subsequent development.
For information on the Asian exodus from Kenya, see B. P. Mehta
1978:335-389.
58 Military and civil administration in East and Central Africa were
synonymous during the early days of the British rule. The result of this link
between the military and civil administration was the development of a
system in "which the military officer played a special part in the extension
and development of British rule in the territories..." H. C. Moyse-Bartlett,
(1956:xvii).
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In November 1897, Sir Arthur Hardage (the Commissioner for British
East African Protectorate, 1895-1900) reported that his forces comprised
250 Sudanese, 368 Swahili, 298 Indians, 16 Arabs, and 191 Somalis - a total
of 1120 men59 . Again the Swahili group was always a mixture of people
from different ethnic backgrounds which included Wanyamwezi, Manyema,
among others who had been converted to Islam and Swahilized. From its
composition, it is clear that the force was virtually Muslim - the Sudanese,
Somalis and Arabs being traditionally Muslim.60
After the headquarters of the K.A.R. were transferred to Nairobi in
1904, it was deemed that the main task of the force "lay in the supporting
of the gradual extension of the administration from Nairobi towards Mt.
Kenya".61 Therefore, the Embu garrison which had served in Nyeri, moved
to Meru in 1908 with Edward Butler Home. The decision to administer the
Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) was taken in 1909 due to the Somali
disturbance.
With the decision in 1916 to build a road to Wajir in N.F.D., the
station at Meru "automatically" became the headquarters of N.F.D.
transport. An additional area of 120 acres was acquired for K.A.R., the
whole area was fenced in and became known as "N.F.D. Ridge", abutting on
H. C. Moyse-Bartlett, 1956:104.
60 The establishment authorized by the government in 1898 had five
Sudanese and three Swahili companies. The forces were used in the Ogaden
campaign of 1901 and Jubaland expedition of 1895-1901. They were re-
organized at the end of 1901 and on 1st January 1902, King's African Rifles
was created, with the original forces being incorporated. As will be shown
below, some of the residents of the Nubian village in Meru had served in
almost all of these campaigns.
61 H. C. Moyse-Bartlett, 1956:204.
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the township land. On the ridge were the supplies stores and the
dispensary, now Meru hospital.62
Of significance to us here is the arrival of a relatively large number
of Muslims in the army. It is said that besides sharing a common identity
in the army, the soldiers and their families rallied around a mosque in
their cantonments, and there celebrated maulid and observed other
religious festivals, to which other township residents were usually invited.
One informant enthusiastically described the maulidi celebrations in the
barracks as the biggest and best organized in the township at that time.63
When Meru became the headquarters of N.F.D. administration,
K.A.R. and police activity increased - more officers and workers were
brought in and out of the district. Many workers from the neighbouring
colonies also found their way into the station and fell into two distinct
categories: "Nubian" and "Swahili". The generic Swahili category included
all those who professed to be Muslims, regardless of whether they were
Baganda drivers or Nyamwezi askaris.64 As the Swahili category will be
dealt with in the next chapter, it may be useful here to give a brief
See Annual Report, 1921, DCIMRU/1J1. When it was decided that N.F.D.
be ruled by the military, the headquarters of 5 K.A.R. were transferred
from Kismayu in present-day Somalia to Meru. Some of the descendants of
Kismayu returnees are still in Salama near the hospital. For the
cantonments, a site was selected on the Meru-Archer's Post road, about
one-and-half miles from the township. Today the former officers' mess is
part of Mwithuinwiru primary school and its white-washed walls still stand
in contrast to the rest of the school buildings.
63 Interview with Kainda, Mjim 26th November, 1991.
64 It has already been explained above that the K.A.R. and the police
force were not comprised solely of Sudanese, there was a wide range of
other communities.
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background to the Nubian group that came to form the Nubian community
in Meru.
Recently, the Nubians in East Africa have been the subject of a wide
variety of studies, covering military slavery, migration and identity among
other topics. 65
 There are several versions of their history. However the one
point on which the historians seem to concur is that of Nubian
heterogeneity. The Equatorial Province, governed by Emin Pasha,66
included a wide area of what is now the Sudan, the north-western part of
Uganda and north-eastern Zaire. Of the original group of Emin Pasha's
troops who joined Lugard in 1891, 800 were soldiers and 9000 camp
followers. In the following year, this number rose to 1000 soldiers and
10,000 non-combatants 67 with the replenishment being obtained from these
areas.
Kokole in his rather provocative article based on the Nubians in
Uganda, argues that the Nubians in East Africa constitute a "Muslim club"
whose "world is not territorial" but "religious and cultural". 68
 This may be
true for Uganda where the process of Nubianization has been recorded
The most recent studies on the Nubians are about the Nubians in
Uganda, where their social circumstances are different from what they are
in Kenya.
66 Egypt's interest in the River Nile provided the necessary impetus for
her imperialist manoeuvre, and by the second half of the 19th century she
had advanced, placing garrisons along the river in the region that came to
be known as the Equatorial Province. Through Egypt, Britain obtained
direct access in the pretext of suppressing slave trade and promoting
'legitimate' trade. The governor of Equatorial province at this time was
Emin Pasha, an Austrian who had converted to Islam and taken the name
Emin Pasha, Hansen (1990:320-1).
67 D. H. Johnson, 1988:152.
68 0. H. Kokole, 1985:433.
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particularly during the reign of Idi Amin, but not for the exclusive Nubi
communities of ex-servicemen and their descendants in Kenya.
The Nubian identity is essentially a complex of a cumulative Muslim
cultural experience coupled with a deep regard for the value of the military
service to the colonial government. During their long military career, the
Nubians had built and strengthened a feeling of common identity and
cohesion among individuals recruited from various ethnic, cultural and
regional backgrounds. Their collective experiences prior to their arrival in
Meru shaped their perception of themselves as a group:
the Nubians were subjected to strong army discipline and training,
and a way of life in accordance with military standards developed.
What really distinguished the military communities was their Islamic
basis, which separated then from the surrounding society and helped
to develop their own cultural traits".69
The strongest tie was the military culture - the barracks constituted their
social environment, with the large contingent of non-combatants providing
the necessary support for the soldiers and later ex-soldiers. They felt
themselves to be superior to the people among whom they settled, a feeling
derived from a long association with the rulers. It is to be remembered that
the K.A.R. units in which they served were used to crush stubborn
communities which were reluctant to submit to the colonial authority.
Thus their role in the military placed them well above the peoples they
helped to subjugate.7°
The Governor's (Edward Northey) "personal" concession of land to the
Nubians in Kisumu in western Kenya, set a precedent for their
counterparts in Meru, who petitioned the D.C. in Meru for similar
69 See H. B. Hansen 1990:321.





treatment. The Governor's approval of the Nubian claim and consequent
occupation of residential piots rent free, was in a way an affirmation of the
Nubian special status vis-a-vis other government servants. The D.0 in Meru
also reiterated that they were a respectable community 71 deserving of
government attention and support. From the outset, the conditions for their
settlement on the ridge that came to be known as the Nubian village in
Meru were clearly spelt out by the district administration, laying emphasis
on long military service, at least 9 years.72
The Governor's "personal" land concession to Nubians in Kisumu was
used by the Nubians in Meru to legitimate their claim to government
recognition of their 'Nubianness', and hence their 'non-nativeness'. This
apparent government support filled in for the possible feeling of isolation
that they might have experienced had they been thrust into the Meru
society without any government support. Colonial paternalism reinforced
the notion of 'Nubianness'. They could have been (numerically)
outnumbered and lost their identity, but by clinging to such concepts and
organizing to suit their own conditions, they were able to hold onto their
separate identity. In a sense, 'Nubianness' was turned into an important
social asset in the process of creating and sustaining a separate social-
religious identity of a minority group. It is evident , therefore, that their
settlement had a different social stance from the start; and thus they were
able to cling to their separate identity for almost 40 years, during which
period only the "legitimate residents" 73 occupied the settlement.
Initially, it was not envisaged that the N.F.D. ridge would be
occupied by ex-servicemen, but as the discharged men and their families did
71 D.C. to Senior Commissioner, Nyeri, 10th September 1921,
DCIMRU/2/4/10.
72 District Commissioner's Office, 22rd May 1930, DCIMRU/2/4/10.
In 1946, the "legitimate residents" were defined as "only ex-police and
K.A.R. Askaris who were given free plots personal to them" by the
Governor. See D.C. 7/2/1946 in DCIMRU/2/4/10.
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not have an alternative place, they sought permission to settle in this area
which was regarded as the property of N.F.D. administration. And since the
Governor (Sir Edward Northey) had approved the proposal to permit
ex-K.A.R. to remain on residential plots rent-free in Kisumu, similarly the
Nubians in Meru appealed to the local administration for the same
conditions to be applied to them as they were also
ex-K.A.R., ex-police and ex-N.F.D. Constabulary; and in possession
of certificates of long service, exempting them from payment of Hut
and Poll Tax.74
In 1921, the D.C. reported that:
a number of Nubians principally ex-N.F.D. police, are settling here
and plots have been laid out on the' N.F.D. Ridge' and allotted to
them. ..though the proposal was supported by the C.N.C.75
From the outset, the conditions of the occupation of the ridge were
stipulated, and these came to largely determine the nature of the
settlement, giving it a different social stance from the already existing
Swahili village and the subsequent Majengo. As more retired officers of the
N.F.D. force settled in the ridge, it became imperative for the
administration to address the issue and in 1922 the Governor
.reversed his original ruling that certain Nubian ex-Askaris must
pay rent for their plots. Consequently, all Nubian ex-K.A.R. &
ex-N.F.D. Constabulary, discharged with a good character after not
less than nine years' service are all allowed to occupy their plots
rent-free. These men and also the Swahili are on the whole very
law-abiding and give little trouble.76
D.0 to Senior Commissioner, Nyeri, 19/9/1921, DCIMRU/2/4/14.
75 Annual Report, 1921, DCIMRU/1J1.
76 Aual Report, 1922, DCIMRU/1J1.
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This was the beginning of what came to be known as the "Nubian
Village" in Meru. Virtually all the Nubians settled in Meru had rendered
long service in numerous campaigns. 77 The Government was indebted to
the Nubians for their remarkable service in the establishment of colonial
rule and now that the Fax-B ritanica had been achieved, the government felt
a sense of responsibility for the well-being of these ex-servicemen and their
families.
It was these ex-soldiers and their descendants who formed the
Nubian Muslim community on the ridge. However, their settlement on the
ridge, which was then abutting on the township land, was to cause
unforeseen difficulties later on when it became necessary to expand the
hospital and plan the growing township. Therefore, subsequent District
Annual Reports were dominated by the medical officers' condemnation of
the insanitary conditions of the town in general and the Swahili and the
Nubian villages in particular. The removal of the Nubian village to a new
site was deemed necessary, but after examining its feasibility, the issue
would be left in abeyance only to be reopened some years later.
Nevertheless, the Nubian village was never moved from the site even
when it became part of the growing township. What has actually been
happening is that the settlement has been shrinking to give room to the
expansion of the district hospital 78. In the late 1960s or early 1970,
' The Egyptian campaign of 1882; Jubaland 1893-190 1; Ogaden
1900-1901; Nandi 1895-1897, 1905; Embu 1906; Somaliland 1908-1910; and
finally in the First World War 1914-1918. Some of the discharged Akaris
settled in British Dolo, but with the cessation of Jubaland in 1921, they
returned to Meru. The list of the house owners in the Nubian village shows
that some of the ex-servicemen had served the Imperial British East Africa
company in the late 1880s. See file on Nubian village, DCIMRU/214/10.
78 It has been said above that on the N.F.D. Ridge, when it was first
occupied, were the paymaster's house and the dispensary. It is this
dispensary which developed into the present Meru District Hospital.
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when the medical school wing was built, the displaced Nubians were settled
in Salama, a row of eleven houses just below the hospital. My Nubi
informant claimed that only "pure Nubians" were settled at Salama.8°
Though it is unlikely that the question of 'purity' would be considered by
the authorities, it is certain that the criteria for resettlement of the affected
persons were that: they must be original owners of the plots taken up by
the new hospital wing; or their direct descendants. It is these criteria that
were construed as emphasis on purity of 'Nubi blood'. Today, the hospital
occupies the greater part of the Ridge; with Salama and "new Swahili
village" (built in 1954) on either side, with the tall wing of the hospital's
training school and flats towering menacingly over the rusty tin roofs,
which are now the legacy of the once thriving Muslim settlement.
Majengo
The third Muslim settlement in the town is that of the mahaji,
pioneer Meru converts. There is evidence, as I shall illustrate below, to link
the founding of Majengo (the mahaji settlement) in Meru,in 1926 or there-
about, with the events taking place in the African Muslim settlements in
Nairobi. The Nairobi Muslim villages, having been established by porters
and Askaris,8 ' provided a model for future up-country Muslim settlements,
which became a fmi1iar feature and an integral part of many towns in
Kenya. The emergence of Majengo, though itself a result of the colonial
policy, was seen as a "native" problem. Describing the situation in 1931, the
Nyeri Provincial Commissioner lamented that:
' In the absence of administrative records or other records regarding
the construction of the medical school, it is difficult to fix the precise dates.
80 Interview with Zuena and Mariamu, Salama, 27th October 1991.
81 J• Bunjra (1969 passim) and my own study of these settlements - A.
Maingi (1987:104-134) and A. Kubai (1992:33-43).
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The problem of detribalised or deruralised natives is becoming acute
in the vicinity of all large towns and municipalities and in Nairobi
itself, the situation inow causing anxiety.. .there is all over Nairobi
a race of detribalis ,this and neighbouring colonies who cannot
be sent home... They are nearly all Mohammedans. Most of them call
themselves Swahili.82
The Nairobi Muslim villages were Pangani, founded by people from
Tanganyika; Unguja by the Zanzibaris; Mji wa Mombasa, occupied mainly
by people from Kenya's coast; and Kileleshwa with a mixture of both the
Swahili and mahaji Muslims. It is necessary, before we proceed with the
formation of Majengo in Meru, to explain who these mahaji were and how
they themselves came into contact with Islam.
The first thing to note about the mahaji , is that they were individuals
who had left their homes in the rural areas and travelled to distant towns.
Individual mahaji had left their homes in different circumstances and for
different reasons. From personal accounts of a number of my mahaji
informants, it emerges that some of them went out of sheer adventure, for
instance Mzee Ibrahim explains how he left his home for Nairobi, in the
following interview:
When I was about sixteen years of age, even before I was
circumcised, I heard from one of the warriors in my village that there
was a place called Nairobi. It was said that this place was full of
cars, Europeans and Asians and many other things. I was quite
excited by these stories and, together with a friend of mine, we
decided to travel to Nairobi. As you know, we would not be allowed
to leave, so we absconded from home. After walking for more than a
week, we arrived at Pangarn, the African location. For some time we
did not have a place to sleep, but later on we found a job with an
Asian. It was difficult and soon I left to work for a Somali - my job
was to herd his cattle near the present Ngara Road in Nairobi, which
at this time was a bush. I became friends with some men from
Tanganyika (now Tanzania)who converted me to Islam. I moved to
82 5 H. Fountaine, 13/3/1931, K.N.A. ADMJ7/31.
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stay with them in a house owned by a Nandi woman in Pangani.
For Mzee Ibralim, it was his adventurous spirit that led to his conversion
and changed his future life; but the same cannot be said of many others,
whose departure from their homes was not only instigated by the colonial
administration, but actually enforced through compulsory recruitment of
labour.
The reasons for the reluctance to workM were mainly cultural; and
also previous experience had shown that many of those who went out to
kiaro, as this forced labour was called, never returned - probably they
died in the harsh conditions of travel and hard labour. Soon the local
administrators realized that:
To talk of educating the natives up to the idea of the dignity of
labour, of instilling into their minds their duty to the community in
this respect, or introducing amongst them the new wants for the
satisfaction of which they must obtain money by work, savours
rather of the parliamentary orator at home (England) than of the
practical man on the spot. The fact remains.., that there is in most
cases from the natives' point of view no reason whatever why 4
should go out to work unless compelled to do so and as soon as he
Interview with Mzee Ibrahim, Majengo, 26th August 1991.
84 Among the Meru people, division of labour between men and women
was clearly defined, for instance men looked after the cows while the
women tended the fields. Even then there were certain crops for instance
yam, which were tended by men and not women. The warriors formed the
defence of the land and were exempted from such labour. Therefore, when
the Europeans introduced the idea of going out to work, it was difficult to
fit it in the traditional pattern of work and division of labour.
In Igembe there are numerous accounts of how the early Europeans
captured the strong young men and forced them to become porters for the
expeditions. Many of these never returned to their families, giving kiaro bad
connotations in the minds of the Meru.
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has become independent enough to refuse to go when told,
compulsion... is the only remedy.
The administrators felt that the "only solution", therefore, was to be
found in increased taxation in order to force the Meru people to go out to
seek work so as to obtain money for the tax, with failure to pay leading to
various kinds of punishment in the hands of the ruthless local aides to the
administrators and Askaris. Besides the economic pressure after the
introduction of "new wants and desires for the satisfaction of which they
must obtain money by work", the establishment of colonial rule saw the
disruption of the social system; for instance, the warriors who were usually
organized around the Meru traditional barracks, from where they handled
the defence matters of their country, were now redundant. The result was
the tendency of some of the young men to go out of the district in search of
a new life.
Others were conscripted into the army and the police force. 87 While
in the army, some of the soldiers found it necessary to convert because they
were treated with veiled repugnance by soldiers drawn from communities
which were traditionally Mus1im, for instance, eating together with non-
Muslim (and therefore washenzi or uncultured) colleagues, was deemed
unacceptable by many believing soldiers.89
See Annual Report 1912, DCIMRU/1i1.
87 The role of K.A.R. has been discussed before, but the recruitment of
the Meru did not take place until the beginning of the First World War.
Some of the mahaji who converted in the army are: Abdi Murungi, Abdallah
Tumbo, Abdi Shangishu, and M'Laibuni.
I have shown in my analysis of the composition of the K.A.R that the
force was virtually Muslim.
89 The Rev. J. N. Mruka, (1974) in his study of the Sunm Muslim
community in Kisuinu in western Kenya, observed that "senior askaris
treated new recruits with contempt and like the Arabs referred to them as
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It was these men and others who had, through the army and other
factors that have been outlined above, found their way into the Nairobi
African ("Native") locations, who now returned as mahaji to establish the
Majengo in Meru in 1926 or thereabout. The reasons why they could not
return to their rural places of origin form part of the reaction of the Meru
to the presence of Muslims in their midst. These reasons will be discussed
in detail in the next chapter, therefore, here we shall only allude to some
of the most important ones.
While in the Nairobi African locations of Pangani, Mji wa Mombasa,
Kileleshwa, and later Pumwani, all of which were predominantly Muslim,
some of these people came into contact with Islam, and their lives were
influenced by the religious, political and social life in these places. For
instance, under the leadership of the leading non-coastal Kikuyu Muslim
scholar Maalim (Haji) Hamisi, they had become aware of the tension
existing between the coastal Muslims and the mahaji in Pangani.9°
When Mji wa Mombasa was demolished in 1922, the bulk of its
residents moved to Pumwarn, then the new "Native Location." However,
this demolition did not provide a signal to the Meru mahaji that sooner or
later they would have to return home; they found alternative
accommodation in the remaining Pangani and Kileleshwa. But four years
later, Kileleshwa was also demolished and it was best thought that its
residents should be urged to return to their original homes. Consequently,
in 1927 those who wished to return to their rural homes in different parts
kafiri or washenzi. In some cases the old askaris did not have much to do
with the new recruits at the times of meals. They refused to eat with
kafiris" (p.4'7).
° A. Kubai 1992:39-40.
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of Kenya were given three months to accept the offer of free tickets.91
Though the list of Kileleshwa house owners shows only one Meru house
owner,92 there were Meru tenants in many other houses, as a number of
pioneer mahaji in Majengo and Mjini claim to have lived in Kileleswa at
that time.
The effects of the demolition of the African villages in Nairobi were
far reaching and the Meru mahaji elected to return home. They were joined
by others from other towns who realized that repatriation was inevitable,
owing to the colonial desire to curb the growth of African population in
towns.93 In these apparently inevitable circumstances, individual mahaji
returned to Meru. It is worthwhile to note that they did not move as an
organized group. On arrival, each individual tried to find a place, with the
first target being the Swahili village, since, as has been shown above, the
Nubian village on the Ridge was officially designated for ex-servicemen.
Soon it was realized that the returning mahaji needed their own
place. A group of about 30 men94 were now united by a common purpose
91 Deputy Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State for Colonies, 11th
August, 1936 on "Clearance of Pangam Village", CO 533/462/8, Public
Records Office, London.
Mzee Hamisi (interview 27th November 1991, Mjini) told me that he was
converted while in Kilelshwa and owned the only Meru-owned house that
is mentioned in the Kileleshwa Files, K.N.A. PC/CP 9/15/3.
The colonial attitude towards the growth of African population in
towns is summed up by the Nyeri P.C., see above footnote 54.
Some of the pioneer mahaji were Mohpmmed Kamari who had been
converted at Thika; Bilal from Igembe; Maalim Asuman; Ali Mbetera,
converted in Kiambu, Umari from Ng'onyi but converted in Embu, Umari
Nkingo who moved to Mutuati later on, Simba from Tharaka, Abda]lah
Kamau Memba, from Kianjai, converted in Nairobi, Ramdhan Nkiiri, Au
Kalasinga, a Kikuyu, Umari Mukatheri, Salim Matumbu, Hassan
Kamushari, Salim Ngundu, Juma Tinge, Mzee Umar Mulingoti, Abdi
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- the need to establish their settlement, their own Majengo. While in
Nairobi and especially in Pangarn village, they had witnessed the struggle
between the Swahili and the converts. 95 They now became even more
conscious of their mahaji identity which, they had to safeguard even in
their own home district. They realized that the putative 'superiority" of
those "born in the faith" 96 over the converts was not altered - they were
subjected to the same disdain by the Swahili as they had been at Pangani.
To the Swahili in Meru, they could be nearly as bad as washenzi , but were
they going to be relegated to an inferior position and subjected to the
coastal Swahili disdain even among their own people, above whom they
have been elevated by conversion to Islam?97 The relationship between the
two groups is dealt with in the next chapter.
Similarly, they would not be absorbed in the Nubian village for a
number of reasons: First, the "legitimate residents are only the ex-police
and K.A.R. askaris..."98 Second, the Nubians prided themselves in their
association with the government, an aspect to which we can attribute their
contempt for both the Swahili and the mahaji. Third, was the question of
space. By the time the mahaji arrived, the resultant problems of the
settlement of Nubians on the ridge were becoming manifest to the
M'Kiambati, Hamisi Ngozi, Osman M'Mwarama, Saidi Kiundu, Ali
MThuuri, Hamisi M'Mwongo, Hamza, Ali M'Ing'entu, Salim M'Athuu, and
Mzee Twa. Interview with Mzee Ibrahim (one of the pioneer mahaji),
Halima Majengo, 26th August 1991.
See A. Kubai (1992:40).
96 A fuller discussion on the notion of superiority of those born in the
faith over the converts is given in chapter 2, pp.81-89.
Interview with Mzee Ibrahim, Majengo, 26th August 1991.
98 D.C. Meru to Provincial Commissioner, Nyeri, 7th February 1946,
DC/MRU/2/4/10.
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administration, and therefore it was not feasible to accommodate the
mahaji there.
The next alternative open to the administration was to return the
mahaji to their rural villages of origin, but that option was not viable: first,
the views of the Secretary of State for Colonies (S.S.C.) with regard to the
removal of Muslims from Nairobi, were well known to the local
admimstration - there were those whom the government considered "to be
not detribalised but who do not wish to go to the reserve", to whom an
option was given. The S.S.C. therefore advised that arrangements be made
"to permit such fgmilies to continue to live in accustomed social and
religious association"
There was an obligation on the part of the government to settle the
dispossessed individuals, though the governor's ambivalence towards the
mahaji is apparent in the comparison that he makes in the following reply
to the S.S.C.'s queries concerning their welfare:
3. The nucleus of the inhabitants are old men and widows, strict
Muslims according to their lights, detribalized, deruralised. . .the
majority came originally from the coast and from neighbouring
territories... For them I have sympathy and respect...
5. Round this respectable nucleus have gathered in later years
natives from local reserves, who live by their wits and on their
fellows.. .Most have assumed the veneer of Islam but the tenuity of
this can be judged from their addiction to illicit brewing and
drunkenness.. .They are neither detribalized nor completely
deruralized. . .For such I have no sympathy.. .The problem of their
settlement is difficult...
6. There is, however, provision for the deruralized in the trading
centres in reserves and in the townships where there already exist
See CO 533/462/8, Public Records Office, London.
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Muslim communities with their mosques and other social and
religious amenities".10°
Second, the mahaji themselves were reluctant to return to the rural
areas. There are several plausible explanations for this: first, they had
acquired a distinctively urban, in other words, Swahili lifestyle which was
fundamentally incompatible with that of the rural traditional villages. They
had also internalized Swahili-Islamic religious and cultural values which
now set them apart from their non-Muslim relatives, making it difficult for
them to be integrated into the traditional social system. It was difficult for
such people to go back to the mainstream of the traditional society and its
ways, a great deal of which they had tried to abandon as a result of their
conversion. 101
Third, has been shown in the case of Ibrahim above, some of these
pioneer Mahaji had absconded from their homes. For such individuals, the
conditions in which they had left their homes many years before now made
it difficult for them to be re-absorbed into their families. Some of them had
maintained little or no connection with their places of origin and hence for
them, it was expedient to settle in or near a township.
Fourth, there was a marked sense of insecurity among the returning
mahaji, compelling them to live together in what the S.S.C. termed
accustomed social and religious association.'° 2 The idea of an individual
Muslim surrounded by non-believing neighbours to whom s/he could not
extend the customary majengo habits of visiting and exchanging
'°° The Governor of Kenya to the S.S.C., 29th August 1936. CO
533/462/8.
point can be illustrated by the case of M'Ibuuri in chapter 6 (pp.




information in neighbours' houses and the calendrical religious festivals
which are cherished by all, was clearly unattractive to the mahaji.'°3 It
was in these circumstances that the first band of mahaji set out to find a
setfiement in Meru. At first, the administration offered them a site some
eight miles from the town, but they rejected the offer because the place was
isolated from any trade centre and also prone to attack by the Dorobo.
Besides, there was no reliable source of water. They attempted to settle at
Gakoromone, then adjacent to the township land, but they were soon
thrown out by the owners of the land.'° 4 At this time, the Meru had not
come to terms with the idea of selling land, and exclusive individual rights
or possession of it were still unthinkable. As one colonial administrator
observed, though he failed to grasp the significance of the role of the clan
in matters of land and therefore distorted and misrepresented the idea,
The mwiriga (clan) is the land owner. The land belongs to the tribe
in general, but it is parcelled out among the mwiriga and the
mwiriga divides it amongst its members. No individual can alienate
land. In the case of alienation of land to non-natives, the kiama
(executive council of elders) would have the deciding voice.'05
Furthermore he noted that the clan ownership of the land embraced
"a conception of land tenure to which the European notions of absolute
ownership are quite foreign".'° 6 Therefore, when an ex-askari named
M'Kirika 'sold' the site on which Majengo now stands to the mahaji, the
clan abrogated the sale. As an individual, he did not have the mandate to
do this, the decision lay with the council of elders of the clan. The district
administrator acknowledged that "the elders of these bodies have
103 Interview with Mzee Ibrahim, Majengo, 26th October 1991.
'°' Interview with Halima and Nyanya, Majengo, 26th August 1991.
105 Annual Report, 19 12-13, DCIMRU/1i1.
106 Ibid
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supernatural powers and are empowered to lay a curse on people and
things".'°7 The duality of the role of the clan is described by Fadiman
thus:
To its members a clan consisted of the living and their ancestors. It
"lived," therefore, within not just the temporal world, but an
interrelated spiritual sphere as well. Reflecting this duality, the
councils existed within both secular and supernatural contexts.
Being aware of the role of the clan in the society: the implication of
its verdict on social issues; and the efficacy of its curses , if it became
necessary to resort to this ultimate measure, the mahaji sued for peace.'°8
By invoking the principle of impartiality enshrined in the law of the land,
which entitled them to fair treatment in spite of the fact that they had
"become Muslini", and consequently lost their place in the traditional
society, the mahafi appealed to the particular clan which had jurisdiction
over the area in question.'°9 Finally, they acquired the piece of land, then
outside the precincts of the township on the other side of Kathita river
where Majengo stands today.'1°
The first 20 houses were built within a relatively short time, and the
population began to increase as more mahaji poured in after the demolition
107 Dobb's report, 1920 cited in 1927 Annual Report, DCfMRU/1J1. Also
see LAMB 115/6. The efficacy of curse is illustrated by the Njia case in
chapter 2, pp. 111-114.
'°8 Mzee Salim (Interview) described in detail how the mahaji appeased
the elders by paying the required 'legal fees', that is honey beer and a goat
for the elders to consider their case.
109 The Meru judicial system stresses the principle of equality before the
law. For information on the Meru judicial system, see A. M. M'Imanyara
(1993:84).
110 Interview with Mzee Haniza, Majengo 3rd August 1991.
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of Pangarn. It was not long before the village, which by this time was
outside the precincts of the township, assumed a distinctive Majengo
character, not too different from the other two earlier settlements, the
Nubian and the Swahili.
Trade Centres
The presence of the Muslim elements scattered in the small trade
centres in other parts of the district also needs to be explained. The first
trade centre to be opened was Maua in 1910 and gazetted on 21111/1911;
then Njangwa (Tharaka) in 1912, Muthara in 1913, Igoji and Kirieni in
1915. By the end of 1915, it was reported that
All these centres have proved an unqualified success, they are
used by comparatively large number of Indians and Swahilis
and opening of a new centre has always been succeeded by an
increase in the volume of trade in the district."
This trend continued and by 1926, seven more trade centres had been
opened. In these centres most of the pioneer commercial plot owners at this
time, are foreigners: Indians, Arabs, and Swahili. There was also a
relatively large number of Muslims from Ethiopia, popularly known as
Abashi in most of the trade centres. Mutuati, which was opened in 1927,
became the centre of Abashi activity in Igembe, many of them having
somewhat established themselves and built a mosque at Kabachi,
approximately three miles from Mutuati (Tamani). At this time there was
a flourishing trade between Igembe and Garba Tulla and consequently most
of the Abashi could come down from Marsabit. But in 1939, probably due
" Annual Report, 1915-1916. It is also to be remembered that all the
Swahili and most of the Indians in the trade centres were Muslim.
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to the on-going Second World War, Mutuati was closed. The D.C. reports
that:
Mutuati ceased to be a Trade Centre at the end of the year but there
still remained the difficulty of finding residence and subsistence for
a number of the Abyssinians there. They have been in the country for
many years but rarely pay anything in the way of rents or taxes if
they can possibly avoid it."2
It is not clear how this problem was solved by the administration, but
all the Abashi were removed from Mutuati, only to reestablish themselves
in other centres. 113 Their mosque was demolished and the materials were
taken to Lare, another trade centre. There they were used for the
construction of the Mosque which was completed in the following year,
194O." For many years, this remained the only public mosque in Igembe,
with the annual maulid celebrations being held there, usually under the
leadership of N.F.D. sheikhs. But as we shall see in chapter five, the recent
increase in Muslim activity in the area has resulted in the construction of
a number of new mosques in Igembe in the last fifteen years.
Chuka is another centre with a significant Muslim population,
therefore it is necessary to give its historical background. Writing on the
history of the district in 1925, the District Commissioner, D.R. Crampton
reported that Chuka first came under nominal colonial control in 1907 when
Edward Butler Home, after crushing the Embu resistance, opened a station
there. In his explanation for tighter control of the area and its people, he
said that "the size of the district and the wild nature of the people
112 Ajual Report, 1939, DCIMRU/1J4.
" My informants say that the Abashi were dealing illegally in arms
with Ethiopia, and that is why they were moved and dispersed to other
trade centres in Igembe. See Annual Report, 1939, DCIMRU/1i4.
114 Interview with Sheikh Ibrahim, Kiengu mosque, 28th August 1991.
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necessitated most of the work close to the station"." 5 Therefore, the
outlying Chuka area would not be effectively controlled from Embu. 116 The
Chuka people were said to be rather stubborn, though" some real control"
was achieved in 1910. During the following year "considerable progress is
made", and in 1912 a road was cut through Chuka country. In 1913, it was
decided to make Chuka a sub-district and the site known as Katumbi was
selected for the new station, with Mr Orde-Brown as the A.D.C. in charge.
It seems that the same procedure as that of opening up the boma in Meru
was applied to Chuka:
The work on the station was undertaken on June 8th. Mr.Orde-
Brown arriving at the site with all the necessary loads on that date.
Work was at once began on the police and Tribal Retainers
lines...117
For our purpose, it is important to note that the administrator
arrived with all the necessary paraphernalia of a boma. Of particular
significance were the police lines, which, together with the porters' lines of
the accompanying porters and other servants, all of whom were generically
referred to as Swahili, were located on the present site of the Catholic
church. In comparison to the boma in Meru, Chuka was a small station, and
therefore the Swahili settlement was much smaller than any of the three
in Meru boma.
Soon the Swahili men took local wives, and a few Chuka individuals
were converted to Islam. These are joined by a number of pioneer Chuka
families who had been converted in Embu." 8 The Swahili were the usual
115 Meru Political Recordbook, 1908-24, DCIMRU/4/4.
116 Chuka Political Recordbook, 1925-1957, DCIMRU/4/5.
117 Chuka Political Recordbook, 1925-1957, DCIMRU/4/5.
118 Some of these were Oman Kagunda, Almas Njeru, whose sister was
married to an Asian, Oman Idd (from Kanyakine not Chuka), Abdallah
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mixture of people from diverse places, for instance, Kirugua who assumed
the leadership of the Muslim community, is said to be of Tanganyika
(Tanzanian) origin. He became the Imam of the mosque in the station and
also served as the teacher, and even performed the duties of a qadhi as he
conducted marriages between his fellow Muslim men and local women.
The station proved to be a flourishing trade centre, many traders
settled there and married the local women. Some of the traders left their
wives and travelled to Tharaka, which explains why the traders in Tharaka
were said to be "somewhat migratory"." 9 This migratory nature could be
attributed to aridity of Tharaka region, which, perhaps, hampered the
development of trade centres, with the result that no Muslim communities
were established there.
Chuka station was closed in 1928 or thereabout, and its residents
divided between Meru and Embu stations. The askaris were moved to Meru
and the majority of the other Muslims preferred to go to Embu.
After all, most of them had been converted there, and therefore it would be
easier for them to rejoin their godfathers than to start life afresh in Meru
boma, where they would be strangers, and would probably get caught in the
rivalry between the Muslim groups.
When the station reopened in 1941, a number of Muslims returned
to Chuka and first "squatted", as one of these returnees put it, at Ndagani,
Saidi (converted in Chuka), Au Ntaru (he had ran away from home to Embu
from where he went to Pangani in Nairobi), Ali Kaume, Mohammed
M'Arindiri, Hamisi Kathuu (a Kikuyu), and Mohammed Kathanju.
Interview, Joel M'Ikangi, Chuka, 23rd November 1991; and interview with
Mariam, Mjini, 26th November 1991.
" Annual Report, 1912-13 DCIMRU/1J1.
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a mile from the present Chuka township.' 2° Later on, they obtained a
piece of land from Thwagira clan, on the site that is now known as "Kwa
Swain", the place of the Swahili.' 21 The question that comes to mind is
why this failure if religion, as Peil suggests, "can be very useful in holding
together a group of people"? 122 When I posed this question to one of the
pioneer Chuka Muslims, he attributed the failure of Chuka Muslims to
establish a Majengo in spite of a the presence of a sizeable group of
Muslims living there, to two factors: first he explained that the pioneer
Chuka Muslims had not been fully integrated into the Swahili-Islamic
culture when they returned during the Second World War, for if they had
been, they would have established themselves at Ndagani where they first
squatted when they returned. But their newly acquired religious values,
which, after all, had not become deeply ingrained, were somewhat diluted;
and therefore, when it became necessary for them to settle in one place as
members of Muslim a community, it was difficult for them to forge
unity.' Seen in this light, it can be said that unlike the mahaji in Meru
town, the absence of the fundamental network of roles involving interaction
between individual members, which gives a Muslim group its distinctive
qualities, hampered the construction of a viable Muslim community in
Chuka.
120 Note that Chuka has recently been elevated to township status. In
1992 Meru district was divided into two districts: Tharaka-Nithi, with the
headquarters in Chuka; Meru; and Maua Sub-district with the
headquarters in Maua. Prior to this Chuka has been a trade centre.
121 The Imam of Chuka mosque, to whom I am grateful for this
information, explained that the clan was infuriated when a pioneer Muslim
convert, Omar Kagunda, who had been converted in Nairobi offered a piece
of land to the Muslims.
122 M. Peil, 1977:218.
' Interview with Almas, Chuka 23rd November 1991.
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The second factor is the hostility of the majority of the Chuka people
towards their kinsmen who had converted to Islam. This hostility, he said,
is manifest in the long standing dispute between the local council (perhaps
because the council nowadays has replaced clan in matters of land
ownership) and the Muslims over the ownership of the piece of land in
question. However, in 1981, it was decided that, in spite of the legal tussle,
the construction of the new mosque should commence. But no sooner had
the construction began than the council invaded the site and bulldozed the
foundations of the mosque. With the help from some prominent Muslims in
Meru town,astrong deputation sought the intervention of the relevant
authorities of the local government. The council was ordered to restore the
foundations of the mosque and pay compensation to the Muslims.
Notwithstanding the order, the council neither paid the compensation nor
restored the demolished foundations. The matter was left in abeyance for
quite some time. But with external donations through the Islamic
Foundation, the Muslims managed to put up a magnificent mosque that
now overlooks the desolated Kwa Swain (the place of the Swahili). Thus the
spatial and consequently the social development of a Majengo in Chuka has
been hampered by numerous factors, and when one looks at the so-called
"place of the Swahili", except for the magnificent white-washed mosque with
its tall minarets dominating the scene, the few thatch-and-mud houses
scattered haphazardly in the midst of banana trees, clearly show little
semblance to the Majengo communalism that is typical of Muslim
settlements in urban centres.
Conclusion
Muslim presence in Meru is a direct result of the establishment of
the colonial administration there. Prior to the arrival of the British
administrator, Edward Butler Home and his men in 1908, the Meru people
were living quietly on the slopes of Mount Kenya as they had done for
centuries. As has been said, those accompanying Mr. Home, that is the
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K.A.R. company, the police and porters, were largely Muslim. People from
diverse backgrounds constituted the heterogenous group that came to
identify itself as the Swahili in Meru. The settlement of the various groups
in different parts of then embryonic station came to reinforce the notion of
separate identity for each group. The arrival of the mahaji from Nairobi and
other towns and the establishment of their settlement outside the town
precincts in what is now Majengo added a new dimension to the intra-
Muslim relations in the station, it now became a Muslim triad: the Swahili,
Nubian and mahaji. These groups formed the nucleus Muslim communities
in Meru. The Indians in their bazaar formed another group, but due to the
racial segregation obtaining at that time there was little interaction
between them and the Africans.
The trade centres proved a big success for trade in the district and
the role of the Asians in spreading Islam to these centres cannot be
overlooked. Some of the Asian traders based in the township set up
businesses in the trade centres, for instance, Mohammed Moti opened a
posho mill in Maua. He was also permitted to open a shop at Chuka, even
before the station was gazetted as a trade centre in 1913. It is reported
that, besides meeting the needs of the residents of the station, his shop
attracted the Chuka people and soon a promising trade sprung up. Some of
the Asians who settled in these trade centres were Muslim. They were
joined by a few other foreigners, especially the Abashi, people from Ethiopia
who were Muslim.
These foreigners and their families remained the only pioneer
Muslims in the centres until they were joined by a few indigenous people,
especially traders who acquired plots and settled in the trade centres with
their families. At this time, there was virtually no Muslim family outside
the trade centres, thus living up to the Islamic reputation of being an urban
religion until the early 1970s.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE APPROPRIATION OF ISLAM IN MERU: DIM VERSUS
USHENZI
Introduction
By late 1920s, the three African Muslim groups,' that is the Swahili,
the Nubiaris and the mahaji or converts, were well established in separate
quarters in and around the Meru township. Symbolically, the Nubians
occupied the higher ground on the ridge abutting the township on the
eastern side; the Swahili were at the centre; while the mahaji were perched
on the opposite western ridge, outside the township boundary.
Islam and 'Swahiliness' are synonymous in the minds of most people
living far in the interior of Kenya. Thus, the presence of the Muslim group
that identified itself as 'Swahili', and the converts who identified themselves
as mahaji vis-a-vis the Swahili group in Meru, has to be seen against the
coastal background, that is the underlying ideas and concepts associated
with being a Mswahili. It is the process of transposing the Swahili coastal
ideals of 'urbanity' and 'civilization', albeit in a 'fossilized' form, that
tempered the local representations of Islam far away from its traditional
abode at the coast.
'Swahiliness' and Swahilization constitute a vast topic. While caution
will be taken not to get entangled in the maze of information on this issue
created both by historians and by anthropologists of the Swahili culture,
1 The Asians in the Bazaar constitute another group, but due to the racial
segregation and disharmony at this time, there was very little in the way of
interaction between the Asian Muslims and the African Muslims. Though the
Sunni Asians prayed in the Swahili mosque, they kept racial boundaries clear.
Ahmadis and Ismailis maintained their sectarian mosques.
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reference will be made to it here in so far as it is relevant to the study of
Muslim presence and representations of Islam in Meru. It is necessary first
to define the underlying coastal notions of 'urbanity' and 'civilization' in
order to understand the nature of the Swahilizingflslamizing influence in
Meru.
Explaining Ungwana and Ushenzi
The classic view that the East African coastal settlements were
established by Arab and Persian colonists, with the result of a dominant
Middle-Eastern culture, is changing drastically as more evidence is being
discovered which suggests that Islam was "grafted onto the local" 2 cultural
milieu of the East African coastal towns. Whatever the truth, the coastal
society, as Bergman observes, has functioned over the centuries through "a
sort of coastal meta-cosmology" whose "key oppositional dyads... are
ustaarabu/nyika (Arabness/civilization and town/bush), Muslim/mshenzi
(pagan or savage), waungwana/watume (freemen/slaves)". 3 This coastal
meta-cosmology is brought to bear upon the nature of Islam that is
introduced in Meru. Therefore, a brief historical background to these
"oppositional dyads" is a necessary preamble to the discussion on the nature
of Muslim influence in Meru.
El-Zein traces the genesis of the concept of ungwana to the earliest
Lamu inhabitants who were divided into the 'more free', ess free' and slave
categories.4 With the emergence of various strata in the traditional Lamu
2 j• de V. Allen, 1980:3 14.
J. Bergman, 1988:3.
4 stratification on the coast is well covered in the literature, for instance,
A. H. M. El-Zein (1974:19-42) examines the origins of the different groups in
Lamu, traces the development of social stratification and describes the division of
the early Laniu society into various strata. F. Constantin (1989) and A. I. Salim
(1976) have also dealt with the stratification of the coastal society.
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society, the control of education by a certain class of people and the
marriage rules provided the means of creating and sustaining an elaborate
social stratification. Ideologically, tie waungwana system was based on the
concept of hishima, which according to El-Zein, "is not only respect, or even
honour; it also involves the maintenance of the position in which respect or
honour is due" (his emphasis). 5 To protect one's hishima was of prime
importance to waungwana. Marriage between equals provided the necessary
protection for the principles of hshima.
Furthermore, "a person's position in this stratfficatory system was
determined by the category to which he belonged". 6 Birth determined a
person's position and occupation and place of residence. People of higher
categories were expected to observe heshima, that is respect, honor and
status, by behaving in accordance with the society's expectations of them as
members of waungwana class. Similarly, people of low strata had to observe
the behaviour expected of those within the boundaries of their particular
stratum. Waungwana had to keep a distance from the lower classes. As a
result the slaves who were treated as 'uncivilized' 'bush people' lived in mud
houses on the farmlands where they worked on the mainland while the
waungwana lived in stone houses in the town. The town was the centre of
civilization and its inhabitants, the waungwana were the civilized, as
opposed to the 'uncivilized' non-waungwana, washenzi.7
The most important feature of the coastal settlements, at least in the
eyes of their occupants was precisely the nature of their urbanity. A
sort of spectrum was rapidly established, extending from the longest
established groups in any settlement to the complete rural-dwellers,
the former were seen as 'civilized', 'urbane'; while the latter were
'uncouth', 'country bumpkins', 'savages'. The two Swahili terms




expressing these concepts are respectively u-ungwana and ushenzi.8
It is worthwhile quoting Allen at some length on this issue since he has
paid more attention to the origin of the coastal social differentiation than
any other scholar.9 The situation that arose is vividly captured by him
thus:
A contradiction inevitably grew up between newcomers and those
who had founded the settlements or had lived there long enough to
lose all traces of their former cultural
This process became cyclic and in the long term, over several generations
the non-waungwana
too would become long established town residents and would begin
to resent the washenzi of the still more recent arrivals and to side
with the waungwana against them. And when the chance came...
these same people could seldom resist the temptation to take it and
so became waungwana themselves, thereby perpetuating not only
most of the older values, but also the very concept of u-ungwana."
8j de V. Allen, 1980:3 16.
The Swahili culture and language is one of the most extensively studied
aspects of East African history. J.de V. Allen has written extensively on the
concept of urbanity and civilization, among other aspects of the Swahili society,
see J. de V. Allen (1973) "Swahili Culture Reconsidered", "Town and Country"
(1974), "Swahili Culture and Identity" (1976 b), "The Swahili House: Cultural and
Ritual Concepts Underlying its Plan and Structure" (1979), "Swahili Culture and
the Nature of East African Coastal Settlement" (1980) and his most recent book,
The Origins of the Swahili (1993), published posthumously.
10 J de V. Allen 1979:4.
"Thid., p.4.
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At the coast, town life epitomized the core of civility and urbanity
(u-ungwana), and the 'civilized' (waungwana) sought to put a divide
between themselves and the 'uncivilized' (washenzi) in every sphere: social,
political and economic, though with little success in regard to the latter,
owing to their inevitable dependence on the hinterland "washenzi whom the
townsmen affected to despise" to use Allen's words. In order to sustain this
divide, the waungwana arrogated to themselves certain rights and
privileges, thus marking themselves off from the 'uncivilized'
non-waungwana groups. They lived in a separate quarter of the town and
as Allen argues, u-ungwana was based on the stone house culture. They
used a particular mode of dress, for instance, and
by holding on to such relatively trivial points, they were able to
preserve the facade of their superiority over migrant traders and
others...'2
The points which Allen considers to be trivial, were nevertheless
important enough to sustain the facade of superiority of one group over
another; therefore, they may not be as trivial as he suggests. As has just
been said, the concepts were deep-rooted: the washenzi were uncultured and
ungwana, defined as it was, in terms of stone dwellings and length of
residence in towns, was cumulative, "derived from generations" and could
not be otherwise acquired by the newcomers.
For many centuries therefore, Islam and ungwana, were intimately
related. Pouwels makes a particularly important point about the
relationship between Islam and ungwana:
'Civilization' for the period roughly before the middle of the 19th
century was rendered by the word uungwana. This word embodied
12 J• de V. Allen, 1980:3 17.
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all connotations of exclusiveness about town life as well as its
positive expressions... '3
The wind of change began to blow at the beginning of the 19th
century - the internal threat from the slaves and their children (wazaliya)
who constituted another social class that undermined the fundamental
ungwana principle of marriage only between equals, coupled with the
cultural impactthe Busaid Arabs,' 4 cracked the very core, and led to what
El-Zein terms the "passing of the traditional society".' 5 Waungwana
exclusivity began to peter out. But the old concepts of 'civilization' and
urbanity as defined by Waungwana did not die out; in a sense, they became
'fossilized'. Even after the abolition of slavery in 1907 and the manumission
of slaves, the ideology of social differentiation remained unchanged.16
The essence of the perceived differences between the coastal dwellers
and the communities of the interior is aptly summed up by Janmohamed:
The people of the littoral could easily perceive the contrast between
themselves and the indigenous population of the hinterland: while
they themselves possessed a universalistic faith with a book, a
literary tradition and an urban civilization, the people of the interior
were seen as possessing none of these characteristics. In the eyes of
a people also deeply embedded in the system of slavery, these people
naturally appeared somewhat inferior.. 17
13 R. L. Pouwels, 1987:72.
l4 the Arab Busaid dynasty in Zanzibar began to exert a cultural as well as
a political impact upon the coastal society after the mid 19th century, coastal
civilization and Arabness, ustaarabu, became associated.
' See A. H. M. El-Zein, 1974:45-10 1.
16 F Constantin (1989:149) notes that the ideological representations of slavery
and other forms of discrimination "were not immediately eradicated from
individual minds, collective beliefs and daily attitudes".
17 K K Janmohamed, 1976:195.
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As the contact between the coastal peoples and the interior increased
in the late 19th century and early 20th century, these ideas found their way
into the interior, where the emerging communities in the new
administrative centres "adopted a recognizably Swahili" character. The
cyclic process that Allen describes above, was first replicated in the
relationship between the groups that identified themselves as the 'Swahili'
and the pioneer local converts, or mahaji as they came to be known, in such
administrative (later urban) centres as Meru.
Reinventing Ungwana in Meru
As has been said above, the coastal social setup was built upon the
institution of slavery where the distinctions between the free-born
(Waungwana) and the unfree members of the society were given prominence
in the arena of social interaction. But the group that initially identified
itself as 'Swahili' in Meru transmuted these concepts in the new social
environment, radically different from that at the coast. The irony, as will
be illustrated below, is that most of these people who tried to re-enact the
coastal social stratification, a stratification largely based on slavery, were,
to use Janmohamed's words, "the people of the interior' who possessed
"none of these characteristics" 18 that constituted the core of coastal
urbanity. They were not waungwana, they were not the descendants of the
progenitors of Lamu that El-Zein describes in his analysis of the traditional
Lamu society.'9 They were, as the house-owners figure given below
illustrate, Wanyamwezi, Wasukuma, Manyema and others "from more
distant places"2° who had been added to the list of Swaliilized peoples,
individuals whom the real waungwana of the coast were loath to accept as
anything better than 'uncivilized', or to quote Allen yet again, whom they
18 K Jimmohamed, 1976:195.
' A. H. M. El-Zein, 1974:19-33.
20 A. I. Salim, 1985:216.
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"affected to despise", who now posed as the waungwana of Meru. Some of
these from west of Lake Tanganyika, as Hobley informs us,
had filtered down to the coast with returning caravans; the majority
however, having first been enslaved and then embracing the doctrine
of Islam, had lost all connection with their particular tribe.2'
Also after the abolition of slavery, some of the freed slaves sought
employment in European farms, and the Uganda railway. They also found
jobs as porters, askaris, clerks and servants. 22 A good example of these
were a number of people (Wangaziya) who traced their origins to the
Comoro Islands in the Indian Ocean. At the coast, though they had
embraced Islam and many of the knew the Quran well, they were kept in
servitude by the wangwana.23 When they came to Meru as servants of the
colonial administration, they projected themselves as second only to
Europeans, and treated the mahaji with as much disdain as they did non-
Muslims.24
Evidence for the diversity of the people that constituted the Swahili
group in Meru is borne out by a rough listing 25 of the house owners in
what came to be known as the "Swahili village" in the growing township:
Comorians 31%





21 C. Hobley, 1928:187.
22 R. L. Pouwels, 1987:194.
A. H. M. El-Zein, 1974:28-30.
24 Interview with Mzee Ibrahim, Majengo, 26th August 1991.
25 have computed the percentages from a list of house owners in the file on
Nubian village, DCIMRU/2/4/10.
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The list of house owners says little about the composition of the resident
population of the Swahili village. Nonetheless, the figures of house
ownership suggest that only a small proportion of the house owners could
trace their origins to the coastal Swahili society. Thus the identity of the
Swahili was not the product of a single culture, but of the interweaving of
many traditions. Nzibo put his finger on this fusion of cultures:
many tribal rites and traditions passed for Islamic rites and
traditions of coastal Muslims especially those from Tanganyika
passed for Islamic practices. Many upcountry mahaji adopted these
rites and customs in the mistaken belief that they were Islamic, and
therefore much of what was passed to them were cultural beliefs of
the Wadigo, Wanyamwezi and Wamanyema, etc.26
However, implicit in his argument, is the assumption that this
process of codification of diverse traditions into the Swahili culture is
unislamic. The crudity of this rather antiquated notion of syncretism in
African Islam should be acknowledged. He echoes the classic view that
Islam was 'accommodated' or 'accommodated itself in African cultures. He
disregards the fact that the process of Islamization in Africa is two-way: the
Islamization of the practices of the people that adopt Islam; and the
practical indigenization of Islam in the ensuing cultural interaction. What
is and what is not perceived as Islamic is relative and varies from time to
time, and society to society, dependent upon the mode of this interaction.
Sanneh in his illuminating article on the domestication of Islam,
argues that, contrary to the view that the Islamization of African peoples
hinged on the "flexibility" and "adaptive power" of Islam, "traditional Africa
sustained the Muslim impact by investing the new religion with its own
identity, not by yielding to it". 27 This phenomenon is well illustrated by the
process of codification and reification of the 'Swahili Islam' in East Africa.
26 Y. A. Nzibo, 1986:121.
27 L. Sanneh, 1980:2.
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This may help to explain the lack of a precise answer to the intriguing
question of 'who is a Mswahili'. The process of Swahilization continues,
albeit in varying degrees and shades. According to Beckerleg:
people can aspire to become Swahili, as many diverse people have
done over centuries. They have adopted the values of the culture
along with the external trappings that proclaim their allegiance.
From an outsider's perspective they may be described as 'Swahili'
while from within labels more precise and redolent of status are
attached. The value of the term Swahili lies in its application to
people of diverse ethnic origin, who broadly share a common
language, culture, religion and who have taken the preoccupation of
Swahili society as their own.28
Beckerleg makes a significant point about becoming Swahili - the
process has been happening for many centuries, and those to whom the
label is attached by others, they regard themselves as other than Swahili.
However, when they adopt the 'Swahili culture', they also bring something
with them. Determining the extent to which the visitors from across the
Indian Ocean influenced the so-called 'Swahili culture', has been the focus
of many coastal scholars, with little contribution being attributed to the
interior peoples. Though Nzibo sees their contribution as unislamic, at least
he acknowledges the fact that the cultural beliefs and practices of the
Wadigo, Wanyamwezi, Wamanyema and many others, became part of the
Swahili culture and were passed on to the Muslim converts. Over the years,
layers of practices have continued to pile up as more people graduate into
the Swahili category. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between what
is originally 'Swahili' Islamic practice, and what is originally Nyamwezi or
other Swahilized and hence Islamized practice.
As has been said above, in the coastal social setting, the population
was divided by wealth, kinship, and of course residence in time and space.
28 5• Beckerleg, 1990:27.
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In the absence of the fundamental values attached to the traditional coastal
notions of civility, namely, stone houses; financial credibility; length of
residence in town; and more importantly kinship, the group that identified
itself as the 'Swahili' and assumed the mantle of ungwana in Meru, had to
find viable substitutes, onto which its members could hold. Here they found
themselves in a strange and rather hostile social environment, where they
were numerically insignificant, but by creating a web of relations
functioning at different levels, they turned what might have been their
predicament into an asset by trying to mirror the coastal society: to the
mahaji or converts, they posed as the exemplars of the faith, the
waungwana - with their feeling of superiority hinged on the claim to
superiority of "those born in the faith" over "mere converts", that is
kuzaliwa katika dini, as opposed to kusilimishwa. 29 Considerable emphasis
was laid on the superiority of those who were Muslim by 'birth' over those
who had been converted to Islam. Kuzaliwa katika dini automatically
placed its 'holders', since it was regarded more or less like a qualification,
on a higher level than the converts. It is interesting to examine the
application of the coastal notions of civility in what can be termed a
'fossilized' form as the Muslims in Meru tried to mirror the coastal society.
'A Country Cock Does Not Crow in Town'
Both the Swahili and the Nubians looked down upon the inahaji as
"mere converts". The prevailing attitude was that, since the mahaji in
Majengo had been converted, they could not be equal to the Swahili. As said
in chapter 1 the use of the term 'mahaji' itself was somewhat derogatory.
It connoted lack of religious profundity:
29 For a fuller discussion on the function of 'birth' in construction of a common
Muslim community identity, see chapter 3, pp.153-154.
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What do they know, these are newcomers to dini? Only recently they
were washenzi, before we came to Meru and brought religion and
civilization. We taught them how to wash and dress themselves.30
In such debasing remarks, the attitude of the 'exemplars of faith' to the
converts is evident. 3 ' Underpinning this attitude towards converts was the
coastal notion of inequality, now imported into Meru and expressed in the
proverb that: "Jogoo Ia sham bani haliwiki mjini", meaning that 'a country
cock does not crow in town'. 32 This proverb makes a particularly important
point - it emphasizes the position of the mahaji vis-a-vis the Swahili in
Meru. It is necessary here to point out that this notion was also
symbolically reinforced by the location of Majengo outside the township.33
At a glance, both the proverb and the sheikh's statement cited above,
fit Janmohazned's rationalization of the perceived differences between
people of the coast and those of the hinterland. But as has been illustrated
above, hardly any waungwana joined the caravans or sought work in the
European farms or worked as servants for the colonial administrators in the
inland stations. Therefore, the few of those in Meru who could trace their
origin to the coast proper were people from the lower social strata. The
30 lnterview with Sheikh Mamoun, Mjini, 26th October 1991. As will be shown
in the next chapter, even the children born to the Meru women married to the
Nubian ex-Askaris were not allowed to speak their mothers' language, that is
Kimeru. It was regarded as the language of washenzi. The children were
encouraged to learn their fathers' language, that is Kinubi, which H. Kyemba,
(1977:18) has termed the Nubians' "own version of Arabic".
31 Similarly, the term 'Haji' was contemptuously applied to the Digo converts,
see D. C. Sperling, 1970:74.
32 Interview with Mwanaidi, Mjini, 20th November 1991.
It has been said above that the returning mahaji acquired a piece of land for
their settlement on the ridge beyond Kathita river, outside the precincts of the
township. It was much later when the area was brought within the boundaries of
the township.
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majority of the so-called Swahili in Meru were people of diverse
backgrounds, themselves possessing none of the ancient coastal literary
tradition and urban civilization. They fit the description of the category that
Nzibo, in his analysis of the social hierarchy in the early Swahili-Muslim
communities of Nairobi, calls mwinyi. He suggests that, prior to the second
world war, the African Muslims could be divided into three social classes:
the waungwana, the mwinyi and the mahaji. The mahaji were at the
bottom of the ladder. The mwinyi class consisted of a variety of
Tanganyikan and central African tribes who had come to Kenya as porters
or askaris, and people who had come from the coast as Muslims.34
Yet in opposition th the mahaji, they projected themselves as the
model of Swahili-Islamic civilization. As I have suggested above, they
assumed the role of waungwana and the mahaji were often reminded that
they were the 'country bumpkins', unfamiliar with the notion of urbanity
and 'civilization'.
This attitude was explicitly expressed through song and dance during
the annual religious festivals. The festivals, besides their intrinsic religious
value, provided an opportunity for each group th express its identity in
relation and opposition to another. Mwanaidi who was a young 'Swahili'35
woman then, describes the happenings in which we see this expression of
identity, with a feeling of nostalgia:
On Idd day, individuals organized feasts in their homes and the
prayers were performed by all at the Swahili mosque. In the
subsequent three days, the township was a hub of activity: the young
sung and danced, they moved in processions, beginning at the
Swahili village and ending at the Nubian on the fourth day.
Y. A. Nzibo, 1986:140
Mwanaidi was born to a Mnyamwezi father and a Meru mother, and
therefore she was not classed among the mahaji. She identified herself and was
identified by others as a 'Swahili'.
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These processions were usually highly emotionally charged and the
leading elders often lost control over the excited youths and women.
Consequently, the end of the celebrations was marked by fierce
fighting, sparked off by the insinuating songs. These songs were
deliberately provocative, the dancers launched scathing attacks on
their rivals.
Provocation and violence were inevitable. The tension that
accumulated throughout the festivities, usually exploded into a fight -
it was a collective responsibility to protect the members against any
external attack. These episodes were strikingly dramatic. As the
groups moved in processions, watu wa mashambani, that is the
'country bumpkins', as the mahaji were referred to, would defiantly
not give way to the Swahili or Wanyamwezi wa unga na kikapu, that
is 'the Nyamwezi who subsisted on maizemeal', as the mahaji in turn
referred to them.
Such defiance and provocation usually resulted in fighting between
the groups. Consequently, the police intervened to stop the clashes,
but their intervention usually failed to see the end to the matter
until the elders deliberated on the issue and exacted a fine from the
aggressors. Exacting a fine from the aggressors did not serve as a
deterrent because the same events were repeated in the following
year, nevertheless. Similarly, maulid celebrations were organized
separately in each village in turn, with each trying to outdo the
other.36
Here the songs provided an effective medium of communication
between the various groups: the singers directed sharp criticism at their
rivals and at the same time expressed their group identities in a way that
might have been otherwise difficult, if not impossible to do. The mahaji , for
instance, as members of Juinuia-tul-Baladia expressed their sympathy for
the nationalist cause and voiced dislike for the Swahili hegemonic
tendencies. The role of song and dance in expressing various themes has
been given an interesting analysis by Spencer. 37 He gives various functions
of dance as: vehicle for expressing emotion and feeling; and dance as a
means of generating group cohesion. Seen in the light of Spencer's analysis,
the festivities in Meru, besides providing entertainment, furnished a forum
36 Interview with Mwanaidi, Mjini, 20th November 1991.
" P. Spencer, 1985:1-38.
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for people to express their community identity, not only as a religious but
also as a social group through the use of song and dance. 38 This explains
the popularity of these events and the enthusiasm with which they were
executed.
In his study of the early Muslim communities of Nairobi, Nzibo,
provides background information to the military type of dance associations
that emerged among the Muslim communities in many urban centres in
Kenya. On discharge after the First World War, African soldiers who had
acquired some skill in playing in the military brass band, promoted a
military type of dance known as beni (band) dance. The dancers imitated
the Scottish regiments and the dancing clubs were named after sections of
the British armed forces: Kingi (King), Scotchi (Scotts), Marini (Marines)
and Arinoti (Aeronautics). Similar dancing associations were formed in
various towns; many people, men and women, became associated with "the
new dance craze". 39 In the 1920s, other dances: mserego from Zanzibar,
ngoma from Lamu and kimungwe, a kind of Scottish country dance, were
introduced among the Muslim communities in Nairobi. Again, the outbreak
of the Second World War was to revitalize the dance associations and
provide motivation for the formation of new ones, for instance; Arabia
Congo dance association was formed in Nairobi in 1939.° In Meru,
kimungwe and Arabia Congo established themselves, though with much less
success than they had achieved in Nairobi. As Strobel observed among the
Muslim women in Mombasa, dances were performed during weddings and
38 Jso see A. Cohens, Masquerade Politics for another example of this kind of
study.
Y. A. Nzibo, 1986:165.
4° In terms of the organization and enthusiasm, and perhaps as an expression
of identity, these street associations and the dance performances, could be
compared to the West Indian carnival celebrations, though the carnival is on a
grander scale. See Abner Cohen's (1993) study of the London Notting Hill
Carnival.
86
religious calendrical communal celebrations where "antagonisms were
revealed in song".4'
Rivalry is a salient characteristic of the Swahili society and maulid
and other social events, including marriage ceremonies, have over the years
provided the means for expressing this rivalry. There is a competitive edge
to almost every social communal and even personal affair. Beckerleg
reminds us of the 19th-century rivalry among the Swahili city-states that
precipitated their decline: "the history of the Swahili shows rival ethnic
groups and towns in a continuous battle for power and social position".42
Again, the significance of playing up the notions of 'Swahiliness' for the
group that came to identi1y and be identified as the 'Swahili' in Meru
should be borne in mind. These celebrations therefore, in their own
significant way, perpetuated the rivalry that characterized these
communities as they endeavoured to mirror the coastal society in a
completely different social setting in Meru.
In order to illustrate the attempt to emulate the traditional coastal
society, I will examine some of the concepts and idioms which were
borrowed from the ungwana culture and reinterpreted to fit the exigencies
of the life of the emerging Muslim communities in Meru. As said above,
control of education by the waungwana who viewed the slaves and all non-
waungwana, "as incapable of understanding sophisticated knowledge",
was one of the ways of creating and sustaining social differentiation in the
Lamu traditional society. Similarly, in a bid to isolate the mahaji and
legitimate their own paternalistic tendencies, the Swahili in Meru argued
that the mahaji, being mere converts and therefore, lacking in religious
41 For a fuller description of Lelemama dance associations, see M. Strobel,
1976:213.
42 5• Beckerleg, 1990:15.
A. H. M. El-Zein, 1974:35.
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profundity, could not even provide qualified religious teachers for their
children.
But some of these mahaji had come from Nairobi where they had
witnessed the widespread disaffection towards the Swahili, when it was
realized that the Swahili had all along paid lip-service to Islam, and used
it cunningly to foster their own hegemonic interests. 45 The experiences of
these mahaji in Pangani46 were brought to bear upon the situation in
Meru, by providing the motivation and means to resist Swahili paternalism.
Therefore, they found two teachers from among themselves: Mzee Twa and
Asuman Nchurai, each of whom ran and maintained a school in which
religious instruction was given to the mahaji children in the teacher's
house. Nevertheless, the Swahili insisted on providing a teacher for the
mahaji on the grounds that their own men could not pronounce the Arabic
words correctly since they were not used to speaking Kiswahili or Arabic.47
This move was vehemently resisted by the mahaji.
At issue here was not their competence - whether or not these two
men were qualified to teach - but principally that they were themselves
mahaji, and therefore not capable of mastering religious knowledge, which
was then considered to be the prerogative of individuals from a social class
Interview with Nyanya, Majengo, 23rd October 1991.
For further information on the controversy between the new teachers
returning from the coast and the Swahili leaders in old Pangani whose social
status depended upon their putative religious authority, see A. Kubai 1992:40.
46 In his analysis of the social stratification in the Muslim villages of Nairobi
prior to the Second World War, Y. A. Nzibo (1986:40) identified three social
classes: waungwana, mwinyi and mahaji. In Pangani, the mahaji, as converts,
were at the bottom of the social ladder and "resented the religious domination and
also the open discrimination practiced by them" (the Swahili).
47 Mzee Ibrahim claimed that the two mahaji teachers, Mzee Twa and Asuman
Nchurai were more qualified than most, but they would hardly be recognized as
such by the Swahili.
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or group to which these two did not belong. The point of contention was not
their Muslim learning, but their status on the scale of the 'Swahili' culture.
This scale, as has been said above, was drawn upon what I have termed
'fossilized' notions of civility, notions which seem somewhat misplaced in the
modern society, since the traditional distinction between waungwana and
washenzi was applicable only in a system of social inequality then based on
the institution of slavery.
Nonetheless, this notion of inequality found new expression and
meaning in the distinction between those who saw themselves as the
exemplars of the Muslim faith in Meru and the converts. Group identity
was constructed through the reenactment of selected aspects of coastal
urbanity, class locality, affiliation and ascribed social status, elements
which were now transposed in a different milieu in Meru. Marriage also
became instrumental not only in confirming a person's position in one
group, but also for obtaining such a position. A case of two sisters could well
illustrate this point: Kainda, the elder sister, married into the Swahili
community (though she told me that her husband was a Mnyamwezi) and
therefore lived in the Swahili village; while her younger sister married a
mahaji and lived in Majengo.
Kainda, married to a 'Swahili' man (since a Nyamwezi was not
considered to be mahaji but a Swahili) gained a certain respectability as a
wife of a Mswahili and effectively abandoned her former (shenzi) status,
acquiring her husband's 'Swahili' status. She and her children identified
themselves as Swahili. In contrast, her sister, Karimi, who married into the
mahaji community identified herself as a mahaji and therefore was
considered unequal to her sister. Of course they were not considered to
Interview with Karimi, Mjini, 26th November 1991. She explained that
though both the sisters had been converted through marriage to Muslim men, they
were not considered by the Swahili to be equal - Karimi was treated as one of the
'Swahili', while her sister was seen as a mahaji or convert.
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be equal in status because the one was considered to be a Swahili and the
other a mahaji - as I have explained above, in the eyes of the Swahili a
mahaji was one without religious profundity. Thus Kainda and her sister
belonged to two social-religious categories by virtue of marriage. However
Karimi's children, as will be shown in the next chapter, were considered to
be equal to their (Swahili) cousins, since they, unlike their parents, were
born in the faith and not converted.
As will be illustrated in the next chapter, the first generation of
Muslims descending from the mahaji attached a great deal of importance
to "religious names". 49 The reason for this was that, after conversion, one
acquired an Arabic name in addition to the Kimeru name or names.
Therefore a person's name, for instance Au M'Ingentu, was indicative of his
religious background - it was possible to tell that he was a convert who had
acquired an Arabic name after conversion and retained his Kimeru name
or names. In contrast, his children's first names were Arabic, to which they
appended Ali as their surname: one was Yusufu Ali and the other Abdallah
Au. For this second generation of Muslims, emerging from the mahaji
section, it was important to have double Arabic names without Kimeru
appendages in order to obliterate their mahaji background. Perhaps it is
this phenomenon that led Nzibo to conclude that "the process of
Swahilization seems to have been very effective among second generation
mahaji"5° in Nairobi. In Meru, they were considered by the Swahili to be
on a higher stratum (at par with their Swahili cousins) and therefore better
Muslims than their mahaji parents. They were considered to be better
Muslims than their parents because they had acquired their religious status
through birth and not through conversion.5'
See chapter 3, (p.154) for more information on the significance of having
double Arabic names.
° Y. A. Nzibo, 1986:13 1.
' Interview with Abdallah, Majengo 26th August 1991.
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It is useful here to show how an individual's identity could shift back
and forth. Mwanaisha's life history as she narrated it is a good example:
I was brought up by my aunt who was married to a Mngaziya, (a
Comorian) and therefore, I was not considered to be a mahaji. In fact
very few people, if any, knew that this Mngaziya was my uncle and
not my father. I was tutored in the Swahili way and when I grew up,
I was taken to a tutor (somo) who prepared me for marriage. I was
first married to a Somali K.A.R. man. But I did not like him, so I ran
away and came back to my aunt. After some time I married
Athnmrn, one of the pioneer mahaji founders of Majengo. I lived
with him here in Majengo. Though I grew as a Swahili girl, since my
aunt was married to the Mngaziya and everyone thought I was their
own daughter, after marriage to Athuman, I was treated as one of
the mahaji. Those days, the Swahili looked down upon the mahaji
and each group tried to maintain a separate identity. I knew that by
marrying Athunian, not only would I have to live in Majengo which
was then only occupied by mahaji , but also identify with the mahaji.
For instance, during weddings and other occasions when we were
invited to the other side, (either by the Nubian or the Swahili) I
would sit in the rnahaji group, and not among the Swahili.52
In her life time, Mwanaisha's identity changed twice. Before she was
adopted by her Muslim aunt, she was just like any of her six siblings, but
when she left her village and went to live in town with her aunt, life
changed and she became a different person: she learnt Kiswahili, and
acquired all the external trappings of Swahili-Islamic culture. That is the
first change of identity because she became a Mswahili, and therefore
different from her non-Muslim brothers and sisters who were left in the
village.
She was brought up as a Swahili girl, and retained this identity even
after her marriage to a Somali soldier. But after her marriage to Athuman,
her identity and status changed - she was now regarded as one of the
52 Interview with Mwanaisha, Majengo 23rd October 1991.
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mahaji by her Swahili relatives. Shift in identity was reflected in the
change of place of residence and vice versa. This was particularly so because
Majengo was then outside the township, and therefore, Mwanaisha's move
from the Swahili village to Majengo signified a departure from one
community to anther. The implication of such a shift of identity was that
one had to remain within the social boundaries of one's group - Mwanaisha
had to identify with the mahaji and not the Swahili. By marrying into the
mahaji community, Mwanaisha lost her place among the Swahili. At that
time, (late 1920s and 30s) the social boundaries between the converts and
the standard bearers of the faith, that is the Swahili, and the mahaji, were
clearly delineated.
'He Who Walks With a Fisherman Smells of Fish'
In Meru, the underlying concept of dint, in other words, the cultural
dimension of Islam, was manipulated by the Muslims to define and sustain
themselves as a separate group. The ushenzi and ungwana/dini constructs
were used to shape the relationship with non-Muslims. Part of the ethos of
being a Muslim meant exercising the restraints within the parameters of
what was understood to be ungwana, that is shunning ushenzi. Their
representation of Islam to the rest of the Meru society could be summed up
by the proverb 'he who walks with a fisherman smells of fish', (mfuatana
na mwuzi hunuka vumba).
During the first 18 years after their arrival, there was little
interaction between the Muslims and the Meru people. Except for the
occasional marriage to local women, it appears that the presence of the
Swahili and Nubians, in the town, posed little threat to the Meru social
order. Therefore, the development of forms of social interaction that, in
many cases, enhanced the process of cultural exchange, was hindered partly
by the formation of Muslims in the town into close-knit groups which were
socially and spatially separated from the rest of the Meru people. The closed
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nature of the Muslim settlements minimized social contact between them
and the majority of the people, whose customs and general way of life the
Muslims derided as backward, ushenzi. As a result of this attitude, the
tendency was to keep the washenzi at bay, as one would something highly
contagious. The prevailing situation is captured vividly by an informant in
the following extract of an interview:
During this time people treated others as if they had a contagious
disease that would be passed on to others through physical contact.
It was considered unacceptable for Muslims to shake hands with non-
Muslims... When non-Muslims visited their Muslim relatives living
in town, they were served food on banana leaves! The reason for this
was that non-Muslims were said to be dirty and unclean, and since
it was the custom that the members of the family and even the
guests (of course not forgetting the separation of the sexes) eat
together from one large bowl, it was unacceptable for them to join in
the meal. On the same token, it was felt that if they used the
utensils in the house when they visited, this would render them
unclean and therefore unfit for use by Muslims.
To observe the distinction between halal and haram was not a novel
aspect of Islam in Meru. It must be emphasized that Islam was inextricably
linked with the coastal notions of 'civilization', and the Muslims
demonstrated this 'civilization "concretely by importing things like textiles
and ceramics from overseas" which became "an essential attribute of the
cultured Swabili man".54 The point is that the Muslims in their
interpretation of ungwana, went a step further to treat the 'condition of
being without religion', in other words ushenzi , in which they regarded the
non-Muslim Meru people to be, as if it were a highly infectious condition
that could be transmitted through the slightest form of contact. Thus the
proverb cited above makes a particularly important point here, it warns
against close association with washenzi. The point of this proverb was that
if a higher person (in this case a Muslim) closely interacted with a lower
Interview with Mwanaisha, Majengo, 24th October 1991.
54 J. de V. Allen, 1973:122.
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person (mshenzi) s/he will be like the lowly person, and that was contrary
to the rules of heshima. The concept of what in this context, was
understood to be ungwana and ushenzi was open to various interpretations
and thus became rather fluid. It lacked a precise definition as it acquired
a considerable degree of elasticity, best utilized at the discretion of
individual Muslims in their dealings with non-Muslims. To some, it was
extended to embrace every aspect of social intercourse, for instance, they
did not shake hands with washenzi, just as the waungwana at the coast
had to keep a distance from the lower people.56
It can also be said that the response was two-way and the aversion
mutual - at the other end of the continuum was the Meru people's belief in
the primacy of their customs and practices; and a very strong apprehension
about Islam and Muslims. It is evident, that the Swahili and other foreign
practices offered no attraction, and some even found them revolting.
Today the concept of ushenzi is played out by Muslims in a variety
of ways in everyday context, as can be illustrated by the following incident
that I witnessed.
I was interviewing two informants in a tea kiosk belonging to a
Muslim when a woman came in and asked for some water to drink.
The owner of the kiosk told her in Kiswahili to take a glass and fetch
the water for herself from the kitchen wash basin, but she did not
understand, so she went to the sink and begun to wash her hands in
In the traditional Lamu society, it was considered disgraceful for a higher
person to associate closely with a lower person. Such behaviour was contrary to
the rules of heshima, which each person had to observe by behaving as was
expected of them, in line with the requirements of their own social category. This
proverb was particularly relevant in defining the relationship that should exist
between the waungwana and non-waungwana, A. H. M. El-Zein, 1974:62-3.
56 In the traditional Lamu society, members of "higher social categories had to
keep a distance even in physical contacts. For example, they did not shake hands
with other people", A. H. M. El-Zein, 1974:63. In Meru, this was interpreted in
terms of the contact between Muslims and others.
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order to drink the water from her cupped palms. The owner of the
kiosk got angry with her for washing her hands in the sink used for
washing the vegetables in and started shouting to her to get out of
his kiosk. She did not understand why he was shouting at her so she
thought that she was required to pay for the water. I intervened and
explained to her in Kimeru the cause of the misunderstanding, she
apologized and left. Afterwards, the owner of the kiosk explained that
that incident would not have happened if the woman had not been a
mshenzi. He attributed the misunderstanding to her ignorance since
she neither understood what he was saying to her in Kiswahili, nor
realize that it was inappropriate for her to wash her hands there.
Such behaviour, he said, was typical of washenzi.
Here it is interesting to note that from the Muslim man's point of view,
ushenzi was the readily available explanation for the misunderstanding
between himself and the woman in need of a drink of water. Thus ushenzi
is still experienced by the Muslims in everyday contexts of their interaction
with non-Muslims.
Mystification of Islam
Islam was portrayed by the Swahili in Meru as something beyond the
comprehension of ordinary mortals, so to say: the teacher and the sheikh
(and supposedly all Muslims) claimed and ostensibly displayed their ability
(rare in these circumstances) to read a book written in a foreign langaage;
and performed prayers in a manner which appeared rather ludicrous in the
eyes of the non-Muslims. This is comparable to the ridicule of Muslim
prayer among the Galla of Ethiopia. Fisher points out that non-Muslim
Galla ridiculed their Muslim brothers "comparing them to back-rinsers, who
like monkeys cry at special times of the day".57
It is evident that the Swahili clung tenaciously to apparently trivia!
external cultural symbols, for instance, the mode of dress, paying relatively
See H. Fisher, 1993:16. In Meru, carrying ajug of water for the purpose of
ablution was particularly unappealing to potential converts.
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less attention to the scriptural and doctrinal dimensions of Islam
throughout the period between 1910 and 1955. illustrative of this point is
the process of acculturation, devoid of religious instruction on the
fundamentals of the faith, that the local women married to Swahili went
through. For the mahaji, it was admittedly meritorious (and almost
obligatory) to emulate the Swahili standards of piety, both because of the
notions of civilization that the Swahili fostered; and the desire to elevate
themselves and bridge the gap between themselves and the Swahili on the
one hand, and at the same time widen the one between themselves and
their washenzi relatives on the other.
At that time, women did not frequent the mosque, except during the
Idd and maulid celebrations. However, men were expected to be pious
and knowledgeable in religious affairs. Women were mainly concerned with
the organization of such communal affairs as arubaini59 and matanga.6°
As will be shown in chapter 5 (pp.2l6-2l'fl, women begun to frequent the
Jamia mosque as a show of solidarity during struggle between the Asian and
African sections of the Muslim community for its control.
59 Arubaini means forty, but here it is the ritual performed on the fortieth day
after a person is dead. Once I attended arubaini ceremony at the home of a
prominent Muslim in the town. The sons of the deceased man had provided the
money to buy food and the women under the leadership of the chairperson of one
of the women's self-help groups prepared the food. The ceremony was held in the
afternoon and when all the guests were seated, the leading sheikh briefly
addressed the gathering and said the prayers. Then the food was served to the
large number of guests who were invited. After the leaders had left, other guests
left at leisure. When I enquired from some of the women, they said that failure to
sponsor the ceremony for their deceased father, would incur retribution - the
deceased would not rest in peace and his children would not prosper.
60 the traditional Lamu society, the ritual of mtanga moja, that is observing
mourning together, was based on the bonds created by marriage between equals.
Through mtanga moja, a group tied together by marriage "shared the experience
of mourning" (A. H. M. El-Zein, 1974:56). El-Zein explains that the women in the
group which was bereaved were secluded for three days following the demise of a
member, and were not allowed to use perfume. In Meru, and other places in the
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They collected the donations, publicized the events and did the cooking.
These arrangements were in the female domain.
More emphasis was laid on external signs of compliance than on the
acquisition of religious knowledge and the propriety of religious practice, for
instance, the correctness of the prescribed posture during prayer. 61 The
result was that most of the converts understood very little about the
fundamentals of Islam. Hence the tendency to mystify those aspects that
appeared inexplicable. In these circumstances, it became difficult for many
potential converts to adopt Islam for its religious appeal, which, as will be
shown below, was apparently lacking.
Muslims in Meru mystifiedlslam with the result that many people
conjured up all sorts of images about it, for instance it came to be
associated with the age-old practice of witchcraft. In the Meru cosmology,
the structure of knowledge can, in a general sense, be said to function
hierarchically at three levels: the common, the allegorical, and the secret,
or that which is incomprehensible to the ordinary person, and hence
consigned to the realm of magic and the supernatural. One early European
interior, the fundamental aspect of kin sharing the loss of one of their own, was
lost - it was transposed with the practice of mourning whereby fellow Muslims,
regardless of whether or not they were related to the bereaved, could participate
in the ritual. More important, while in the Lamu classificatory system it was
linked to the practice of marriage between equals and derived from the bonds
created by such marriages, in Meru where the people were incognizant of this
social significance of the ritual, it was seen as a matter of religious practice. It was
believed the entire Quran must be recited by certain individuals during this period
so as to give respite to the soul of the deceased. Sheikh Mwinyi, (interview, Mimi,
19th November 1991) said that in many cases, the readers who were paid to do
the reading did not read the entire Quran as required.
61 It will be shown in chapter 6 that many of the converts in the rural areas,
where the main emphasis is on the acceptance of Islam rather than the acquisition
of the knowledge of the fundamentals of the faith, the correctness of the prescribed
posture during prayer and even the ability to verbalize the Arabic prayers, are not
given prominence in the process of winning converts. As a result, many women
(and men) Muslim converts cannot perform prayers.
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administrator, failing to grasp this essential aspect of Meru cosmology,
commented that:
Black magic however enters very largely into the lives of the Meru...
though the Meru fear and dislike witchcraft intensely, their belief in
it is still altogether unshaken.62
Like any other instrument of social control, this secret knowledge
could be applied to good use or bad use, for example, to enhance social
harmony and benefit the members of the society, or to provide treatment;
or to cause disharmony and loss to society, for instance by inflicting
sickness and death. The identity of its practitioners who put it to the latter
use was not known with certainty because any of its possessors was liable
to pervert it. Certain individuals were merely suspected of it. However, the
society had the machinery to deal with the situation - when such an
individual was caught and proven guilty, she (it was usually a woman that
was caught though cases of male practitioners were not unknown) was
publicly executed. This was a severe deterrent to others who might put this
secret knowledge to other than good use.
Nevertheless, as Fadiman observes, though he confuses the identities
and functions of doctor and witch or wizard, "the concept of witchcraft was
an essential element of the Meru world view".63 This may be true for many
other societies, for whom it furnishes a means of manipulating the
supernatural forces. But it is not intended here to enter into the vast topic
of religion and magic, suffice it to say that the apparently inexplicable
beliefs and practices of Muslims were interpreted in the traditional
understanding of magic. Furthermore, this apparently unfamiliar type of
magic was generally believed to be more efficacious than the traditional one,
62 Aual Report, 1929, DCIMRU/4/2.
63 J A. Fadiman, 1977:93.
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the more so because it derived its potency from words written in a foreign
language. The power of the written word has been acknowledged
elsewhere.'
Islam in this area was pervaded by secrecy not only because of the
inexplicability of some of its fundamental concepts, but largely because of
the severely restricted access to Arabic, the language of the Quran, of
prayers, and of Islam. This inaccessibility of the Quran can be contrasted
with the use of the Bible by the Christian missionaries in their endeavour
to evangelize the Meru people. The Biblical verses were translated into
Kimeru quite early65 and it was not long before some of the pioneer
Christian converts were able to read the Bible for themselves. Unlike the
Bible the Quran acquired a magical value, it became a secret kept by the
experts (that is the sheikh and or the teacher), to be read and used only by
them. As I have just said, possession of any type of knowledge is a source
of power. Goody reminds us that even during Pythagoras' time, not all was
to be revealed to the people. 66 It was necessary for those who possessed
knowledge to withhold it in order to maintain monopoly of the source of
their power. Similarly, the mystification of the Quran in Meru by a few
people who could read it, provided for them a source of power for they knew
what others did not and they were feared for their knowledge which, it was
believed, they were liable to use to harm others.
Secondly, the Muslims themselves harnessed the local people's fear
of and dislike for manipulative magical powers to enhance the belief in the
superiority of their magic over that of the traditional practitioners. In
64 See J. Goody, 1968:227.
65 Z. Nthamburi (1982:67) observes that "it was generally envisioned that to
know Christian principles one had to have access to Christian literature, notably,
selected passages from the scriptures or gospels. In Meru, St. Mark's and St.
John's gospels were translated for this purpose".
66 J. Goody, 1968:11-12.
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seeking to insulate themselves against the wider Meru society; and preserve
and protect their jeopardized minority status, the Muslims often made
ostentatious displays of the apparently strange and supposedly Muslim
paraphernalia that they alone possessed. For instance a type of incense
popularly known as rubadiri which some individuals kept burning in their
houses perhaps only for its aroma, was said to keep out any one who tried
to enter the house with other than good intentions. The belief in the power
of the eye is found among the Meru as well as among other African peoples.
To avert the power of evil eye, charms were carried on the person, and one
of the ways of dealing with envy was to place protective charms in the
house or entrance to the homestead. Like those found among the
Giriama67 the protective charms have no healing property. The belief in
the power of the eye and the tongue can explain the popularity of the
Swahili-Islamic hirizi which was (and still is) believed to be more potent
than the traditional. Also picture frames with Quranic inscriptions believed
to dispel evil forces were displayed strategically on the walls in houses of
Muslims.
Others practiced as medicinemen in order to supplement their
income, though this is not to say that there were no genuine medicine-men
among them. Treatment usually included the reading of certain phrases in
Arabic, in addition to the administration of certain medicinal concoctions.
The importance of the treatment to its recipients lay in the use of the
Swahili paraphernalia: the sheikh himself, believed to possess a different
type of knowledge than the traditional doctor, owing to his ability to read
the Quran, makes the protective charms (hirizi) and uses such items as
rubadiri, which were not only different from those used by the traditional
medicineman, but also unknown to the latter. In addition, the sheikh made
67 M. Udvardy (1989:45).
68 For further discussion on the purpose of the picture frames with Arabic
inscriptions, see chapter 6, p. 285-287
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charms, (hirizi) to be worn on the wrist, waist or neck for protective
purposes. It is no wonder then that Muslims came to be invariably regarded
as practitioners of witchcraft and possessors of magic by the rest of the
people.
It must be said that what came to be (and still is in the minds of a
great number of people) a strong association of Islam and magic in Meru
was not totally unfounded or based only on the Muslim ostentatious display
of strange paraphernalia,
for in Islam magic is legitimated by religion.., the whole apparatus
of cabalistic learning found in books such as al-Bunis Shams al-
Ma'arifa, the use of magic squares, numbers and names, is closely
tied in with the Holy Book and constantly employs the names of
God.. 69
Magical practices in Islam,
As long as they depend upon techniques which derive their validity
from a Muslim source, Islam fully approves and sanctions magical
structures which are directed towards such legitimate ends as the
cure of disease, the prevention and curtailment of misfortune and the
assurance of prosperity and success.7°
The use of these techniques is entirely left to the discretion of the individual
user, with the result that some individuals use them to create disharmony.
For instance, certain individuals claimed that they had the power to turn
their adversaries into cats, cause madness, and inflict any other form of
hurt on those who dared to incur their displeasure, as my informants put
it.7'
69 J Goody, 1968:228, citing E. Doute, 1909.
° I. M. Lewis, 1966:65.
71 Interview with Fatuma and Mariam, Kiengu, 8th August 1991.
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I came to know of an interesting case of a man who "dared" to break
into a mosque and steal cooking utensils and other items that had
been stored there after the celebration to mark the end of Ramadhan.
When the members of the mosque committee found out that the
items had been stolen, a public appeal was made after the Friday
sermon, urging the culprit to return the stolen items. The sheikh said
that if they were not returned, the punishment for profaning the
mosque lay with God - the Quran had the power to retaliate against
such blasphemous transgressors. After three months a man in the
next village collapsed and died shortly after. Soon rumour was rife
that he was the culprit, and even before the cause of the illness was
known, it had already been concluded that he died because the
Quran had been 'read' for him.72
Parallel illustrations of the power of prayer against those who profane the
mosque have been recorded in the history of Islam in Africa as
early as the 14th century, when a group of people opposed to prayer and
Muslim practices in Kano, Nigeria, defiled the mosque. Muslims in Kano
agreed that prayer was the only remedy against this blasphemy and they
spent the whole night in prayer in the mosque. It is said that God answered
their prayers and the very next day, the leader of the group that had defiled
the mosque and all who participated in the defilement and their families
were struck blind. 73 Except among the Jakhanke,74 the use of prayer to
curse, harm or cause fear for the cleric is a common element of African
Islam. In East Africa, the reading of the Quran for magical purposes is
72 lnterview with Musa, Amaku, 13th October 1991. This story was well known
to the people living around the mosque and it served as a deterrent for any future
potential vandals. It was re-told several times during my field work and since
many people in this area believe in the efficacy of the 'reading' of the Quran for
the purpose of recovering lost items, members of the dead man's family and other
people were still convinced that the sheikh's reading of the Quran was the cause
of the man's death.
P. Ryan, 1978:21.
' With the exception of the Jakhanke, though prayer occupies a central role
in clerical activity, cursing and "prayer against" are widespread amongst Muslims
in Africa. L. Sanneh 1989:199 points out that a "category of prayer for which the
evidence is very weak indeed among the Jakhanke is prayer used as a curse... the
exploitation of prayer to harm, or threaten to harm, thus including fear and
respect for the cleric".
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mentioned quite early in the Swahili history in the myth of the founding of
the ancient city of Kilwa.75
But in the case under study, this particular incident illustrates the
local people's perception of Swahili-Islamic magic. Kithioro's death, for that
was the man's name, was not a straight-forward case of illness and
subsequent death, he died of an unknown cause. The circumstances
surrounding his death were open to various interpretations: to the non-
Muslims, his death became a testimony to the efficacy the Swahili-Islamic
magic and to the Muslims, it proved the point that the Quran, which the
sheikh invoked when making the appeal, was potent enough to exact
retribution for profaning the House of God. A pathological cause was out of
the question. A theory was put forward that as long as the stolen items
were retained by his family, other members would be affected and the
entire family might be wiped out in the long run. In spite of lack of any
evidence that the dead man had stolen items from the mosque, to prevent
more harm coming to the family in question, the members decided to pay
compensation to the mosque. The stolen items were not recovered but again
an explanation was found in the theory that the dead man might have sold
them away immediately, since he knew the inevitable outcome of stealing
from the mosque. It is difficult to assess the depth of the local people's fear
of the efficacy of the Muslim magic, but certain modes of behaviour and the
use of certain phrases, for instance the speculation that this man's sudden
death triggered, and even the suggestion that the family find and return the
stolen goods, provide evidence that people are generally not unconcerned
when some individuals claim that they (as Muslims) have access to power
that can turn others into cats or harm them in many other ways.
It is no wonder then, that since Muslims became associated with the
practice of magic, the whole concept of Swahilization, (which in Meru and
See S. G. P. Freeman-Grenville, 1962b:74.
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many other places in the interior was, and still is, synonymous with
conversion to Islam) came to acquire gravely pejorative connotations in the
minds of many people. It is believed by many people, the greater majority
of them non-Muslims, that if the "Quran is read for an individual", (as it
was believed to have been read in the case described above) s/he will
inevitably become mad or suffer a serious misfortune.
It is common to hear a person saying to another: "if you do that to
me, I will go to the Swahili sheikh", meaning 'if you force me to seek the
help of the Swahili magic you will have yourself to blame for the
consequences' which are believed to be irreversible. Hence 'to be read for'
has become part of the daily vocabulary in Meru. If for any reason an
individual begins to behave in a strange manner, to most people, the
immediate course will be found in the suspicion that "he or she has been
read for" rather than consider the possibility of nervous breakdown or
mental illness. Madness is the more common consequence of a sheikh's
'reading', which may include the burning of the incense popularly known as
rubadiri, and a host of other activities, though there is a catalogue of other
types of misfortunes which are likely to happen. With such ideas about its
effects looming large in the minds of many people, Islam failed to attract a
large following.
The Significance of Structural Factors in the Meru Response to
Islam
The representation of the magical elements of Islam by Muslims
themselves and the local people's traditional view of the supernatural
served to a large extent as deterrents to conversion to Islam. This
phenomenon takes the discussion back to the pertinent question of the
Islainization of African peoples. The role of chiefs and kings in the spread
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of Islam in Africa and in West Africa in particular is well documented,76
giving rise to the theory that a centralized source of authority furnishes the
entry point for Islamic influence into such societies. Now examples of
uncentralized Islamized peoples, such as Somali and Borana, have corrected
this view.77 The many facets of Islam in Africa defy the application of
broad generalizations; rather, there is need for particularity in dealing with
each of these localized forms of Islamic worship, in other words, of the many
'Islams' that function as constituent parts of the (whole) global Islam,78
summed up in the immutable creed: "There is no god but Allah and
Muhammad is His Messenger".
The diversity of African cultures cannot be overemphasized. Hence
the point of encounter with Islam (whatever the model) and the subsequent
result, may differ, not only from one society to another, but also from one
moment in history to another within the same society. An important point
to note is that various factors are relevant to various questions. Even for a
case such as the one under study, different kinds of factors need to be
invoked in order to explain the different aspects of Islam. Useful questions,
as Peel suggests, are those that ask
76 See N. Levtzion, 1968, for instance. This entire work is devoted to the role
of chiefs in the development of Islam in West Africa. Also see the role of the Yao
chiefs in Central Africa. The case of the Buganda Kingdom stands in its own
category in East Africa, see J. D. Y. Peel, 1977:119-141; B. D. Kazozi, 1986:14-17;
N. King and B. D. Kazozi, 1973:4-8; A. Oded, 1974:39-136. In Kenya where
centralized societies were few, the chief of Wanga realized the advantage in the
superiority of the firearms possessed by the caravan traders and thus welcomed
them in his kingdom. As a result, what is now Mumias in Western Kenya became
the first place in the interior where Islam predated the advent of colonial
administration - Islam registered its presence there by the mid 1870s, M.
A.Abdallah, 1971:20-25.
'' See I. M. Lewis, 1966:32-33.
78 R. Launay, 1992:5-7.
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why conversion occurred when it did (rather than earlier or later),
why it attracted the social categories that it did, why it moved
through the society in the way that it did, why it occurred unevenly
between areas as it did, why it occurred as suddenly or as slowly as
it did.. •)79
No single factor can answer all these questions for any given place,
hence Peel warns writers against claiming "overriding importance for a
factor to which they attribute great moral significance". 8° Apparently there
is no firm sociological basis for generalization about which structural factors
facilitate the spread of Islam and which hinder it. The process of the
Muslim penetration and conversion defies broad generalizations - one
structural factor might enhance the process in one society, and reverse it
in another. Two examples could well illustrate this point: the rite of
circumcision, if introduced by Muslims in a society where it is not
traditionally practiced, it is seen as alien and it may be associated with
Islam. In such societies, it may hamper conversion. In other societies where
it is performed as a rite of passage at a later date than that prescribed by
Islam, it acquires what Lewis refers to as duality: that is certain of its
aspects are Islamized and therefore officiated by the local Muslim cleric
(sheikh or teacher), while the others are officiated by the traditional
expert.81
Yet in another domain, circumcision may cause a problem as it did
in Meru in the early period when the pioneer converts were required to
undergo a second circumcision, or Islamic circumcision. Initially, the Meru
method of circumcision was seen as unclean and therefore unacceptable to
the Muslims. Circumcision to the Meru people was (and still is to a large
extent) the conferment of adulthood on an individual (for both men and
J. D. Y. Peel, 1977:110.
80 Ibid., p.110.
81 • M. Lewis, 1966:68.
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women) therefore, it was almost inconceivable for an adult man to be asked
to submit to the Muslim demand for a second circumcision. Of course it
would be impractical to carry out a second circumcision operation, so the
sheikh insisted on symbolic shedding of blood in order for the convert to
achieve the condition of cleanliness or tohara. My informants were
unanimous that "no adult male would swallow his pride and submit to such
an indignity and lose his social status, for that is what it amounted, in
order to convert".82
The conversion ceremony up till the early 1950s is described by one
M'Mariu, converted in the early 1940s, thus:
After a person declared their intention to convert, they were taken
to the sheikh, if there was one within reach. In some cases where the
candidate happened to be the head of a household, the sheikh would
be invited to the household and all the members would be converted.
The candidate would make the profession of faith, the kalimah; then
they would take a bath; cut their nails; and have their head shaven.
After this physical cleansing, which symbolized spiritual cleansing,
the convert donned new clothes bought for this occasion. In some
cases the sheikh provided the turban, hi lemba , long shirt, kanzu, cap
and sandals for men converts, to symbolize a break with the past and
the dawn of a new life.
The convert was then given a new name, the choice of which involved
an interesting exercise: three names were written by the sheikh on
pieces of paper which were folded and tossed in a bowl. The convert
then picked up one at a time and handed it to the sheikh who read
82 such pioneer explained (though with much difficulty since such matters
are not discussed in the presence of women, and least of all with them) that this
practice of shedding symbolic blood which had its origins in the old Muslim
settlements in Nairobi was later abandoned. During my study of the early Muslim
communities of Nairobi, I found out that during the period prior to First World
War the converts in Pangani and other Muslim settlements in Nairobi were
required to undergo a process of tohara, cleansing, to mark the beginning of a new
life. If the convert had not been circumcised before conversion, the complete
operation would be carried out and the initiate would be put in an initiation house
to learn the Swahili culture. However, due to cultural implications and physical
complications arising from this requirement, the practice was abandoned and
replaced with the symbolic shedding of blood. See A. Kubai (1992:37).
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the name aloud for all to hear. This process was repeated three times
and if the same name was picked at least twice, it became the
convert's name. They were encouraged to use 'religious names' which
were highly valued.
It is interesting to note that the practice of ritual cleansing at
conversion, was observed in the 11th century in the kingdom of Mali, West
Africa, where the cleric exacted "some visible signs of interior conversion,
including a complete bath and a change of garments after some
rudimentary instruction.M The practic81rituai cleansing at conversion as
observed in Meru, was carried over from old Pangarn and other Muslim
settlements in Nairobi during the early period when conversion entailed
being sprinkled with water by a sheikh, kutiwa maji ya kata. The
prospective convert went to the sheikh and stated his wish, after which the
sheikh sprinkled some water on him/her from a nutshell, kata, and then
chose a 'Muslim name' for the convert. A person responsible for the
conversion of another was regarded as a 'father' and it was meritorious,
though not obligatory, that a convert assume as his surname the name of
his 'god-father'. Then the convert was taught how to pray and recite a few
verses of the Quran. The girls who were thus converted were married to the
It is interesting to note that while the mahaji retained their Kimeru names,
the second generation of Muslims exhibited a tendency to use two Arabic names,
for instance, Ali son of Osman M'Nabea would be Ali Osman. The significance of
names will be dealt with below.
84 p Ryan, 1978:17. Ryan describes the ceremony of wonk, where the presiding
cleric washed the convert's hands and legs three times each for the right and the
left. Then the convert cleaned his nose and ears three times each. Sanneh (1979)
suggests that this ritual which was performed at six in the morning, points to
"strong Islamic influence, though the underlying religious outlook here is too
traditional" (p.77).
The practice of sprinkling water from a nutshell in the old Pangarn is
alluded to in my work on Islam in Nairobi, (A. Maingi, 1987:121). Also see Y. A.
Nzibo, 1986:121-124.
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sheikh's Sons and others were married off to the sheikh's friends as his own
daughters.
In the traditional Meru society, there were various forms of
initiation87 and the life of an individual was punctuated by various rites
of passage as s/he went up the social ladder. The process of initiation was
conceptualized in terms of 'birth' into the next grade or social class,
therefore the novices were usually referred to as 'children'. They were
initiated by older men. Eldership (for men only) was the culmination of a
lifelong process of initiation into various social grades. Seen from the
perspective of initiation into the various traditional councils that constituted
the social ladder, conversion to Islam in Meru during the early period could
not fit into the obtaining pattern of initiation rites, for instance, it could not
be seen as one of the njuri grades to which adult men were initiated.
In these circumstances of the contact situation (contact between the
Swahili-Islamic and Meru cultures) with least proselytization; and the
motivating factors varying from one individual to another, the spread of
Islam was left to fortuitous circumstances. My informants described several
cases, (particularly in Igembe where these initiation rites were more
elaborate than the rest of Meru) of men who declined to convert to Islam
because their would-be 'father' was a younger man.89 The reason for this
was the underlying concept of age-grade system, which determined the
place of every individual in the society. To move up the social ladder, an
A. Kubai, 1992:37. Also see Y. A. Nzibo, 1986:12 1.
87 See J. M. Baikiao, 1977:100-110.
The D.C. reported that "the natives of this district are absolutely sunk in
superstition... Several organizations exist, such as Njiricheke (sic) and Kiama
which being credited with supernatural power makes the work of administration
very difficult". Annual Report, 1923, DCIMRU/li1.
89 lnterviews with Asuman, 12th October 1991, Kiengu and Musa, Antubetwe-
e-Njoune, 9th November 1991.
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individual was initiated into the next 'social class'. Knowledge was
transmitted vertically from the old to the young and never the reverse, and
therefore, it was not long before a contradiction in trying to fit conversion
into the existing age-set system became apparent. It was considered
indecorous for older men to be 'initiated' into Islam by their juniors.9°
A second example to illustrate the variability of the impact of
structural factors on the process of Islamization from one community to
another, is the lineage system. While the lineage system among the Somali
was said to facilitate Islamization91 , the clan and its component lineage
system, among the Meru, served as a stumbling block to the establishment
of social contact with Muslims and thus hampered the process of
Islamization. Indeed, the clan provided the only form of communal anti-
Muslim response by preventing alienation of land for the settlement of
Muslims, as it will be shown below.
This sense of hostility crystallized into a form of communal response
when the mahafi returned around 1926 and tried to find a place to settle.
Previously, the Meru had to contend with the foreign Muslims with whom
there was no form of relationship - all forms of relationships either at
personal or communal levels, being regulated by such social institutions as
age-set system,92 ichiaro,93 and membership to njuri and clan.94 It was
° Interview with Asunian, Antubetwe, 15th October 1991. Also the mosques
founded by leading local Muslim pioneers were described by one of them as "places
for giving 'birth' (to new converts)". See chapter 6.
' I. M. Lewis, 1966:34.
92 T. Spear and R. Waler (1993:40) in their description of the Maasai age
system, which has close semblance to that of the Meru, defines age grades as "the
successive statuses to which individuals are ascribed in the course of their lives.
An age-set comprises all those within a broad range of ages who are formed into
a group of peers with their own separate identity". Among the Meru, the age
system is based on the rite of circumcision, which constitutes a group of
individuals circumcised at the same time into an age group or age set. An age-set
comprises three age grades, beginning with Nding'uri, followed by Kobia and
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felt that the return of their own kinsmen who had absconded from the Meru
society and joined the ranks of the foreigners by adopting Islam, posed a
threat to the social status quo. Disregard for the customs was believed to
incur the displeasure of the ancestors who safeguarded the welfare of the
society.95 By violating the customs, one automatically rendered oneself
ritually impure, muiro, a condition which was believed to cause calamity,
not only to the victim, but also to those related to her or him. By
implication, this is what the Meru pioneer Muslim, converts had done.
Hence the mahaji found it difficult to gain acceptance among their own
people.
finally Kaberia, separated by an interval of about 5 years between them. The
members of one age set, form a group of peers and are bound to one another by
the unbreakable bond of circumcision. This bond regulates inter-personal relations
at a various levels, for instance, one is duty-bound to afford all possible help and
respect to one's age-mates. On a theoretical level, children are expected to treat
their fathers' age-mates as their own fathers, therefore, marriage cannot occur
between a woman and a man of her father's age - he should be younger (or even
older). Also see J. Mahner, (1970:passim) on the function of the age system in
Meru.
Lambert defines (g)ichiaro as ritual brotherhood, instituted for purposes of
peace and mutual help in war. "Gichiaro, derived from chiara, bear, means simply
'birth' or possibly 'a large or greater birth' and does not by derivation imply a
common birth or common blood based on ritual alone or patrilineal descent alone;
it could equally apply to both." Lambert's is a rather narrow definition of gichiaro
or ichiaro, depending on the Meru dialect in use, but he admits his lack of
adequate knowledge about this important social institution. See Lambert Papers,
LAMJIJ2/1-9 chap. 3 p.259.
The clan was the most important unit of social organization in Meru.
Lainbert in his description of the Meru social organization, uses the term "clan'
to denote the largest unit in which a belief in a community of patrilineal blood is
completely functional" (LAM /112/1-9 chapter 4, p.312). Usually there are two
dimensions of this function: marriage and spilling of blood. One may not marry
within his clan nor spill the blood of his clansman. The infallibility of the exogamy
rule is absolute.
For the role of the ancestors in the Meru cosmology, see J. M. Baikiao,
1977: 111-113.
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At the communal level, this rejection was manifest in the reaction of
the clan, which personified the collective responsibility of the Meru society,
to the attempts by the mahaji to obtain land for their settlement at the
present Majengo.96 To them too the label 'Swahili', which had acquired
pejorative connotations in Meru, was invariably attached. 97 The action of
the clan, which embodied the collective will of the Meru people, could
therefore be seen as a systematic reaction to the Muslim presence at the
communal level.
An Incident of Conversion and Social Crisis: the "Njea Curse"
As it has been said above, cursing has certain important functions
among the Meru. The fear of its efficacy for example serves to reinforce
certain aspects of inter-personal relationships. In principle the Swahili
Muslims did not recognize, the potency of a curse in the Meru traditional
context, or the significance of Meru customary ritual brotherhood (ichiaro).
These two were related in their function of defining and regulating inter-
personal, family and communal relationships in the traditional Meru
society.98 The early converts, who were integrated into the emerging
Majengo community, became enmeshed in new relationships based on
Swahili-Islamic paradigms. They had left their extended families, who
would have been socially obligated to render moral (and even material)
support to them in their villages of origin; now the Muslim community ifiled
this role - it provided the necessary communal moral support for the
96 Communal response (by the clan) to the presence of Muslims is alluded to
in chapter 1, pp. 61-62.
97 The Meru traditional judicial system stressed the principle of equality before
the law. For information on the Meru judicial system, see A. M. M'Imanyara,
1993:84.
98 For a definition of ichiaro, refer above footnote No. 88.
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converts and fellow Muslims were seen as one's jamaa or family. 99 In a
sense, the Muslim community replaced the traditional social setup for the
converts living within the enclaves in the town. However, there were a few
converts who returned to their villages in the rural area and sought to be
reinstated in the traditional society, with all its positive expressions and
means of social control.
My informants were quick to point out that the few converts who
returned to their villages of origin in the rural areas, and tried to be
integrated into the traditional society, lost their Muslim identity.
Underlying this statement is the local perception of ushenzi. The
relationship between Muslims and others was conceptualized in terms of
the struggle between dini and ushenzi. As has been said above, ushenzi was
treated as if it were contagious; therefore, it was considered perilous for a
convert to leave the Muslim community and return to the village to live
among washenzi relatives and friends.'00
It is not as if they themselves did not believe in the traditional forms
of social control; after all, they had been raised in the Meru traditional
society. For them, the whole process of conversion and Muslim identity was
based on the distinction between themselves as 'people of religion' and
others, in other words the perceived difference between dini (religion) and
ushenzi. This distinction could only be achieved by emulating the Swahili,
by becoming as Swahili as possible (as has been shown above, there are
various degrees of Swahilization), and therefore, those traditional
institutions which were considered unislamic could be substituted for
Interview with Nyanya, Mzee Ibrahiim, Halima, and Musa, Majengo, 26th
November 1991. My informants were emphatic that the community in Majengo
provided the support the members needed.
'°° The concept of. mji, (town or settlement) and its territorial significance for
Muslims is illustrated in the discussion on the spatial significance of Majengo in
chapter 5.
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Islamic ones. Seen from this perspective, a convert who returned to his
rural village, and participated in the activities which, on the scale of the
Swahili-Islamic culture, were considered to be ushenzi, was said to have
'become an unbeliever', amekufuru.'°'
Examples lending credence to this theory were readily cited by my
informants. A case in point is an interesting occurrence, recorded in the
District Annual Reports of 1939 and 1941 as the "Njea curse". It is
described thus:
During the 19 14-18 War a party of Rendille went to Igembe to buy
food and were attacked by the youths of Njea who took their hides
and skins from them. The Njea elders recovered some of the hides
and returned them to the Rendille but some were never recovered
and the Rendille laid a curse on Njea with the blood of a girl, of a
ewe lamb, of a female kid, and of a female donkey foal, so that the
land should bear thorns (devil's dice) instead of grass and become
infested with ants. In August 1939 the Njea people reported to the
District commissioner that the curse was beginning to work and that
they had been advised by their medicine man to try to get the
Rendille to lift it. They asked the District Commissioner to get the
District Commissioner, Marsabit, to send some of the original party
of Rendille, together with their wives, to Njea for this purpose... In
October (1941) the District Commissioner, Marsabit said he hoped
soon to be able to send the Rendille spell-raisers and the Njea people
were told that this would be their last chance and to make up their
minds whether they wanted the curse lifted or not. They replied they
did. The Rendille party arrived in November and spent many days in
Njea...But, as the District Commissioner, Marsabit, remarks, it is
hoped that the Rendille have not left behind a delayed-action curse
on which their sons can cash-in in twenty years time...102
How did Islam come into this then? According to the Meru customs,
certain families from certain clans were designated to offer sacrifices on
behalf of the rest of the society. Therefore, when the Rendille party
101 Interview with Sheikh Mwinyi, Mjini, 16th November 1991.
102 This extract of the 1939 Annual Report is found in LAMB/1J218, p.11,
University of Nairobi Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library Archives.
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returned to lift the curse and remove its afflictions on the people living in
Njia,'°3 the clan charged with the responsibility of performing the
prescribed cleansing rituals, was faced with a problem because the person
designated to perform the rituals had converted to Islam. He objected to
these rituals, arguing that, as a Muslim, he could not participate in such
ceremonies where he would be required by the custom to partake of
substances considered to be religiously 'unclean' and forbidden for
Muslims.'04
Such a social crisis as was precipitated by this man's conversion, had
not been anticipated, and therefore, the only course open to the members
of the clan was to prevail on him to oblige and do what to them, was his
duty to the society. He found himself in a dilemma as the whole of Njia
looked to his family, and to him in particular, to facilitate the lifting of the
curse. The curse was beginning to work and failure to lift it would cause the
land to bear thorns instead of grass and be infested with ants, with the
result that whole society might be wiped out by these afflictions. Yet Islam
did not recognize the efficacy of curse and therefore, the rituals to lift the
curse were unislamic. He was faced with a question of choice between his
Muslim identity and his society. His faith was a personal matter, but lifting
the curse was important for the entire society, so he performed the rituals.
Some of my Muslim informants showed more contempt for him than they
would for an unbeliever.
Unequal Competition Between Islam and Christianity
There is evidence to suggest that the colonial authorities exercised a
restricting influence on the spread of Islam in Meru, while they fostered the
103 In the cited district annual report, Njia, which until 1992 was a large
administrative unit in Igembe division, is spelt as "Njea", but the spelling that is
currently in use is 'Njia'.
104 Interview with Asuman, Antubetwe mosque, 15th October 1991.
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spread of Christianity. During the early years of the British Protectorate,
Islam and Muslims found favour with such administrators as Sir Arthur
Hardinge (the Commissioner of the British East African Protectorate 1895-
97) and John Ainsworth. Initially the coastal Muslims proved useful for the
colonial administrators because they were the only literate (in Arabic)
indigenous people who, as a result of trade relations with the inland
peoples, possessed some knowledge of the interior.' 05 At the declaration
of the British East African Protectorate in 1895, Sir Arthur Hardinge, the
Commissioner, assured the Muslims that the British rule would not
adversely affect their religious sensibilities; that Islam would be recognized
as the public and the established creed on the coast; and that Islamic law
together with the traditional government of Walt and Qadhi would be
For quite some time, therefore, the Muslims were accorded a
privileged status. They were considered to be civilized, Sir Arthur Hard i nge
saw the Swahili "and in general the native Mohammedan population of the
coast as the only civilized element" which stood between the Europeans
"and the utterly barbarous tribes of the interior".' 07 He is said to have
even envisaged the possibility of training the Swahili and using them to
administer the whole of the protectorate. However, the situation began to
change and the Muslims gradually lost their favourable position when both
the government and the missionaries realized that expansion of coastal
Muslim influence was a 'potential' danger inherent in the employment of
coastal Muslims up-country. The government attitude henceforth, is
summed up in the remarks of C.W. Hobley, a Provincial Commissioner
(P.C.) in Mombasa who declared that
105 A. I. Salim, 1973:77, citing Hardinge's report, PP.LX (l898),p.227.
106 A. I. Salim, 199 1:8.
107 G. H. Mungeam, 1966:26.
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it must be realized that it is not in our interest or in the interest of
the people that the Mohammedan faith and sharia should spread
among the Aboriginal tribes, in fact one may go as far as to say that
the policy of the administration should be antipathetic towards
Mohimmedan propaganda and proselytization.108
In Meru, no sooner had the Muslims settled than the Christian
missionaries arrived. From the outset, the missionaries thought that their
success depended entirely on systematic aggressive evangelization methods,
to break down the existing social system. In the initial years of their work
at Kaaga, near the township, the Methodist missionaries reported that:
Our operations may be conveniently divided into 3 sections viz: 1.
Evangelistic; 2. Educational; 3. Medical; upon the understanding
that the last two are subsidiary forms of activity. We exist as an
evangelistic agency with express object of inculcating the Christian
(Protestant) faith among the native population. We have been at
work for 3 years during much of which time our activity has been
restricted while we become acquainted with the language...
We have adopted the boarding system as being the only way in which
we can secure regular attendance and sufficient control over the
minds of the scholars.'°9
This extract clearly illustrates the missionaries' advantageous
position pitted against that of the Muslims. The latter could not boast of
being able to apply such methods. Preaching of Christianity was organized
and systematized, with western education11° and medical services being
used as the major means for evangelization; while Islam was left to
108 C. W. Hobley to Ag. D.C. Shimoni, March 1913, DC/KFIJ3/1.
'°9 R. T. Worthington to D.C. 15th April 1916, DCIMRU/1J1.
110 Z. Nthamburi (1982:67) notes that western education was an important
aspect of missionary propaganda. "Literacy was required for baptism to take
place... Public education was geared toward scripture reading..."
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fortuitous circumstances. With the "express object of inculcating" Christian
faith, the missionaries aimed to break what they saw as Meru intransigence
by use of systematic proselytization which their rival Muslims, owing to the
very nature of their presence in the region lacked. There is no comparison
to be made between this aggressive Christian proselytization, and the
circumstances of sheer chance to which conversion to Islam was left.
However, it would be erroneous to give the impression that the
missionaries, in spite of this aggressive proselytization program, found it
easy to win converts among the Meru. That for a period of 3 years, they did
not manage to baptize any one, is a testimony to the fact that the spread
of Christianity, too, was not as rapid as it might seem. The Meru people are
described as "suspicious and resentful of the new ways that were brought
by the foreigners".' 1 ' The church made little progress and the first 11
baptisms were conducted in 1916 (four years later). Things did not improve
until 1918-1919 when famine and influenza struck Meru and "had a
salutary effect on the growth of the Methodist Mission", as many
unfortunate persons sought refuge at the mission, converting to Christianity
in the process of getting help during these difficult times. Thus these
"natural disasters helped to accelerate the changes which had been brought
about by the introduction of 'Pax Britanica"."2
The missionary endeavour to evangelize the Meru was inextricably
linked with the administration policy as can be seen from the
administrators' demand (though it was hardly met) that Christian converts
be admitted to Njurj." 3 By use of such methods, the government was
111 Z. Nthamburi, 1982:63.
112 Thid., pp.61-62.
" Njuri, which constituted the Meru government, was a powerful political-
judicial council with sacred sanctions. It comprised various councils: Njuri Ncheke,
Njuri Impingire and Njuri Imbere. Initially Njuri posed an obstacle to the
establishment of colonial authority and for a long time, the district, unlike many
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intent on gradually dismantling the existing social institutions which
obstructed its authority and in 1924, it was reported that in many parts of
the district
the hold over the natives by witch doctors and the guilds known as
Njuri Ncheke and Njuri pingiri (sic) has during the year appeared to
be slightly on the wane, owing chiefly to the re-organization of strong
government Native Tribunals. •114
This disintegration of the traditional Meru social institutions continued as
the Christian missionaries, with the government support, endeavoured to
spread Christianity. By 1940, the district commissioner, reporting on the
work of the missionaries, said that:
I am glad to be able to record my opinion that as a result of the
cooperation between the administrative officer and missionary the
year 1940 will mark an important stage in the history of religion in
Meru. For the first time, though in deed after a long preparation,
Christianity has been brought into the very heart of the tribe...'15
Whether the Christian religion had been brought to the very heart
of the Meru people by 1940, is questionable, but the relevant point for our
purpose in this extract of the D.C.'s report is the cooperation between the
administration and the missionary in the spread of Christianity in Meru.
There was no such cooperation with the Muslims and therefore Islam was
an unequal competitor in the religious arena. It is also necessary to note,
as the D.C. acknowledged, the preparation for the ground to sow the seed
others in the country, was ruled indirectly through the Njuri. See Lambert's use
of indigenous institutions for administration, LAMB/1J2/9.
114 jual Report 1924, DCIMRU/1i1.
115 District Commissioner's report on the work of the Christian missions in
Meru, 1940 Annual Report, p.21, DC/MRU/1i4.
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of Christianity was long in spite of the government support. It was not easy
to spread Christianity in Meru.
To satisfr the African religious needs as the colonial administrators
perceived them, it was deemed necessary to choose for him their own faith,
which was "the foundation" of their "civilization". It was this civilization
that they "caused to impinge on the African cultures."16
The situation as they saw it in Meru was summed up in the following
words:
If we agree that something ought to be done about the Africans'
religious needs the question arises as to what is the right religion to
inculcate. And that is easily answered. Christianity is our own faith
and the one that we are the most competent to teach. It is the one
faith.., the highest ethical code capable of general application to every
day life.., the problem is how to inculcate it.The problem is not for
the few, for those who attach themselves to a mission station; it is
one for the whole tribe, since it is the religion of the whole tribe that
is withering away."7
With such notions as are expressed in this extract influencing the
colonial policy in Meru, the spread of Islam was not only disadvantaged, but
also curbed by the very nature of the colonial policy. With this explicit
government support for Christianity, Islam was not an equal competitor for
the souls of the people of Meru.
"6 Annual Report 1940, DCIMRU/1J4.
117 Ibid. Annual Report 1940, DCIMRU/1i4
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Conclusion
Bunger has argued that the process of Islamization is shaped by the
nature of contact between Muslims and non-Muslims, and by the culture of
the people who bring Islam, among other factors." 8 To a certain extent,
this is true of Islam in Meru. The cultural input of the 'Swahili' Muslims,
based, as I have illustrated in this chapter, on the concept of 'fossilized'
coastal notions of urbanity and civilization was a significant factor. Through
the process of Swahilization over the years, many people came to identifSr
themselves as 'Swahili', with the result that layers of practices were formed
and later transported inland wherever Muslim communities were formed.
When Muslims arrived in Meru, these rather 'fossilized' concepts
were transposed in a different cultural milieu. For instance, the group that
identified itself as 'Swahili' re-enacted the coastal social stratification,
originally based on the system of slavery. As a result, they posed as the
exemplars of dini and by holding onto such notions, they were able to
preserve a facade of superiority over both the mahaji and the rest of the
Meru people. The creation and preservation of this facade had the result of
insulating Muslims against the rest of the people of Meru.
Each group had its own notion of what Islam should be. The result
was a fairly broad spectrum of actions and behaviour associated with the
propriety of religious observance. Hence inconsistency and the resultant
disagreements became the salient feature of Islam in Meru throughout the
early period. The growth of this divided and mystified Islam was hampered
by these very features.
There was also the culture of the people to whom Islam is
brought from outside. The Meru social institutions proved a stumbling block
118 R. L. Bunger, 1975:1.
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to the spread of Islam. The point I want to make from the foregoing
discussion is that the Meru structural factors, perhaps more than any other
factor, hampered the spread of Islam up till the end of the Second World
War. Though the colonial administration policy favoured and encouraged
the spread of Christianity, while it remained anti-Islam, it was not until the
traditional social institutions had been systematically eroded, and where
possible broken down in the process of westernization that followed the
establishment of colonial rule, that even the favoured Christian faith gained
a foothold on the Meru soil.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW PHASE: THE EMERGING URBAN
MUSLIM COMMUNITY IDENTITY
Introduction
The development of Islam in Meru can be divided into three distinct
phases: the initial phase lasted from 1910 to the mid 1950s; while the
second phase, beginning in the mid 1950s through the 1960s, saw the
emergence of a new urban Muslim community and its subsequent
consolidation. The last phase began with the advent of Tabligh at the end
of the 1970s. In the previous chapter, I have discussed the key concepts in
the representation of Islam by the pioneer Muslims and the response of the
Meru people to the presence of Muslims in their midst, laying emphasis on
the various factors that affected or largely tempered this response during
the period before the Second World War.
As a primary premise in this chapter, I am concerned to demonstrate
that during the latter period, that is the late 1950s and the 1960s, Islam in
Meru was going through a process of change, as the pioneers were giving
way to a new generation of Muslims. This double-edged change triggered
the fusion of various Muslim elements, culminating in the consolidation of
an urban Muslim community identity. The cataclysmic events of the Mau
Mau1 not only reinforced this change, but also permeated the social,
'Mau Mau is the liberation movement which rallied the Kenyan peoples
together to fight for independence during the period between 1950 and 1963. There
are several hundreds of works written on the various aspects of the movement, for
economic origins of the Mau Mau and administration of oaths and propaganda, for
instance, see W. Maloba, 1993:24-78, 98-133 and D. Throup, 1987:1-27, 139-162.
For belated Mau Mau activity in Meru, see D. Njagi, 1993. The list could be much
longer, therefore, we shall limit the discussion to the way in which the movement
served as a catalyst to the changing situation of the Meru Muslims.
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political and economic life of many Kenyans and the history of the country
in general during the period prior to the attainment of independence in
1963. The Mau Mau movement and the demolition of the old Swahili village
shook the Meru Muslim fraternity. Documentation of these events,
including the description of various incidents, is necessary in order to
account for both the past and present trends of Muslim influence in this
region.
To do that, I will first illustrate the effects of post-war nationalism
in Meru, then discuss the changing circumstances of the 1960s and finally
show how this change manifests itself thereafter, in relation to the
underpinning stuggle between dini and ushenzi. In the previous chapter, it
was illustrated how the struggle between dini and ushenzi operated at two
levels: between those born in the faith and the converts, that is the mahaji
versus the SwahililNubi, 	 on the one hand; and the Muslims (as a
whole) versus the rest of the Meru neople whom the Muslims considered to
on the other.
be 'uncwihzed' (wastienz,,ln tius chapter, I will show how the balance of
what is seen as ungwana shifts and alters the structure of the relationship
between the Muslim groups and paves the way for the emerging urban
Muslim community identity.
The Effect of Post-War Nationalism upon Muslims: 1948-
1955
The Returnees
It has been mentioned in chapter 1 that Edward Butler Home, the
first colonial administrator in Meru, encountered violent resistance from the
Tharaka and the Tigania sections of Meru. The Meru were averse to foreign
influence and for many years they doggedly stuck to their customs, under
the indigenous government of councils of elders, Njuri, which the colonial
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administrators were quick to integrate into their administrative system in
the district after they realized that:
There are no paramount chiefs in the district.. .but real
authority is vested in the kiama or councils of elders, who
work collectively.. .The strength of the kiama which is
particularly noticeable in Tigania and Igembe has resulted in
the native tribal organization being kept to a much greater
extent than is the case in some districts, a feature which is by
all means to be encouraged.2
Up to the end of the Second World War, the Njuri implemented the
government policies and apparently there was no pressure for nationalism.
But after the war, the situation changed as the Meru were awakened to the
political consciousness which was already rife in other parts of the country.
At the same time Njuri was faced with the challenge from the semi-
westernized teachers, derogatorily referred to as Njuri e-kauku (meaning
'Njuri of the book') who, due to the pressure from the colonial government,
were allowed, though of an inferior status, to "attend its deliberations on
certain questions if those Christians were sworn on the Bible to secrecy on
each occasion".3
At the same time, the ex-soldiers were returning home; in 1946 alone,
1425 were demobilized. 4 In the following year, they defied forced labour
and through a concerted effort, they managed to rouse the people whose
apparent acquiescence had beguiled the authorities into believing that they
were incapable of violent resistance. The ex-soldiers' influence now
prompted them to "near civil disobedience". The District Commissioner
(D.C) reports that:
2 Armual Report, 1912-13 in DCIMRU/1i1, p.7.
See Annual Report 1950 in DCIMRU/1J4.
4 Annual Report 1946 in DCIMRU/1J4.
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• . .There were several set-backs during the year due mainly to
the returning soldiers who refuse to take part in this work
(communal labour) and endeavour to prevent their wives from
doing so.5
As feelings began to run high, escalating the pressure occasioned by
the need to rid the district of all the non-Meru (foreign) residents, the
already strained relations with the Kikuyu, who were beginning to use the
Meru region as an extension area, were exacerbated. From then on,
particular emphasis was laid on getting rid of the foreigners residing in the
district. They were seen as "parasites on the Meru soil" as my informant,
one of the returnees, put it. Among the Meru, the use of double-edged
imagery is a highly developed art and an integral part of ordinary speech.
The use of the analogy of "parasite" to describe the foreigners is a powerful
image; not only does it illustrate their parasitic nature as seen from their
hosts' point of view, but also the latter's restiveness. The Meru felt that
they were playing host to all the non-Meru residents who were, apparently
sucking the life out of them.
The general feeling at this time was that if nothing was done, the
situation would get out of hand. The newly formed societies and
associations embarked on serious propaganda, calling on the people to resist
both the cultural and political domination, and return to their "glorious
past".6 The resultant tension now sent shock waves through the sections
of the Muslim community. As for the Kikuyu, they could always return to
their places of origin. But what about the Swahili, the Nubians and their
descendants? The need to maintain separate identity had, all along,
inspired them to insulate themselves against the host society and now, this
very identity was, in retrospect, working against them. The prevailing
5 Annual Report 1949 in DCIMRU/1J4.
6 J T. S. Kamunchuluh, 1975:197.
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sentiments were articulated by one of these returnees in the following
words:
My father was a young man when Kangangi, Edward Butler Home,
came to Meru and he witnessed the atrocities that were perpetrated
by Kangangi with the help of Swahili in the KA.R. People were
massacred ruthlessly and their property was plundered. When these
foreigners came, they thought that the Meru were backward
washenzi without any idea of religion. They despised us. I will tell
you - it is like someone coming to your house and taking possession
of everything in it, including you, the owner, so you have no say in
whatever he does. This is what these people - the Europeans together
with the Indians and the Waswahil did to us. This oppression
continued unabated for years, but thanks to the Second World War,
after which the situation began to change.
I was conscripted into the army and served until the war ended in
1945. While there, I learnt many things, my eyes were opened to the
reality of the relationship between the African and the European - I
discovered that the white man was an enemy. The foreigners in Meru
were his associates who supported the administration in various
ways: the Indian kept the shops and thus controlled and manipulated
the supply of goods; the Swahili and others used their religion
(Islam) to disgrace us - remember that we were regarded as washenzi
wasio na dini, (that is) uncivilized and without religion. These were
fellow Africans but because they had picked up a few habits from the
coastal Arabs, they arrogated to themselves a higher social status
than the rest of the people.
In fact it was at this time that I came to know that some of these
people had worked for the Arabs and indeed that was how they had
acquired their religion. It was at this time that, with a number of
other ex-soldiers, I began to work covertly among our people in order
to inspire them to rise up against the foreign elements that had set
themselves in our midst. Remember the saying that kikulacho ki
nguoni mwako. We made it clear to the people that unless something
was done, the Swahili would persist in treating us with contempt and
our daughters would continue to abscond to Mjini (town) where they
became prostitutes. You know that prostitution was unheard of in
Meru before the people founded their Majengo with its mitaa, and all
that came to be associated with it. They enticed our women with rice
and sugar. My own sister, Habiba left home and went to Mjini when
she was about 18, later on she got married to Abdallah. We felt that
we could not take these insults any more. Is it fair for someone to
take control of your own house and then treat you like dirt? The
white man, brought these people together with the Christian
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missionaries and they all rendered him a faithful service. But we
were not going to remain an ignorant lot of washenzi that they
thought we were for ever, it was time to change our situation. You
know the saying that 'God helps those who help themselves'.7
M'Tuanjau and many others like him were conscripted into an army
to fight for a king and country they knew nothing about. In the course of his
service in various places, he becomes reasonably exposed to new ideas, and
hence his argument is well articulated - he links the current events with
the arrival of the first colonial administrator in Meru; and sees the foreign
cultures, that is Islam and Christianity, and even the Asian traders, as
instruments of oppression. He goes further to interpret the Swahili disdain
for the others as cultural domination. The central point of his argument is
summed in the saying that kikulacho ki nguoni mwako. This literally means
'that which bites you is in your clothes', but the real meaning is that the
greater enemy is the one from within. The enemy from without is known
and therefore easily dealt with, but an enemy who is within is much more
dangerous because he strikes, just as the metaphor says, from within. In
this case, it is easier to deal with the Europeans, Asians and other
foreigners, but the situation is complicated by individuals like Habiba, his
sister and other mahaji who, in his opinion, had joined the ranks of the
enemy. Later on, as we shall see, the mahaji tried to exculpate themselves
from this charge by reviving the Jumuia-tul-Baladia, a nationalist
association formed by the mahaji Muslims in old Pangani, Nairobi in the
mid 1930s.
Besides political consciousness, the returnees also had acquired new
tastes and habits, therefore, a large number of them preferred to establish
themselves in or around the town rather than return to their villages.
Though the available statistical evidence does not expressly show the
' Interview with M'Tuanjau, Kangeta, 17th October 1991.
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distribution of these returnees, it is evident from both the annual reports8
and the personal accounts given by a number of them during the interviews,
that at least one half of the war returnees settled in or around the town.
Others, with the skills obtained in the army, tried various trades in the
rural trade centres in other parts of the district, from where they were able
to establish links with their counterparts in the town.9
It is evident that a network was now evolving and in 1948 these
nationalistic tendencies began to manifest themselves through societies and
associations mushrooming all over the district. Of particular relevance is
the Kianjai Connection Traders Association, formed in 1948 in Tigania.'°
This association, which the District Commissioner describes as being
"undoubtedly flavoured with politics and provides a convenient cloak for
such activities" soon came to represent a strong clique of traders and a
few others who considered themselves 'enlightened'. They formed a class of
their own, outside the orbit of the government employees. These people
were ex-soldiers, and not the 'ignorant washenzi' that the Muslims
considered the others to be. They were able to stand apart and as a result
of their experiences, were able to articulate the nationalist ideology and
propaganda. Clearly, they were well above the average Meru people.
Prior to this, the majority of the Muslims lived in their settlements,
without any serious threat from a few individuals who tried to establish
themselves in the town either as traders or as employees of the government.
As I previously stated, these ex-soldiers were not just another lot of
'ignorant washenzi' that the Muslims could easily dismiss as ineffectual. To
8 Annual Report, 1946, DCIMRU/1J4.
Interview with M'Tuanjau, Kangeta 10th October 1991.
10 J• T. S. Kamunchuluh, 1975:196.
"Annual Report 1948, DCIMRU/1J4.
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the Muslims, they constituted a more dangerous form of ushenzi, they not
only idolized the Meru customs but also popularized an aggressive
propaganda against foreign religions and culture which they saw as a form
of domination by foreigners. Therefore, the preponderance of these
'enlightened' yet non-Muslim, ex-soldiers evidently upset the balance
between the 'civilized' and the 'uncivilized'. In the previous situation it was
at least certain that the great majority of Africans holding any
position of authority in the reserve are mission-trained and under
strong missionary influence.'2
That is, the people who considered themselves or were considered by
others to be enlightened, were the few semi-westernized missionary-
educated teachers and government employees who were all Christian and
therefore, posed no real threat to the Muslims. But they were now caught
in the cross-fire of the Mau Mau. The Muslims had endeavoured to
maintain distinctiveness, especially the 'supercilious' Nubians, but the
returnees began to undermine the basis of this distinctiveness, namely, the
status derived from association with the colonial authority reinforced by
dini, (Islam). The activities of these returnees culminated in the Mau Mau
nationalism which shook the very foundations of the colonial administration
itself. The protection in which the Muslims had been basking until now was
replaced by insecurity as a result of the animosity generated by the Mau
Mau movement. This point is illustrated below in the discussion on the
demolition of the old Swahili village.
The important issues at the root of the growing antagonism towards
those who failed to conform to the Mau Mau during this period, are aptly
summed up in the following notice placed at the entrance to the Meru
Teachers' Training College in August 1952:
12 Mr. Gerald Casey of Beale Farm, Timau, to Mrs. Barbara Castle, M.P.,
October 1957, CO 82211240.
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May any African woman or man who drinks European beer die like
this dog. May any African woman who sleeps with a European, an
Indian or an Arab die like this dog. May any woman of our country
who prostitutes herself to an African for money die like this dog. May
any person who sells our lands to a European die like this dog." (Mau
Mau notice No.4 Kenya Swahili part)"The British Empire upset like
this dog.. .Rulers who sell black people or any person who sells black
skin die like this!!! Our freedom rise now". (Mau Mau notice No.4.
Kikuyu part).'3
Indeed, this notice written in Kiswahili, Kikuyu and Kimeru, and
strategically placed for all to read, emphasized the core issues namely:
prostitution, sale of land, domination by foreigners, and betrayal. Land was
the key issue of the Mau Mau movement - freedom fighters were fighting
to get back the alienated land, and land and freedom/independence were
intimately linked. The relationship between the land and the people was
presented in the African traditional religious symbolism:
the concepts of land, God, and Kikuyu political identity were thus
symbolically fused together in the prophetic ideology of the
nationalist movement.'4
The notice warned that: those who sell out (those who sell black skin) will
die. A key feature of this notice is the emphasis on the relationship of
women with the races that are named. Such relationships have to be
severed; violation of this notice went with an attendant warning of
impending death. That is to say that the potency of the curse is inevitably
retributive.'5
'3 J. S. T. Kaniunchuluh, 1973:193, citing Annual Report 1952, DCIMRU/8
' B. C. Ray, 1976:168.
15 The power of curse and its functions as an instrument of social control have
been discussed above, see pp. 111-114.
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Nevertheless, during the initial days of the Mau Mau outbreak, Meru
nationalism was in inverse proportion to that of Nyeri and Murang'a. As
will be shown here, Meru nationalism was sustained at a simmering level
for many years while the rest of the country, especially Nyeri and
Murang'a, was writhing under the Mau Mau movement, only to gain
momentum during the closing years of 1950s and the early 1960s. There are
two plausible explanations for this state of affairs: first, the already
mentioned form of indirect-rule that was sustained through the use of the
indigenous institution of njuri'6 led the Meru to cherish the illusion that
they were autonomous. Secondly, is the fact that, except for the Buuri
plains, not much of the land in Meru had been taken for white settlers and
therefore not many people were displaced. Hence the relative lack of
political ferment and nationalist consciousness, a subject that will be dealt
with in the next section.
The Predicament of Sheikh Mwinyi
The effect of the war returnees on the Muslims varied from one group to
another, that is from the mahaji on the one hand to the Swahili on the
other. While M'Tuanjau (cited in the above interview) articulates the
prevailing anti-Swahili sentiments in the words of an enlightened ex-soldier
and nationalist, the case of Sheikh Mwinyi below, illustrates the
predicament of the Swahili Muslims in Meru during this period. The sheikh
narrated his life history thus:
My father was a soldier in K.A.R. and after the war he settled here
and married from Abothanja clan. My mother lived here, on this very
plot where I have built my house. At the peak of the Mau Mau
movement, there was a widespread feeling among the local people
that the "foreign elements" in this village should leave the area
16 See H. E. Lambert on the use of indigenous institutions in administration
in Meru, LAMJIJ2/1-9, University of Nairobi Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library
Archives.
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together with the Kikuyu. I was then a teacher at the madrasa and
I began to feel that it was unfair for these people to say that we
should leave the district and go where our fathers came from. I began
to think that though my father had always talked of going back, he
actually had no place to go back to. He had settled and established
himself here in Meru and now he was too old to move anywhere else.
My father always said that he had some relatives in Unyamwezi in
Tanganyika, but I have never met any of them. I never even came to
know their names, except my grandfather's which I have taken for
my surname. Now, due to Mau Mau influence these people began to
call us foreigners. Some Nubian families convinced that an imminent
danger faced them, left around 1952 to join their relatives in Kibera,
Nairobi. I do not remember the names of all of them, but I can count
15 houses which I know were sold out at that time to other people.
For me and others like me, it was not a question of choice either to
leave or stay, we belonged here and we were here to stay. But for us
the Mau Mau people developed a strong hatred, they saw us as
traitors to the freedom cause because we did not care for the land.
You know that we Muslims are town people and it is only recently,
after independence, that many of us have acquired pieces of land.
How could I own land and I did not belong to any clan at that time.
My mother, as I have said comes from Abothanja clan, but as you
know, I cannot belong to my mother's clan. As for my father, having
left his place as a young boy, did not even remember the name of his
clan back in Unyamwezi. My maternal uncle had given my mother
a small portion of land to cultivate, but even she could not lay any
claim to this piece of land. Had my uncles been religious (Muslim)
people, their sister would be entitled to some inheritance, but you
also know that according to the Meru customs, she could not inherit
any land from her father. In fact during this period, many Muslim
women who had obtained small pieces of land from their relatives for
cultivation were forced to give them up. The people were now
complaining that the Swahili were no good - they supported the
colonialists who are responsible for their presence in the area.
Anyway, to cut a long story short, this was a bad time for us in this
town. It was at this time that I moved to Igembe and married my
first wife from Yusufs family and settled there.'7
17 Interview with Sheikh Mwinyi, Mjini, 16th November 1991.
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The case of Sheikh Mwinyi highlights the effects of the Mau Mau on
the Muslims in Meru. The reality of the situation was that they were not
in transit as their fathers had made them believe all along. For the first
time they realized that 'foreignness' to which undue emphasis had all along
been attributed, especially by the ex-soldiers, was now turning sour for
them and more so for their descendants. This realization came as a shock
to them. All the while they had continued to look down on the rest of the
Meru people as washenzi, "backward people without religion", but now it
dawned on them that the threat facing them was immense. Their very
existence was threatened and there were not many alternatives open to
them.
The main points of this case can be situated in the wider perspective
of dini versus ushenzi: it is clear that the sheikh blamed his "rootlessness" in
Meru to the fact that he could not belong to his mother's clan; his uncles
were not religious, they were washenzi and therefore their sister had no right
to land inheritance though she herself was a Muslim. To him, her Muslim
identity was being threatened by her 'uncivilized' brothers who denied her
what was otherwise legally hers. He also blamed this on the local customs
of lineage that demanded that he belong to his father's and not his mother's
clan.
The idea of the rest of the people was that these foreigners should
leave the country. For all those years that they have been around, there had
been no attempt to confront them, but now the opportunity presented itself
in the struggle for independence. The people were particularly incensed by
the practice of prostitution attributed to the Muslim settlements in the
town. The Kianjai Trade Connection Association mentioned earlier on
claimed that one of its major aims was to fight prostitution and those
responsible for it must leave the district.
Attacks on government servants started early in 1952 in Nyeri and spread
to Murang'a and, as we are informed:
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The attacks have in the main been directed against chiefs and
head men but the junior government servants such as chiefs'
messengers and clerks, agricultural instructors, teachers... and
loyal Africans in general have also suffered.'8
Not only were the Muslims among the 'loyal' Africans, but, as I have
mentioned above, there was rancour against them. The Mau Mau
movement was opposed to all foreign religions and culture. Commenting on
the religious aspect of the movement, the Governor spoke of the:
recent attacks by the Mau Mau on the Christian faith which
have resulted in the absolute condemnation of the society by
the Protestant and Catholic churches. In July a church in Fort
Hall District (now Murang'a district) was desecrated by the
slaughter of a goat before the alter; in August the removal of
a portrait of Christ from a school in Nyeri District was
demanded on the grounds that 'He was an enemy of the
people'; Members of the society are not allowed to use
Christian names...'9
The Mau Mau propaganda against foreign religions was interpreted as the
"irreligious character of the movement" by the Christian leadership in a
pastoral letter to the Catholic Bishops:
10. It has recently come to light that the movement is
assuming a definite anti-Christian attitude and policy. This
religious side of the present state of things is for us most
essential and an aspect of the movement which eminently
concerns us by reason of the office which we hold. We have
many proofs of this tendency... On personal testimony the
victim said: 'I was told that if I contribute any money for the
churches.. .if I walked with religious people and if I read the
Bible, and if I am called by a baptismal name and if I reveal
any of this kiama to the government then the things they were
18	 to Deal With Disturbances Arising From the Activities of the Mau
Mau, CO 822/437.
19 Governors statement on the proposal to deal with the disturbance arising
from the Mau Mau secret society, Co 8221437.
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giving me would kill me.' This fact reveals the aim of the
association in clear terms; it gives a direct clue to the type of
social and political order.. .the Mau Mau is preparing for its
people.
11. But other evidence of still a more malicious and blasphemous
nature has come to our notice; the kind of propaganda which aims at
the complete overthrow and denial of all religion. This phase in the
development of this proscribed society constitutes, in our opinion, its
greatest evil because it attacks and endeavours to destroy the
religion of Christ.. •20
Though in these extracts, both the government and the Christian
missionaries emphasize the attacks on the Christians: Mau Mau was anti-
foreign, anti-Christian and anti-Muslim. Attacks on people of other religions
were documented only when they were perpetrated against "non-Natives",
even isolated incidents were reported to the Governor, for instance, it is
reported that:
An Asian mother strangled and her house ransacked. The attempted
abduction of an Asian child.. .The brutal murder of an Asian trader
and slashing of his wife and children; and an armed attack on an
Asian trading centre.2'
Though these reports on attacks make no mention of Meru Muslims,
the available evidence shows that they were not spared by the nationalists.
My informants related gruesome experiences in which they lost their loved
ones and their property. One Swahili woman tearfully narrated how her son
and husband were murdered for allegedly being anti-Mau Mau. 22 Another
one explained how she woke up one morning to find her husband's
20	 letter from John J McCarthy, C.S.Sp., Titular Bishop of Cercina and
Vicar Apostolic of Zanzibar, to the Bishop's house, Nairobi. 26/8/1952, CO 822/438.
21 Sir Everlin Baring to Secretary of state for the Colonies, 29/12/1952 CO
822/465.
22 Interview with Mwanaidi, Mjini, 15th November 1991.
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dismembered body at the doorstep. There are numerous such cases and the
list could be much longer. It is important to note that the residents of the
old Swahili village and the Nubian Village suffered more than the mahaji
because they were considered to be foreigners and therefore, it was not
possible for them to take the Mau Mau oath which earned them acceptance
by the nationalists and protection against harassment. The oath was
administered to the indigenous people in order to flush out the foreign
elements in their midst. The severity of persecution suffered by this group
could be attributed to the avowed condemnation of the Mau Mau by the
Muslim leadership and its support for the government's ruthless measures
and blind determination to stamp out the movement. The Muslim support
for the government against the Mau Mau is evident in the following extract:
The governor interviewed.., the Asian members both Hindu
and Muslim.. .The Assistant Liwali of Mombasa and Mukima
(Mukamba) signified agreement. All Asians I met, who
included Arab elected members, two Hindus, Ebrahim
(Ismailia). . .expressed strong agreement and satisfaction.
Furthermore,
Dr. Hassan, Muslim elected member of the Legislative council
addressing his constituents in Mombasa, referred to the emergency
measures and said 'I feel it my duty to support the government in
these unpalatable but essential measures in order to strengthen its
)23hand.
The Liwali in Mombasa was the traditional administrator and leader of
Muslims, and the coast, as has been said in chapter 2, provided inspiration
and served as the model for the Muslim communities living far inland,
Meru included. Therefore, such official pronouncements, made by leading
Muslims, reflected the general attitude of Muslims which rekindled intense
Position of the Asian Community in Kenya During the Emergency, CO
822/465.
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antagonism in Meru with the result that attacks on Asians, Swahili and
Nubians became more frequent.
Demolition of the Swahili Village
At the height of these attacks in 1954/55, the old Swahili village in
Meru town was demolished. It was clear that the village was demolished in
accordance with the long standing town planning scheme:
To get more land to build and extend the New Bazaar Area, it
was necessary to remove the Swahili village to another site
within the township. Council decided to build them houses and
supplied various materials. The expenditure was therefore
borne from 'compensation for disturbance vote'. The provision
made in 1954 estimates is inadequate to meet timber bills. To
complete these buildings it will require additional expenditure
of £90. Plot holders pay annual rent to the council.24
However, there is evidence to suggest that the impetus to implement
the scheme at this time was provided by the Mau Mau movement. My
informants gave various accounts of how and why they were moved to the
"New Swahili village" adjoining the Nubian village. Mzee Ibrahim, of whom
previous mention has been made, said that the Swahili could not be moved
to Majengo because the inahafi had bought the piece of land for themselves.
He happily added that now it was the turn for the mahaji to reject the
Swahili:
24 In February 1949, it was reported that "some 34 shops built of temporary
materials comprise the Asian commercial lines, the whole lot constitute a statutory
nuisance and contravene the...regulations of the Township Ordinance;...there will
be at some not too distant date a development plan for Meru township which will
eliminate the existing unsavoury conditions and in turn set up on modern lines
another Asiatic business area." Private survey for building plots was started in
1953 and by 1957 most buildings were completed and the demolition of the old
bazaar commenced. Meru Township File, DCIMRU/2/9/2. Also see the
Supplementary estimates of Meru African District Council, 1955. Unclassified,
Meru Municipal Council Chambers.
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After all, we have not changed (our status). They considered
themselves to be waungwana and referred to us derogatorily
as dewe (pierced then stretched earlobes). When we were in
need, they did not welcome us to their settlement, and now
that it is broken, they turn to us. Are we not the same mahaji
that they despised?
Thus the initial proposal to move them to Majengo was rejected on
the very grounds that the mahaji were rejected nearly 30 years before.
Ibrahim's statement indicates that the old rivalries were still lingering.
Nonetheless, there were other plausible reasons for not moving them to
Majengo, regardless of the availability of space there and acceptability by
the mahaji. First, it was deemed expedient by the colonial administration
to curb Mau Mau activities by all means, therefore, putting these two
groups together would defeat the purpose especially because the mahaji
were members of Jumuia-tul-Baladia, and some of them had already taken
the oath binding them to the Mau Mau movement. Second, the move to
create for them a new Swahili village can be seen as part of the
villagization which was at this time being introduced elsewhere in the
country.26 The majority of the evacuees that I interviewed, attributed the
destruction of the old Swahili village and the transfer to the new site, to the
Mau Mau disturbances.27
During a meeting with the elders, the District Commissioner
explained that the Swahili were being moved in order to protect them from
Mau Mau harassment. But they were herded together and the whole area
Interview with Mzee Ibraliim, Majengo, 26th August 1991.
26 Villagization was first introduced in Kikuyuland after the colonial war
council met in 1954 and decided that it was the most effective way to control the
Mau Mau. People were herded into huge enclosures, and home-guards kept a
twenty-four hour vigil to monitor the movement of the residents, and ensure that
no food was given to the freedom fighters in the forest.
27 Interview with Mwanaidi, Mjini, 20th November 1991; Karimi, Mimi, 26th
of November 1991; and Mzee Hamisi, Mjini 27th November 1991.
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cordoned off, making them virtual prisoners, as one informant put it. This
constriction, coupled with a twenty-four-hour vigil by home-guards,
generated its own force - compelling the Muslims to pray in the mosque
nearest to them, that is the Nubi mosque, since they were allowed to go out
only for an hour in the afternoon to perform the prayers and buy food. This
state of emergency triggered a process of reconciliation between the Swahili
and the Nubians. They realized that sustaining their cleavages and rivalries
was of no use in solving their immediate problem for should the Mau Mau
succeed, and the colonial administration collapse, the immediate substitute
would be power in the hands of people who have been agitating for the
expulsion of the Swahili and other foreigners from the area.
The evacuation was devastating. In addition to the Mau Mau threat,
the administration overrode both groups' religious sensibilities by putting
them together in what was now designated the "New Swahili Village". They
were not allowed any say on the issue and, contrary to the council minutes
and the D.C.'s promise, no compensation for disturbance was forthcoming
in spite of various deputations to the D.C. The council minutes indicate that
houses were to be built on the new site by the council for the people in
question, but a number of my informants who were themselves victims of
the demolition, say that only a half of the houses were constructed by the
council, and the other half by the owners with little help from the
council. It should also be noted that when the original houses were
destroyed, some of the house-owners who had either bought or inherited the
houses from relatives, were now considered ineligible for plots on the new
site and this had tremendous effects on the social setup of the settlement,
as will be illustrated below. An examination of the reasons and arguments
The District Annual Medical Officer of Health Reports show that Swahili
village had 29 houses. Perhaps there might have been more houses since the
settlement was congested, but the process of acquiring a plot on which to build a
house was rather tedious; and even then only certain people were eligible for these
plots. It should also be remembered that the "out houses" were not registered with
the council and for that reason, they are not included in the reports.
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given by the applicants for plots in the new Swahili village, shows that
previous ownership of a house in the old village and service to the
government were the most important criteria for resettlement:
priority is being given to persons already resident in the old
Swahili village. Should any land be available when present
residents in the Swahili village are re-housed, further
applications may be entertained.. •29
In pursuance of this council minute, many persons lost their houses
and were thus turned into lodgers, a loss that had both economic and social
implications for the members of the community. From the economic point
of view, each house provided accommodation for a number of individuals or
even families. At the same time, a house was an important and sometimes
sole source of income for its owner. Also, over the years, the lodgers came
to constitute a separate class of residents, making the social structure of the
Swahili settlement quite complex. The outhouses and the rooms which were
let out to them, served as bases for the various trades for most of them.
Socially, it was important for one to own a house in the town for it
was a source of high status, though, in a different sense from the coastal
setup that Allen describes. 30 These house owners may be seen as "the long-
established town dwellers" of Meru. But, in contrast to the coastal ungwana
where status hinged on "stone house culture" and "creditworthiness and
financial integrity", house ownership and its attendant social status in
Meru, hinged on service to colonial government. At the coast, lineage
defined the core groups while in Meru, lineage was not a factor in the
formation of a core group. The house owners formed an inner circle, which
functioned as the core, the reference group from which wazee wa mji,
29 DCIMRU/2/4/10. From the President of Meru African District Council,
22/3/1954.
30 J• de V. Allen 1980:306-335.
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leading elders, were constituted. 3 ' Therefore, loss of a house to one of them
entailed exclusion from this core. The option of becoming a lodger was
entirely unacceptable, entailing all of this and signifying a downward step,
a loss of social status. It should also be remembered that most of these men
and women could not find an alternative source of income, therefore, even
those who were willing to lodge with their neigbours, could not afford the
rent. Several families were forced to seek refuge with relatives and friends.
While the evacuation was devastating for the victims the demolition
marked a new phase in the development of Islam in Meru. Not only did the
Muslims realize the futility of sustained cleavages and rivalries, but it
became quite impractical to sustain these differences now that the two
groups are virtually merged after the demolition. It can be said that this
was the beginning of the process which culminated in different identities
being blurred, as group distinctiveness began to dissipate, giving way to a
culturally constructed Muslim identity in the town.
The Resurgence of Jumuia-tul-Baladia
The interesting point for our purpose here is that initially Mau Mau
activity in Meru was low key when compared to Nyeri and Murang'a. But
towards the end of the 1950s, when such activity was beginning to subside
in other parts of the country, it gained momentum in Meru. Commenting
on the resurgence of Mau Mau oathing in Meru, the director of intelligence
observed that:
The present outbreak (of oathing) has more serious implications.
Oathing has been taking place at the probable rate of two or three
small ceremonies a week since September 1957 and it is known that
eighteen ceremonies have taken place. In every known case violence
or intimidation was used to compel the initiates to take the oath...
' For the discussion on the role of the elders in the social and religious affairs
of Majengo, see chapter 5, pp.226-234.
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The administrators were always armed with pangas and the rituals
used were typical Mau Mau with local Meru embellishments.32
The available evidence suggests that this resurgence precipitated the
revival of the Jumuia-tul-Baladia in Meru. That is to say that the revival
of Jumuiatul-Baladia in Meru at that time can be seen as the Muslim
response to the Mau Mau. By 1952, a group of mahaji had small pieces of
land which they cultivated for subsistence at a place called Naari, a few
miles away from Meru town. Naari area was apparently attractive for
settlement, so they constructed a mosque and a number of them were
considering the possibility of moving from Majengo to found a new Muslim
village there. But the oathing outburst was executed with a frightening
vigour, forcing them to withdraw from the new-found land. The very
presence of Swahili and other Muslims in Meru Town was bad enough, and
now allowing them to establish another Majengo in Naari and living in close
proximity with them, was seen as a betrayal of the nationalist cause. A
number of my informants who had moved to Naari narrated how the Mau
Mau oath administrators pulled down the wattle-and-thatch mosque and
sent them fleeing back to Majengo. The revival of Mau Mau in Meru was
animated by the idea "that to catch up with the rest of the country oathing
was necessary".33
32 Ag. Governor to the Secretary of State for Colonies,"Mau Mau Oathing
ceremonies in Meru", 24/111958, CO 822/1254.
It has been mentioned earlier on that during the initial days, there was
relatively less bitterness in Meru as a result of the form of in-direct rule that was
sustained through the use of njuri, hence the belated political consciousness, see
Ag. Governor to the Secretary of State for Colonies,"Mau Mau Oathing ceremonies
in Meru", 241111958, CO 822/1254.
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One can see a link between this resurgence of oathing and the revival of
Jumuia-tüI-Baladia by the Majango residents, the ma haji , all of whom owed
allegiance to the movement since its inception.34
On the origin of Jumuia-tul-Baladia in Nairobi, Nzibo has the
following to say:
Jumuia-tul-Baladia was formed as a result of the Kikuyu mahaji's
dissatisfaction with the way they were dominated and kept in
ignorance by the Coastal Waswahili. Its leader Maalim Hainisi
Ngige. ..found (sic) his own madrassah to promote Islam among the
mahaji who by 1930 had become frustrated by the little Islamic
knowledge they possessed and the exclusive domination of Islamic
affairs by the coastal people. Many rejected the term hajfi as
discriminatory and despised the patronizing attitude of the coastal
Muslims.35
It may be argued that Nzibo's explanation is an oversimplification of a more
complex phenomenon which culminated in the formation of Jumuia-tul-
Baladia by the mahaji in the old Muslim settlement of Panagarn, Nairobi.
However, the relevant point here is that after the demolition of Pangani,
the association opened branches in various places where there were mahaji
communities: Karai in Kiambu, Nakuru, Embu, Meru, etc., with Nyeri as
the headquarters. In its hey-day under the leadership of Hajji Hamisi, the
society became engrossed in the propagation of Islam among the Africans
in the interior, the construction of mosques (14 mosques are listed under its
achievements up to 1973)36, promotion of Muslim education, and other
Interview with Mwanaisha, Majengo, 24th October 1991.
Y. A. Nzibo, 1986:127.
36 Minutes of the meeting of Jumuia-tul-Baladia held on 18/111973 in Nyeri
(Minutes given to me by one of the Baladia leaders in Meru). The society claims
to have been founded much earlier than 1937, but we have no other evidence of it
existence prior to this date. Its achievements are mainly the construction of
mosques and madrasa in Ngong, Karai, Riruta, Thika, Murang'a, Sagana, Kutus,
Embu, Nyeri, Nanyuki, Meru, Nakuru and Makindu.
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activities considered vital for the improvement of the lot of mahaji Muslims.
Faced with scarcity of funds and lack of effective national leadership, the
society achieved a limited measure of success.
In Meru, prior to the tidal wave of oathing orchestrated by
nationalists, song and dance performed during the Muslim calendrical
festivities served as conduits through which the sentiments of the members
of Jumuia-tul-Baladia and the antagonism and rivalry between the various
groups were expressed. 37
 What we now see as voluntary oathing by those
had been left out; and the severity of their criticism of those disinclined to
take the oath, is an almost fanatical attempt to make up for the lost time.
The case of Ruring'u Muslim village in Nyeri, which was razed to the
ground at the climax of the Mau Mau struggle,38
 now provided the
inspiration; if the Ruring'u victims were going to be rewarded after
independence, so should those in Meru. Thus the Jumuia-tul-Baladia
provided the blue-print for Muslim participation in rituals which the
Director of Intelligence describes as "typically Mau Mau with local Meru
embellishments".39
 He does not say what these embellishments were, but
the oathing process undoubtedly involved handling of blood and the use of
other items which are strictly forbidden for Muslims.
One informant who could not, understandably divulge the details of
the oath to me, said that the Muslims partook of a special oath acceptable
to them, but again it is difficult to gauge their compliance to the prescribed
Song and dance as a means of expressing the rivalry that existed between
the groups has been alluded to in chapter 2, pp. 83-84.
38 Residents of Ruringu Muslims village in Nyeri were suspected to be
members or sympathizers of the Mau Mau movement and their village was razed
to the ground in 1955, leaving only the mosque untouched. Interview with
Ramadhan, Chuka, 23rd November 1991.
Ag. Governor to the Secretary of State for Colonies, "Mau Mau Oathing
Ceremonies in Meru", 24/111958, CO 822/1254.
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oath; or to specify the point at which they drew the line between halal and
haram in the oathing rituals. When asked why in the first place they as
Muslims assented to oathing of whatever form, some said that the Mau
Mau movement was a movement by the 'people of the land' and the mahaji,
therefore, had no reason to remain aloof. Be that as it may, a more
appropriate explanation for their participation would be the degree of
insecurity generated by the great passion with which the compulsory
oathing4° was being executed by the nationalists. While, then, it can be
said that the conscious harassment targeted at them was partly responsible
for their participation, there are parallels in Murang'a and Nyeri which
seem to lend credibility to the suggestion that in partaking of the oath, they
were asserting national group loyalty over religious loyalty.
The he-goat (nthenge) oath, described as the "second most powerful
Kikuyu oath" by the then Director of Intelligence, was said to be
'planted' on the proposed victim in the form of a dead dog, cat
or chicken to which is affixed a notice telling him what he may
or may not do and detailing the agonies he will suffer should
he dare to disregard the oath... As a result, a large number of
potentially loyal government servants and others have seen no
alternative but to take the Mau Mau oath. They have gone in
fear of their lives, brutal murder of their families and
destruction of their property..
This description of the he-goat oath fits the description of the notice placed
at the entrance to the Meru Teachers College mentioned above. What
on compulsory oathing in Meru, the Director of Intelligence wrote
that "The present outbreak (of oathing) has more serious implications. Oathing
has been taking place at the rate of two to three small ceremonies a week since
September 1957 ... In every known case violence or intimidation was used to
compel the initiates to take oath...", Ag. Governor to the Secretary of State for
Colonies, "Mau Mau Oathing ceremonies in Meru", 24/111958, CO 822/1254
41 CO 822/437 Proposal to Deal With Disturbance Arising From the Activities
of the Mau Mau Secret Society in Kenya.
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emerges at this point is a conscious manipulation of the age-old belief in the
efficacy of curses by the activists to coerce people into taking the oath;
hence many mahaji took the oath to eschew the attendant consequences of
failure to support the Mau Mau. From the foregoing discussion, it is clear
that resurgence of Jumuia-tul-Baladia was first and foremost the mahaji
response to the Mau Mau. Two important elements of this response were:
the need to catch up in case of reward after the fruition of the Mau Mau
struggle; and the need for protection and mutual trust that the oath
guaranteed for its partakers. This protection was crucial to mahaji Muslims
now that the call for foreigners to leave the area was becoming even louder
towards the closing years of the 1950s and the early 1960s.
However, it was not possible for the Meru people to get rid of all the
unwanted residents because some of them had already become deeply
rooted in their midst. They only managed, by 1962, to procure a separate
"Meru region" by protesting through the Meru African Coffee Cooperative
Union, "representing 40,000 members"; "the Meru African District Council,
representing 500,000 of all the Meru people"; and the Njuri, "to which all
males over 30 are eligible"; all of which expressed "the Meru wish to be
completely separated from the Kikuyu who try to dominate them and use
their land as an expansion area. If they are not separated the Meru will use
force."42
Muslims and the 'Independence Scramble'
After the construction of the new bazaar between 1955 and 1960, and
the attainment of independence in 1963, many other people began to move
into Meru town. The economic prospects of the now enlarged town, coupled
with the inspiration drawn from the newly acquired independence, lured
42 Kenya: Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission, Her Majesty's
Stationary Office, London, 1962, p.55.
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many new-corners into the town. The "independence and scramble" slogan,
attributed to Bernard Mate, then Meru representative in the Legislative
Council, became not only the slogan for the period, but also the rallying cry
for acquisition of land and property in the district. There was a rush to
"harvest the fruits of independence", but, as O'Brien observes, the advent
of independence "found the Muslims all together confused and
unprepared".43 In Meru they had not prepared themselves for the
eventualities of independence, one of which was the influx of outsiders into
the town. As we have seen above priority in plot allotment in the New
Swahili village had been given to the residents of the old village, and
"applications from persons in the reserve to set up in the township"" were
not considered even as late as 1954, but now such restrictions were no
longer exercised.
Majengo had been a cultural island, the Muslims had lived for many
years without external threat and hence busied themselves in articulating
their differences. Now they were faced with an increasing number of non-
Muslims, with many of them seeking and finding accommodation within the
Muslim settlement itself. For the first time, they felt that there was an
imperative need to stand up for their faith. Their cultural identity,
moreover, must be able to stand the test of time and this could not be
achieved without cohesion amongst themselves. The process of redefining
religious status (of converts and those born in the faith) in order to dissolve
the groups' religious and social boundaries and embrace all the Muslim
elements in a newly constructed cohesive Muslim community in the town
D. C. O'Brien, "Coping with Christians: The Muslim Predicament in Kenya",
S.O.A.S. Islam in Africa Seminar Paper based on field research conducted from
December 1986 to early February 1987, in Nairobi and Mombasa.
' Mr P. R. Spendlove (the District Commissioner) to the Reverend Valender,
4/3/1954, DCIMRU/2/4/1O. Valender, the Methodist Church minister in Meru, made
an application for some of his flock to set up in the new settlement, but the D.0
objected on the grounds that persons in the reserve were not encouraged to move
into the township, even as late as 1954.
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will be examined below. The point to note here is that this influx of new
corners living in close proximity to Muslims, constituted a social and
religious threat. This threat became all the more apparent for the additional
reason that the Muslims had, for a long time, insulated themselves from the
rest of the society in an attempt to keep dini free from contamination by
ushenzi, with the result that they had not availed themselves of the
opportunity to obtain western education, which now seemed to confer an
enviable advantage on the rest of the people. Needless to say this
advantageous position gave them an upper hand over the Muslims.
So far, we have illustrated the effects of the Mau Mau on the
Muslims in Meru. From the evidence assembled above, it is clear that the
Mau Mau cataclysm triggered a chain of events, which provided an external
stimulus for change. This process of change shook the Muslim fraternity out
of its complacency, and they came to realize that future security for them
would only be found in identifying with the mahaji descendants.
The Swahili and the Nubians were led by the events
of the Mau Mau and its aftermath to realize that they could not hold out
against the current of social change taking place in the region; and that it
was in their best interests that they support and obtain the support of the
apparently more secure mahaji and their descendants. They could no longer
rely on the patronage of the colonial administration, the most appropriate
course presented itself in a form of loe unity for the Muslim groups. On the
other hand, a new basis for the necessary re-orientation of attitudes which
would govern their future relationship had to be found. This was readily
constructed in the ideology of kuzaliwa katika dini, 'born in the faith',
which was charged with new dynamism.
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The Mechanics of Religious Community Identity
Construction
To 'Be Born in the Faith'
In the late 1950s through to the mid 1960s, the Muslim fraternity in
Meru was experiencing what Cohen in his illuminating study of Sabon Gari
in Nigeria, calls "structural" change, though the Sabon Gari differ
essentially from the Majengo in Kenyan towns in that the former are
formed by people of the same ethnic group who migrate to cities in Nigeria.
The Sabo function as bases for the control of trade in the south, hence their
leaders and residents have an economic basis of power which the Majengo
lack. In the previous chapter I discussed the social and religious cleavages
in Meru, showing how the various Muslim groups endeavoured to maintain
distinctiveness. It is this distinctiveness which was now shifting as the
Muslim pioneers began to give way to the second generation.
It might be useful here to state Cohen's thesis in order to provide a
framework for our discussion. Cohen examined the process of social
organization in the Sabon Gari, 'the strangers' quarter', by showing the
economic and political interdependence in the network of the Sabo
residents, and their response to a changing political situation. He isolates
six problems: the problem of distinctiveness, of communication, of decision-
making, of authority, of ideology, and of discipline. In the first one, an
ethnic group defines its separateness within the parameters of the
prevailing political climate, by insulating itself against intrusion by
members of other less privileged groups. Thus distinctiveness is achieved
through the propagation of myths of origin and claims to superiority; and
descent and endogamy. Kinship is crucial to the Sabo group membership,
while intra-group interaction helps the group to deepen its distinctiveness.
Abner Cohen, 1969:25.
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This form of interaction is expedited by spatial proximity, which he argues,
"can be an important auxiliary factor in the development of effective ethnic
grouping".
Cultural homogenization is a requisite for resistance to external
pressure in a situation where two or more ethnic groups are poised in a
struggle. With regard to the problem of communication, distinctiveness
alone does not transform a group into a polity, the development of a
communications system among its members is also a necessary condition.
Authority, Cohen's fourth problem, is vested in the old, socially well
established settlers of the Sabo. He further argues that it is "political
ideology which legitimates power and converts it to authority". 47 For
ideology to function, certain beliefs must be inculcated and sustained
through the conditioning of moods and attitudes of the individuals
concerned. Following Turner, he says that the symbols must be charged
with meanings which are situationally relevant.
Cohen takes as his starting point what he calls the "sociological
paradox" of 'retribalization' and 'detribalization' taking place in African
towns. In detribalization, an ethnic group tries to adjust itself to a new
situation by adopting new customs which are shared with the contiguous
groups. In retribalization, a group adjusts by accentuating their traditional
customs, symbols and ideologies. It is the retribalization of the Sabo that is
the concern of Cohen's study. His thesis is based on the assumption that the
migrant ethnic group is retribalized in its attempt to articulate an informal
political organization to be used in the struggle with the other groups. This
analysis assumes that every ethnic group develops into a polity in a new
political situation.
46 Abner Cohen, 1969:204.
thid., p.208.
See V. Turner, 1967:28-30.
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Conversely, the group in Meru town does not develop into a polity
after independence. Therefore, it can be said that the social organization,
that is, the customs, the religious symbols, ideologies and political
structure, all have a great deal to do with how a group adjusts itself to a
particular situation, be it political, religious, economic or a combination of
two or all of these. Again, it should also be remembered that it is not only
the past experiences that affect the response of an ethnic group, but also a
particular situation may require a particular response. In other words the
Hausa in the Sabo have a different historical experience from that of the
Muslims in Majengo and Mjini in Meru and the political situation of the
Hausa in the 1950s differs in several important respects from that of Meru.
Nevertheless, one can see a striking parallel between the two cases:
in one, the "increasingly bureaucratized administration.., no longer officially
recognizes the Sabo as a Hausa Quarter"; in the other, the municipal agents
of the independent African government do not consider Majengo and Mjini
as exclusive settlements. Thus for both the Meru and the Hausa Muslims,
the idea of regional distinctiveness comes to an abrupt end. Furthermore,
the distinctiveness of the Meru Muslim settlements is seen as a colonial
relic, incompatible with the ideals of independence. It is not my intention
to make a detailed comparison between the Sabo Hausa and the Meru
Muslims, though it would be interesting to do so. The point I want to make
here is that, as a sociological model of analysis of a Muslim group, this
study is highly illustrative. However, for it to fit the case in question, it
needs to be altered significantly.
When the indirect rule in Nigeria collapsed with the resultant loss
of the colonial support for the Sabo, the immediate threat facing the
community was both political and economic, the two aspects of Sabo life
being inextricable; whereas the threat in Meru was articulated in religious
and cultural terms. Unlike the autonomous Sabo chief whose authority is
backed up by political and economic power, the authority of the elders in
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Majengo, though they constitute an indispensable body of authority to
which the Muslims have recourse in any matter affecting them, has no
political significance. Their lack of political power, for instance, was best
demonstrated during the already mentioned transfer of the old Swahili
village to a new site in 1954/55. After the demolition, they were bundled
together in the new settlement, apparently without any resistance. Even
when the authorities failed to comply with the terms of the transfer, such
as compensation for disturbance and council help in the construction of new
houses, the victims were unable to organize for political action. They could
only send numerous deputations to the district administration, but these
were soon to prove the most ineffective means of seeking redress for
political grievances.
Religious orders in some parts of East Africa, have been the corner-
stone for resistance of the pressure of colonial rule, and the development of
other forms of nationalism,49 but in Kenya their influence has been
minimal. Along the coast, it is limited to the veneration of saints' tombs and
the performance of dhikr, sufi meditations; while a more vigorous adherence
to Qacliriyya and Salihiyya orders is evident among the Somali. 50 In Meru
town, only a small number of individuals owed allegiance to these orders.
It has been argued above that Muslims in Meru were not a polity,
nevertheless, they had to reorganize themselves in a changing political
situation. The question then is how they articulated the reorganization.
They resorted to a dynamic re-arrangement of archetypal concepts and
See B. G. Martin, 1976:172-176.
50 In my study of the Muslim communities in Nairobi (Maingi, 1987:140-142)
I found that the after the assassination of one Sheikh Uways in 1909 for his
attack on the venerated leader of Salihiyya, Sheikh Abdallah Herse, (both men
were of Somali origin) the adherents of the two orders were slaughtering one
another in Nairobi up till the end of the FirtWorld War. However, the tension
between them subsided only to be revived during the late 1950s and early 1960s
to buttress the claims to the then simmering Somali nationalism.
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ideals of birth in the faith, in order to realign relationships and create a
basis for a new social setting. The significance of 'birth in the faith' is
articulated by Sheikh Mwinyi, whose father was a Nyamwezi and therefore
not one of the mahaji, thus:
The children of the mahaji are not mahaji themselves. Their fathers
were converts. Even if they had become Muslim, they still retained
some of their past (ushenzi) 'uncivilized' traits. It is true to say that
they are now pilgrims (they have made pilgrimage from disbelief) but
it is not easy for a person to change completely and forget the things
one was accustomed to since childhood throughout until the
attainment of adulthood. How could they (the mahaji) alter their
condition? As you know a child or a human being is born a Muslim
but it is the parents or the guardians who later on lead him or her
in another direction. You know the saying that 'the way a child is
raised is the way s/he grows'. Now the mahaji, in spite of the fact
that they had made pilgrimage from disbelief, they were encumbered
with many things of the past. But their children who have been born
in this town, are not concerned with most of these things. Again
these are lucky to get religious education in the madrasa here, and
many are able to read the Book for themselves. Therefore, their faith
is different (in terms of understanding and depth) than that of their
fathers, a person who knows cannot be equal to one who does not
know. In this respect, they are a step ahead of their fathers and
therefore, they are not rnahaji, they are born in the faith.6'
The Sheikh's argument goes much further than whether birth in the
faith is or is not superior to conversion; it is not simply a question of
whether or not the mahaji descendants are different from the predecessors,
but rather in what ways are they different. The index of differentiation
between the mahaji and their descendants is the degree of Swahilization
ascribed to the "religious" environment in which the latter have been raised.
Thus the superiority of birth over conversion hinges crucially on the hidden
agenda that there has been no contact with ushenzi, the notion of a truly
Muslim identity, supposedly passed on from parents to children; and also
accrued from every-day experiences in what the Sheikh regards as a
culturally conducive atmosphere. The two categories of Muslims cannot be
' Interview with Sheikh Mwinyi, Mjini, 16th November 1991.
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equal: for the one 'Muslimness' is immanent; for the other, it is merely
acquired through conversion. Accordingly, for those born in the faith,
'Muslimness' is an inherent quality deeply ingrained in their lives, unlike
those who have merely acquired it through conversion and are, therefore,
less likely to sustain it.
What needs emphasizing here is that the dichotomy between those
born in the faith and the converts is based on the notion of inequality, that
is the degree in depth and therefore in purity of faith varies between the
two categories of believers. This point is brought out clearly by Sheikh
Ahmed who says that those who know are not equal to those who do not
know. We need not concern ourselves with the validity of this claim, but its
ramifications are important: on the psychological level, it proves propitious
for the mahaji descendants or those 'born in the faith' for they now feel
elevated to a higher level than their fathers and hence equal to both the
Swahili and the Nubians within the town. They do not have to seek
acceptance as did their fathers by substituting the names of their god-
fathers for their own surnames since they have acquired it through birth.52
Thus the notion of birth provides for both groups a basis for reorganization.
What this means at this level is that the notion of birth, being the
aggregate of the inherited religious qualities, is not only in harmony with
52 It has been shown in chapter 2 (p. 107) that during the early period, the
converts were regarded as children of their 'religious fathers', god-fathers or
patrons. The person who was responsible for the conversion of another was highly
regarded. Sheikh Mwinyi, of whom previous mention has been made, once
lamented that in those early days of ignorance, the converts had to take the names
of their patrons in the belief that the god-fathers had now replaced their real
fathers who were still "katika hali ya ushenzi", in an 'uncivilizedThackward'
condition. However, though the situation has changed, one's patron deserves
respect that is due to them, for instance, one Friday afternoon, I was sitting in
Mama Salwa's house, one of my informants in Kiengu. Five other women joined
us for tea and each one of them brought food and other gifts to Fatuma. She said
to me that the five women were her daughters', she was their patron and so they
treat her as their mother. This woman is old and has no children of her own, but
I observed she depends a great deal on these 'daughters' for help, which is always
forthcoming.
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the religious sensibilities of all the Muslim groups but must also serve to
explicitly exclude the outsiders who are closing in on the Muslims in the
town.
The converts for their part are expected to be more meticulous in
their religious observance since they must struggle to rise above ushenzi.
Once I visited a young woman who had been recently converted and her
Muslim friends insisted that she always veil herself. When I inquired why
they themselves are lax in their use of the veil, one of them argued that the
convert is the one who should follow the religious prescriptions to the letter
for two reasons: first, there is a change in their lives and this change should
be made manifest for those who knew them before conversion should be
able to recognize the change; second, there is a high risk of relapsing into
ushenzi when one's faith is not deeply ingrained. In this case, her friends
who could boast a higher (religious) status, felt that the possibility of losing
their apparently inherited faith was rather remote. Similarly, the mahaji
descendants felt secure as they would now be accepted on equal terms by
their counterparts in the town.
At the time of the establishment of the Meru Muslim settlements and
throughout the formative period, the Swahili made selective references to
Islam in order to legitimate the claim to religious superiority of those born
in the faith over converts. This putative superiority provided the basis for
asserting distinct divisions between the Muslim groups. Nearly fifty years
later, the process is being reversed, with the result that the same concept
that was then used to legitimate distinctiveness is now being re-interpreted
and vested with a new meaning. Here, it should be borne in mind the idea
is manipulated by both sides to serve a double-edged purpose: on the one
hand, the foreign elements who had suffered during the Mau Mart freedom
struggle, hope to be integrated into the Meru society and obliterate their
external non-Meru links for which they had been threatened with removal
from the area between 1957 and 1962; and on the other, the mahaji
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descendants are uplifted. Since they were born into the faith, unlike their
fathers who had been converted, and they are considered to be equal to
their cousins (the Swahili men married local women - see the case of the
two sisters discussed in the previous chapter) the descendants of the
Swahili Muslim pioneers.
Here, the concept of birth in the faith becomes charged with new
significance, as Turner would have it. 53 Previously, it divided the Muslims,
now it unites them. The social boundaries and group distinctiveness have
gradually been dissipated. The concept of birth as it was applied in Meru,
can be understood to connote not only a new beginning but also continuity
stretching into the future. In an insecure transitional period, it becomes
necessary to attach the values of religious purity to descent from the mahaji
which is associated with occupancy of higher religious status and confers
respect upon the occupants. Thus the construction of a new religious
community identity in Meru can be understood in terms of Abner Cohen's
"structural" or "historical" change, rather than his "cyclical" change.54
The available data on the Meru Mjini and Majengo Muslims does not
indicate a cyclical change as the pioneers began to give way to the second
generation of Muslims. Well defined and graded roles and a series of clear-
cut stages through which an individual must go in order to move from one
status to another in the Sabo society are evidently absent in this case. The
second generation Muslims could not be said to step into the shoes of their
fathers in a cyclical sense - times have changed. For instance, the military
(in which most of the pioneers worked) and the civil administration are no
longer linked, as was the case during the early days of the British rule.55
Hence the most important distinction between the Sabo and the Majengo
V. Turner, 1967:28.
54j\Jner Cohen, 1969:25.
See the discussion on the role of the K.A.R. in chapter 1, p. 46.
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is that in the former "men became more settled not as a result of a slow
process of 'acculturation' or 'socialization' but of a dramatic movement from
one role to another.. •56 While the reverse is true in the latter case, with
acculturation and socialization being the cardinal parts of the whole
process.
At one level of abstraction, the cohesion of the community is ensured;
at another, the community insulates itself from the outsiders. Previously,
the struggle was between the self-styled standard-bearers of faith (the
Swahili) and the mahaji, on the one hand, and between the Muslims as a
whole and the overwhelming non-Muslim majority of Meru people on the
other, whom they (Muslims) saw as washenzi wasio na dini, 'uncivilized
people without religion'. With the elimination of the first level, that is the
mahaji level, only one level is now left, that is the struggle to resist the
mounting pressure from the overwhelming non-Muslim majority of the
people moving into the enlarged town, in order to construct a common
religious community identity.
Towards Unity
What is the real test of whether there is an emerging urban
community Muslim identity among the Muslim groups in Meru town? The
real test is for us to identify the changes that are taking place and show in
what direction they are moving - whether they point to an evolving
community identity or not. The first of these is a changing attitude, evident
in the recognition by all the sections of the Muslims, of the need to create
a sense of unity among members. As has just been said above, the events
leading to the attainment of independence in 1963 and the attendant social-
economic changes, undermined the foundations of the Muslim presence in
Meru, forcing the Muslims to search for unity in order to affirm their
56 Abner Cohen, 1969:32.
158
identity and their virtues over against those of other groups in the enlarged
town. The idea of unity was popularized in the informal gatherings
(baraza), where men sat during their spare time and discussed religious
questions, current affairs or any topical issues affecting the community.
Muslims were beginning to realize that they had a common destiny in their
struggle against ushenzi, which was seen as becoming increasingly
threatening. This unity came to be embodied in the person of the well
respected Sheikh Said.
Sheikh Said commanded great respect and wielded immense
authority, owing to his coastal lineage and his Muslim learning. It was felt
by many people that he was beyond the local squabbles, and true to this,
his charismatic leadership played an important role in uniting and
consolidating the Muslim community in the town. He became the 'big
Sheikh' with wide ranging duties: he acted as the Qadhi, the indisputable
arbitrator whenever personal, individual or community disputes arose, and
headed the various deputations to the local and other government agents,
in which he was the recognized spokesman for and leader of the Muslim
community. His authority which transcended the group boundaries, was
legitimated by his relatively high religious learning - he was regarded as
the most learned Sheikh in Meru at that time.57
Under his leadership the Muslims began to see themselves as a
single entity as opposed to the forces of ushenzi. As a community apart,
they could clearly identify the religious beliefs and practices which
engendered this 'apartness'. Pouwels points out
people's self-consciousness, their awareness of themselves as a
distinctive cultural group is profoundly affected by their collective
57 Sheikh Said was said to be of Comoro origin. He was well respected and my
informants spoke very well of him.
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experiences of the world in which they live both in time and
space.. 58
In view of the changes taking place in Meru at that time, the
Muslims brought their experiences to bear upon their relationship with the
rest of the town residents. Their awareness of themselves as a separate
group proved advantageous to Islam in so far as it strengthened the
devotion to the Muslim community on the one hand; and on the other, it
became a liability in so far as it deliberately curtailed the relations with
those who were considered to be outsiders. The result was the stagnation
of the spread of the faith for about two decades, that is from the late 195 Os
to the mid-seventies when a current of Middle Eastern and Pakistani
influence swept through the region.59
'Learn and Proclaim Your Faith'
In these changing circumstances affecting Meru Muslims, a new
relationship between the standard bearers of the faith and the converts is
defined, expressed and legitimated within the provisions of Islam.
Accordingly, attention is redirected towards the importance of learning and
living one's religion in accordance with the scriptures and the fulfillment of
the obligatory prescriptions. This point is articulated in one of Sheikh Said's
Friday sermons. He warned that
58 R. L. Pouwels, 1987:23.
The role of Tabligh in the recent spread of Islam in Meru is analyzed in
chapter 6, pp. 246-25 1.
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Days are gone when we used to distinguish between Swahili and
Nubians, between Swahili and ma haji . Those were days of ignorance,
when many people did not understand the fundamental teachings of
Islam. Now we have some individuals, among them our own sons,
who can read the Book for themselves and to others. This is a big
step forward, of which we must take advantage to strengthen our
faith. Our fathers have now retired in old age and it is upon the
young men to keep the light of Islam burning in this region. You
must proclaim your faith to the rest of the people - remember that
the Kalimah, (the confession of faith) is the first pillar of faith. This
underscores the importance of the proclamation of faith by a Muslim.
Of course this is not to override the other pillars, especially prayer.
You must proclaim your faith, or else how will other people know
what you believe? On the other hand proclamation alone is not
enough, one must live according to the teachings of Islam, which are
spelt out clearly in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet
(Peace Be Upon Him).
In the early days our neighbours on both the right and the left hand-
sides were fellow Muslims and they watched over each other. It is not
the same any longer. Your next-door neighbour is not necessarily
bound by the same religious canon as you, therefore, your actions
must demonstrate that you are a Muslim. Your observance of the
religious obligations will show that you are different from the other
person who is not bound by these obligations.60
Sheikh Said's statement was an acknowledgement of the process of
change that has been taking place in the area over the years. The faithful
had to adjust accordingly, but then what should they do? Learning and
living one's faith is the answer. Previously, acculturation of the converts
had been emphasized to the detriment of religious instruction, 6 ' but now
60 It is said that Sheilth Said used the Friday sermons to communicate to the
Muslims the need for unity and awareness of their Muslim identity. He laid
emphasis on the significance of living according to the teaching of Islam especially
at that time when Muslims were becoming outnumbered in the town. His sermons
were effective in rallying together the Muslims in the town and they are still
remembered by many individuals who heard them. There were several versions
of the above extract, but the theme that runs through is his call for unity of all
Muslims in Meru. Perhaps this is a testimony that the community was deeply
divided.
61 See chapter 2 (pp.94-95) for further information on the process of
acculturation of the local women who married the Swahili Muslims.
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the emphasis was shifting towards the importance of learning more about
the faith than just the distinction between halal and haram. In the early
period to which the Sheikh refers as the days of ignorance, a phrase
normally used to refer to the pre-Islamic times, the Quran was taught
without translation and very few people, if any grasped the meaning of
what was taught. But now, there was a small number of young Muslims
who, having been born and raised in the town with the facility of three
mosques - one for each group - and several teachers offering religious
instruction in their own houses, Muslims had acquired a limited measure
of literacy in Arabic and religious education.
In addition to these, some young men had just returned from their
studies under some of the renowned religious scholars on the East African
coast.62 Thus some were able to read the Quran. This accessibility to the
Quran, albeit limited in scope, had an effect upon the Muslim community.
Indicative of its impact were the reading sessions which became an
increasingly important activity during the baraza, meetings or gatherings
in which men sit to sip coffee and discuss the current affairs. These baraza
are a common Swahili practice though they may, and sometimes do have
different functions in different places. In this case, these baraza, held
several times a week, provided opportune time for religious discussions
based on the Quranic readings as well as other general issues concerning
Muslims.
62 this time some of the young men who had been sent to the coast to study
the Quran were returning home. One of them had been sponsored by the Jumuia-
Tul-Baladia to study in Zanzibar, though he returned after one year due to some
difficulties there. It is interesting to note that the Muslims in Meru are
experiencing a revolutionizing effect of coast-trained teachers in the mid 1960s,
while the effect of Ali bin Khalid, among others, was being felt by the end of the
first World War in the old Pangani in Nairobi. It is evident that in Meru the
'standard bearers' of dini held sway over the others until the Mau Mau
nationalists shook them out of their complacency in 1952.
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It follows then that, not only is the claim to Islam necessary, but also
the ostentation of such a claim in shaping the urban Muslim community
identity, both to themselves and outsiders - they must be seen to be
different. This state of affairs resulted from the social context, that of a
minority status, within which the Muslims had to define themselves in
opposition and relation to the wider non-Muslim majority. In the absence
of much else in the form of political and economic achievements, or
existence of other forms of social identity and distinctions to mark them off,
the Muslims turn inward and employ the use of"religious names", "religious
language", (Kiswaliili), "religious" mode of dress and mosque attendance.
We shall examine the use of each these external "religious" symbols.
Mosque Attendance
The first of these external symbols is attendance at the mosque. Up
till now, each group used its own mosque and there was no concept of the
Friday mosque. But when Sheikh Said began to cultivate a sense of unity,
the idea of Friday Mosque came up and he became its Imam, rallying the
people around it. He came to be recognized as 'the big sheik'. Incidentally,
at that time, the district administration proposed to transfer the old Swahili
mosque from the present site of the Jamia mosque to the site where the
Meru Muslim Primary School stands today. This proposal provoked much
antagonism and the centrality of the mosque henceforth became a thorny
issue. The Muslims objected to the proposed transfer, asserting that the
mosque was centrally located for all the sections of the community and
therefore, its removal would jeopardize its neutrality, and adversely affect
its role as the Friday mosque.63
63 In the absence of any records or even a plaque in the mosque, it was not
possible to fix the precise date when the present Jamia Mosque was built.
However my informants said that it was built in the 1960s, in what was then the
New Township site after the implementation of the town plan in 1954/55. There
was a difference of opinion with regard to whether the Asian Muslims or the
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From then on a great deal of emphasis was laid on Friday attendance
at the mosque. Women were encouraged to attend the Friday prayers
regularly. During the baraza, men who failed to attend regularly were
admonished by the sheikh, showing devotion and piety were guuged by
regular attendance and performance of communal prayers. fliustrative of
this was the significance attached to the facial mark, sijda, caused by
prostration during prayer. This mark is valued as a sign of piety, it is seen
as a mark of swalihina, those who pray regularly. According to Sheikh
MWinyi some people even rub their faces hard on the mat during prayer in
order to get the mark of swalihina. 64 It is not for us to judge the truth of
this claim, but as my informant said, it is believed that the facial mark will
serve as a torch for the believer when his body is put in the grave. However,
the point being made here is that external display of piety, external
religious symbols acquire a prominence hitherto unknown.
During the Friday sermon, the Imam urged the Muslims to observe
the religious obligations, and during the baraza, the sermons would be
explicated within the local religious and social context. The extent to which
these discourses impacted upon the people is difficult to assess, but they
seem to have exerted great influence. In the words of my informant, Sheikh
Au who not only participated but also played a leading role in these
discourses:
these discourses were useful in clarifying many issues relating to
Muslim etiquette and thus helped to strengthen the Muslims at this
difficult time. Regular attendance at the mosque was important first
for the individual believer, and second for the community -
congregational prayers cut across group boundaries and unite the
African Muslims or both contributed to the construction of Janna mosque. The
controversy over the control of this mosque is dealt with in chapter 5, pp. 214-217.
64 significance of the facial mark caused by rubbing the face on the prayer
mat regularly is elucidated in chapter 6, pp. 295-296.
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people as they pray together shoulder-to-shoulder friend and foe, poor
and rich, young and old.66
There is evidence to suggest that these activities were bolstered by the
appearance of Sheikh Abdullah Saleh Farsy's Swahili translation of the
Quran in 1969.66 A number of individuals were able to obtain copies of the
Swahili translation, making Quranic reading, which had been a prerogative
of a few privileged individuals, accessible even to those who were not
literate in Arabic. The result, as we shall see below, was an increased
religious knowledge for many more people; and an increased use of Arabised
Kiswahili as more people began to make references to the Quran in the day-
to-day conversation.
Contending 'With the Language of Washenzi'
As has just been said above, the use of 'religious language' became an
external symbol, a mark of distinction between Muslims and others.67
What one sees at this time is a changing pattern of language use in Meru.
Throughout the early period - 1908 to the late 1950s - the Nubians kept
strictly to their language, Kinubi, among themselves. At the same time, the
use of Kiswahili was inevitable, first as a means of communication within
the wider heterogenous population and second between the spouses, as most
of the foreigners obtained local wives.
65 Interview with Sheikh Ali, Meru town, 16th November 1991.
66 Sheikh Swaleh Farsy was the Chief Qadhi of Kenya for many years. He
studied under some of the most famous East African Ulama and worked on the
translation of the Qur'an for many year, not only to produce a masterpiece but
also the first Swahili translation of the Holy Quran: Quran Takatifu, Nairobi, the
Islamic Foundation, 1969.
67 The symbolic value of Kiswahili has always been important in different
places, see J. L. Balda, 1991:8-10.
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For our purpose, it is important to note the Nubian insistence on the
use of their language by all the residents of their village. 68 One sheikh, a
Nubi descendant, says that as a child, he was not allowed by his parents to
learn Kimeru, Luga ya washenzi, the language of the uncivilized. His father
was keen to impart Kinubi to his children; and to ensure that the children
did not learn luga ya washenzi, all the children in the neighbourhood were
required by their fathers to learn and speak Kinubi. It was felt that the
children were prone to the 'danger' of picking up their mothers' language,
therefore, all the local women married to Nubians had to learn Kinubi and
always speak it.69 There are two explanations for state of affairs: first the
Meru women married to the Nubian men had to learn the language as a
means of fully integrating them, and second, the children were required to
identify with their fathers and not their mothers. But then this was couched
in religious terms.
In her study of the usage of language in a multi-ethnic setting in
Pumwani, Nairobi, Bujra observes that the use of different languages serves
two purposes: it facilitates intimate communication7° amongst members
of each group and at the same time, marks them off from others. In Meru,
the use of Kinubi by the Nubians added another dimension to these two: it
underscored the alleged superiority of Nubians over other residents of the
township. It was to its speakers a superior language for, after all, it had
68 There were 8 Wanyamwezi ex-Askari house owners living with their
families in the Nubian village. There were also a number of Manyema and others
collectively referred to as Nyasaland ex-Askari, probably from Malawi and other
place in Central Africa - see the formation of King's African Rifles in 1902 entailed
a merger of the Central African Rifles (1&2); East African Rifles; and Uganda
Rifles, H. C. Moyse-Bartlet (1956:111) Also see (C. Hobley 1928:187) for the role
of the Wanyamwezi, "Manyema from west of Lake Tanganyika" in the Zanzibari
caravans.
69 Karamburi, married to a Nubi sergeant, told me that she had to learn
Kinubi so that her children would not pick up Kimeru from her. Interview, Mjini,
27th October, 1991.
70 J Bujra, 1974:2 18.
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borrowed some words from Arabic and by analogy, it was closer to Arabic
and hence closer to Islam than Kimeru. Also their insistence on its use
points to a collective manipulation of a fundamental cultural element by a
group, in order to actually keep itself closed to those seen as outsiders. This
manipulation is manifest in the restriction (just described above) placed by
the Nubi men on their wives' use of Kimeru. This way the Nubian
community identity would be sustained in spite of its shrinking size. Thus
the use of Kinubi in Meru may be appropriately placed in a different and
evidently higher category than Bujra's "vernaculars", used in the
multi-ethnic Pumwani Muslim community; it had a deeper meaning for its
speakers, it was a status symbol for them. Islam was conveniently dragged
in, in an attempt to legitimate this manipulation by making reference to the
all pervading concept of ushenzi with all its negative connotations which we
have discussed above.
After 1963, the Muslims began to define themselves as a religious
community as opposed to the enveloping majority of non-believers. The
focus of the emphasis shifted from the distinct elements of the various
groups towards a common Muslim identity. During the period between 1910
and 1955, the different groups maintained their social and religious
cleavages: the Nubians projected themselves as second only to Europeans,
an attitude reinforced by the preferential treatment accorded them, best
illustrated by their exemption from carrying passes on their persons as was
required of all natives. The mahaji in Majengo, on the other hand, had
constituted a community of converted people, whose internal solidarity was
crucial in the face of hostility and pressure exerted from various quarters:
the Swahili, the Nubians and more significantly, from their non-Muslim
relatives and the Meru society in general. Sheikh Mwinyi lamented "that
at this time such petty issues divided the Muslims in Meru". 71 For our
purpose, these attitudes cannot be regarded as petty because they were
71 Interview with Sheikh Mwinyi, 16th November 1991.
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crucial to those who held them and indeed, it is to such attitudes that the
existing cleavages can be attributed.
At this point (the late 1960s) there was a conscious effort to obliterate
these cleavages, there was a discernible change in a particular direction: a
culturally constructed Muslim identity is evolving in the town. It should
also be remembered that the residents of the old Swahili village have been
transferred to the ridge in 1954/55, making the settlement no longer a
domain of the Nubians. As I have mentioned above, the decline of Nubi
influence at this time could also be attributed to the migration of a number
of families to Kibera in Nairobi, which is the largest Nubi enclave in Kenya.
These factors may explain the diminishing use of Kinubi in Meru, which is
now used only in the family circles,72 but they may not explain the failure
to replace it with Kimeru or the all out effort to popularize the use of
Kiswahiui by all the Muslims, that was prevalent at this time.
Soon Kiswahili emerged as the everyday language within the group,
and the unwritten rule that one should use Kiswabili when talking to fellow
Muslims, came into operation. The tendency was for Muslims to speak
Kimeru to non-Muslims and use Kiswahili amongst themselves. If two
individuals - a Muslim and a non-Muslim - were engaged in a conversation
and a second Muslim happened to join them, making the ratio two-to-one,
the probability is that s/he would first salute his fellow Muslim in Arabic
after which s/he would greet the other person in Kimeru, and most probably
the two Muslims would soon enter into a conversation in Kiswahili,
interspersed with Arabic phrases. The dialogue might continue for a few
minutes, the participation of the other person being contingent upon his or
her ability to speak Kiswahili. This behaviour can be explained by the
significance attached to the greeting itself, which, as Aguilar also observed
72 During the interviews with some of my Nubian informants, they switched
from Kiswahili to Kinubi whenever they wanted to exclude me from the
conversation.
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among the Waso Borana,73 is considered to be religious. The greeting is
important in that it helps to keep the flow of blessing. Here it is a form of
identity expression for Islam had to be expressed daily and therefore the
greeting serves as an expression of a person's 'Muslimness'. Very few people
in this area speak Arabic, therefore, an Arabised greeting is an indication
of piety. Greetings also provide particularly for the more knowledgeable and
pious men, a chance to quote a verse from the Quran. Therefore a believer
and a non-believer cannot share the Muslim greeting for it is considered
religiously incorrect to do so. When extending greetings to both a Muslim
and a non-Muslim, a distinction has to be made between them, hence the
separate greetings. It can therefore be said that the Muslims gradually
achieved their objective of using Kiswahili to mark themselves off from
washenzi
As a result, Kiswahili became the first language for the Muslims in
Meru. This is not a peculiar development - Balda has shown that there is
"an ever increasing use of the Swahili language as the language of Islam in
East Africa"75; and that it is becoming the "every day lingua franca" for
the Muslim refugees from Sudan and Uganda living in North-East Zaire.
Again he says that Rwanda, (which in most cases is not considered as part
of East Africa where Kiswabili is spoken) is "a country where, in peoples'
minds, the Swahili Language is very much linked to Muslim Religion".76
Similarly, in Meru it is associated with Islam in the minds of many people,
but to the Muslims themselves, it acquires an additional dimension - that
of marking them off from the rest of the people. The association of Kiswabili
and Islam is further explained by Ali A. Mazrui in his four-stage
M. I. Aguilar, 1994:222.
It has been shown in chapter 2 (pp.93-94) that the notion of ushenzi is
played up daily, whenever an opportunity presents itself.
J. L. Balda, 1991:8.
76 Ibid., p.24.
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development theory of Kiswahili. He points out that it is the native
speakers, "the Waswabili proper who are overwhelmingly Muslim", 77 and
that
because Kiswahili developed within an Islamic culture, and borrowed
many Arabic words, the language initially carried a considerable
Islamic association.78
For our purpose here, it is important to point out the disparity in
usage of Kiswaliili in Kenya and Tanzania, in spite of the fact that it is the
national language and the means of communication between members of
different ethnic groups in the two countries. Mazrui says that of the total
population in Kenya, "only about a quarter a million people speak Kiswa1ili
as a first language".79 Though this figure appears too small to be credible,
the important point to note is that Kiswahili in the interior of Kenya is still
associated with Islam and urban life by many people; while the situation in
Tanzania is such that the language
has been promoted for reasons of cultural self-reliance and self-
development. One government area after another has been
pronounced as an area in which only Kiswa}iili is to be used.8°
Thus in Tanzania, the language is not so much associated with Islam
in the minds of people generally, as it is in many parts of Kenya. To the
Muslims in Meru, the use of Kiswahili was not only considered to be
"beneficial", but it also served as a psychological bond, binding together the
individual members of the Muslim community. In defence of the use of
Kiswahili by people born and raised in the monolingual Meru society, and
77 A. A. Mazrui and P. Zirimu, 1990:25.
78 Ibid., p.31.
Ibid., p.40.
80 A. A. Mazrui and P. Zirimu, 1990:40.
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who are otherwise expected to speak Kimeru as their first language, one of
my informants enumerated the benefits of being accustomed to speaking
Kiswaliili instead of Kimeru:
The benefit of speaking Kiswahili is that one acquires the 'right
accent' by constant use of words and phrases, many of which are
borrowed from Arabic. Therefore for those who can read the Qur'an,
this daily use of Kiswahili is believed to enhance the ability to
pronounce the Arabic phrases correctly, to acquire tamko Ia Kiarabu,
Arabic accent, which is highly valued. Even the majority who cannot
read Arabic, use it in prayers and hence the habitual use of Kiswahili
is important to them.81
In his study of the use of Kiswahili in the rural areas in Kenya,
Whiteley analyzed the claimed frequency of the use of Kiswahili in Katheri
(rural area) in Meru and concluded that 53% of the total sample claimed
competence in Kiswahili at some level; of the "total sample claiming 3/5
frequency, i.e. several times a week or more often" were 27%; and "of total
sample claiming 112 frequency, i.e. once a week or less" were 26%.82
Though things have changed in the last 25 years since Whiteley carried out
the study, these figures especially when compared to a few other areas
where the study was done at the same time and revealed 100% competence
and 88% frequency of 3/5 times a week or more often, show minimal use of
Kiswahili in the rural areas in Meru.
It can therefore be said that there exists a direct relationship
between usage of Kiswahili and adherence to Islam in an area where the
majority of the people are monolingual, and Muslims are conspicuous in
their use of Kiswahili. To them, it is indisputably second in rank to
81 Interview with Basil, Amaku, 13th October 1991.
82 W. H. Whiteley, 1974:321.
For further discussion on the use of Kiswábili as a religious language, see
chapter 6, pp.256-260.
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Arabic, which is revered as the language of communication with God. The
religious aura of Arabic is extended to Kiswahili, since every member is
expected to have a reasonable command of the language.TM
Language is an indisputable element of identity as it is linked to the
idea of a group sharing common cultural values. For the Muslims in Meru,
a deep knowledge of the language, ability to use its idioms and metaphor,
and naturalness in speaking Kiswabili, which the Aniir equates to tamko
la Kiarabu, reflects Islamic religious and cultural appropriateness which
the Muslims seek to achieve as a mark of identity.
Conclusion
Some of the points that I have made above need further explanation,
and Au Mazrui's statement that those for whom Kiswahili is the mother
tongue have been overwhelmingly Muslim seems to be an appropriate
starting point. A number of interpretations may be made about this: first,
the Swahili in Meru town served as the standard bearers of the faith to the
mahaji. What was happening was that the traditional cleavages, expressed
in the rival dances described in chapter 2, were being bridged and the
previous social boundaries among the Muslims themselves were weakening.
During the early period, Islam was used to define and sustain these
boundaries, now the reverse was happening - it was being used to efface
them and create unity among the believers. The mahaji were replaced by
second generation Muslims and the Nubians were gradually being
subsumed into the Meru society under the umbrella of the Swahili-Islamic
culture. It should not seem as if the Nubi elements claimed to be Swahilized
84! was amazed one day, when one of my informants used an idiom which I did
not quite understand and when I asked her to explain, she was appalled at what
she considered as grave language incompetence on my part. She asked "kwani
wewe watoka wapi, hata luga hufahamu!" where do you come from, that you don't
even understand the language!
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-rather they ceased to emphasize their separate identity from the other
Muslims in the town. In other words, all the Muslims in the town came to
be seen as one and equal. The fact of being Muslim by birth no longer
distinguished one Muslim from another. Thus occurred a social
transformation of Islam.
The development of Islamic community identity can also be seen in
the emphasis laid on communal prayers and mosque attendance. Though
it was important for one to be seen in attendance, it also underscores the
importance attached to prayer, which is one of the fundamental pillars of
faith. There was also a greater emphasis on the Quran and Sunnah.
Previously, when all the residents of the mji were Muslims and, to use the
words of Sheikh Said, "watched over one another", propriety of behaviour
was especially important because one had to be seen by others, neighbours
and friends, to uphold and fulfil the social and moral obligations of a
Muslim society. As has been shown, acculturation up to this time had been
emphasized to the detriment of religious instruction. Wearing "religious"
clothes, cooking certain kinds of foods and speaking a different language
were considered enough to mark off the Muslims from washenzi.
It seems that the tenacity with which the Muslims clung to the
cultural dimension during the early period, superseded the attention
accorded to the scriptural and doctrinal dimension of Islam. Now the influx
of different people into the town, some of whom had western education with
its attendant prestige and social status, which the Muslims did not have,
called for a more sophisticated approach by the latter. This became all the
more necessary because some of the cultural elements undoubtedly lost
their Muslim exclusiveness when they were acquired by the so-called
"enlightened" non-Muslims. What was happening now was that an elite had
emerged and was posing a serious threat to the Muslim community. It
seemed that the tables had been turned - the washenzi who were considered
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to be backward, had now become "enlightened", if anything they had
achieved a much higher standard of living than the Muslims. I suggest
therefore, that by urging the Muslims to live according to the teachings
spelt out in the Quran and Sunnah, Sheikh Said was voicing the need for
them to adopt a scriptural approach to the changing social circumstances,
since that was the one which seemed to provide a more solid foundation for
distinctiveness. This can also be seen as an identity with the Muslim
iimmah which, as Launay observes, transcends the local distinctions.
Can we, then, regard the increasing emphasis on the Quran as an
expression of the Muslims' desire to express their religious community
identity within Islam and therefore insulate themselves against the non-
Muslim majority in the town? The answer is in the affirmative, but the
situation was much more complex than this, for the underlying struggle
between dini and ushenzi continued. Paradoxically, the emerging elite was,
in the eyes of the Muslims, still in the condition of ushenzi. This takes us
back to the meaning of ushenzi for the Muslims in Meru - it was not merely
the opposite of civilization, and could not be eradicated solely by the
acquisition of western education and modernity. In other words, it is all
that which Islam is not. As a result, the Muslims seemed to be implying




BORANA MUSLIMS AND THE 'SHEIKH' CULT IN MERU
Introduction
In this chapter, I shall examine the attempts to propagate a form of
sheikh cult by the Borana' Muslims, who entered Meru from the
neighbouring Isiolo district and the North-eastern Province. Islam is the
main religion in Isiolo. Adherence to religious orders, particularly those of
Qadiriyya2 and Salihiyya,3 is an important aspect of Somali Islam. The
'The former N.F.D. (now Norther-Eastern Province and parts of Eastern
Province) is occupied by the Somali, Borana and other related nomadic peoples.
As will be seen below, Isiolo still maintains close social and economic ties with
Meru.
2 Qadiriyya order is named after its founder, Abdul Qadir Jailan, born in 470
AHJca. 1077 in Jailan, south of the Caspian Sea. The general theme of his doctrine
was the necessity of a period of asceticism, during which persons should remove
themselves from the world while in communion with the deity. After this period
a person may return and enjoy the remaining part of his life converting others.
His followers attributed to him the ability to perform miracles. He was a renowned
jurist and the body of doctrines with his authority was sufficient to constitute a
system. Though his order reached Somalia in the early period, it was Sheikh
Uways bin Mohammed al Barawi who revived it in the 19th century. Sheikh
Uways went to Bagdad for further instruction in 1870. Eventually, he became a
fully-fledged sufi and he is said to have received the body of secret spiritual
knowledge, believed to be transmitted from the founder. He returned to Somalia
in 1880 and became the undisputed leader of the local adherents of the order. It
is difficult to fix a precise date when the order reached Northern Kenya because
for many years - before the present boundaries were drawn to divide the Somali
country among the states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, the Somali people
roamed the whole region. For information on the origins of the new Qadiriyya
order in East Africa, see B.G. Martin (1976:160-165).
Salihiyya order took its name after a Sudanese Mohammed Ibn Salih Al-
Rashid (1854-1917) who lived in Mecca. The order spread from Western Arabia
across the red Sea into the Somali country where it gained many adherents.
Doctrinally, Salihiyya descended from Ahmadiyya order, founded by Ibn Al-Fan
(1758-1837), a reformer of Mecca.
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Horn of Africa, to which Somali Islam belongs, "shares with the Sudan that
marked emphasis on the cult of saints and Sufi Orders". 4 The traditionally
Muslim Somalis are credited with the Islamization of the Borana, a process
which "meant piece-meal Somalization",5 particularly of the Borana living
in and around Isiolo.
A significant proportion of Borana Muslims owe allegiance to
Husseiniyya, the order attributed to Sheikh Hussein of Bale, Somalia,
through the ayaana rituals. Sheikh Hussein is revered by many Borana
Muslims and shrines dedicated to him attract many pilgrims annually. The
main figure of the cult is Sheikh Hussein, who is believed to have worked
miracles for the poor and brought back to life dead stock. The term ayaana
is given a variety of meanings, including a cult of the same name. In
everyday language the term ayaana was used in relation to the traditional
lunar calendar which has 27 days. The days are invested with both positive
and negative forces influencing the society in various ways and hence the
calendar serves as a basis for spiritual activities. Its use as a spiritual
concept is more common among the agricultural Oromo across the border
in Ethiopia.6
Ayaana cult draws from both the Borana traditional religious sources
and Islam,7 blending the elements from these two sources into a cult
analogous to the better known sar cult among the Somali.8 To its
practitioners, ayaana is associated with a particular body of spirits which,
' I. M. Lewis, 1966:9.
P. T. W. Baxter, 1966:249.
6 G. DaM, 1989:153.
I. M. Lewis, 1983:68.
For information on sar possession cult among the Somali, see I. M. Lewis,
9171:75-80.
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unlike the humans who were made of mud on the same day, were made of
smoke. The spirits were given to the Prophet and later assigned to Sheikh
Hussein.9
Hjort makes a brief presentation of the connection between ayaana
and Husseiniyya, which he sees as purely local".' 0 Ayaana and
Husseiniyya are inextricably linked- ayaana focuses on the person of Sheikh
Hussein and pilgrimages are made to the Sheikh's shrine rather than to
Mecca. Initiation into Husseiniyya equips the members with the ability to
communicate with ayaana spirits. Possession by these spirits, as Aguilar
further notes, is explained in terms of their wish for a gift - they have
power to make their wishes known, so they take possession of an individual
in order to explicitly and actively communicate their wishes. Diagnostic
sessions are held for the adept to identify the particular spirit that is active
at a given time. The sessions in which other members of the cult are in
attendance, provide support for the afflicted person. When the active spirit
has been identified by the adept, it is placated with gifts and an animal is
sacrificed.'1
What the sheikhs were trying to cultivate in Meru was the cult of
Sheikh Hussein, but as has been shown, it is intimately linked with the
ayaana rituals in Borana culture. The connection between ayaana and
Husseiniyya is clearly brought out by Aguilar in his analysis of the various
meanings and dimensions of the concept of ayaana among the Borana -
ayaana provides the means for the expression of the Husseiniyya sufi cult
within the Borana cultural milieu. An ayaana ritual "has many
connotations and certainly hymns related to the cult of Sheikh Nur Hussein
of Bale are very prominent during the sessions" and even then "only part
M.I. Aguilar, 1991:34.
'° A.Hjort, 1979:44-45.
"See M.I. Aguilar, 1991:34.
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of the session is related to the actual solving of sickness.., most of the
session is spent on singing and praising Sheikh Hussein".12
Opposition to Ayaana Rituals in Meru Town
Information on the practice of ayaana cult in Isiolo is rather scarce.
According to Dahl, ayaana was unknown in Isiolo until 1952 when the first
case of possession was reported among the Borana coming from the north
in Marsabit and Moyale! 3 Baxter too, points out it was in the early 1950s
that a few Borana elders were endeavoring to maintain religious customs
and adopt cultural traits associated with Islam by the Borana.' 4 It is
possible therefore, to link the prevalence of the ayaana cult at that
particular time with an increase in Islamic influence in the form of
Husseiniyya. Hjort observes that in Isiolo,
Through the ayaana cult, which is associated with this tariga
(Husseiniyya) and which is condemned at the mosque, one
establishes and formalizes a communion with other poor or oppressed
Muslims. An interesting aspect of this cult is that the solidarity is
restricted to Muslims and becomes horizontal. Thus membership
implies a certain degree of opposition to the Muslim affluent social
class. 15
Livestock is the life-line of the Borana, Somali and other pastoralist
peoples living in Isiolo and the entire north-eastern region of Kenya. Due
to the arid climate in the region, drought is a constant threat to livestock
and hence to large pastoralist populations who depend on it. This constant
threat to livestock which is the mainstay of the Borana pastoralists,
perhaps explains the belief that sheikh Hussein performed miracles for the
12 Aguilar, 1994:277-278.
" G. Dahl, 1989:154.
14 P. T. W. Baxter, 1966:235.
15 A. Hjort, 1979:42.
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poor and brought back to life dead stock. Usually when famine strikes many
people are left destitute and the only alternative open to them is to move
to urban centres in hope of finding a substitute means of survival. Many of
these victims of natural calamities (which are not infrequent) find solace in
joining the Husseiniyya order and through the ayaana ceremonies and
rituals, they establish solidarity of members. Also frustrated married
Somali women, sometimes wives of prominent men, join the order which
provides for them a means of challenging the male dominated world of the
pasthralist. Hjoryaana activities in Isiolo as attempts "to express and
counter in a ritualistic manner an oppressing and frustrating situation for
impoverished Muslims".'6
The Husseiniyya cult is seen by the Muslim establishment as an
unislamic practice picked from the bush, with the result that it is
condemned at the mosque as shirk, associating God with other beings, and
outlawed by the prominent religious leaders in Isiolo. The displacement of
many Borana and Somali from their homes in Isiolo and surrounding areas
after the 'shifta' 17 disturbances in the late 1960s, is largely responsible for
what Hjort sees as a rapid spread of Husseiniyya and its attendant ayaana
16 A. Hjort, 1979:44.
17 The international boundaries between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya were
drawn by the colonial administrators to suit their own interests, without due
regard to the ethnic boundaries and interests of the inhabitants of the area in
question. It was not long before the resultant problems became apparent.
Therefore, shortly prior to independence in 1963, a commission was set up to
investigate the opinion of the peoples living in the then N.F.D. and determine
what their preference was - whether to become part of Kenya or Somalia (See the
"Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission", 1962). But the peoples in
question showed the least degree of consensus: the non-Muslim groups preferred
to remain in Kenya; while the Muslims opted to join Somalia (Baxter 1966:234).
However, the colonial government arbitrarily decided that the N.F.D. should
remain part of Kenya (Hjort 1979:34). Consequent upon this decision, the groups
which had wanted to join Somalia carried out a ceaseless secessionist campaign,
which culminated in a sort of guerilla warfare in the late 1960s. To them the term
'shifta' which in Ainharic means 'bandits' was attached, (M.I. Aguilar: 1994:23).
Even today, the 'shifta' pose a serious problem for the northern-most part of Meru.
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cult.'8 During the 'Shifta' war, a number of the displaced Borana families
and individuals, sought refuge in Meru town. They became tenants among
the Muslims in the Nubian village. These 'new corners' brought with them
their customary practice of ayaana cult. Muslim leaders here, too, branded
them unislamic and banned the Borana from the mosque. The Borana
tenants were threatened with expulsion by their Muslim Nubi or Swahili
landlords if they continued to perform ayaana rituals in the houses in which
the other (Swahili) Muslims also lived. One of the sheikhs who strongly
opposed the observance of ayaana rituals in the settlement, attributed his
own antagonism to what he described as:
a threat to the Meru Muslim community. The leaders who out-lawed
the ayaana practices within the town, constituted the over all
authority on the religious affairs of all the Muslims in the town.
These Borana were few, but they were now living among us, in our
houses. If we did not object to their performance of these unislamic
rituals in our houses, inaction or silence on our part would not only
imply our approval of these rituals, but it would also encourage them
to spread these ideas to the rest of the people in the settlement. In
view of the physical and social set-up, it would be practically
impossible for the Borana to keep their practice to themselves, if they
persisted in their performance of ayana rituals while living in our
midst.'9
Concern about syncretism alone cannot be taken as the real reason
behind the condemnation of ayaana rituals by the Muslim leaders in Meru
Town. There is no a priori reason why a local 'Swahili' practice which is
perhaps no less syncretic than ayaana, is necessarily more Islamic, or
religiously appropriate than the Borana adherence to Husseiniyya through
traditional ayaana rituals. There are three plausible explanations for the
resolute opposition to ayaana rituals in Meru Town: first, in Isiolo,
adherence to Husseiniyya through the ayana cult served as a means of
solidarity among the oppressed Muslims, a means of opposition to the well-
'8 A. Hjort, 1979:45.
19 Interview with Sheikh Mamoun, Meru Town, 26th October, 1991.
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to-do; and subsequently became the source of controversy at the mosque
which was (and still is) the centre of power. 2° Being associated with the
lowly members of the society as a means of opposition to others, the cult
therefore had little chance of successfully accommodating itself as a
different (from the predominantly Swahili cultural milieu) and viable source
of religious influence among the Muslims in Meru town.
The Meru Muslim leaders realizing Isiolo's proximity to Meru and the
economic and social relationship between the two areas, 2 ' both of which
could be great assets in the spread of the cult, became anxious to counter
the influence of this cult in Meru town. This anxiety is reflected in the
Sheikh's statement above, that the cult was viewed as a threat to the
existing local religious and social order. The influence of ayaana had to be
'nipped in the bud', to borrow the words of my informant. 22 Second, the
cult was, to a certain extent, associated with the secessionist war in the
minds of many people in Meru, and it is highly likely that this association
with 'shifta' contributed significantly to its rejection. The Muslims in Meru
were emerging from the backlash of Mau Mau nationalism, which had
precipitated a re-definition of their identity vis-a-vis the rest of the Meru
people. Third, as has been shown in chapter 3, by 1967 when the Borana
appeared on the scene, the social boundaries that previously marked off the
members of the various Muslim groups from one another, were beginning
to dissipate as the Swahili, Nubi and mahaji descendants drifted towards
20 A. Hjort 1979:42.
21 There is a symbiotic relationship between Meru and Isiolo. For a long time
Isiolo has served as an extension of Gakoromone market in Meru town and
prostitutes to Isiolo are recruited from the areas around Njaambene hills through
Majengo in Meru town (A.Hjort, 1979:116, 159).
22 Interview with Sheikh Mwinyi, Meru, 16th November, 1991.
The process of common Muslim identity construction and the emergent
urban Muslim community of those born in the faith is discussed in detail in
chapter 3.
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a common Muslim community identity within Meru town. They were now
concerned by the more immediate and vital issue of fostering Muslim unity
and community identity, in the face of the threat posed by the influx of
many people into the town after independence.
On the one hand, it is possible to see ayaana rituals and Husseiniyya
cult as a means of creating and sustaining solidarity of the oppressed, 24 on
the other, it may be an expression of religious affiliation, an affiliation to
Somali-Borana rather than the Swahili brand of Islam. One possible
development at that time when the Borana in the Nubian Village were first
displaced by the 'shifta' disturbances and then faced with hostility from
their hosts, was an emergence of a community-within-a-community, this is
to say that they might have insulated themselves from the rest of the Meru
Muslim community, with their separate group identity finding expression
in ayaana and Husseiniyya rituals. Given a chance in this case, ethnicity,
since the Borana,unlike the heterogenous Swahili group, were drawn from
a single ethnic category, might have reinforced closed-group formation.25
What I wish to suggest here is that the controversy between the
Meru Muslim leaders and the ayaana practitioners, was largely an attempt
to create an impenetrable barrier against what was seen as a foreign and
therefore, unwelcome influence borne by the Borana Muslims. It was a
means of opposition to intrusion by another source of Muslim influence into
Meru town. In the prevailing circumstances, the prospects of the formation
in Meru town of the type of the ritual community that Cohen describes in
the Sabon Gari in the Nigerian towns 26 were remote. The viability of such
a community would necessarily depend on its ability to cut across the
24 See I. M. Lewis, 1985:69 and A. Hjort, 1979:41.
The process of retribalization of a group in a minority situation is adequately
documented. See for instance A.Cohen, 1969:4-5 and F.W.Lewis, 1978:20.
26 A. Cohen, 1969:204.
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existing social boundaries and provide a new focus of religious, and perhaps
social-economic interest for the various interest groups. The ayaana cult did
not cut across the Muslim groups; and therefore it could not provide such
a focus in Meru town
The Borana Sheikhs and the Search for Power in Igembe
In his discussion on the East African sheikhs, Constantin notes that:
The seed of charisma is made up not only of factors related to both
individual and relational religious qualities, but also.., of social
factors, which then give the sheikh's word total authority.27
His observation fits neatly with the situation that is found outside the
Muslim settlements within the town. While the Muslim leaders in Meru
town managed to halt the iafiltration of ayaana cultic influence, the
somewhat isolated Muslim families living in Igembe, about 30 miles away,
both geographically and socially excluded from the Muslim nucleus in Meru
town, appeared more susceptible to it (cultic influence) through the Borana
sheikhs who began to frequent the area in the early 1970s. Their
susceptibility which furnished an opportunity for the sheikhs to display
their (obviously rare) skills and establish themselves there could be largely
attributed to social factors.
What then were these factors? First, living outside the Majengo
milieu which usually furnishes a unique and vital social and religious
network for individual Muslims in most places in the inthrior, the
27 F. Constantin, 1988:7 1.
See discussion on Majengo social-religious network in chapter 5, 225-229.
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individual Muslims scattered in different trade centres in Igembe 29 did not
have as solid a base for a social-religious network as did their counterparts
within the town
Secondly, a significant proportion of local pioneer converts in Igembe
in the northern part of the district, came into contact with Islam either as
a result of residence in North-Eastern Province, or through some form of
contact with Somali or Borana Muslims. In the absence of close ties with
the Muslims in Meru town, these families and individuals, came to depend
on North-Eastern Province for religious guidance and leadership, with the
result that they created and sustained a close relationship with
SomalilBorana sheilths. This alignment is manifest in the reverence and
hospitality that the sheikhs enjoyed during their visits and stay at the
homes of their hosts and supporters, as will be shown below.
Thirdly, as said earlier on, the pioneer Muslims in the trade centers
in Igembe were largely foreigners, as can be seen from the census figures3°
for non-natives found in the district at the time of enumeration in 1962.
Some of these people, particularly the Borana, Somali and Abashi, provided
moral and material support to the visiting sheikhs. A good example is the
case of one prominent trader living at Kangeta trade centre, whose home
Most of these local Muslim converts, on returning from the various places
where they had come into contact with Islam, set up with their families in the
trade centres. It was much later when this pattern began to change in the early
1980s as a result of proselytization campaign evident in the construction of a
number of new mosques and the establishment of madrasa in several places. See
chapter 6, pp. 267-270.
30 Census figures obtained from the 1962 census report by the colonial
administrators in Kenya to the House of Commons in England, show the total
number of non-natives found in the district at the time of census to be 1300, most
of them Asian, Somali, Borana and Abash (Ethiopians). The available evidence
shows that these were largely Muslim.
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served as a base for the N.F.D. sheikhs and the celebration of maulid,
sponsored by him, went on for days each year.31
Initially, sheikhs from N.F.D. began to visit the area with the
purpose of conducting the maulid. When asked why the sheikhs were
welcome in the area, one of the local Muslim pioneers, almost invariably
responded that sheikhs were
invited to read maulid on the basis of their Muslim learning. At that
time, the Muslims in Igembe did not have their own sheikh. None of
our own people was learned enough to preside over the maulid
celebrations. The Muslims in Igembe looked forward to the
celebration of maulid read at Lare Mosque. After the big maulid at
Lare, which served as our centre for a long time, other maulid
celebrations were held at Kangeta and Azi z home in Maua.32
This statement may be accepted as an explanation as to why they turned
to N.F.D. for support and even more importantly, why the sheikhs managed
to get a foothold in this area, albeit for a limited period. However, it should
be noted that most of these sheikhs might not be recognized elsewhere as
learned. The criteria for being thought learned in Igembe, where the local
Muslims were not only few and far between, but also largely uneducated
and still mystified by Islam, were different from the criteria in the Muslim
settlements within Meru town, where the reading of the Quran was
accessible, albeit to a small minority. For instance, it is said that the well
respected Sheikh Said traced his roots to Comoro Islands. His Comorian
background and his Muslim learning under a famous coastal scholar23
31 Ado, his wife told me that most of the guests invited to these celebrations
and the sheikhs who conducted the maulid, came from N.F.D.
32 Interview with Mustafa, Kiengu, 12th October 1991.
In Meru and many other places far in the interior of Kenya, the coast is
regarded as the abode of Muslim learning. Studying at the coast or going there for
'further religious studies' is quite prestigious for the particular individual and his
family. So the fact that Sheikh Said had his religious education at the coast,
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were important assets in his leadership of the Muslims in Meru town. The
sheikhs in Igembe, though they may not have been considered authoritative
elsewhere, nevertheless, knew much more than the local people and thus
proved their superiority over them. Their competence was judged by the
recovery of lost items that they facilitated; and the effectiveness of their
treatment of the sick, while that of Maalim Asuman and Twa in Majengo,
for instance, depended largely on the reputation of the teacher under whom
they had studied.34
For quite some time, the sheikhs' visits were confined to the trader's
home at Kangeta and Lare, where Sheikh Shariff Hussein, attracted by a
relatively larger resident Muslim population than any of the other trade
centres, established a base. Later on, one prominent cattle and skins and
hides trader who converted while living with a Somali family in Isiolo and
who was well connected with the N.F.D., set apart a special place for
prayers in his homestead, known as maula. This maula came to serve as
the base for sheikhs visiting Kiengu area, for instance Sheikh Shariff Adam
who is said to have came to Kiengu in 1974. The significance of this base35
is that it was located in the village outside the trade centres and thus
accessible even to those who might secretly want to avail themselves of the
though his teachers were unknown to my informants, was important to the local
people - it was supposed that he learned under some of the famous scholars; and
whether or not (for it is difficult to ascertain that) he studied under a famous
scholar, his association with the coast greatly enhanced his social status, which
in turn was an important factor in his leadership of the emerging urban Muslim
community in Meru.
two mahaji teachers, Asuman and Twa, are said to have been trained
in Pangani under the influence of Hajji Khaniis, the first Kikuyu Muslim scholar
of repute. See chapter 2, p. 87.
It is now a public mosque, built of wood and iron in 1979. Abdallah told me
that there are about 100 Muslims within the vicinity of this mosque, though only
20-30 people turn up for prayer on Fridays. On the three occasions when I visited
the mosque during the afternoon prayer, I found 5-7 people in attendance. My
informant attributed the poor attendance to lack of religious knowledge and
commitment by the local people.
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sheikh's services. Another maula was set up at Juma's homestead and now
it is a public mosque.36
Let us see what actually happened when the sheikhs began to edge
their way in, as they began to oversee the maulid celebrations and serve as
religious teachers and patrons to the local converts in Igembe. From the
accounts of the various informants, it is evident that being able to host the
sheikhs and support them for several weeks, was not only a source of
prestige,but was also believed to bring good fortune and prosperity (baraka)
to the host. They came to enjoy a great deal of reverence. Their possession
of secret knowledge contributed considerably to the local peoplds reverence
for the sheikhs, which in turn enhanced the latter's prestige. The power of
the written word and its impact in Meru have been discussed in chapter 2.
Since the majority of the people of Meru were largely uneducated and
Arabic was virtually inaccessible, these sheikhs, as Goody observes
elsewhere, employed their possession of the written word to maintain a
monopoly of the source of their power.37
The importance of the sheikhs' visits is evident in the number of
people that went to consult them on such issues as sickness and lost items.
Interestingly enough, some of the lost items would be recovered after the
consultation.38 The recovery of lost items is not peculiar to this case - use
of magic to enhance luck in matters of business and even love, is well
38 For further information on this mosque, see chapter 6, p. 274.
J. Goody, 1968:12. This point is raised again in the discussion on the use of
picture frames with Arabic Qurarnc inscriptions in chapter 6 (pp. 285-287) and
also in relation to the use of Muslim magic in the widespread practice of seeking
the sheikh's 'reading' for various purposes in chapter.
38 Interview with Asuman, (Antubetwe mosque, 16th October 1991) a
prominent local Muslim, one of the two whose maula were important bases for the
visiting sheikhs.
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documented aspect of East African Islam. 39 The important point for us to
note is that the maula in Asuman's home served as base for the sheikhs to
render these services and in addition, launch Husseiniyya cult.
It was not long before a limited number of individuals at Kiengu,
Lare and Kangeta (see map) were initiated into the cult. These
individuals40
 were labeled watu wa murid, meaning adherents of murid.
My attempts to get the details of the initiation rituals from two of my
initiated informants (one of them now turned reformer due to Tabligh
influence) were met with a blunt refusal. Nevertheless, they were agreed
that membership to the order entailed admittance into an inner circle, a
clique which saw itself as the epitome of faith. They were seen as possessors
of baraka and this claim to possession of baraka legitimated their influence
over the local Muslims. A manifestly strong commitment was demanded of
all the members and laxity could engender calamity on an individual
member.4'
In his study on healing in black Africa, Fisher, though he links
healing with the second of his three-stage theory of conversion, makes a
relevant point which neatly fits the situation of Husseiniyya cult as
See Beckerleg, 1990. This is also comparable to the case of the stolen mosque
equipment cited in chapter 2 (pp. 100-102). It was said that the sheikh's prayers
were answered when a suspect in the village fell ill and died.
4° I was able to trace only 7 local people who claimed to have been initiated
into the cult. One of them is married to a Borana woman and speaks the Borana
language fluently.
41 Sheikh Hussani cited an example of one of the pioneer members of the murid
in the area, whose family are now said to be suffering due to their negligence of
the order. Two of his daughters died of illness but according to Sheikh Hussam,
their failure to adhere to the order and therefore fulfil the wishes of their departed
father, was the cause of these misfortunes. Hussam fears that the whole family
might be wiped out if they continue in their laxity.
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reflected in the role of the sheikhs in Igembe and the generally nascent
stage of Islam in this part of Meru:
it is clear that those characteristics of the healer.., his status as a
welcome immigrant, the fear which he inspired, and his ability to
earn his living - greatly strengthen him as a pioneer representative
of Islam whilst that religion is still, in the particular village or
chieftaincy concerned, in the quarantine stage.42
It must be emphasized here that the sheikhs were not keen on either
proselytizing among the local people, or on revolutionizing Islam in the
area. The fear that they instilled in potential converts and the secrecy that
they cultivated around the cult shows that they were mainly interested in
creating and maintaining their own power over the local people. For
instance Shariff who came to Kiengu in 1974 is said to have used magic to
convince people of the power of Islam.43
It must, nevertheless be stated here that, the accounts of this cult as
given by the various informants are slightly jumbled - during the
interviews, three of them claimed to have been initiated into Qadiriyya, and
four others into Husseiniyya. Yet they all claimed that they were members
of murid. This imprecision in stating the identity of the order could be
attributed to the secrecy surrounding the cult - only a few individuals were
initiated into it and little information was available outside the small circle
of members.
While ordinary members of the cult were believed to be ritually
protected, the sheikhs themselves were believed to be invested with magical
powers. These magical powers came to be inexorably linked with healing
42 H.Fisher, 197 1:38.
It has been shown in chapter 2(pp. 94-99) that Muslims encouraged an aura
of secrecy which they usually harnessed for their own advantage - by mystifying
Islam and cultivating fear in other people, they made up for their low social
esteem.
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powers, with the result that their medical skills were much sought after,
especially because they claimed the ability to cure the more intractable
diseases like barrenness and madness, and provide protective charms. It is
a commonly held belief among the local people that these two types of
illness are caused either by witchcraft or other social forces such as curse,
which is believed to be extremely efficacious.44 Therefore, to those who
hold this belief, the treatment of these types of illness is outside the realm
of the western-trained medical doctors and only the sheikh and or other
diviners are considered to possess the necessary skills to make the right
diagnosis and deal with the cases effectively. It is for this reason that some
of the local people consult the sheikh instead of going to the hospital.
Therefore, to a great many people, both Muslim and non-Muslim, talismans
can protect those who possess them against potential sorcerers and witches.
Though the sheikhs did not put their services up for sale, so to say,
there was an economic dimension to it. The sheikhs earned a living by
giving these services, and since the services were considered vital by their
recipients (most of whom were non-Muslims) they were willing to pay in
cash and kind for them. The most popular reward was in the form of goat,
perhaps because the goat was the traditional unit of currency among the
Meru. However, a different opinion is given by one of my informants, who
suggests that the sheikhs, realizing the degree of the local people's fear of
witches, harnessed it for their own advantage and charged exorbitant fees
in cash and kind for their services. 45 They cast a spell on the people. Their
visits, which happened two or three times a year, and extended for nearly
44 The fear of the efficacy of curse among the Meru has been illustrated in the
case of the 'Njia curse' in chapter 2, pp. 113-114.
Aslam (interview, Amaku, 11th October 1991) claims the ability to cure
many diseases. He takes after his father, a leading adherent of the order of Abdul
Qadir Jailan in the area.
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two months on each occasion, 46 were characterized by much festivity at the
homes of their supporters which, as has just been said, served as their
bases for healing, divination and other services for their clients.
However, it would be erroneous to give the impression that the cult
operated on a large scale in this area. It must be pointed out that though
the recruitment to the cult, as Lewis notes, is usually "through illness and
affliction",47 there is no evidence to suggest that treatment was linked with
conversion to Islam. Many of the sheikhs' clients sought just remedy for
their maladies, and were not inclined to conversion. Nor were the sheikhs,
as I have just said above, eager to spread the cult beyond a small circle of
adherents. Here there is no evidence of spirit possession akin to Parkin's
"therapeutic" Muslims among the Giriama. Even in a case such as that
of Nchulubi,49 the mental illness that bedeviled her family, claiming her
husband and her son, were not perceived in terms of spirit possession. Her
quest for Islam was a quest for protection against the harm supposedly
caused her by an envious neighbour.
Thus the cult was sustained not so much by its own vitality as the
local people's fear of the inexplicable charisma of the sheikhs. Since
Muslims were relatively few and far apart in this area, and not all were
members of the order the sheikhs' supporters were usually zealous
prominent Muslim men, whose support bolstered the image of the order in
the eyes of local people, which in turn, enhanced their social status. On
Asuman, to whom I am indebted for this information, still hosts the sheikhs
in his home, though now only for treatment of the sick and divinatory
consultations.
I. M. Lewis, 1985:69.
D. J. Parkin, 1972:40.
' This case is discussed in detail in chapter 6, pp.282-289.
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these occasions, the sheikhs treated the sick, made talismans, and attended
to those who came to consult or seek help in tracing lost items.
A remark needs be made here about the representation of the cult of
Sheikh Hussein of Bale in Meru. The concept of ayaana is an element of
Borana and not Meru culture, therefore, the sheikhs seem to have adapted
certain ayaana rituals to a different milieu, perhaps by down-playing them,
in order to bring the cult of Sheikh Hussein to prominence. For instance
Sheikh Mwinyi (already mentioned) who claims to have been first initiated
into Qadinyya and then Husseiniyya, sees ayaana as possessing members
of the cult for "misdeeds'and non-members as a "calling". 50 What the sheikh
meant to say in this statement which I have rendered into English, is that
since ayaana manifests itself in the form of spirit possession, if an initiated
individual is affected by ayaana, it is believed that s/he must have done
something to warrant the attack; but if a non-member is 'affected' it is an
invitation to enter the cult.
During the period of their visit, which lasted for several weeks,
ceremonies to avert evil were held in the members' homes, usually on
Thursdays and Fridays. Though these sessions were rarely held to deal with
cases of illness or possession by ayaana, as is the case among the Borana
they are comparable to those described by Aguilar. 5 ' I have just said that
though most of the people who consulted the sheikh did so in search of
remedy for their various maladies, they were not treated as possessed by
a spirit. The explanation for this omission may,found in the absence of the
concept of spirit possession among the Meru. There are various causes of
barrenness and other intractable illnesses: an individual may have been
bewitched or violated a certain taboo incurring the condition of ritual
impurity known as muiro for which a prescribed cleansing ritual is
° Interview with Sheikh Mwinyi, Meru town, 16th November 1991.
51 M. I. Aguilar, 1994:254-282.
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performed by an expert. Here some individuals preferred the Muslim sheikh
to the Meru traditional medical/ritual expert on the basis of the novelty of
Muslim medicine. Some people wanted to try it just because it was new to
them.52
While among the Borana the customary possession by ayaana
furnished the occasion for the performance of the rituals which also served
as the medium for expressing allegiance to Husseiniyya, in Meru
ceremonies to avert evil provided an opportune time for cult members to
meet regularly. Ceremonies to avert evil were held on Thursday or Friday
evenings at the homes of members:
1. Members were invited to attend.
2. A new pot was placed near the entrance and green coffee, milk
butter and sugar were kept aside.
3. Coffee berries were fried by the woman of the house, that is the
wife of the house owner.
4. After frying the berries, she scooped them with a calabash from
the pot and steeped them in fresh butter. Then every one touched
and applied a little butter to their faces and legs.
5. Then the berries were passed round for the elders and all the
participants to pick up the berries one by one and eat them. After
each person had 3 to 4 berries, the remainder should not be finished,
some should be left and returned to the woman who fried them.
6. The rest of the evening was spent singing praises for the Sheikh
Hussein and chanting remembrance, dhikir.53
52 The preference for the Muslim cleric's remedies to those of the traditional
expert, in many cases without conversion is alluded to in chapter 7, p. 320.
The session was described to me by Mustafa (Kiengu, 12th October 1991)
and Sheikh Hussam, (Amaku, 13th October 1991).
193
It is important to emphasize Husseiniyya is intimately expressed
through Borana traditional rituals, though there may be variations in the
application or adaptation of these rituals in Meru as this particular
ceremony illustrates. For instance, though this session whose purpose is to
avert evil, differs slightly from the one observed by Aguilar among the Waso
Borana,54 coffee is an important common ritual item. The coffee dish used
in the ritual is a Borana traditional
sacrament of peace and fertility. Traditionally the coffee fruit has
been used to help moments of prayer... The bean itself has the
connotation of prosperity and the butter that of fertility and
abundance.65
The sheikhs introduced the ritual of burying the heads of animals
slaughtered for meat as a protective measure for the home in which the
animal was slaughtered. They also introduced a three-hundred-bead white
rosary, tasbih, believed to be more potent than the ordinary one. It was
oiled and worn on the shoulder as a sign of the order. A former member of
the order now turned reformer, said that this tasbih was believed to be so
potent that if an uninitiated person used it, s/he would suffer grave
consequences, usually the victim would become insane, unless certain
rituals were performed to cleanse the victim, after which they would be
initiated into the order by the senior sheikh. Members were encouraged to
wear long hair, purported to be the abode of the pepo, spirit. This was the
symbol of the cult where initiation and magical protection were the prime
elements.
Basing their argument on the Quranic prohibition of consumption of
intoxicants, the sheikhs condemned the chewing of miraa, that is cart has
M. I. Aguilar, 1994:278.
M.I. Aguilar, 1991:35-6.
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edulis,56 which is a popular habit among both the local people, the Somali
and the Borana. They argued that miraa fell within the Quranic definition
of intoxicants. This led to an unprecedented controversy with the Muslims
involved in both its trade and consumption. However, the sheikhs do not
seem to have made any headway in their fight against this highly valued
commodity.
'Every Sheikh has his Own Way'57
The most influential of these sheikhs was a Borana Sheikh Hiloli.58
From his base at Kiengu, he managed to surround himself with a group of
supporters from among the local pioneer converts, owing allegiance to his
cult.59 The sheikh was and still is feared for his magical powers. My
informants were in agreement that he can cure all kinds of diseases and is
especially renowned for his unrivaled skill in treating a sort of spirit
possession, popularly known as 'pepo ya jinn'; madness and barrenness.
However, there is no evidence to suggest the practice of spirit possession
56 Miraa, (Carthas Edulis), is grown in Igembe region of Meru district. The
bark of the young shoots is chewed for leisure and it is the major cash crop for the
people in the area - it is sold in many parts of the country, mainly the
North-Eastern Province, Nairobi and Mombasa, all with significant Muslim
populations.
57 'Every Sheikh has his own way' is a well known Arabic saying. In this case,
the lack of consensus among the sheikhs was expressed in this idiom.
On a visit to the home of one prominent local Muslim, I was fortunate to find
the highly revered Sheikh Hiloli, to whom I am grateful for much of the
information in this section. He said that he was born in 1911 at Garba Tulla. In
1928, he joined other traders at Mutuati trade centre, which had been opened in
the previous year. He says that he has lived in Igembe for most of his life.
the impetus provided particularly by the secessionist tendencies since
the 1950s, religious orders were quite active in the N.F.D. throughout this period.
See chapter 4.
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among the Meru Muslim converts. When I visited him at a home of a
prominent local Muslim, his host described him rather modestly:
The sheikh, to us, is only a helper when need arises. For instance, if
any one is ill, he can and in fact does give treatment. In the whole of
Meru, only this Sheikh and sheikh Mwinyi (previously mentioned)
are fully qualified to deal with all types of illness, though there are
other minor healers. There is a specific book for this treatment, and
this task can only be performed by the experts who are initiated into
it. It is not just anybody that could handle this without serious
repercussions. A few others, for instance Sheikh Musa, have given up
this work due to the reformist influence.60
Another important sheikh came to the area in the early 1970s,
(various informants gave different dates) and established himself at Kaburi,
a few miles away from Kiengu. It should, however be remembered that by
the time the second Sheikh arrived, Sheikh Hiloli had already established
his reputation among the local people. It seems, therefore, that for the new
sheikh to make a mark in this new territory, which was somewhat within
the Sheikh Hiloli's 'sphere of influence', he had to demonstrate his magical
skills in order to attract a following and hopefully carve out his own 'sphere
of influence'. This he achieved with rapid success since many people, both
Muslim and non-Muslims valued the services offered by the sheikhs. It is
also said that he was an eloquent preacher and a number of converts were
won through his preaching.
However, it would be erroneous to give the impression that Sheikh
Umari (the second sheikh) established himself without difficulty in Hiloli's
domain. There is evidence in the accounts of several informants who claim
to have witnessed the encounter between the two sheikhs, to show that the
two "men of learning" soon began to disagree on various doctrinal issues.
60 mystical powers attributed to these sheikhs and the immense reverence
accorded them, were some of the aspects of this sheikh cult in Igembe that Tabligh
teachers were quick to condemn. See chapter 6, pp. 261-262.
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Most thorny of these was the question of whether or not to deliver Khutba,
the Friday sermon, to a gathering of fewer than forty male worshippers, as
stipulated by the Shafi school of Islamic law. Sheikh Hiloli explained to me
that the disagreement between him and the other sheikh derived mainly
from the fact that the latter leaned more towards the Malik school than the
Shafi. Hiloli argued that according to the Shafi school of Muslim law, an
Imani should not deliver Friday sermon in a mosque if the attendance fell
below forty resident male worshippers. But the second sheikh countered
that in the circumstances where it was difficult to gather forty resident
male worshippers due to the sparsity of Muslims in the area, ten men
fulfilled the basic requirement for an Imam to give khutba on Friday. As a
result, he would deliver Khutba at Mangala even when the attendance fell
far below the Shafi stipulation.
Another point of disagreement between the sheikhs was the rate of
payment of zakat, alms for the poor. At one time they gave different rates,
with the result that some prominent traders in Kangeta threatened to
withhold their payment until the sheikhs came to a consensus. With each
sheikh basing his advice on his own understanding of the law, or "his own
way", as my informant put it, it proved difficult to attain consensus. Sheikh
Hiloli says that the problem as he saw it, was the second sheikh's tendency
to lean towards the Malik school of thought and thus give rise to a
difference in emphasis on certain details between the two schools (Malik
and Shafi), which though minor, might engender confusion and hence
disorient the rather feeble converts. He felt that since the local Muslim
converts, to whom Sheikh Umari was ministering were Shafi, he should
adhere to the Shafi prescriptions to avoid any confusion that might arise if
the Maliki bias crept in.6'
61 Interview with sheikh Hiloli, Antubetwe mosque, 16th October 1991.
197
Of course the converts understood little about the fundamentals of
faith, let alone the intricate details of the Muslim law, so to most of them,
the disagreement between the two sheikhs was reduced to competition and
rivalry. This could well be another way of seeing the struggle between the
learned sheikhs. Taking into account the fact that the new sheikh was
trying to carve out an area of influence for himself, it is likely that his
arrival was viewed as an intrusion by the other sheikh. In fact several
informants who claimed to know both sheikhs well, insisted that to them,
what appeared to be subtle details of law were of little significance.
Since the early 1970s, the sheikhs of the former N.F.D. were active
in providing Islamic remedies for various maladies for those who sought
them, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. However) except for the formation of
a small ban4ipporters calling themselves 'people of Murid', this cult made
little impact upon the people in Igembe. Just as the influence of the Borana
tenants in Meru town were constricted by the leaders, the cult in Igembe
did not actually 'make it'. The advent of Tabligh in the beginning of the
1980s saw a quick exit of Husseiniyya supporters.
Conclusion
Launay in his study of the introduction of a new ritual "that never
'quite made it"62 among the Dyula Muslims in Senegal, observed that
there is a tendency to perceive change in the context of retrospection
If one considers only those changes that have successfully been
adopted, history tends to take an aura of inevitability with 'past' and
'present' as two points on a vector leading in a certain direction. Such
a teleological view can obscure the obvious fact that changes are
often the outcomes of conscious decisions by specific individuals. Such
decisions, however, carry the risk of failure. The circumstances in
62 R. Launay, 1992:147.
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which individuals fail to institute certain changes tell us as much, in
the long run, as the circumstances in which they succeed.
The relevant point from Launay's discussion in this passage, is that those
changes and events that do not quite "make it" or produce the desired
effect, are as informative about the circumstances in which they occur as
those that do make it and therefore, such events should be accorded no less
attention. Following Launay, therefore, it can be said that though the
sheikh cult in Meru was short lived, its emergence and failure to entrench
itself communicates something of the local model of Islamic worship and
hence deserves attention here.
A relevant point to consider in the above discussion of the sheikhs
is the timing of their arrival: they arrived at a time when, as has been
shown in the previous chapter, the Muslim enclaves within Meru town were
on the threshold of unity as they were struggling to construct a common
Muslim identity. The group distinctiveness that might have surrounded the
Borana religious ceremonies and rituals would find no place in the emerging
urban Muslim community in Meru Town.
However, the Muslims in Igembe, isolated, few and far between, and
well aware of their lack of Muslim learning, were more susceptible to the
Borana influence than their counterparts in the "New Swahili village", now
merged with Nubian village. Whether or not the Borana sheikhs had
sufficient Muslim learning was not the issue to the Muslim families
scattered in the area, most of whom knew little or nothing about Islamic
learning. While in Meru town a Borana sheikh would be subjected to the
scrutiny of the more authoritative Sheikh Said, for instance, whose
credentials were obtained through 'recognized' scholarship at the coast, and
therefore accredited by the members of the community, in Igembe they
63 R. Launay, 1992:148.
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filled a gap - the sheikh cited above said that "none of our own people was
learned enough to preside over the maulid celebrations", so these sheikhs
were welcome.
This is in agreement with Constantin that
to be admired one must have admirers. In other words,
circumstances must favour a particular sensitivity towards the
exceptional. At certain periods certain social groups may be
particularly exposed."
Possession of baraka (imputed to the sheikhs) and the ability to read
Arabic, made them appear extraordinary and therefore more than qualified
to preside over the Maulid.
It was this situation in Igembe that somewhat favoured the formation
of a small circle of cult members. The functions that the sheikhs performed
were the preserve of men considered to have access to secret knowledge. It
was the situation in Igembe that favoured "the germination of charisma",
to quote Constantin again, that was rightly attributed to these sheikhs.
64 F. Constantin, 1988:79.
65 F. Constantin, 1988:80.
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CHAPTER FiVE
THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF THE MAJENGO MUSLIM
COMMUNITY
Introduction
In this chapter I intend to examine the functioning of the Muslim
community in Meru town through a study of the various activities and
group affiliations, in other words, the intricate web of the social-religious
network that is characteristic of the Muslim residents of Majengo.' The
picture of the urban community would be incomplete without the discussion
on the role of the resident Asian Muslims. 2 Though they do not live within
the precincts of Majengo and Mjini, they play an important role in the
town's social-religious network. The salient aspects of this network are:
power relations, that is the means by which certain individual Muslims
exert influence, authority and power within the Muslim community; general
expectations of others as members of the community, and the means of
enforcing and evaluating the fulfilment of these expectations. The data for
this chapter were derived mainly from participant observation. My
participation in many of the local activities was particularly helpful leading
to first-hand contact with nany Majengo residents in their homes.
'As said in chapter l(p.26) Majengo in Swahili means buildings. But the term
has come to denote cheap low income residential areas, usually with a
predominantly Swahili-Islamic character, in what were formally designated
"African locations" in the administrative centres founded by the colonial
administrators in the interior of Kenya.
2 See chapter 1 (pp.41-45) for information on the establishment of the Indian
Bazaar and presence of Indian Muslims of Sunni, Shia (Ismaili) and Alimadiyya
sects in Meru.
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The Spatial Significance of Majengo
The Muslim enclaves of Majengo and Mjini 3 are separated from each
other by the upper part of Meru town. Majengo lies on the ridge beyond the
Kathita river, straddled by a foot-bridge at one of the narrower points of its
deep canyon just below Majengo. The main bridge across the Kathita is
further down on Nkubu road. A significant number of the old mud-and-wood
tin roofed "Swahili houses" are still there, though an effort to "improve the
settlement", as its residents put it, is evident in the wooden structures that
are gradually replacing the mud-walled houses when they collapse. The tall
minarets of the magnificent stone mosque, built in 1986 by the Islamic
Foundation on a piece of land donated by Al-Hajji,4 tower over these
structures in a striking contrast between its white-washed walls and the
surrounding rusty tin roofs.
The Nubian village is on the other ridge beyond the town, and
similarly separated from the upper part of the town by a small stream. The
new hospital wing overlooks a row of 11 mud-and-wood houses occupying
the lower part of the ridge. Beyond the hospital, other similar houses are
scattered haphazardly. A tin (mabati) mosque stands rather inconspicuously
beside a small dusty street.5
For the residents of both places either to visit one another or go to
town, they have to "cross over to the other side", as I heard it said many
times. In spite of this geographical setting, whatever happens in one place -
3 Mjini is the name given to the area occupied by both the Nubian Village and
what in 1954/55 became known as the "New Swahili Village", created for those
evacuated from the old Swahili village. Twenty-nine house owners were resettled
here.
Interview with Al-Hajji, Majengo mosque, 2nd August 1991.
For a fuller description of the physical location of the Majengo, see chapter
1, pp. 35-40.
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marriage, funeral or gossip - rarely escapes the attention of the people on
the other side of the town. Therefore, for the purpose of our discussion the
two entities will be treated as one Muslim community. According to Peil,
the term community
usually implies some idea of locale, frequent social interaction and
close ties between members of a group. These ties may be based on
kinship, common occupation, the experience of living together, etc.,
so long as they are sufficiently important to provide the members of
the community with common interests and goals. Some uses of
community omit locale and argue that community interests ignore
distance ( a community of scientists, who might live all over the
world). But residence in the same area is important in providing
opportunity for interaction and working together for common goals,
even though technology helps to overcome distance, it seems more
useful to keep the idea of common residence and use some other word
for close knit groups which lack this.6
The spatiality, in other words, the existence of a geographical place that is
constructed and identifiable as a Majengo, upon which the strands of
interaction and close ties within the group are crucially dependent, fulfills
the pertinent criterion of locale. In the Majengo situation, every individual
has a network of relatives, neighbours and friends who, through their
shared adherence of communalism, are not only more likely, but are
obligated, to act together and assist one of their number in need. It is this
network that makesjajengo Muslim community different from the
Muslims scattered in the rural areas without a common Muslim community
identity. Locale, in this case the spatiality of Majengo, is vital for the
construction of a common Muslim community identity in Meru. As Anthony
Cohen suggests
the reality of community lies in its members' perception of the
vitality of its culture. People construct community symbolically,
making it a resource and repository of meaning..
6 M. Peil, 1977:19.
Anthony Cohen, 1985:118.
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In this case the criteria for differentiation or elements of
distinctiveness, as I have referred to them before, are: mode of dress; use
of Swahili as a language of community; and other forms of Swahili-Islamic
material culture which are perceived as marks that distinguish Muslims
from others.8 For the Muslims in Meru Town, the process of community
identity construction is facilitated by the spatiality of Majengo. The phrase
"Majengo people" has a different connotation from "Majengo residents". The
real Majengo people do not see themselves as 'residing' there for they say
of themselves, "we are the Majengo and there is no Majengo without us".9
The notion of a geographical place for Muslims, usually expressed as mji
wetu, in spite of the presence of others who are not necessarily part of the
Majengo Muslim community. In the early period the elders used to collect
the tax money from all the residents and deliver it to the district
administration in order "to keep the police out the settlement".'° Keeping
control of the settlement meant keeping out various forms of external
influence, for instance the Borana living in Mjini were threatened with
eviction if they persisted in their Ayaana celebrations which according to
the elders, were regarded as unislamic. Now they are gradually losing the
hold on this area as many other people move in and the municipal council
threat to demolish the old houses looms even larger. This notion of a
geographical place for Muslims is comparable to that found in Ujiji by
Balda.
8 For a fuller discussion on the process and mechanisms of the construction of
a common Muslim community identity and distinctiveness in Meru town, see
chapter 3, pp. 149-170.
Interview with Musa, Mzee Ibrahim and Nyanya, 7th September 1991. The
threat of the demolition of Majengo by the Meru Municipal Council has been in
the air for a long time now and my informants expressed concern for the future
of their settlement and all that it symbolizes.
10 Interview with Mzee Ibrahim, Majengo 26th August 1991. Ironically,
nowadays, the police carry out daily raids in an attempt to curb brewing of illicit
liquor.
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Muslims in Ujiji, Tanzania, consider it of vital importance to keep
the Islamic character of their town not only by controlling future
Christian movements, but also by keeping at bay any other Muslim
groups...'1
Living in close proximity enhances the vitality of the Swahili-Islamic
culture. As I have said elsewhere' 2 once they are established, the Muslim
settlements become cultural islands, an attribute which not only facilitates
but also deepens the process of Islamization. Therefore both locale and
criteria of differentiation are crucially important for a common Muslim
community identity formation in Meru.
The significance of locale can be illustrated further by drawing upon
the following statement made by one of my informants, when asked to
explain why they tend to stick together in Majengo. Sheikh Abdallah of
Majengo felt that:
We Muslims are one community. The Muslim brotherhood obligates
us to help one another. That is why you see in Majengo the Muslims
live as brothers, one with another. Now if an individual lives alone
out there, that is in a place without other Muslims or others who
understand the religion of Islam, it may be difficult for such an
individual to fulifi his religious obligations. For instance Muchena,
the owner of the house at that end of the row, was a devout Muslim
who observed a regular mosque attendance. When he moved from
Majengo to his village in Mutuati in the 1960s, we even thought that
he would try to spread Islam among his neighbours. But see what
happened - after a few years there, he stopped attending the annual
Maulid celebrations. He stopped going to the mosque. Finally, he
abandoned his religion altogether. Only his children bear Muslim
names, otherwise there is no trace of Islam in their lives. In fact they
are not Muslims. They are just like the rest of the people living
around them. That is what is likely to happen to individuals if we do
not stick together as Muslims - even though Majengo is what it is.'3
' J. L. Balda, 1990:302.
12 See chapter 1 (p. 36) for the definition of Majengo as a cultural entity.
' Interview with Sheikh Khalid, Majengo, 26th August 1991.
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Abdallah's statement shows clearly that membership in the Majengo
community sustains practice and ensures conformity. Without intending to
overstate the case for Muslim brotherhood or unity, the point to note is that
the Muslims ascribe a great deal of importance to their being together in a
Majengo social and physical setting. Also, the process of enforcing and
evaluating conformity to what is socially acceptable and expected of a
Muslim, is to a large extent, enhanced by the physical setup of Majengo. A
good example is the proximity of the mosque. Two informants said that they
consider it a privilege to live next door to the mosque.' 4 It is a shame, they
said, for one living so close to the mosque to fail to observe the five daily
prayers regularly, especially because whenever the call to prayer is made,
it reverberates in the roofs of their houses.
The call to prayer is heard in every corner of Majengo and indeed, all
conversation ceases during the time when the caller's voice is heard and
silence is maintained until the call is finished. I observed that even those
without the intention of attending the prayers observe silence while the call
is going on. The explanation given by my informants for this behaviour,
even when one has no intention of answering the call either by praying
wherever they are or by going to the mosque, is that it is considered
religiously incorrect to interject while the call to prayer is being made,
because the declaration of Allah's Greatness should supersede any other
utterances. The call to prayer serves as a constant reminder of one of the
most important religious obligations, it pricks the conscience of the believer
five times a day. The point here is to illustrate the significance of the
Majengo setup in which the proximity of the mosque can enhance religious
consciousness, unlike the sparsity of mosques in the rural areas where the
equally sparse Muslims have to trek, as will be shown in the next chapter,
for long distances to go to the nearest mosque.
' Interview with Mzee Ibrahim and Musa, Majengo, 7th September 1991.
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Power Relations and Muslim Discourse
The concept of permanency in Majengo, (though this is now haunted
by the imminent (proposed) demolition ofMajengo by the town council, and
hence the destruction of their community) is crucial to the sustenance of the
Majengo religious and social network. The house owners and their families
are permanent town residents, with few or no connections with the rural
areas. Majengo is the place that they know and identify with as Muslims.'5
They constitute the core group in Majengo and, as it will be shown below,
play a significant role in maintaining the religious and social network in
Maj engo.
With the recent increase in the town's population, the availability of
cheap housing in Majengo has attracted a number of new residents that my
informants describe as "outsiders". A good proportion of these outsiders are
women. Many women migrate from rural areas into town in search of jobs;
others leave their homes after broken marriages; and some others simply
"go out in search of easy town life", as one such woman put it. Most of these
women end up in the town's low income residential areas, one of which is
Majengo. After settling in, some of them are joined by their relatives who
help to swell the Majengo population. Similarly, Dutto found out that in
Nyeri town, the sex ratio varies appreciably between the different areas,
"with an excess of women in Majengo".' 6 In her study of African women,
Obbo identifies various categories of women who migrate to towns; and the
' It is only recently that a number of long-time residents ofMajengo and Mjini
obtained plots of land in the newly developed agricultural schemes in formerly dry
uninhabited areas in the district. I traced six of my informants to these schemes.
One sheikh has stationed his first wife in the scheme, while the youngest stayed
with him in the town. Another man has moved his family, leaving behind his
father and mother, to the scheme and settled there. Through his efforts, a mosque
has been built in this area.
16 C. A. Dutto, 1975:106.
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various reasons that precipitate the migration.' 7 She concludes that
"Unattached single women are ubiquitous in East African cities and towns,
in contrast to the rural areas".18
Muslims (it may be partly in response to this presence of many non-
Muslims in their midst) are manifestly conscious of their Muslim identity.
This Muslim consciousness is expressed in the phrase "we Muslims" that
one hears in almost every conversation among Muslims or between Muslims
and non-Muslims. When asked about non-Muslim Majengo residents, the
tendency was to give a disinterested response: "What do you want to know
about them. Most of them are tenants here".' 9 It is important, therefore,
to note that they are regarded as 'insiders' in Majengo; and at the same
time, as 'outsiders' to the Muslim community.
On the surface, the Majengo Muslims appear as a united group,
whose common adherence to Islam and the local variant of the Swahili
culture, with its dense network of social ties, transcends individual
differences and personal interests. To a visitor, the scenario of leso-clad
women sitting in front of their houses enjoying the morning sunshine and
children clattering around, as they play in the mud in the space between
the rows of houses, gives a sense of false tranquility. Muslim men are seen
walking around in their embroidered skull caps, and those who are
supposedly more pious than others, in their long shirts (kanzu) and turbans
17 C. Obbo, 1974:71-80.
18 women in the Majengo of many towns, "are limited in their activity to
petty trading.. .illicit selling of local beer, and to various forms of prostitution (C.
A. Dutto, 1975:106). Also see C. Obbo, 1974: 18. Itis this form of survival activities
which has given mtaa, and Majengo in general, pejorative connotations. Thus
mtaa (singular) or mitaa, has come to be associated in the minds of many people
with loose living.
19 Interview with Musa, Majengo, 23rd October 1991.
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wound over the skull caps. 2° Those who have to go to work early in the
morning (though these are few), cross on the foot-bridge to the other side
into town. For the rest, the mornings are usually slow. It is not until about
eleven-thirty that people begin to walk towards the town, where they "talk
to other people" so as to catch up with the news before the afternoon prayer
time (for those that observe regular mosque attendance). Great value is
placed on "talking to other people". 2' They meet and exchange news and
views about what is happening: politics, social welfare, religious affairs etc.
This is a society where everyone knows everyone else. Categories of
relationships seem to overlap at various points, for instance one is kin and
neighbour; or neighbour and friend. Every family has an extensive network
of kinship and friendship. At the primary level though, are the family ties.
It is quite common to find relatives and their families living close together,
either in the 'out-houses'22 of the main house or as next-door neighbours.
As will be shown below, this close-knit nature of the community generates
its own forces within the community's network of relationship.
A conceptual model of the Majengo Muslim community would consist
of a four-tier pyramid: at the apex are the most prominent Muslim leaders,
who may also be influential business men or politicians. It is believed that
high proffle for one member can benefit the community which sees itself as
financially handicapped. For instance, Al-Hajji is a prominent Muslim
leader who combines big business with participation in the local politics.
For him, the two sources of prestige, that is big business and a leading role
in the local political scene, reinforce each other and thus become a great
20 many, the mode of dress is not only a sign, but also a gauge of the degree
of piety. See chapter 3, pp. 162-163.
21 Interview with Musa, Mzee Ibrahim, and Asuman, Majengo, 26th August,
1991. They were unanimous that it is "important to cross over to town and Mjini
just to know what is happening".
22 See the description of the 'out-houses' in chapter 1, p. 39.
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source of patronage for the town's Muslims. The community seems to have
entrusted its welfare to him in that they look up to him for assistance in
finding jobs and more importantly, for help from the local, national and
even international agencies. For example, through his efforts, an appeal was
made in 1990 to an international organization to fund a proposed project
for the electrification of Majengo.
The obtaining of such financial aid for community projects helps to
improve the individual's prestige within the community. I often heard it
said: "we Muslims have no power. Only Al-Hajji has the power (financial
and political)." Despite the Al-Haul's efforts there is severe economic
hardship. Outright regret for their diminished fortunes is openly expressed
and references to a better past which compares unfavourably with the
present are common. Both women and men express a feeling of
disillusionment:
Our fathers were the pioneers in this place but they did not seem to
have any foresight to invest in the future of their children. Take my
father, for example, he worked for the colonial government for a long
time until his retirement, but he did not invest his money. We had
a much better childhood than most of our neighbours and the future
did not matter then. Now you see what has happened over the years
- even this house, which is the only thing that we inherited, is likely
to be lost when the settlement is demolished (as they say it will be
in not the too distant future) to give way for the construction of
better housing.24
However, it must be noted that, in spite of the group's declining economic
situation throughout the post-independent period, a sense of Muslim
community identity continues to sustain Majengo as an entity in itself.
See "Meru Town mini-Project": proposal for improvement of Majengo social
amenities, Municipal Council Office. Though the community are aware of the
demolition threat, there is hope that if the social amenities are improved, the idea
of demolition might be shelved.
24 Interview with Musa, Majengo, 7th September 1991.
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In the second tier are individuals whose influence in the community
has no poiitical or economic basis. These are the Sheikhs who derive their
authority from their possession of the treasured Muslim learning. As one
of my informants said "one who knows and one who does not know, cannot
be equal". Unlike the autonomous leaders in the Sabon Gari mentioned
in the previous chapter, 26 their authority and knowledge in religious
matters does not give them any political influence or power. It should also
be pointed out here that the criteria for being thought learned are not the
same in Meru as those on the coast. The local sheikh may not be considered
an authoritative theologian or aiim by coastal standards, but he knows
more than the rest of the people around him, and this knowledge
contributes considerably to the appreciation of his religious and social
prominence.27
Included in this category, are certain individuals who derive prestige
and esteem from previous personal history and experience, for instance ex-
soldiers from the two World Wars and retired policemen, and any other
such people, who are widely travelled and therefore are believed to be (and
in deed many of them are) more knowledgeable than the rank and file of
the Muslims. It is such individuals who are elected to represent Meru
Muslims both at the local and provincial branches of the various National
Muslim organizations and associations.
Interview with Sheikh Ahmed, Mjini, 26th October 1991.
For the contrast between the role of the autonomous, politically and
economically powerful leaders of the Sabon Gari in Nigerian towns, and the elders
in Majengo, see chapter 3 pp. 150-152.
27 F. Constantin (1988 passim), in his study of charisma in East Africa, gives
an interesting treatment to the source and nature of the sheikhs' charisma.
There are district, provincial and national branches of all the major national
Muslim organizations and associations, for instance, the Supreme Council of
Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), Young Muslim Association, etc.
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In the third tier are some of the older men and women pioneers and
first generation Muslims. Among the Meru, and many other African
peoples, age is respected as a source of wisdom. Their role as elders of the
community will be discussed below. Perhaps in this category we can include
a few individuals who, either due to possession of some western education,
or by being ingenious, have a regular source of income (however small) as
an office junior, a paid driver or a kiosk owner. Though they have a
relatively lower participation in the community affairs than the other two
categories, they have, nevertheless a certain role to play within the Majengo
social-religious matrix. For instance Ali, an office messenger in one of the
offices in town is an active anti-maulid activist, and his wife is an active
member of one of the women's self-help groups.
In the bottom rank are the majority with least participation in the
community affairs. A significant proportion of these are women and young
people; however, it should be remembered that leadership of the community
is traditionally in the hands of men.
As shown above, social and even political alignments of members of
the community are continually shifting, and individuals with regular jobs
(though these are few) are usually turned into supporters for one rival
group or the other.29 In these circumstances of limited resources, religious
For instance, when I started my research in July 1991, I was introduced at
the mosque and many social gatherings by the most prominent Muslim leader. But
soon I noticed that some people were not only reluctant, but also bluntly refused
to see me or grant me an interview. When I probed further, I learnt that they
were in a different camp, opposed to the leader who had introduced me. Indeed it
was difficult for me to convince some of them that I was not aligned to any side.
An interesting incident happened one day when, after three-hour long interview
with an Imam, we broke for lunch only to return later and find him furious
because during the break, he found out that I had been to see his rival with a view
to interviewing him. The Imam was so enraged that he cancelled any further
interviews and even withdrew his promise to let me peruse through two files with
information concerning the mosque which were in his possession. He also recanted
all that he had told me and even suggested that I should erase the notes that I
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representation must work through clientelistic paths of leadership and
patronage, where it offers access to the much needed financial support for
the religious cause, even from sources other than Muslim. This point can be
illustrated by the case of the row in 1989 between the supporters of a
powerful local politician, a non-Muslim, and his opponents. He offered th
donate money for the celebration of maulid, this caused a big rift in the
Muslim community: those against, argued that the use of unclean money
from suspect sources would invalidate the maulid celebrations and that his
offer was politically motivated. They suspected that the ulterior motive was
to "buy" their votes. Those for argued that the source of the money would
not affect the religious value of the celebration. The controversy revolved
around the appropriateness of receiving money or accepting sponsorship for
such an important Islamic festival from one considered th be an unbeliever.
The congregation was split during the celebrations, and the opponents who
withdrew sponsored another maulid celebration within a week after that.3°
Since, as has been suggested above, unity among Meru Muslims is
an ideal rather than a reality, it is necessary to point out that the notion of
a common Muslim community identity does not always engender unity. As
will be shown below, shifting local social alignments are usually reflected
in religious practice, and discord among Muslims manifests itself in the
pattern of mosque attendance. Some of the shifts in social alignment could
be seen as highlighting the general interplay of statuses and power
relations which affect the religious discourse within the town. This could be
illustrated by the altercation between the various groups, representing the
interests of leading personalities with whom they are aligned; and the local
social and religious authority, embodied in the elders.
had taken during the interview with him that morning, 22nd November 1991.
° Interview with Mwanaisha and Mirza, Majengo, 24th October 1991.
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The mosque is the meeting point and therefore, in most instances of
discord, controversy revolves around it; controversy either over control of it
or the choice of the Imam to lead the prayers. For instance:
After the demise of the well respected Sheikh Said who had served
as the Imam of the Janiia mosque for many years, there was a
leadership vacuum. His successor did not command an equal
intensity of respect from all the sections of the Muslim community in
the town, and it was not long before signs of discord began to emerge.
Some people felt that he was unfit for the office, and some of the
reasons given were that, though he was fluent in both Kiswahili and
Arabic, his accent was unacceptable; and his appearance unbecoming
of the stature of an Imam. In addition, he augmented his earnings by
working in the slaughter house, which was considered disreputable
for an Imam. Some people refused to pray behind him and when the
disagreement assumed alarming proportions, his supporters appealed
to the Chief Qadhi in Mombasa to intervene.
The Chief Qadhi dismissed good looks and any one accent as
qualifications. He reiterated that proficiency in both languages was
the minimum requirement, so as to ensure correct reading of the
Quran without altering the meaning of the words, which there was
no doubt the Imam satisfied. He also ruled that working in a
slaughter house has no religious implication and therefore would not
jeopardize the duties of the Imam. The Imam was reinstated and
confirmed in his position by the intervention of the Chief Qadhi.
Calm was restored but only temporarily.
It was not too long before the opponents, installed a new Imam in
place of the embattled one. This time there was no attempt to mask
the hostility between the antagonized sections of the Muslim
community in Meru town. Once again the disagreement assumed a
new dimension when it was realized that the new Imam could not
communicate effectively with the majority of the Muslims, especially
during the Friday sermon, due to his inability to speak Kiswahili or
the local language - he spoke only Urdu and Arabic. Accordingly, a
section of the community felt that his imposition was an outright
violation of their rights and some of them preferred to pray outside
the mosque rather than behind him.3'
' It is difficult to give the precise date when this controversy took place, but
Mwanaidi and Sheikh Ahmed, to whom I am grateful for this information
(interview, Mjini, November 20th 1991) said that the late Chief Qhadhi, Sheikh
Saleh Farsy approved the appointment of the new Imam after the death of Sheikh
Said. For information on the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Said, see chapter
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Running through these differences is the issue of leadership of the
Muslim community. The reasons given for the rejection of the first Imam
seem rather trivial and it is possible that the real reason has more to do
with his descent rather than his competence. He is a descendant of a
convert, mahaji , and hence the complaint that his accent (which is local and
therefore much less Arabized) is not good enough. The old wounds are being
rubbed, so to say. 32 From the Chief Qacthi's ruling, it is clear that the
dissent has no theological basis. These are some of the ramifications of the
shifting social alignments in the Meru Muslim community and their impact
on the religious discourse in the local scene. The impact of these
rirnifications on the religious discourse in the local scene can be illustrated
by an examination of the various dimensions of the controversy over the
control of Jamia mosque.
The mosque, as Middleton observes,
is an important factor in the expression of conflicts and disputes
between those of different rank and of claimed ethnic origins (the two
being essentially the same but using different idioms). Conflicts are
expressed largely in terms of which mosque is accepted as the Friday
mosque.. .
Here, the mosque is used as a source of power by an individual or a group
of individuals and to have control over the mosque, and in particular the
Jamia mosque, ensures the exercise of a certain measure of control over the
people who are organized around it. As has been shown elsewhere, the
3, p. 158.
32 See chapter 2 (p.81) for the distinction between the converts and those 'born
in the faith'; and the attempts to obliterate the divisions along these lines in order




different mosques in the town reflect the divisions among the Muslims.34
For Majengo residents, for instance, it is really their new mosque - Al Azizia
- in which they take real pride in proprietorship. The mosque serves as a
symbol of group or community identity.
The Jamia mosque has been at the centre of a protracted battle
between those who identify themselves as the 'African' Muslims and some
members of the resident local Asian Muslim population.35 There are
several versions of the history of this mosque: one version says that, after
the demolition of the old Swahili village in 1954/55 and the construction of
the new bazaar in the then new township site, all the sections of the
Muslim community contributed the money for the construction of the
mosque. Prior to the construction of the present Jamia mosque on this site,
it was occupied by a temporary mosque building which was used by both
the Swahili and the Sunni Asians. In view of this, neither group could
rightly claim to own the mosque building itself or the site.
The other version is that the 'Africans' made only a small
contribution while the Asians undertook the construction. In addition they
have continued to maintain the mosque throughout this period. As a result
of this, some people, particularly the Asians, began to feel that after all, the
mosque belongs to them. At the height of the tension between the two
sections of the community, the Asians were challenged to "carry away what
they considered as their mosque building (if this were possible) and leave
the plot vacant for the construction of a mosque that would be accessible to
There are 5 mosques within Meru Municipality. The old Majengo mosque
which had fallen into disuse was now (during the time of my research in October
1991) being used by the supporters of maulid who felt that they could not pray
shoulder to shoulder with the anti-maulid activists in the new magnificent mosque
in Majengo.
Since the early days, the presence of a "surplus Indian population" was
described as a real problem for the local administration. See chapter 1, p. 44.
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all the Muslims in the town". 36 The important point to note is that
superiority in numbers was turned into an effective means of challenging
what was considered to be Asian paternalism. As many people as possible
were now encouraged to attend the mosque. For the first time, there was
an urgent need to involve women who previously did not attend mosque.
They were now encouraged to turn up in large numbers for Friday prayers.
My informant explained that
this was a strategy to try and fill up the mosque hail, especially
because the presence of so many African women would keep out
Asian women who did not want to pray together with African women.
Many women began to attend the mosque more regularly and the
desired effect was achieved - we were able to assert ourselves and our
right to the mosque.37
The group that sees to the general administration of the mosque affairs,
including maintenance, and pays the madrasa teacher, no doubt is seen to
be fulfilling a religious obligation. Members of such a group gain respect
and a higher social status, with the result that the mosque itself becomes
their power base and thus pivotal to the usually thorny religious leadership
issues. Thus the history of the mosque shows the Asian and African sections
of the Meru Muslim community in a perpetual struggle for power. Claims
and counter-claims by either group shade into the struggle for the control
of the local religious affairs, in other words, access to power within the local
social-religious matrix.
36 Interview with Mwanaidi, Mjini, 28th October 1991.
37 Mwanaidi explained that prior to this campaign to encourage women to pray
at the mosque, most of them prayed at home except during the calendrical
religious events when they turned up at the mosque in large numbers. When I
visited the mosque, I found 30 women, mainly the older ones, praying in the hall
behind the mosque. I was informed that the Asian women were praying in a
different hail. Segregation of sexes at prayer as a rule, must be observed, but since
there is no provision for a women's section in the main mosque building, they pray
in the hail attached to the back of the mosque.
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The pattern of mosque attendance in Meru is changing. This change
can be ascribed to the reformist stance of the Tabligh advocates and its
effect upon the existing social alignments. Previously, Friday prayers were
held only in the Jamia mosque, but simultaneous prayers are held in the
mosque which has been built recently at Mukutano, about a mile from the
town centre, and is now managed by a religious organization which is said
to be solely Asian. When I enquired whether the congregation was too large
for the Jamia mosque on Fridays, the madrasa teacher said that Friday
prayers were:
held at Mukutano initially for the nearby college and secondary
school students who would have to walk along distance to the Jamia
mosque in the centre of the town. But now other people have started
to attend the Friday prayer there.38
Whether or not this answer was to mask the real reason behind the new
trend, it was not possible for me to ascertain. However, another informant
said that: "now the situation has changed there is a choice and one is free
to pray wherever s/he wants". 39 This particular informant was unwilling
to respond to my suggestion that there was an emerging pattern of mosque
attendance, which has more to do with the shifting social alignments,
contingent upon the relationships between the influential personalities
within the Muslim community, than simply choice for the immediate
purpose of prayer. Two other informants, were in agreement that, now the
choice between the two venues available for Friday prayer is inalienable
from need to support the leading personalities.40
38 Interview with Madrasa teacher, Mukutano mosque, 10th November 1991.
Interview with Musa, Majengo, 17th November 1991.
4° The story of the "oppositional mosque" (masjid al-dirar) can be traced to the
life time of the prophet when a mosque outside Medina was used as a base by
members of an opposition group to stir up divisions among Muslims, (K. Zebir,
1993:211).
218
These leading personalities may be Asian or 'African' and, therefore,
it would be misleading to emphasize the adversarial aspect of the
relationship between the Asian and African sections of the Meru Muslim
community and overlook the complexity of a situation in which they are, on
various occasions, divided on certain issues affecting the entire community,
and united on others; or to suggest that the community is clearly divided
along racial lines on all the issues affecting them, and thus reduce the
whole gamut of the intra-community dynamics merely to racial conflict. I
have dealt in considerable detail, with the various dimensions of the battle
over the control of the Jamia mosque, because it represents not only the
tensions within, but also the functioning of the Muslim community in Meru.
In other words, it represents the internal dynamics of the urban Meru
Muslim community.
The Maulid Debate
The ordinary Muslim in Meru is not concerned with practice or
orthodoxy, in other words, the propriety of religious ehaviour, for the
rightness and wrongness of the behaviour of the individual Muslim, are not
judged so much on the basis of the 'official' Muslim view as on what is
locally permissible. The controversy over the celebration of Maulid
illustrates this point.
As is well known, in many parts of the Muslim world, there is a long
standing controversy between those Muslims who consider the practice of
celebrating maulid as an innovation (bid'a) that should be restricted, if not
banned 1altogethei, and those who regard the celebrations as socially
important and religiously permissible. This controversy did not arise in
Meru until the early 1980s, when it became inevitably linked with the
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Tabligh canipaign.4' Since then, it has been a most thorny issue among
the Muslims. Though the controversy has its genesis in the Wahhabi reform
at the coast,42 it is mainly the Asian section of the Meru Muslim
community which has carried out an aggressive campaign against Maulid
celebration in Meru. My informant remembers that:
Sheikh Maulana from Pakistan (an advocate of Tabligh) began to
propagate ideas about innovation (bid'a), objecting to
western/Christian type of wedding ceremonies; use of protective
charms (hirizi) which are quite popular with Muslims; reading of the
Qur'an for protective or other purposes than the prescribed worship
(Iba&zh); the practice of mourning at the home of the bereaved
neighbours and friends (matanga) and observance of 'the fortieth day'
(arubaini). Since the mourners are fed at the home of the bereaved,
he equated matanga to using the property of the orphaned, which is
prohibited in the Quran. All these were quite popular practices and
the Muslims found these reforms too far reaching to accept. He
' Tabligh, as part of the current revivalist movement in many parts of the
Muslim world; its general aims and objectives in Kenya; and its specific aims,
influence and achievement in Meru are ex pmined in chapter 6, pp. 245-246.
42 Maulid in Lamu (where it is perhaps the most celebrated) has received an
interesting analysis from A. W. Boyd (1984 passim). Also see "The Prophet is
Born" stories by M. Bakari, S. Yahya, M. M. Adam and F. Nandi, Africa Events
Vol.3 No.1, January/February 1987. The Maulid debate and conflict between those
for and against the celebration of Maulid has been raging on the Kenyan coast for
quite some time. The current conflict on the coast is between those influenced by
Wahhabi reform which opposes the practice of Maulid celebration, on the grounds
that only God is worthy of praise and that the prophet himself abjured giving
praise to any human being; and the traditionalists who have carried out the
celebrations of maulid for centuries, with the result that the ceremony has evolved
and acquired local East African embellishments, which came to distinguish
between the various classes or categories of Maulid particularly in Lamu. The
anti -Maulid influence has recently found its way to Meru and now it is tearing the
Majengo community into two rival groups.
The relationship between the African (Meru) and Asian sections of the
Muslim community has been perpetually turbulent and complex. However, it
should be mentioned in passing that, from the point of view of most of the
informants, the Asians have been emphatic in their ban on Maulid celebrations
in Meru, but the effectiveness of this ban is another matter. Some of my
informants confided in me that they are not against maulid but the ban is
imposed on them by the leaders who have turned against the practice.
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wanted to eradicate these old practices of the African Muslims but
people still observe matanga and arubaini and their other practices.
But the real debate about the celebration of Maulid in Meru started
some time in 1984 or thereabout. Most people felt that there was no
reason why they should not carry on with this age-old practice. 'Who
are these foreigners to come and tell us that we are wrong in our
religious practices', the Muslims in Meru asked. At the height of the
crisis, a meeting of all the sheikhs and other leaders in Meru was
held in the Jamia mosque hall and debate on the issue. Those for
Maulid, sought guidance in the Quran, 33:56 which says "God and
His Angels Send blessings on the Prophet: 0 ye that believe! Send ye
blessings on him, And salute him With all respect". They also argued
that the prophet was praised when he entered Madinah.
Those against argued that times have changed and even the
celebrations are held irregularly at different times and for different
purposes, especially when different sponsors aim to outdo one
another. Also during the celebrations these days, there is a
disposition towards laxity in observing the segregation of sexes, for
instance. These gatherings therefore are turning into social rather
than religious occasions, and that is a form of bid'a.
The sheikh's statement is consistent with Launay's suggestion that many
Muslims are aware of the existence of alternative practices of others which
are inconsistent with theirs but also lay claim to Islam.
At the centre of these conceptions are questions about what it means
to Irbe Muslim"- in other words, about what ideas and, especially,
what practices are acceptable, desirable, or obligatory, or else
objectionable, if not prohibited. Conceptions of Islam, as opposed to
one another in specific places and times, revolve around
disagreements over the status of specific practices, about the ways in
which Muslims ought to act and the religious significance of different
forms of acfion.
Sheikh Khalid, (interview 16th November 1991) to whom I am grateful for




Among the Muslims in Meru, controversy revolves around social and
ritual issues as well as around doctrinal and theological questions. The
opponents in Meru have questioned the religious value of maulid. Specific
questions include the appropriateness of men and women mixing during
celebrations and the performance of song and dance (ngoma). At issue also
is the observance of certain rules of cleanliness (tohara) which are likely to
be flouted in the merry-making spirit of the maulid celebrations, when all
the participants are free to attend the mosque. The night meetings were
also questioned from a moral point of view.46
There was no consensus among the sheikhs over the celebration of
maulid and the conflict remained unresolved. Maulid was considered by the
sheikhs to be both joy (farah) and obligation (faradh) and since there should
be no compulsion in religion (at least in principle) there were no means of
enforcing conformity to the ban which had been imposed in 1982 by some
influential Asian personalities and their supporters, hence the celebrations
were resumed after a temporary stoppage. In October 1991, there was a
fracas in the mosque in Majengo when the members of the anti -maulid
group tried to halt the celebrations and forcefully ejected the celebrants
from the mosque and locked it up. The police were called in to restore calm
and the celebrations were stopped. This incident shocked the rest of the
Muslim community. Thereafter the supporters of maulid boycotted the new
magnificent mosque, built in 1986 and began to hold their prayers in the
old mud-and-wood mosque which had been abandoned for the new one. The
Majengo community split into two rival groups. 47 The supporters of maulid
began to refer to their opponents as "bid'a people", because the latter
46 Interview with Sheikh Mwinyi, Mjini, 27th November, 1991.
I visited Majengo a week after the incident at the mosque and the details of
what had happened were still part of the news. I observed that some neighbours
were not on talking terms with others. One could almost feel the tension between
them, people who had been friends chatting away in front of their houses during
my visit in the previous week, now could not even say greetings to one another.
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claimed that celebrating maulid is bid'a. Beckerleg notes that in Watamu
on the coast, where Muslims are similarly divided over the issue of maulid:
An interesting form of competition has arisen between the two
groups concerning the naming of the other. To most people the new
group is known as bid'a. Members of either the maulid or new group
may use this term, although some supporters of the new movement
point out that the other maulid supporters are bid'a, while they the
new group are halali sunnah or orthodox and permitted.48
As the tension between the two groups in Meru continued to escalate,
another debate on maulid was held at the Janiia mosque hail.49 Again, the
conflict was not resolved, but it was agreed that those who felt that maulid
was religiously beneficial to them could go ahead and celebrate. Others
should keep away. When asked for their opinion, many people, especially
the older men expressed their disapproval of what they considered to be an
externally instigated conflict to "divide the Muslims". There is a general
disposition to treat the controversy generated by the maulid issue and the
resultant religious divisions among the Meru Muslims as "the work of a few
rich individuals who want to exercise control over the whole community".5°
After the Majengo mosque incident, another maulid celebration was
organized and fairly well publicized, only this time it was held in Mukutano
mosque. In the words of one of my informants, they (the pro-maulid
Maj engo residents):
S. Beckerleg 1990:41.
' I was not allowed as a woman, to attend this meeting. However, after the
meeting, Sheikh Mwinyi and Sheikh Ahmed, to whom I am grateful for this
information, provided me as full an account of the proceedings as was possible.
They told me that even in the meeting, the division between those against and
those for maulid was evident, and therefore, it was not possible to come to a
general consensus on the matter.
50 A number of informants expressed such sentiments.
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bowed out of the Majengo mosque due to our respect for A1-Hajji. We
could have resisted when they pushed us out of the mosque, but
because he is a government man, when the situation got out of hand
and the police were called in, we knew the best thing then was to
give up and leave the mosque.We knew that the mosque is ours and
no individual has a right to lock it up against another. This time
when maulid celebrations were planned to take place in another
mosque, we were prepared for the worst. If they tried to disrupt the
maulid celebration, we would resist and not bow out as we did in
Majengo. This was our maulid celebration, not theirs and if they
could not accept it, it was better for them to keep away from the
celebrations rather than try to stop us.5'
It can be said that this celebration was held partly as a protest against the
Majengo incident. While in Watamu the halali sunna "represents an
organized and concerted challenge to the power of the Sharif' and aims "to
separate piety from Sharithood" 52 the supporters of maulid in Meru aim
to challenge Asian domination. On the one hand therefore, support for
maulid in Meru is seen as an opportunity to launch a concerted struggle
against the Asians who are trying to take control of the community's
religious affairs. Those who have joined the new group against maulid
(bid'a people) are said to have been "bought by the Asians." 53 When I
enquired the reason for this allegation, my informants argued that each of
the six men who are now at the forefront in the anti -maulid campaign have
turned only recently against maulid,
511 attended this maulid and observed and felt the tension as the opponents
were expected to disrupt it, but thanks to my informants (Interview with Rukia,
Musa and Amina, Majengo, 9th November 1991) for filling in the details of what
had happened previously.
52 S. Beckerleg, 1990:198-9.
Interview with Mzee Ibraliim, Musa, Nyanya, and Halima, Majengo, 9th
November 1991.
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as if they have been converted to a different religion which requires
them to abandon and even fight against the very practices that they
themselves have hitherto supported.54
On the other hand, the reformist, stance in Meru typifies challenges
that now face the body of traditions and customs which crystallized into the
so-called Swahili-Islamic culture among many communities far from the
coastal abode of the Swahili. The reformists inveigh against all forms of
tradition, for instance, matanga and arubaini, practices which have held
sway over the Muslim community for many years. Their opposition to these
practices is consistent with their determination to bring about change, and
(in the words of Sheilth MWinyi, now turned reformer and head of the anti-
maulid campaign) "make the people realize that these practices are not
essentially Islamic, they belong to the days of ignorance".55
Nevertheless, the majority of the people in Meru are in favour of
maulid and there is a widespread feeling that there is no need to ban
maulid celebrations. A large proportion of those against are young people
who, as one of my informants put it, are easily swayed by external influence
from outside the country. The older people are determined to hang on to
what they consider as an important practice, handed down to them by their
fathers. Sheikh Mwinyi, when asked to explain his change of mind, said
that after reading widely, he realized that the local religious practices as
taught by the pioneers needed to be re-examined and evaluated in the light
of the available knowledge. He argued that when he was young (in the
1930s and 1940s), the teaching of the Quran aimed at inculcating belief
without understanding the basic concepts and many other customs and
ideas were introduced alongside, one of which is merry-making during the
maulid celebrations. It must now be changed. He admitted to being
U Interview with Sheikh Ahmed, Mjini, 27th October 1991.
Interview with Sheikh Mwinyi, Mjini, 27th November 1991.
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influenced a great deal by his reading of the exegesis of Al-Suyuti and the
works of the late Chief Qadhi, Sheikh Swaleh Farsy. 56 Not all the
members of the anti -maulid group are as widely read. When some of them
were asked why they oppose maulid, they said that they learnt about the
issue of bid'a after viewing some videos brought in from the coast. Many of
them could not offer a theological explanation as to why they consider
celebrating maulid to be religiously wrong.
The Elders' Formal and Informal Authority
Since the Muslim settlements were established, 57 elders (Wazee wa
Mji) have played an important role in the general running of the
community's affairs. Some of the leading individuals in the second and third
tier (discussed above) constitute an authoritative body, which functions at
both the formal and informal levels. There are no defined criteria for
eldership, except the unwritten rule among many African societies that
wisdom comes with age. Members of this group are neither selected nor
elected, they have no political power base. Age and experience are their
greatest resource.
As I have said above, in this community everyone knows everyone
else, and certain individuals are known to be good orators, persuasive in
arguments, good in judgement, and tolerant. In other words, their
leadership qualities are recognized and their credentials known to other
people. Such individuals are consulted by their neighbours on a wide range
56 See chapter 3 (p. 164) for the influence of the Swahili translation of the
Quran on the local Muslims.
See chapter 1 (pp. 30-33) for more information on the evolution of the
"porters' lines" into the Swahili village; the development of the Indian Bazaar; the
settlement of the ex-servicemen on the N.F.D. (later the Nubian village) in 1921;
and the establishment of Majengo by the returning mahaji in or around 1926.
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of issues and their opinions are taken seriously. These are the ones who
gradually rise to the rank of eldership.
At the formal level, they represent and defend community interests
at the local and central government administration whenever the need
arises. For instance, during the colonial period, they organized collective
payment of taxes in Majengo so as to avoid what they saw as police
harassment and intrusion into their privacy. "This was an effort to protect
the good name of our settlement," as my informant put it. Again, when
the Swahili village was demolished, it was the elders who presented the
affected residents' claim for compensation and resettlement to the District
Commissioner. Thus their role is recognized by the rest of the society - they
are the unappointed community spokesmen.
At the informal level, they are not only concerned with the religious
affairs of the community, but also with the maintenance of order, in other
words, the enforcement of the fulfillment of what is expected of individuals
as members of the Muslim community. The very nature of the Majengo
social structure renders itself susceptible to discord among individuals at
different levels: within the family, between spouses, among neighbours, and
within the wider circle of residents.
On the one hand, the close proximity people have to each other and
the high degree of communalism, are important factors in the creation and
maintenance of the dense network of social ties that characterize the
Majengo Muslim community. On the other, it is a form of social interaction
where every member is a 'sanctioner', and at the same time under scrutiny,
and this generates tension and life is fraught with human conflicts and
situations that require solutions. Nothing escapes the attention of the
residents. Commenting on the way information is passed on from one
58 Interview with Mzee Ibrahim, Majengo, September 26th August 1991.
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person to another and the social contexts in which it comes, Beckerleg
concluded, "gossip in general, and backbiting.. .in particular are highly
evolved arts amongst the Swahili".59 This free flow of information (which
I hesitate to dismiss as gossip) inevitably leads to occasional quarrels and
fights, especially among women. In the event of such fights, it is the elders
who intervene to restore harmony.
While in relation to other people in the town, Majengo residents could
be considered to be poor, they assume the same life motif for survival and
from a social point of view, every Majengo resident faces the same daily
crisis in life. The majority of Muslims, having a relatively low educational
attainment, tend to concentrate on petty trade and unskilled work. All their
efforts are concentrated on subsistence, mainly for the satisfaction of
immediate needs, and accordingly, their chances of acquiring wealth
through accumulation of surplus are decreased. Therefore borrowing and
lending money among friends and neighbours is a common practice. It may
be argued that on the one hand such interdependence among individuals is
not just an expression of solidarity, but also of religious affiliation, it helps
to enhance the notion of community. On the other hand, sharing of limited
resources among many individuals can in itself be a source of tension, as
can be illustrated by the following case:
Musa borrowed some money from Ali but failed to honor his
guarantee of payment. Ali sent one of the elders to fetch the money
but Musa said that he was not in a position to pay. Afterwards, the
two men fought over the debt. In the eyes of the community it was
shameful that cousins should fight over a debt, nevertheless, their
fight triggered a sort of chain reaction - it emerged that Musa's wife
had been taking kerosine (used for lighting) on credit from Ali's wife.
The two women also quarrelled and Musa's wife threatened to
withhold the payment for the kerosine until her husband's money
was paid back. The resultant tension made it difficult for Au's wife
to buy water from Nyanya, Musa's aunt who sells water (from a tap
S. Beckerleg, 1990:197.
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installed in her house with the help of her daughter living in
Mombasa) to the other residents.
The news of the quarrel was known to everybody the next day and
after two days, the story died down though the two women were not
on talking terms. As tension continued to build up, Nyanya, being the
eldest member of the family in question, saw it as her responsibility
to restore harmony, so she approached Mzee Ibrahim to intervene
and reconcile the cousins. A week later, after the congregational
prayer, Ali and Musa were asked by Sheikh Yusuf to remain behind
so as to discuss the matter with the sheikh and three other elders.
After a long discussion, it was decided that the debtor should pay
back what he owed; and the men should advise their wives to settle
their differences accordingly. However, harmony was not restored
immediately, but when I visited them two months later, I found that
life was back to normal.6°
This case illustrates not only the degree of interdependence, but also the
nature of the web of the relationships existing among the Majengo Muslims
and the attendant tension. In such cases, the elders play an important role
in maintaining social harmony among the residents.
'Giving Mwiko to Young Women'6'
The regulation of the community religious affairs is the more
important part of the elders' leadership role. Membership of the local
sheikhs62 within the group legitimates the elders' authority over religious
matters. The Mualim (teacher), sheikh and elders, therefore, are expected
to set a standard for other Muslims. They are responsible for explaining the
kind of behaviour that is expected of a Muslim.
60 Interview with Rukia, Haluna and Mzee Ibraliim, Majengo 26th August
1991.
61 Mwiko is a large wooden spoon or instrument resembling it, used to stir or
mash food.
62	 high regard in which the 'learned' local sheikhs are held is highlighted
above (p. 210)
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A number of my older informants lamented that "the community's
religious life has declined. It is not what it used to be twenty years ago."63
Thus they express their disillusionment with the deteriorating religious
commitment of youth. 64 The older women talk nostalgically of the quality
of education that they were given by their tutors or somo to prepare them
larment thatfor adult life, andAtlus education is no longer given to Muslim girls. 65 The
elders' concern to uphold the religious morality of the Muslim community
is evident in the following episode which was described to me by some of the
participants:
Recently, it was decided that young women should take over from
their mothers the function of preparing meals for such religious
festivals as Id-ui Fitr and maulid celebrations. The idea came from
the older women in Majengo and it won an enthusiastic support from
the elders, who suggested that for the handing-over ceremony, all the
young women participants should wear a 'uniform' 'a religious dress'.
The young women decided that the 'uniform' (a grey long gown) be
ordered from one dealer because that way, it was cheaper and easier
to ensure that all the gowns were uniform.
63 Nyanya Mwanaisha and Mzee Ibrahim (Majengo pioneers) were unanimous
in their view that there is a tendency among the youth to become less religious as
they get enmeshed in the town's social and economic activities (interview,
Majengo, 26th August 1991).
64 On several occasions when I attended the Friday prayers at the Jamia
Mosque in Meru town, I observed a low attendance of the youth. In one of the
women's prayer hall (I was informed that the Asian women pray in a different
hail) for instance, there were approximately thirty to forty women on each occasion
and the majority were elderly women.
Mwanaidi, (interview, Mjini, 20th November 1991) says that "on attainment
of puberty, a young girl would be taken to live with her tutor or somo, who taught
her how to be a Muslim woman". Of this form of education among the Swahili of
Mombasa, Mirza and Strobel (1989:7 1) say that "girls were instructed individually
by a somo on matters of menstruation and sexuality". But now things have
changed and this form of instruction has been replaced by formal schooling, which
according to Mwanaidi, who still values the education she got from her somo when
she was a young girl, "does not inculcate religious ideals or even the notion of
socially acceptable behaviour".
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The members of the community contributed money to buy rice and
other food-stuff, and of course Al-Hajji sponsored and publicized the
event. On the appointed day, the older women met at the mosque
grounds in Majengo and prepared the food. In the afternoon, the
elders and other residents congregated there to witness our mothers
symbolically hand over the task of cooking to us by giving the mwiko
to us. When every one was seated (men on one side and women on
the other) Mama Au called all the young women who were dressed
in their immaculate new gowns to one corner and ceremoniously
handed the mwiko to us and said that, henceforth it would be our
responsibility to cook during religious festivals and weddings. Then
we served the food. Afterwards, the sheikh stood to address the
gathering. He spoke at length on the problems afflicting the Muslim
community; the importance of religiously appropriate behaviour and
exhorted us, especially the young generation, to observe regular
prayer and mosque attendance. He expressed his appreciation of our
effort and urged us to keep up the spirit.
After the ceremony, this gown would also be used as a 'uniform' by
all those who were given the mwiko. The elders were delighted that
we bought this uniform. We chose grey instead of the customary
black gown (buibui) because the black buibui is used by the older
women and we felt that a bright colour would be more suitable for
younger women. And also wanted to distinguish ourselves from
others. After all, if we chose to wear black buibui, what difference
would it have made and every Muslim woman is expected to wear
buibui outdoors? This was supposed to be a turning point for the
young women in Majengo.66
Unfortunately, the spirit of the mwiko ceremony did not hold for too long
and there was not much change, even though some of the young women
were seen occasionally wearing their grey gowns.
The Muslim community in Mjini and Majengo has not been static, but
has experienced social change as has the rest of the country. The Swahili-
Islamic cultural values that were inculcated in the 1930s and 1940s by the
personal tutors (somo) for young girls during the puberty stage, for
instance, have either changed, or are no longer meaningful to the society
and the somo institution is now obsolete. For instance, Mwanaidi says that
66 Interview with Rabiya and Rukia, Majengo, 8th November 1991.
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as a young girl, she was taught the wifely duties:how to take care of her
husband, to keep the house clean, and to entertain guests. This kind of
education presupposed that every girl was going to find a husband and a
house to keep, which is no longer the case.
For Mwanaidi and other older people, this change is understood in
terms of its impact on the religious values of the community. They attribute
the common phenomenon of single mothers (which was one of the points
give prominence by the sheikh during this ceremony) to the current social
changes which have taken away the traditional methods of preparing young
girls for adult life and inculcating those values that emphasize the sanctity
of marriage and family life. But this is only a part of the reason, the real
reason may be economic. Let us examine two such cases:
Leila is a single mother of three. She had the following to say about
herself: I was put into the family when I was in form two, and
consequently I dropped out of school even before completing the
second year of secondary education. My life was wrecked and my
parents were furious with me. They said that I had brought shame
to the family, and for a long time, our relationship was strained,
though I was still living with them. Gradually they came to terms
with the situation and our relationship began to improve.
Later on, I met a nice young man who was ready to marry me.
Though he was not a Muslim, I did not mind, but my parents were
again incensed by the affair and forbade me to marry him.
Nevertheless, we lived together for about three years during which
I got a second child by him. It did not work, so we broke up. The
father of my third child, as you see I have three children, lives on the
other side, not too far from here. This was a brief affair because I
knew his father would not allow him to marry me. For the last few
years, I have lived alone and looked after my children on my own.
Without a regular source of income, it is hard for me to support
them. It would be impossible for me to afford rent, for instance, but
I am lucky to be living in this house which belongs to my father.
Those people who complain about brewing illicit liquor are those with
other sources of income. We also know that it is not good, but it is
our means of survival.67
67 Interview with Leila, Majengo, 8th September 1991.
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The second case is that of Mona:
She, unlike Leila, was married, had five children and lived with her
husband in a different town for ten years. Unfortunately death
struck suddenly and she was widowed in her late twenties. Without
a job or any other means of livelihood, it was difficult for her to
support herself and her children. She returned to her grandmother
in Meru. Again, without any source of income of her own, her
grandmother's meager resources were stretched to the limits, and the
situation was almost getting out of hand when she found a small job
in one of the eating houses in the town.68
The background circumstances of these two cases differ in several
respects, but in the long run, the two women find themselves faced with the
same situation - penury and community disapproval. They are judged by the
same criteria of single motherhood by members of the community. For
instance, one mad rasa teacher lamented that many of his pupils are
brought up by their grandparents. Their single mothers are faced with
economic hardships, with the result that they are heavily dependent on the
brewing of an illicit type of local gin, which is heavily consumed in spite the
religious prohibition on the consumption of alcohol and other forms of
intoxicants. The madrasa teacher felt that "this dependency on illicit
brewing would surely diminish should considerable wage earning
opportunities present themselves". 69 In their absence therefore, women (for
it is they who do the brewing and the men the drinking) continue to brew
the illicit liquor, though its production and consumption is seen as a deep-
68 Interview with Mona and Nyanya, Meru town 5th September 1991.
69 A teacher who has been teaching at the madrasa in the Meru Muslim school
for 9 years, explained that during term time, children are given religious
instruction after school and during weekends. During school holidays, i.e. April,
August and December, they attend the religious lessons all day. Attendance is
irregular and the teacher blamed this irregularity on the instability of the families
of some of those children who are left in the care of their grandparents.
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rooted problem for which everyone in the community is continually
apologizing.70
It is also important to note here that, in spite of the fact that every
member of this society is under scrutiny and that gossip and public opinion
serve as means of enforcing conformity to the local standards of morality,
it is the women's conformity that is at issue. Single women are on the whole
disreputable, hence the women two are judged by the same set of criteria.
In Africa men generally "agree that women's morality must be
controlled".7 ' The mwiko ceremony described above, could well illustrate
this point: while it is the young people in general who are showing signs of
relative laxity, the moral lesson is directed specifically at women. Thus the
moral lesson has gender overtones.
This may explain why the young women were the target of this
moralizing ceremony. Under these circumstances, there is a constant effort
by the elders to reconstruct the past Muslim community, where the notion
of individual piety and religious community consciousness are the norm.
Elders are engaged in a perpetual pursuit urging the younger generation
to hang on to age-old religious ideals.
70 many occasions and religious gatherings, sheikhs and other leaders take
the opportunity to condemn the brewing and consumption of liquor, reiterating
that it is forbidden for Muslims, for instance, during a fairly well attended Friday
sermon at the Jamia Mosque (2nd August 1991), the Imam condemned the practice.
Also when I attended the women's group meeting held in one of the member's
house in the town (3rd August 1991), I observed that it was on the agenda - one
of the aims of this women's group is to find alternative means of livelihood for
those dependent on illicit brewing.
71 C. Obbo, 1980:15.
234
Friendship Patterns
Religious affiliation serves as a means of expressing network
solidarity within Majengo and Mjini; nevertheless, Muslims are also aware
of themselves as a social group with common interests. As can be seen from
such welfare associations as the Majengo Muslim Women's Group, they are
organized on this basis. When the group was formed initially, there was a
suggestion that the name be changed from 'Majengo Muslim Women's
Group' by omitting the word 'Muslim', which might exclude other potential
members. This suggestion was rejected on the grounds that this was a
group for Muslim women and not just any women. It was argued that if the
word 'Muslim' was omitted, the identity of the members of the group would
be lost and this group would not be different from any other women's group
in the area. However, the name was not changed and the tendency is to
discourage close association with non-Muslims. For instance there are
members in the women's group who feel that it is wrong to include two non-
Muslim Majengo residents because they consider it religiously inappropriate
to share money or other items that might be part of donations (sackzq).
Occasionally, they receive donations from Muslim organizations and they
feel that such "donations are made in the name of Allah and therefore
should be used for a religious cause - improve the lot of Muslims".72 When
I enquired why this is the case, my informants explained that close
association with non-Muslims may jeopardize one's faith in various ways:
If you walk with people who do not understand or respect your
religious obligations, they are likely to exercise their influence on you
and lead you astray. For instance, if you visit their houses, you might
eat food that is not halal. If you are in their company during the holy
month of Ramadhan, you might find it difficult to observe the fast.
As a Muslim, you must know where you stand in relation to other
people, and let them know that your religion forbids you to do certain
72 Interview with Mwajuma (women's group leader) Meru town, 3rd August
1991.
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things that other people are free to do. That is the difference between
you and them.73
It is therefore evident that close ties between Muslims and non-Muslims are
frowned upon. We can illustrate this further by examining the basis on
which friendships are encouraged and formed within the Muslim
community.
To determine the pattern of friendships, I asked 43 (24 women and
19 men) randomly chosen informants who their friends were and whether
they had any non-Muslim friends. To be able to identify the important
factors that determine the choice of friends, I devised categories of possible
friends: Muslim neighbours; non-Muslim neighbours; and non-Muslims
outside Meru town. The response from my informants revealed an
interesting pattern of social alignment: thirteen (68%) of the men
interviewed said that they have friends among fellow Muslims regardless
of whether they are within or without Majengo; and six (3 1%) have non-
Muslim friends, who are neighbours or clients. One of the six men is a
sheikh, who, by virtue of his position and relatively high social standing,
has a higher degree of leadership, with the result that his level of
interaction with different people is accordingly higher than that of an
ordinary Majengo resident. He is also renowned for his ability to treat
various kinds of illness, with the result that he has a large number of
clients, both Muslim and others.
Another, a recent convert, maintained strong ties with his non-
Muslim friends and the third, a young semi-skilled motor mechanic whose
clients were obviously non-Muslim. Twenty (83%) of the women said that
their friends were fellow Muslims, while 4(16%) of them had friends among
non-Muslim neighbours. Of these two who have non-Muslim friends, one of
Interview with Halima, Majengo, 5th September 1991.
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whom works in an office and according to her, her colleagues are good
friends:
these are educated people and they are least concerned with the
issue of whether or not one is a Muslim. After all, dini should not be
an issue with other people, it is a personal matter. It is between me
and God.74
The third woman is also young and a recent convert, who has been coopted
into the community as a result of her marriage to a Muslim man. She told
me that she has several non-Muslim friends:
because it is inappropriate to sever ties with your old friends, and
also relatives just because one has become a Muslim. Dini has
nothing to do with friendship. In fact it is wrong to hurt your good
friends because their beliefs are different from yours.75
Nyanya, an older woman said that all her friends are Muslim
because a friend is a person that you trust, one that you can rely
upon, and one with whom you can share your problems. Such a
person should be one that has the same aspirations as you, one that
understands your way of life. A non-Muslim is an outsider to the
community, she does not know the rules that you follow. How can
you share your life with such a person? What will she contribute to
your life? Such a friendship will only bring misunderstanding, and
even shame to the believer for having one foot here and the other one
there. You know the saying that 'what is good for you could be poison
for another person - this is even more so for two people who believe
in completely different ways of life.76
On the whole, therefore Muslims prefer to make friends with fellow
Muslims. However these three responses suggest a difference of opinion
Interview with Saada, Meru town, 2nd August 1991.
Interview with Rabiya, Majengo, 2nd August 1991.
76 Interview with Nyanya, Majengo, 26th August 1992.
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between the young and the old - the first two women are young, indeed two
generations younger since Nyanya is their grandmother. Older men and
women tend to stick with fellow Muslims, while younger people are more
inclined to make friends with non-Muslims, and thus their friendship
pattern is not confined within religious boundaries, as can be seen from the
cases of the young mechanic and the office clerk presented above. Saada
feels that her Muslim identity should not determine her relationship with
colleagues at work. In contrast, Nyanya cannot accept to share her secrets
with a non-Muslim and she thinks that such a friendship is not beneficial
to her. Indeed she criticized such opinion as expressed by Saada and
Rabiya; and went on to describe an incident when some youths, due to bad
company, fought at a social club and ended up in the police cells, "bringing
shame to the whole community".
Another significant observation is that men are more open to
friendship with non-Muslims, there being more men with non-Muslim
friends than women. The explanation for this may be found in the relatively
high degree of public exposure to which men are subject in their places of
work. Yet there is an implicit contradiction in that they object to their wives
having non-Muslim friends. I came to know of a man who threatened to
beat his wife if she continued to visit her non-Muslim friends living in a
different part of the town. He complained that "she has started to behave
like them - she is seen in their company without covering her head due to
their influence".77 When I pointed out to this informant that some men
have some non-Muslim friends, he said that women are more susceptible to
external influence than men, and therefore, they should avoid alluring
friends. The validity of this statement is not significant for our discussion;
the point to note is that close association with non-Muslims is discouraged.
'' Interview with Alijabu, Meru town, 16th November 1991.
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The main factor underpinning the friendship patterns is religious
affiliation. In Ujiji, Hino found that people sharing one courtyard, (ua moja)
constitute a primary neighbourhood group; though "they are not aware of
themselves as a group who co-use ua (ua moja) or one courtyard". 78 In
Meru, neighbourhood is of secondary importance. This, however, is not to
negate the significant role of proximity in the life of Majengo Muslims.
Spatial proximity facilitates close relationships among neighbours in
Majengo. One way in which social interaction is created and sustained is
through the exchange of regular visits between neighbours, who may at the
same time be friends, to chat and discuss personal or community affairs. To
the rest of the people, "the Swahili habit of sitting lazily and gossiping
around the mtaa" is detestable.
But to the members of the community, it has its social functions. As
Swartz observed among the Swahili of Mombasa, each individual
is part of a pooi... whose members choose one another for
relationships of varying intensity, frequency and association, and
duration. Some of these relationships are distant and others involve
regular mutual assistance and exchange of some kinds of confidential
information, and strong emotional bonds.79
Though the Swahili community in Mombasa is profoundly different from the
'Swahili' of Meru the social "pool" is similarly vital for the latter. In a sense,
the social pool serves to reinforce social control in this community, in which
it is fairly difficult to keep anything concealed from the attention of
discerning neighbours and friends. It is equally difficult to enter a social
circle outside the Muslim community and at the same time retain one's
place in that community, especially when one is a woman.
78 S. Hino, 1980:13.
M. J. Swartz, 1991:7.
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Raja's case could well illustrate the outcome of an individual's failure to
conform:
Raja, a young single Muslim woman works as a junior employee in
an office in Meru town. She is a daughter of a respectable Muslim
elder. At one time, she moved from her parents' house and sought
accommodation in one of the town's residential areas. No sooner had
she settled in her new house than it was rumoured that she had left
her parent's house so as to "lead a free social life of night dances and
parties like the other town women". Whether or not she went to
these social events, which are unacceptable to the members of the
Muslim community, I was not able to ascertain. But throughout the
period of my fieldwork she lived independently in her own house,
irrespective of other people's disapproval. 80	-
The fact that Raja did not care for public opinion was bad enough.
Worse still, her move to extricate herself from the social pool in the Muslim
community, for that is what it amounted to, constituted a departure from
the norm. Raja's case was particularly thorny because of her father's high
social standing. Three of my informants confided in me that Raja's "family
was gradually losing respect because of the children's waywardness". On
status and culture, Swartz says that:
It is through statuses that it is established which cultural elements
are associated with which individuals according to the categories they
are understood to occupy in different circumstances.8'
This is true in Raja's case. Halima, one of the first-generation Majengo
residents, commented that:
80 met Raja on several occasions (3rd August, 7th september and 23rd
October 1991) and discussed with her the general attitude of the older people
towards the sense of independence that a young woman in her position would
cherish. She told me that even her parents found it difficult to accept her decision
to move out of home and lead an independent life on her own in one of the town's
residential estates.
81 M. J. Swartz, 1991:75.
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if she (Raja) were not the daughter of a respectable Muslim elder, the
gravity of her behaviour would have been much less. It is sad that
many people look up to the family, yet this is what the children are
doing!82
Local perceptions of Islam provide models of what is positively
evaluated behaviour for individuals. In other words, an individual's
behaviour is evaluated in terms of whether it conforms to what is expected
of a Muslim. To quote Swartz on Mombasa yet again, "every member of the
community is a 'sanctioner". Failure to conform to the general
expectations of the Muslim community, therefore, constitutes departure
from what is considered proper. It is in this light that public opinion serves
as a means of enforcing conformity to socially acceptable modes of
behaviour, though a growing trend of failure to control the youth by parents
and the older members of the community is apparent.
These days the situation has changed and a majority of the single
women living in the town have to fend for themselves and their children.
But change is not accepted easily by society, so when young women like
Raja cherish an independent life, rather than seek to fulifi the wifely duties
(as did her mother 40 years ago) her behaviour is frowned upon by the
community. To the majority of the older generation Muslims, these social-
economic changes are fitted in the traditional understanding of religious
morality, which, for instance, demands that women be excluded from public
life. Yet exclusion of women from public life is not consonant with the
demands of modern life. Therefore, as Obbo (1980:15) suggests weight of
moral pressure, which in this case derives from religious sources,
is exerted on women in order to reverse or hinder possible changes
in the power and authority relationships between men and women.
82 Interview with Halima, Majengo, 9th November 1991.
M. J. Swartz, 1991:17.
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For example, male concern over women's dress and morality directly
hinders women's effective entrance into and performance in the
political arena.M
It is against such pressure that women like Raja have to stand.
Perhaps, it is in the same spirit that the women's groups are organized. In
an attempt to improve their lot, the women have formed self-help groups
and associations. The aim of Majengo Muslim Jua Kali Women Group, for
instance, is to "assist each other so that those who involve themselves in
brewing of illicit liquor can find an alternative source of he1p". They
contribute money for one person each week until all the members have
received a lump-some amount which they spend on their immediate needs.
They also contribute money for specific projects, for instance, they buy the
basic household items for those who need them; they have a project to buy
building materials for some of the members living in the old mud-walled
houses; they do embroidery work and make pillows for sale in order to raise
money for their self-help projects.
Men hardly acknowledge the women's efforts. As I have shown above,
they are excluded from religious leadership issues, for instance the debate
on maulid and the issue of bid'a. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
they have an effective role to play in spite of their 'official' exclusion, from
issues of religious leadership. They are able to play an effective role in the
debate indifferent way than their husbands and brothers, perhaps from a
vantage point - they are at the 'grass-root level', where there is intense
social contact.
84 C. Obbo, 1980:15.
Interview with the members of the group, 3rd August 1991. The group's
registration certificate shows that it was registered with the Registrar of Societies
in 1984 and the attendance register has 27 names of members.
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Conclusion
What then holds the Muslim community together in spite of all these
cleavages? The common Muslim community identity, reinforced by the
concept of geographical place, (mji), and the social setup of Majengo, upon
which the intricate web of social ties depends, makes Majengo the peculiar
cultural island that it is. The values of dini have ensured that the Muslims
remain identifiable as a group, in other words, Islam provides the link that
runs through the various strands of the Majengo social matrix. However, as
Beckerleg has warned, being beguiled into presenting order in the Swahili
society, on which the Majengo Muslim community is modelled, is "to impose
order little apparent in social life". Therefore, what I have done in this
chapter is to present the Majengo society with its contradictions as they
appear to an outside observer. The Muslims are aware of themselves as a
religious community, and they are also aware of the external forces that
pose a threat to the community. Thus the elders are concerned to safeguard
the religious morality of the youth who are more susceptible to changes that




TABLIGH AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE 'INSHALLAH MUSLIMS'
Introduction
Islam in Meru is not restricted to the Muslim enclaves of Majengo
and Mjini, within Meru municipality. There are pockets of Muslims
scattered in the trade centres and various other places throughout the
district. Igembe division, in the northern part of the district, has the largest
number of Muslims outside Majengo and Mjini. Therefore, to complete the
picture of Islam in Meru, in this chapter I will identify the forces that have
been at work in these places and examine their influence on the local
constructions of Islam. The main focus will be on the activities of the
Tabligh, the proliferation of mosques in Igembe division and surrounds. I
will also comment on the trends of conversion to Islam in this region.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, one observes a slow but steady
growth of Muslim influence, particularly in the rural areas, evidenced by a
significant rise in the number of mosques. In order to explain this
phenomenon, I will first describe the pattern of Muslim practices and
observance of religious obligations that has hitherto obtained in Igembe.
Then I will examine the extent and nature of the influence of Tabligh on
Muslims in this area.
The situation of individual Muslims cannot be seen in abstract
isolation from the wider social network in the rural areas. This leads to the
pertinent question of Muslim identity: that is, on the one hand, the question
of how the Muslims define themselves in relation and opposition to others;
and how, on the other, they are seen and defined by others. An analysis of
the apparent paradox of antagonistic identities, leads the discussion to the
underlying concept of the struggle between Dini and ushenzi, as it is seen
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in the local constructions of Islam. Here I present the rural situation with
its paradoxes and contradictions as I see them expressed in the study cases.
Tabligh
In this section I will examine the role of the Tabligh movement,
which has been active in the rural areas. First I will briefly put it in its
context of a world revivalist movement' by stating its origins and its
fundamental principles and features. Then I will examine its manifestations
in Meru and demonstrate that, as a result of Tabligh activities, what
appears to have been an interminable stagnation of Islam in Meru has
recently been transformed into a slow but steadily growing force.
Al Mawrid Arabic-English dictionary defines the term Tabligh as "to
be informed, told, notified; to be reported; to be conveyed, communicated,
transmitted.. •2 Tabligh Jamaat, one of the "great Islamic movements
generated in twentieth century South Asia",3 has its origins in the Deoband
school.4 Nielson sees it as "the active pietism of the Deoband
movement".5 Tabligh Jamaat was founded in India by Maulana ilyas
1 There is a large amount of material on the Islamic resurgence - Hodgkin in
her essay on "Islamism and Islamic Research in Africa", Islam et Societes au Sud
du Sahara, n.4, 1992, says that "the study of the Islamic revival has, in the last
decade, become as much of a growth industry as the revival itself' (p.73).
2 R. Baalbalci, Al-Mawrd, A Modern Arabic-English Dictionary, (second
edition). Dar El-flm Lilmalayin, Beirut, 1990.
F. Robinson, 1988:17.
Deoband movement came into existence in India during the second half
of the 19th century. The movement takes its name from the site of the madrasa
(now a large Muslim university) founded in 1867 by two ulama, Muhamad Qasim
Nanautwi (1833-1877) and Rashid Abmed Gangohi (1833- 1905) at the then small
town of Deoband in Uttar Pradesh, India. For more information on the movement,
see B. Metcalf 1982 passim.
J. Nielsen, 1992:133.
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(1885-1944) in the late 1920s and spread to many parts of the world. He
defined the fundamental principles, through which the movement seeks to
reform and spread the Muslim faith. Haq aptly sums them up thus:
To a Muslim, faith and life based on faith means holding firmly to
kalimah and prayer, regularly observing 'zikir', learning its virtues
and excellences, fulfilling duties and obligations, respecting the rights
of fellow-Muslims, seeking the pleasure of God, following in the
footsteps of the Prophet and going from door to door, city to city and
country to country for the sake of faith.6
As a revivalist movement, Tabligh Jamaat relies on Sufi practices.
As Haq observes, its founder, himself a sufi,
inaugurated a religious movement which aimed at reviving spiritual
devotion by emphasizing sufi practices which he adopted for his work
with certain changes.7
The Tabligh influence that is prevalent in Meru originates in Pakistan, but
before I examine the local embellishment to the movement's fundamental
principles, it is necessary first to provide some background information on
Tabligh in Kenya.
Stipulated Aims and Objectives at the National Level
The influence of Tabligh began to infiltrate the country, largely from
Pakistan, in the mid 1970s, but it was not until the beginning of the 1980s
that its effects began to be felt.
6 A. M. Haq, 1972:145.
mid., p.62.
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In the words of a leading Muslim,
The year 1980 was the year of many dreams, many hopes and
expectations, increased struggles, enhanced determination, self-
realization and increased confidence for the Muslim community in
the country. For the dreams and hopes the sources was (sic) the
much needed co-operation and encouraging assistance we received
both from within and abroad; for increased struggles and enhanced
determination the driving force was as a result of a new realization
of the magnitude of the task the Council (Supreme Council of Kenya
Muslims) was expected to accomplish.. .keeping in view the changing
times the consequent (sic) changing needs; and the self realization
and consequent (sic) added confidence was sparked by the 'new
learning' from research Muslim scholars, assemblies and
congregations, and above all the world wide expectations of the new
era of 15th century A.H.8
While this is a testimony to the fact that the year 1980 was significant for
the Kenyan Muslims in general; it is also an apt statement of the events
and forces underlying the emergence of Tabligh throughout the country.
What is significant for our purpose is that this year was a turning point;
and that there was an intensification of the struggle, an enhanced
determination coupled with self-realization on the part of the Muslims.
More importantly, these forces are clearly linked with others abroad or from
outside the country. This is the beginning of Tabligh which spread to Meru,
among other places.9
S This statement was made by a senior member in his annual report to the
Council. The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims was formed in 1972 to co-
ordinate the activities of the Muslims throughout the country. The Council sees
itself as "the parent organization that embraces all shades of Muslim views and
opinions", see Coupcil Memorandum to the President of Kenya, Copies of these
documents were available in the files kept by the provincial representatives to the
Council.
The available information shows that the "Directorate of Tabligh" was
established as a department of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims. It was
stipulated that the members of the Tabligh committee "must be able to act
independently in guiding the Tabligh activities within the framework of the
council's policy". These activities include: looking after "the affairs of the mosques";
"the role and development of religious institutions"; "religious consciousness of
youth". The programs for the Directorate of Tabligh are outlined in a document
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When the Tabligh committee was formed, its members "recognized
the gigantic nature of its duties and largeness of the job" and "saw the
diverseness of its activities".' 0 The aims and objectives of the Tabligh
committee were defined in terms of service to "the Muslim Community".
Whether the whole spectrum of Kenyan Muslims can be regarded as a
'community', is another matter. However, the committee in the main was
initially concerned to establish, among other things:
How is it (Muslim community) dispersed over Kenya?.. .What are
their religious needs? What character is it developing; how much is
Islam cunducine (sic) to the model of its life? how much is it affected
by other than Islamic culture... What role it has as a community of
Muslims - what are its achievements? Who are the mubashiriyn and
khutabaa?... How much Islamic is the youth/are the children. How
much chance to grow as Muslims; What learning facilities there
exists... What to do to make the future community cohesively and
progressively Islamic..."
Initially, it was proposed to organize the Tabligh Committee at the
national level into "compartments or cells". But, whether the cells were
formed or not, it is difficult to tell. It is also difficult to tell from the
accounts of the informants, which of the Tabligh activities that one sees in
Meru are linked with the committee and which are carried out by
independent Tabligh groups that are now active in the area. There is an
overlap in their activities because, after the Directorate of Tabligh was
formed at the national level, the responsibility of the organization of
Tabligh activities in a given area, fell to the local Muslim leaders.
titled "The Background of Development".
10 See "The Background of Development" document, p.2.
' thid., p.2.
248
The first step in the organization of Tabligh was the appointment of
regional leaders known as ma-Amiri and the formation of groups known as
vikundi vya Fisabili-Liahi, which literally means 'groups in the path of
God', to work in each area. The function of these groups under the
leadership of these ma-Amiri, in the words of the national leader of
Tabligh, is to:
make efforts to awaken the people. These leaders visit every town in
the country on a mission known as itikafu in order to popularize
Tabligh. Their collective effort is known as ijt mai, that is the
meetings for religious affairs. And because these activities are closely
interlaced with preaching and proclaiming our faith, the department
of tabligh has been working in conjunction with these ma-Amiri.'2
The aim of the national committee was to reach all the Muslims in the
country; for the achievement of which task, a group of regional leaders (ma-
Amiri, Sing. Amiri) and other Muslim representatives from all over Kenya
(two bus loads) travelled to Moshi in Tanzania, where the movement was
better established, to attend a big religious meeting early in 1980. This was
the beginning of the Tanzanian connection and the influence of one
Darwesh, an Asian of Pakistan origin who is credited with introducing and
laying the foundations of Tabligh work in Meru. On their return, a large
Tabligh meeting was organized in Kisumu in Western Kenya, which it is
claimed, was attended by five thousand delegates from all over the
country.'3 After this, which we might call the inaugural meeting or ijtmai
as my informants prefer to call it, other meetings were organized in many
other towns wherever Muslims are found.
12 See the Council Chairman's Report, 14th April, 1981.
13 Interview with Sheikh Mwinyi, Mjini, 18th November 1991.
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It was soon realized that for it to succeed, Tabligh has to be directed
at a targeted rural population:
If we (leaders) ignore the rural areas, it will be self-defeating for
there are many Muslims there without leadership, still receiving the
traditional education. If you look at the Christians, you find that they
rush to the rural areas because that is where there is need and thus
they find followers: while we concentrate our efforts only in the big
towns. Second, they direct their attention at the youth because it is
easier to teach them and once they grasp the teachings, it is not easy
to abandon them. Also they (Christians) have initiated many projects
in the rural areas to help the youth to become self-reliant; while we
neglect these areas and concentrate our efforts only in the towns.'4
This, may explain why Tabligh activity has been relatively less in the
Muslim enclaves within the Meru municipality. The nain target of Tabligh
being the rural Muslims without leadership, its activities should be devoted
to, and its energies spent on,the areas where there are good prospects of
winning more converts. Hence the recent apparent increase in Muslim
activities in the rural areas can be attributed mainly to Tabligh.
Diffusion of Tabligh: The Inaugural Ijtmai - Meru
Soon after the Kisumu ijtmai, Sheikh Mwinyi, of whom previous
mention has been made and now the newly appointed senior Amiri,
together with other local leaders, organized the first ijtmai in Meru from
3rd to 5th of October 1980. According to my informants, it was a big
success.
In his annual report, the provincial Muslim leader observed that:
The seminar held in Meru was enlightening because many people
have since tried to join Tabligh and attend the mosques in order to
worship.. .boys and girls also are beginning to attend the mosque...'5
' 
"Ripoti ya Naibu wa Mwenyekiti, Mkoa Mashariki", 1981.
' See "Ripoti ya Naibu wa Mwenyekiti, Mkoa wa Mashariki", 1981.
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This marks the beginning of Tabligh in Meru. During this meeting, the
guest speakers, among them Darwesh, espoused the merits of Tabligh.'6
During the sermons the speakers urged the believers to stand up for their
Muslim identity and shun ushenzi. The leading Amir in Meru (appointed by
Darwesh and later sent to Pakistan for six months' training) set forth the
parameters of the work of Tabligh. He defined Tabligh as a "means to
spread" Islam. Muslims are commanded to forbid evil and enhance
goodness, for which task, he suggested, individuals should volunteer and
form some sort of vigilante groups' 7 to revive and spread Islam in Meru.
Further, he elucidated the fundamentals of Tabligh, namely: trust in
God; prayer; performance of Dhikir, using a rosary (tasbih) three times
over; showing kindness and respect to all; purity of faith; and finally, to
strive in the path of God. By backing the need for the formation of Tabligh
groups with the relevant verses, and couching it in obligatory terms, the
Amir was able to appeal to the religious conscience of a good number of
potential individuals, with the result that the first two main Tabligh groups
were formed within a relatively short time after this meeting. They began
their work under this Amiri.
The Procedure of a Tabligh Mission
Musa, a leader of a fairly active Tabligh group'8 explained in great
detail the modus-operandi of a Tabligh mission: a group of 15 to 20 persons
goes out on a preaching mission to a given area. The choice of the area to
16 Interview with Sheikh Mwinyi, Mjini, 18th November, 1991.
17 It is interesting to note that Al-Maghili mentioned something of this kind for
Timbuktu in his answers to Askia's questions, written in AD.1500, see J. 0.
Hunwick, 1985:94.
18 Musa is a local Tabligh leader/teacher, Amiri. He was appointed an Amiri
after completing his training in the organization of Tabligh in Mombasa. To him
I am grateful for the information on the procedure of a tabligh mission.
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be visited is determined by various criteria, principal of which is the "need
to awaken the believers" in that area, if their Muslim identity is considered
to be threatened by external forces. In places where Muslims are few and
far between, a visit by a Tabligh group gives a boost to their faith. Such
visits are organized for this purpose, but with the underlying motive of
making converts, whenever the prospects appear promising. For instance,
a leading member of the Mjini Tabligh Women Group told me that on one
successful Tabligh mission to Igembe area, 20 women were won to
Islam, though the initial aim of the mission was to visit a group of
five women who had recently been converted.'9
When I enquired why her group targeted the women in that area, she gave
two reasons: first, as a women's group, they could not preach to men, so
their attention was directed to other women. Second, in her opinion, some
of the women converted during the 1984 famine had, due to lack of such
encouragement and support as they would get if they were part of a Muslim
community in a Majengo, become retrogressive. Some of them had virtually
lost their Muslim identity, and she as a Tabligh leader, felt the need to
bring them back to the fold.2°
19 Interview with Maruwa, an active Tabligh member and leader of a Tabligh
women's group based in Meru town. She explained that her group has been
engaged in Tabligh activities in Kiengu area, nearly 30 miles away from Meru
town, as a result of which a number of women had been won over to Islam.
20 Interview with Maruwa, Mjini, 26th November 1991. As will be shown
below, many people particularly women in Kiengu and its environs, were
converted during the 1984 famine. This phenomenon of gender differentiation in
this particular incident of conversion to Islam may be explained by the fact that
traditionally, it is women who feed the family, and therefore, should a famine
occur, they are the ones to go in search of food. So during this particular famine,
the food that was distributed in the area had been donated by a Muslim
community through the local prominent Asian Muslim leader. Understandably, it
was distributed at the mosque and so the women had to go there. In the process,
a good number were converted. But since many of them did not even learn much
about dini, it was difficult for them to sustain their new identity. This explains
why the Tabligh groups target this area - even those from Pakistan are directed
here by the leading Amiri in Meru town.
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The ma-Amiri (plural) that I interviewed said that a Tabligh mission
begins with the identification of the place to be visited, after which a group
of 15 to 20 persons prepares to go out to "seek Muslims". The leader of the
group is an Amiri, one supposedly acquainted with the aims and objectives
of Tabligh at the local level. It is Aman to God to go on Tabligh, and
movement from place to place is known as ghast. Before the group sets out,
each of the members ensure that they are well prepared, mentally,
physically and materially - that is they have to be able to provide for their
upkeep wherever they go; as well as being psychologically prepared to
sustain the tempo of the requisite long hours of prayer and dhikir.2'
When a Tabligh group sets out on a mission to a particular place, the
mosque usually serves as the base for their operations. In places where
mosques are few and far apart, they may camp at a home of a local
prominent Muslim, if one volunteers to host them. On the first day of
arrival at the mosque, the Amiri draws up a program and explains the
procedure to be followed, detailing what is expected of each individual
member. Duties are allotted to each member. The mission is divided into
sessions, with prayer and dhikir taking up most of the time. On the next
day, some of the members remain at the mosque to give religious
instruction to any one that might come there (since the visit is well
publicized prior to the arrival of the group); while others go out in pairs "to
seek out the faithful resident in the area".22
At the end of the day, an assessment of the day's work is done and
the leader gives instructions: he reminds them of their avowed commitment
to Tabligh, which is kuzidua watu, "to seek out the people". The benefit of
committing oneself for the achievement of this task is the spiritual
purification and upliftment, not least the reward promised to those who
21 Interview with Musa and Aslam, Amaku, 13th October 1991.
22 Interview with Musa, Amaku, 13th October 1991.
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strive in God's cause. This explains the emphasis on prayer and the
reading of the scriptures throughout the session. An individual volunteers
to awake the group at midnight for the night worship (tajud). This is the
most important prayer time - when it is believed that all the doors of
heaven are open and God listens to those who call upon Him. This is seen
as the most appropriate time to pray for the success of the mission.
This procedure is repeated until the mission covers the targeted area.
Ideally, a group should hold on for 4 months, but the local groups operating
within Meru stay out for two to three weeks. It is said that one should go
out on Tabligh for 40 days once every year. However, my informants were
in agreement that going out on tabligh requires physical and mental fitness,
not to mention the financial demand on the individuals, with self
sponsorship being highly valued. 24 The characteristics of the mission fit
well with those prescriptions laid down by the founder; nonetheless, this
does not preclude local embellishments to Tabligh.
Local Adaptation of Tabligh
Though the spirituality of Tabligh is evident in the sufi practices that
the movement has adopted, the local Tabligh teachers, were set out to
impress upon their followers their own perception of the spirituality of
Tabligh. The first example is the comparison drawn by an Amiri between
the spiritual benefits of teaching in the madrasa and of going on Tabligh
missions. This Amiri argued that "going out on Tabligh mission is more
spiritually fulifiling than teaching in the madrasa". When I asked him why
he thought that the mission was more spiritually fulfilling, his response was
that he "would rather spend time asking for forgiveness from God and
Those who strive in God's cause is the promise of salvation, ix:20. For more
references on the reward promised for those who strive in the cause of God, see:
xxii:78; xxv:52; xxix:69; lxi:11.
24 Interview with Aslam, Amaku, 11th October 1991.
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learning the verses of the Quran than spend most of the time teaching in
the madrasa and the rest of it expecting gifts and reward from others for
doing it".
He explained, that during Tabligh missions, the members of the
group spend most of the time praying and reading the Quran. They sleep
little and eat little. This, he said, is what is necessary for their spiritual
nourishment, and it cannot be attained by teaching at the madrasa. It is
not as if this Amiri is unaware that the acquisition and communication of
knowledge is obligatory for every believer - he holds the view that madrasa
teachers should not expect to be remunerated for fulfilling their religious
obligation. He argues that if teaching at the madrasa is perceived in this
sense, then the problem of the organization and maintenance of teachers
would hardly arise.
The second example is Darwesh's local adaptation of public preaching
and explaining the Quran in the local language. Many of my informants
were in agreement that Tabligh in the area was pioneered by Darwesh.26
He is credited with popularizing its ideals by translating and writing many
books27 in Kiswahili. With Arabic being inaccessible to the majority of the
Interview with Aslam, Amaku, 13th October 1991. Provision of religious
education in Meru is plagued by a perpetual scarcity of resources, both human and
financial. As a result most of the teachers depend on charitable donations from a
local prominent Asian Muslim since the large sums of money needed to pay
commensurate salaries are hard to find. In addition, most of the Madrasa teachers
that I interviewed were either western school dropouts or had no western
education whatsoever, therefore, they were not employable in commercial or
public sectors.
26 Little information is available about Darwesh, except that he was an Asian
of Pakistan origin who visited Meru on several occasions while on Tabligh mission
from Moshi, Tanzania.
27 Procurement and distribution of literature in Kiswahili is stated as one of
the means of Tabligh: "The department has been collecting religious and other
books from different embassies and also from abroad. These books have been
distributed to the secondary schools and other places. Similarly, plans are
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intended audience, the availability and simplicity of a widely distributed
literature in Kiswahili, formed the mainstay of his mission. His practice of
inviting learned sheikhs to explain the teachings of the Qur'an proved a
useful resource. It is said that, before Darwesh came into the area public
preaching and tafsir of the Quran were unpopular - the Muslims, from the
start, maintained an aura of mystery about Islam, whose medium was
Arabic, a language which inspired awe in non-Muslims and new converts
alike. To the surprise of many, therefore, Darwesh propagated the idea
of public preaching and exegesis of Qurarnc verses and even advocated
further explanations to be given in the local language, 29 if and when
necessary.
underway to start a library.. .A special course has been planned for religious
instructors.. .The department of Tabligh is responsible for the organization of this
course..." See the Tabligh report. Some of these books that I came across are:
Fad/ia Ilid-Dahwaht Ilal-Khayr Wat-Tabligh-Lidinillah, written in Arabic by
Sheikh M. S. M. Yahya in India and rendered into Kiswahili as Fadhila na
Umuhimu wa Kulingania Kheir (Uislam) na Kublighisha Dini ya Mwenyezi
Mungu kwa Watu, by Sheikh M. Yusufu, Bukoba, Tanzania. This book emphasizes
the importance of prayer and the uniqueness of the Holy Quran. Darwesh himself
has written a series of books entitled Kioo ya Amiri, Tabligh-Markaz, Dar-es-
Salaam, Tanzania (n.d.). In Kioo ya Amiri no.3, (I have seen only Nos.3 and 4) the
author describes what he considers first to be the requisites of 'Amiriship', that is
the struggle against the self, the nafsi. No.4 outlines the duties of Amiri to the
community.
He revolutionized Islam in this area by trying to de-mystify it - I have shown
in chapter 2 that mystification of Islam was one of the factors that tempered the
reaction of the majority of the Meru people to the presence of a band of Muslims
in their midst. Their 'Swahiliness' which was and still is synonymous with
'Muslimness', became associated with the practice of witchcraft, and the tendency
was to keep the Muslims at bay.
This is a recurrent point of discussion in the history of Islam in Africa - the
issues of public preaching and the use of a language other than Arabic for
religious purposes were dealt with by Al-Suyuti in his answers to questions
arriving from Takrur in 1493. Al-Suyuti ruled that it is permissible to praise the
Prophet in a language other than Arabic. See J. 0. Hunwick, 1970:7-33.
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Darwesh's apparently revolutionary ideas were soon to clash with
those held by the local Muslims who advocated the perpetuation of this
aura of mystery in which Islam in this area has been enshrouded since its
early days. The principal points of disagreement, during the initial stages,
revolved around the idea of public preaching and the use of the local
language to define and explain religious concepts, they are usually
expressed in Arabic and Kiswahili. In the first instance, the very idea
of public preaching, appeared to many to be unislamic, it was perceived as
"kuiga tabia za watu wa dini nyingine " ("to ape the behaviour of people of
other religions")30. It would also, they argued, cheapen or lower the quality
of Islam. Darwesh's advocacy of the use of the local language to explain the
fundamentals of Islam evoked even further criticism from the local sheikh
and his prominent supporters. They objected to the use of Kimeru on two
grounds: first, the Kimeru terms Murungu and Ngai for God were used by
"people of other religions" and therefore, if the Muslim preachers used these
terms for Allah, confusion might arise.3'
The second, expressed by the local sheikh, was theological - the
Kimeru terms Murungu and Ngai for God cannot be substituted for the
Arabic term 'Allah' because they are, it is argued, not only inadequate as
expressions of intrinsic attributes of Allah, but also inappropriate. One
sheikh, went so far as to suggest that the word Murungu is associated by
the Meru with the God of Mount Kenya, (to whom the Meru prayed prior
to the advent of both Islam and Christianity)32 and Ngai with rain, both
30 Sheikh Hussam, and other opponents of public preaching argued that it is
too difficult to translate the term 'Tawheed', for instance, into any other language
without distorting the whole concept.
31 Interview with Abdallah, Kangeta, 25th October 1991.
32 Meru have a well developed concept of God who they call Murungu. The
term ngai, which means rain, is also one of God's attributes since God provides
rain. For the use of these two Kimeru attributes of God, see J. M. Baikiao
1972:167-8.
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of which border on shirk, or the association of God with others. Therefore,
it was and still is felt that explanation of Qurarnc verses in Kimeru is likely
to distort the message. This argument hinges on the notion of the religious
mystique of Arabic - it is the language of the Quran and hence the language
of Islam.
Yet, interestingly enough, the sheikhs do not object to the Kiswahili
term Mungu for God. Once I pointed out to this sheikh that not only do the
two terms Mungu and Murungu have the same 'Bantu' linguistic root, but
are actually derivatives of one and the same term. His reaction was that
Kiswabili, because of its "similarity to Arabic", is richer in religious
vocabulary and is, therefore, less likely to distort the message when
explaining certain religious concepts. He echoes the arguments advanced in
support of the constant use of Kiswahili by Muslims (see chapter 2).
The point here, however, is not to question the validity of this
argument, but to show the clash occasioned by Darwesh's advocacy of the
use of Kimeru to explain religious teachings.
The controversy over the choice of language for religious purpose is
not peculiar to Meru. In Ujiji, a town in Tanzania (of which previous
mention has been made), a controversy arose regarding the use of other
languages than Arabic for religious purposes:
the argument for holding the Quran in Arabic and not Swahili as it
is in other parts of East Africa was fear of widespread uncovering of
interpretations of the Quran, which are not backed by revealed text,
but which have been transmitted by local Muslims.33
Similarly, in Meru the argument for the use of Arabic was based on the fear
of rendering new and supposedly erroneous interpretations of the Quran.
J. 14. Balda, 1990:284.
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However, the two cases differ in that the leaders in Ujiji discouraged even
the use of Kiswahili, while in Meru Kiswahili was preferred to the local
language (Kimeru).
The use of the Kiswahili term Mungu for Allah, is given an
interesting treatment by Topan. On the one hand, his argument lends
credence to the sheikh's idea, that other terms are inadequate as
expressions of Allah's attributes:
Theologically, the word 'Mngu' was deemed insufficient to convey the
full potency of the original model, Allah. A fuller disclosure
necessitated the addition of a qualifier which in Swahili is 'Mwenye
enzi', shortened to 'Mwenyezi': compound word of Bantu and Arabic
origin (from izza) which primarily expresses the omnipotence,
sovereignty and regality of the Almighty. Why was 'Mngu' not
replaced by 'Allah'? The answer.., lies in the fact of the pre-existence
of the concept of Godhood among the Swahili and the Bantu, however
termed. What was necessary was to invest the indigenous term with
connotations of uniqueness and power as conceived in Islam, i.e to re-
define it in terms of the new faith.., rather to qualify it..
On the other hand, his argument does not answer the question why the
Kimeru word Murungu, which is the equivalent of the Kiswahili Mungu is
deemed inappropriate. The Kiswahili word is, according to Topan,
acceptable because of the underpinning Bantu idea of Godhood. In the same
vein, the term Murungu would be acceptable, but it is not. Paradoxically,
the sheikh rejects it because it is deemed to connote the very Bantu idea of
God. We may therefore, say that the sheikh's first argument (that the use
of Kimeru terms for God might engender confusion with other religions) is




In spite of this objection to the use of Kimeru for preaching and
teaching, the Tabligh teachers, with the sole aim of making converts, and
faced with a situation whereby most of the would-be converts in the rural
areas, especially women, are monolingual, realized that they did not have
much choice if they had to achieve any measure of success.
Tabligh preaching activities were augmented with occasional trips by
Meru delegates to Tanzania and the coastal towns for further instruction
in the organization of Tabligh. Some of these individuals have been
instrumental in the propagation of Islam. A good example is Mama Salwa
who lives at the mosque that is known as the Markaz. She told me that she
was converted in 1949, but the advent of Tabligh has changed her
perception of Islam. She herself is illiterate, but she has learnt many verses
of the Quran and she has been trying to organize the local Muslim women
and even give them lessons on how to pray and observe other religious
obligations. She laments that there are too many obstacles to religious
commitment of women in this area. However, she can count more than
thirty women who have converted to Islam through her efforts, since she
joined Tabligh.35
Another example is Aslam, who claims to have converted 420 people
through teaching and preaching during 1988 alone. In the absence of
documented statistical evidence, it is difficult to confirm or deny his
claims. 36
 In my attempt to gauge the influence of Tabligh in this area, I
interviewed a random sample of 50 Muslims among whom 18 claimed to
have converted through Tabligh; 7 during the 1984 famine when food
(which was said to have been donated by Muslims) was distributed to the
Interview with Mama Salwa, Kiengu, 8th October 1991.
36 Three new mosques of wood and iron sheets have been built in the area.
When I tried to investigate attendance and size of their congregations, I found that
they ranged between 5 and 15 members. Perhaps there are others who do not
attend the mosque.
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worst hit areas; 8 said that they converted in order to be protected from
wit;chcraft; 5 were members of the pioneer families converted prior to 1980;
4 were recent converts through marriage to Muslims; 4 were non-Meru
residents (Borana and Somali) who were either working or living in the
district; 3 claimed to have converted as a result of long residence in former
N.F.D.; and 1 through by a close Muslim friend. These figures show that
there has been an appreciable influence of Tabligh in Igembe - the larger
proportion of the most recent conversion occurred as a result of Tabligh
activities.
As Tabligh made progress slowly, entering what can be considered
as its second phase, its incompatibility with some of the ideas propagated
by the sheikhs37 became apparent. For instance, it was opposed to what
the Aniiri sees as an inordinate reverence accorded the (patron) sheikhs by
the local Muslims. As has been shown in chapter 4, these sheikhs were
believed to possess mystical and healing powers, for the use of which they
received gifts in cash and kind. It was on account of this that one Sheikh
Shariff, a leading Husseiniyya sheikh, was driven out of the area, allegedly
for practices which were said by the local leaders to be anti-Ta bligh.
It is alleged that Sheikh Sharrif used the reading of falaq books as
a ploy. He was accused of using his magical powers for self-aggrandizement
- after "reading the books for" his opponents, evil was sure to befall them.
Some of his practices included writing his victims' names on rotten eggs,
which was believed to cause madness, among other evils. To the ordinary
people, these magical practices inspired awe, which he turned into an asset.
He used to obtain goats from those seeking blessings (baraka) from him. To
failure of the Borana influence within the well established Swahili-Nubi
cultural and religious milieu of Mjini, and the apparent success of the N.F.D.
sheikhs' influence in the trade centres and other rural areas of Igembe, are
examined in chapter 4, pp. 177-182.
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the Tabligh advocates, these proscribed beliefs and practices had to be
curbed forthwith, hence he was banished from his base at Lare mosque.38
The case of this sheikh is a pointer to the changes brought about by
Tabligh and the resultant imbalance in the existing religious situation in
Igembe. It was difficult, it seems, for the hitherto awe-inspiring patron
sheikhs to accept to be relegated to a subsidiary role to that of the Amiri,
most of whom were young, and in the eyes of the sheikhs could not boast
either long experience in religious matters or Islamic learning.
The proponents of Tabligh, like the sheikhs, are given to the chanting
of litanies, dhikir. The austerity that manifests itself during Tabligh
missions, is characteristically similarly reminiscent of sufistic tendencies.
This being the case, then I suppose that there are other aspects responsible
for the tension between the existing local perception of Islam, as taught and
practiced by both the sheikhs and their followers; and the Tabligh
advocates. On the one hand, the sheikhs had, by the time Tabligh was
introduced into the area, established a particular pattern of religious
observance and their methods of dealing with the matters of faith had
become accepted by the local people, (see chapter 3). One of these practices
was the cleansing of believers who had, for one reason or another, backslid.
It is common to hear the expression that "so and so has become an
unbeliever", "amekufuru". It is a widely held belief that once an individual
has been initiated into an order s/he is expected to uphold its principles.
38 one time, Lare had a fairly large number of Borana Muslims. It is said
that Sheikh Shariff had become quite influential and famous for his ability to cure
many diseases and also to inflict harm on his own behalf, or of his clients for
which he charged a fee. Fisher draws a parallel on that of a Muslim cleric in
Africa and the biblical episode of Elisha's healing of Naaman the leper. Fisher
calls this harming/healing combination in the role of the cleric "the Gehazi factor"
(H. Fisher, 1985:171). For the details of Elisha's power to cure of Naaman of his
leprosy and to visit Naaman's leprosy on Gehazi, see 2 Kings, 5:1-27.
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Laxity begets calamity. In the event, the common practice in Igembe was
to seek the help of a sheikh.
A case in point is that of M'Ibuuri, a pioneer convert, who is said to
have "drifted" away and lost his Muslim identity:
MThuuri was involved in a long standing legal tussle with his non-
Muslim neighbour over a piece of land. Land cases in this area are
known to be long and difficult to solve. An alternative solution for
such cases is found in the traditional oath of "striking a he-goat
(kuringa Nthenge)". M'Ibuuri, being the eldest son, was duty bound
to save the piece of land for the family so he took the oath. It is
understandable that after participating in the rituals of the oath, he
felt that he had compromised his Muslim identity and dropped the
habit of going to the mosque. Gradually he distanced himself from
his Muslim friends, who now spoke of him as one who "had become
an unbeliever", amekufuru. After several years of a troubled
conscience, he spoke to the Imam of the mosque who suggested that
they seek the help of Sheikh Assim (from former N.F.D) who was
residing in the area. The sheikh said that in order for him to be
reinstated to his former status (of piety) a cleansing ceremony was
a prerequisite. The Imam and the teacher were invited to witness the
cleansing. My informant did not divulge the details of the rituals that
the sheikh carried out for the purposes of cleansing, but the
slaughter of a ram was a major element of the ritual, after which it
was believed that no evil would befall him. His identity was restored
and he was brought back to the fold.39
case was described to me by Sheikh Mwinyi (interview 18th November
1991). The main part of the ritual is the circumbulation of the disputed piece of
land by the appellant, the defendant and some witnesses (elders). A gagged goat
is strapped on the appellant's back and the defendant walks behind, striking the
goat and swearing each time that 'I die like this goat if my claim to the land is
false'. Both men are naked and women and children are not allowed to witness the
oathing. Kuringa nthenge (lit, to strike the goat) is a very serious form of oath,
sanctioned by the clan council of elders only in extreme circumstances. The
attendant curse is believed to pass on from one generation to another. "As a rule
only the defendant does it to prove his innocence, if he is really guilty, his kiama
(council) will not allow him to do it as this is supposed to affect his whole sub-
division or clan". See E. B. Home, District Commissioner 1908 - in DCIMRU/ii1
Meru Political Recordbook, 1908-1918.
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This is but one example of the practices that the Tabligh advocates
were quick to condemn. My informant Amiri Aslam condemned this case for
two reasons: in the first instance, the sheikh's notion of purification and
restoration of the victim to his former status, is redolent of the Meru
practice of slaughtering a ram and using its blood symbolically to cleanse
a person who has become ritually 'unclean' (a condition known as muiro in
Kimeru) either through individual negligence or accidental breach of certain
taboos; or that of others related to them. Aslam therefore did not only
condemn the ritual performed by the sheikh as un-Islamic; but was also
branded it as unequivocally ushenzi practice. Furthermore, the victim erred
both in intent and deed - striking the goat to death in this manner (see
footnote), not to mention the swearing that went with it, was the height of
unbelief. In other words, he had relapsed to his former condition of unbelief
(and in this light, of ushenzi). Being of sound mind, it was his choice and
therefore, he was fully accountable for his own actions.
The second reason for condemning this case derives from the first -
if the offender is fully responsible for his own actions, and therefore
answerable only to his creator, what business has the sheikh in trying to
intercede for him? Here not only the sheikh's putative ability to cleanse and
supposedly restore one's faith is objectionable, but the propriety of the
whole practice is questionable. When I asked him what measures he would
take if he were confronted with such a case, the Amiri said that:
it is the duty of every Muslim to forbid evil and enhance goodness by
pointing out to others where they go wrong, but this does not entail
cleansing rituals. Every believer knows that only God is 'Most
Gracious, Most Merciful'; and therefore it is a waste of time to seek
help from another person when one has erred to God".4°
4° Sheikh Mwinyi said that he objected to the cleansing rituals, but since the
other sheikh also claimed religious authority based on his learning, it became a
question of interpretation between the two men of learning.
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To put this case in broader context of what is now happening in Meru
and perhaps many other places far from the traditional abode of Islam at
the East African coast, the local sheikh serves as the source of religious
authority. And since, as the saying goes, 'every sheikh has his own way',
there is growing tension between the local interpretations which arise from
local sources of religious authority, and what is perceived as the established
Swahili-Islamic model. The difference of opinion between the two sheikhs
is indicative of this tension. In the discussion on N.F.D. influence, it was
shown that the Somali and Borana sheikhs provided the much needed
religious leadership to the Muslims living in the trade centres and other
areas away from the influence of the Swahili Muslims in Majengo and
Mjini. This tension between the established Islamic ideals and the local
manifestations of Islam is documented by Balda:
There is a relentless desire of presenting the ideals of Islam and a
perfect model of the Islamic faith to the Muslim believer, but a
persistent tension prevails among divergent factions each of which
insists that its own interpretations are authentically based on divine
revelation (Quran).41
On the other hand, the apparently extremist interpretation of
religious teachings by the Tabligh teachers triggered a stiff opposition from
several quarters. This could be illustrated with the case of Aslam,
mentioned above, who began to propagate such ideas as that Tabligh should
be regarded as the Hajji for the poor who cannot afford to go to Mecca; that
those who make donations to support Tabligh will be rewarded a hundred-
fold on the Day of Judgement; that those who cry and weep for their
misdeeds will be forgiven; and that those who observe strict discipline and
lose desire for all worldly things will attain paradise. More radical were
ideas about etiquette: for instance, "when you go out to preach, avoid
looking at other peoples' property as such an act is likely to evoke a desire
41 J• L. Balda, 1993:237.
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for it" - desire is seen as evil, "because it breeds envy and consequently
weakens the struggle against the nafsi", the self, as he put it during my
interview with him.42 Such interpretations of religious concepts were, to
many of the local prominent Muslims, clearly unacceptable, prompting one
leader to suggest that:
The department of Tabligh should carry out a thorough investigation,
because now it seems that it is in danger as it appears to be different
from the faith; with many aspects being contradictory to Islam,
tending to sow discord among the people... and also challenging the
methods of imparting religious education judiciously.43
Though there is no evidence to indicate that this suggestion was
implemented, or even to link it with the subsequent events, it was not long
before the Amiri was asked to desist from spreading his ideas. However, it
took some time to stop him and the disagreement developed into what looks
like a struggle between the old and the new. Today, he does not attend the
Friday prayers at the Markaz but prays in a smaller mosque not too far
from his house and spends the rest of the time in his shop, the revenue
from which he supplements with extra income earned from a large number
of clients who seek treatment from him for all types of maladies.
It may be useful, however, to note that the image of Tabligh in the
perception of the local people is bolstered by occasional visits by groups of
devotees (vikundi vya Tabligh), who come from as far as Pakistan and India
to the Markaz in Igembe. The visitors are accompanied by local Amiri, who
not only guide them through the local mosques, but also act as interpreters
during the teaching sessions. I attended one of these sessions where the
speakers spoke only Arabic and Urdu, while the local sheikh gave the
42 Tabligh espouses the sufi doctrine of self denial. My informant puts this in
his own understanding of the insatiable worldly desires of the self, the nafsi
(interview with Aslam, 11th October 1991).
"Ripoti ya Naibu wa Mwenyekiti, Mkoa Mashariki". p.5.
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translation in Kiswahili. On one of these visits which lasted three weeks,
30 new converts: seventeen men and thirteen women were won." It is
therefore evident that Tabligh has had an appreciable impact on the spread
of Islam in this area.
In effect, what one sees in the subsequent years after 1980, is a
steady, albeit slow and almost unnoticeable, spread of Islam especially in
the northern (Igembe) part of the district. Mosques in the area have
increased in number and this increase can be seen as an index of the
growing Muslim influence.
Proliferation of Mosques
The first mosque outside Meru town was the one built by the Abashi
(Abssynians) in Mutuati trade centre, opened in 1927. The mosque was used
mainly by the Abashi traders up till 1939 when the trade centre was
closed.1 After the closure of Mutuati, the mosque was demolished and its
materials were transferred to Lare trade centre in 1940 and used for the
construction of a mosque, which remained the only public mosque46 in the
whole of Igembe for almost twenty years. But during the last 15 years,
beginning 1975, the number of mosques in the whole of Meru has risen to
"During my field work, I came across a group of visitors touring the area around
Kiengu Markaz and another at Ngundune in Tigania. They spoke only Urdu and
Arabic through an interpreter. When I enquired, I gathered that they were
Tablighis from Pakistan. I was also struck by the reverence with which they were
treated by the local people.
closure of Mutuati due to what was considered clandestine activities by
people from Ethiopia, Abashi, is discussed in chapter 1, p. 64.
46	 migrant trader at Kangeta, had a small mosque used by his family and
visitors from N.F.D. during the occasional maulid celebrations held there.
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21, the majority of which have been financed externally. 47 Meru
municipality alone has five mosques.
In 1981, a leading Meru sheikh gave a resume of Islam in Igembe in
the following Kiswahili extract from "Sauti Ya Meru", which I will render
into English thus:
'Islam has very many followers in Igembe'.
It is thought by many people that, Islam here in Meru has few
adherents, the truth is that it has many adherents. The fact that can
confirm this is the number of mosques, though there are many other
indicators. Muslims in Meru have 13 mosques which have been
completed, and another six have been planned to be built. There is
a Friday mosque which is the biggest in Meru town; others are Mjini,
Majengo, Makandune, Chuka, Lare, Mikinduri, Kangeta, Maua,
Kiengu, Amaku, Athiru and Ngusishi in Timau. The greatest number
of mosques are in Igembe division, and even the six that have been
planned, will be built in Igembe.
Though there is a certain proportion of Muslims in the areas where
those mosques have been built, the place with the greatest number
of Muslims is Amaku (Antubetwe) in Igembe. When "Sauti ya Meru"
enquired the reason why there are more Muslims there than in Meru
town, the sheikh. . .who is also the chairman of Tabligh in Eastern
Province, said that this is the case because that is his home area and
he has been involved in teaching them Islam; and they have followed
his example. At one time, he, with the help of the area sub-chief,
endeavoured to put an end to witchcraft activities (vitendo vya
uchawi) in Athiru and they have since ceased. One of the important
activities of Muslims here in Meru is the provision of "madarasa"
education. There is madarasa education in all the areas with
Muslims, but the largest is the one known as "Meru Muslim
Community Madarasa", which is near "Sauti ya Meru" office.. 48
Between 1984 and 1986, two magnificent new mosques were constructed
within Meru municipality. One of them was funded by a wealthy sheikh from
Kuwait. A number of mosques have also been built by local individuals, thus each
one has its own history.
See Sauti ya Meru, Juniatatu (Monday), Julai 27, 1981. Mobile Printing
Unit, Meru. This past issue of Sauti ya Meru was given to me by the sheikh,
during one of my visits to his residence. The extract that I have quoted, is part of
his report on Islam in Meru for this magazine which is appropriately called the
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The Sheikh's statement can be regarded as a testimony to the increasing
Islamic influence in the area. It is important to note that he begins by
correcting what he sees as an erroneous impression about Islam in Meru.
He cites the growing number of mosques as one of the indicators of growth
of the Muslim following. Six new mosques were planned in Igembe alone,
and they have since been built. 49 Most of the funds for the construction of
these mosques (though most of them are semi-permanent structures of wood
and iron sheets) is obtained as donations from organizations and rich
individuals through a leading local Asian Muslim who is well connected
with Pakistan and some Muslim organizations outside the country.
He has made it his duty to build mosques and run the affairs of Muslims
in this area.
In 1983, the Honorary Director-General of the Islamic Foundation
stressed the importance of mosques in the life of a Muslim and for
the dissemination and establishment of Islam. He laid equal
emphasis on the proper upkeep of mosques and the need to develop
them again into regular places of worship and centres of Islamic
activities and functions. The importance of building new mosques and
generating mosque-consciousness and constant love for them was also
driven home.5°
'Voice of Meru', but unfortunately no longer in circulation.
' Also there are others which have been proposed and plots for the
construction have been obtained or are in the process of being obtained. The report
prepared by the chairman of the committee that looks after the mosques in the
area lists 16 mosques in Igembe alone, perhaps because it includes even those that
have been planned but not built as yet.
50 Mtito Adei mosque in in Machakos was opened on 4th December 1983. In his
opening address during the well-attended opening ceremony, the Honorary
Director-General of Islamic Foundation, Br. Muhammad Aktar Rao, stressed the
importance of building and maintaining mosques, see Al-Islam, Vol.8, No.2, June
1984.
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This proliferation of mosques in Meru can be accounted for in either of the
two ways: either as part of the scheme by Tabligh activists to disseminate
Islam; or as an index of the actual growth and development of Islam in the
area. New mosques are known to have been built after disagreement over
the administration and control of the existing ones, nevertheless, one hardly
finds a mosque where there are no Muslims to make use of it. For each of
the mosques that I visited outside the municipal precincts, there were
Muslims, at least a family, living in the vicinity of the mosque. It could well
be that the increase in the number of mosques reflects an increasing Islamic
influence, a new phase for Islam in the area.
Of particular significance is the mosque at Kiengu, approximately
four miles from Maua town. To the local Muslims, it is known as Marikaz,
derived from the Arabic term Al-Markaz, which means centre. The history
of Kiengu mosque is, in a sense, the history of the growth of Islam in this
part of Meru. One version of it says that between 1961 and 1964, Lare
being the only public mosque in the whole of Igembe, a handful of Muslims
(11 families) living in and around Kiengu prayed under a tree on the site
where the Markaz stands today, with Sheikh Ramadhan from Kina as the
teacher.5 ' In 1964, through a collective effort, they put up a temporary
structure of wood and mud on this site donated to them by one Hamisi. In
1967, the road to Meru National Park was made, 52
 through Kiengu. As I
have said in chapter 4, Muslims in Igembe had all along maintained
stronger ties with the former N.F.D. than with Majengo and Mjini, this road
(which passed near the mosque site) therefore, by providing a direct link
between Igembe and the Kina region, facilitated a two-way traffic: people
in Igembe could easily travel to Kina and beyond to the former N.F.D. and
vice versa. The mosque, now strategically located beside the new road,
51 Interview with Mustafa, Kiengu, 12th October 1991.
52 The road to Meru National Park links Igembe with Kina, which has a
significant Muslim population, mainly the Borana.
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provided an appropriate staging post. However, for lack of a quorum, that
is 40 male worshippers in attendance, which, according to the Shafi school
of law, is a necessary condition for Friday sermon (khutba), they performed
only mid-day (dhuhur) prayers on Fridays.53
Later on, with the help of an Asian trader at Maua who donated
building materials, a better structure of corrugated iron sheets and cement
was put up. Thanks to a Tabligh group from Pakistan who visited the
Masjid-al-Noor (that was the original name of Kiengu mosque) early in 1981
and offered financial assistance for the construction of a permanent mosque.
By this time, Tabligh was gaining ground in the area and therefore, it was
decided that the site should be consecrated before the construction took
place. Darwesh, (the revered Tabligh leader, mentioned above) sent a group
of 15 Sufis to determine the direction of the Qibla of the mosque which
would henceforth become Al-Markaz. The leading Asian Muslim, whose
missionary work has been responsible for much of the growth of Islam in
this part of Meru since the beginning of the 1980s, undertook the
construction of the mosque. It was completed in 1982.
The Markaz has come to be looked upon as the Muslim centre in
Igembe. To many Muslims, the replacement of the insignificant - looking
structure which for many years served as the mosque, with the 'magnificent'
Markaz is an indication of Muslim triumph. The Markaz is a monumental
testimony to their present success. 54 When I first went there, I found
The disagreement between Sheikh Hioli and Sheikh Omar over the issue
of khutba at this mosque is examined in chapter 4 (pp.196-197). The one advocated
the reading of khutba to a congregation of less than 40 on the grounds that, the
sparsity of the resident Muslim population is sumcient justification for the reading
of khutba to those in attendance; while the other insisted on the fulfilment of the
stipulated requirements.
As has been said above, with the exception of the mosque at Lare and the
Markaz, other mosques in this area are semi-permanent structures, made of wood
and iron sheets.
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Mama Salwa, an elderly woman who looks after the mosque. She introduced
herself as "the Mother of the Markaz". Explaining why she lives in a house
on the mosque compound, Mama Salwa said that "Markaz should not be left
without a permanent resident to look after it and to receive any guest that
might come in any time". By virtue of her residence at the mosque, she has
become an important personality in the administration of its affairs.55
Since Markaz is the Muslim centre in Igembe many Muslims walk
long distances to attend the Friday prayer there. Its central role in Igembe
is also due to the absence of Imams or madrasa teachers or other qualified
individuals who can lead the prayers in many of the smaller mosques.
Furthermore, I observed that many of the women were unable to actually
perform prayers, ignorant as they were of the details of the various
postures, to say nothing of praying in Arabic. For them therefore, the
congregational Friday prayer compensates for their inability to pray on
their own at other times. Indeed, a good number of women said that they
pray only on Fridays when they come to the Markaz to hear the khutba.56
On the whole, most of the informants, said that the spiritual significance
of congregational prayer was the main reason for this pattern of long Friday
treks to Markaz.57 For instance, I met a man who told me that he walks
Mama Salwa lives at the mosque. She looks after the children who attend
the inadrasa. She said that she gave up everything to come and live there because
she felt that the "Markaz is special and it should not be without a devoted
attendant" (interview 8th October 1991).
56 The sermons are well attended. It was difficult to find out the themes of the
various sermons from the informants, but from those that I attended, the themes
varied and the emphasis shifted from one to another. For instance on one occasion,
the Imam emphasized unity among the local Muslims. The theme of unity was
well in context because only two days before that two factions had fought at the
mosque, with the result that the police were called into the mosque. On another,
a guest speaker elaborated on the importance of living one's faith - that is a
Muslims should stand out among others, be seen to be different.
Segregation of sexes is taken seriously, therefore, since there is no provision
for women to pray separately in the main mosque building, the veranda is
partitioned with a curtain to create a section for the women during Friday prayer,
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10 miles, beginning his journey on Thursday evening so as to attend the
Friday prayers at this mosque. When I suggested that he could go to
another mosque which is only 5 miles away from his home, he seized the
opportunity to enumerate what he believed to be the benefits of this long
journey for the sole purpose of praying at the Markas. Having been a
Catholic prior to his conversion to Islam, this man compared the Markaz
with a cathedral in prestige and function for the local Muslims. And indeed
it is, when compared to other local mosques which are semi-permanent
made of wood and iron sheets. Also it serves as the headquarters, for all the
other mosques in the area are administered from there: the provisions are
stored there and the mosque chairman is in charge of the committee that
is responsible for the distribution of such items as blankets, clothing which
come as donations to the Muslims in the area (see below) and construction
materials for maintenance of the other mosques.
With the exception of the Markaz, Lare and Kina, the other mosques
in this area are much smaller, most of them being temporary wood-and-iron
structures. It is interesting to observe that a good number of them were
built either by individuals on their own plots of land, or through individual
efforts. Seven others were obtained by the now defunct Igembe Muslim
Committee. Describing these mosques and the role that they play, one of
these pioneers, whose family mosque has now developed into a fairly big
mosque, with a regularly attended madrasa and a resident teacher, said
that:
These small mosques were initially founded as places for 'giving
birth' to Muslims (meaning to convert people to Islam) within a
particular locality.58
But when the attendance is high, women sit outside the mosque. As said in
chapter 5 (pp. 2 19-221) laxity and flouting of the rules of segregation of men and
women during the celebration of maulid , is one of the issues hotly contested by the
anti-maulid activists in the raging maulid debate in Meru.
Interview with Hussam, Amaku, 11th September 1991.
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It should be remarked that since these mosques, are normally found
near the homes of prominent Muslims, it is not unusual to find a sheikh or
sometimes the teacher, using such homes as a base for providing his
medical and divinatory services which are usually in great demand by both
Muslims and non-Muslims. For instance, one day I visited the homestead
of a prominent local Muslim and by some strange coincidence I had the
fortune of meeting one of the most revered Borana sheikhs in the area.59
He had come on a routine visit, but of course on such visits he sees many
clients particularly those with health-related problems. I observed that
there were three 'guests' waiting to see him. He had a room in the main
house where the guests went in turn to see him. When my turn came, I
went in and before I could explain the purpose of my visit, he began to
prepare himself for the session. When I said research was the purpose of
my visit, he relaxed but insisted that I should drink some water which he
had prayed over. In the process, I gathered that the other three 'guests'
were patients needing treatment. He explained that during some of these
treatment sessions some of the clients became Muslims. If any of them
decided to convert, the sheikh took them to the mosque, which is only three
hundred yards outside the precincts of the homestead, and "after giving
them the shahada",6° he declared them Muslims. On other occasions,
clients coming from far would first wait at or near the mosque, where they
would be sure to see him during the times of prayer.
However, it would be misleading to give the impression that in these
mosques, one finds large congregations at each prayer time. In half of the
ones that I visited at different prayer times, I found between five and ten
The role of Sheikh Hiloli as a healer has been discussed in chapter 4, pp.
194-195.
60 The phrase "giving the shahada" means that those wishing to convert to
Islam declare their intention in front of the sheikh who them teaches them to
make the profession of the faith, that 'I believe that there is no god but Allah and
Mohimmed is His Prophet'. Then they are given 'religious' (Arabic) names and
told not to eat meat from dead animals or drink alcohol.
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people; while in others, only the teacher, the madrasa pupils and a few
adults observed regular attendance. The significant point for us is that
many new congregations, irrespective of their size, have been established
within a period of 15 years by rallying individuals around a mosque. I also
observed that in two mosques, children from non-Muslim families were
admitted into the madrasa and given Islamic religious education. In one
mosque, for instance, the teacher told me that, out of a total of 24 children,
14 were from non-Muslim families; while in another, there were 9 such
children out of a total of 28. When I enquired from both teachers what was
the reason for this, their response was that since
every child is born a Muslim and only to be taught otherwise by the
guardians, this is the opportunity to bring children back to the fold.
It is also a way of spreading Islam.6'
The mosques here also serve as centres for the distribution of sadaqa, or
gifts which are normally brought by a prominent Muslim either from abroad
or from the well-to-do Muslims in other parts of the country. At one time,
1,200 items: blankets, kanzu, leso and dresses were distributed to Muslims
in this area.62 These items were given only to Muslims, which therefore
suggests that there is a large number of Muslims, which is not reflected in
the often scanty and irregular mosque attendance that one see in this area.
This leads the discussion to the pertinent question of the nature of this
Islamic influence. In other words, what are the salient characteristics of
Islam in this area?
61 Half of the children at the Markaz madrasa are residents. Their teacher
explained that residence at the centre was necessary to ensure that the children
were not distracted. These children have no access to western education.
62 One of the committee that is responsible for the distribution as well as the
administration of the mosques, explained that the converts, especially "women
need help with the religious dresses", meaning long dresses, "so as to encourage
them and some of them may not be able to buy this type of dress". Interview with
Mustafa, Markaz, 12th October 1991.
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Dynamics of Conversion
So far, the evidence assembled above points to a growing Islamic
influence in the area in question. However, it is not enough to suggest that
Tabligh has been instrumental in this growth; it is necessary to go a little
further and examine the effects of this Muslim presence and influence. In
other words, to ask about the force and scope of Tabligh influence: has it
changed those who as a result of it have converted and to what extent?
Have those who have converted really changed their way of life as a result
or have they been engaged in a mere outward profession of faith?
A closer look at the local situation reveals an underlying cleavage
between the Majengo and Mjini residents who exhibit an established
Islamic character, and the new Tabligh converts whose conversion is limited
to acquiring an Arabic name and visiting the mosques during the
calendrical religious festivals. On one occasion, Sheikh Ahmed (of whom
previous mention has been made) in spite of his appreciation of the growing
Muslim influence in this area, showed an ambivalent attitude towards the
converts, dismissing them as "In.shallah Muslims".
The only advantage is that they are increasing in quantity, though
not in quality. But there is great hope that their children will be
better Muslims in the future.63
The point to note here is that conversion is taking place in this region for
the first time without the attendant acculturation that was hitherto, prior
to the advent of Tabligh, regarded as an integral part of the conversion
process. This can be illustrated by the case of Asuman's two wives. Being
a Muslim, Asuinarn had found it very difficult to find a wife, for no self
respecting elder in Igembe would marry his daughter to one who had
become a Muslim (in other words a Swahili). The only alternative open to
Interview with Sheikh Abmed, Mjini, 26th October 1991.
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Asumani was to find a Christian girl (there were a few Christian families
in the area in the late 1940s) who had been exposed to Christian missionary
influence and would perhaps find it easier to embrace another faith. She
herself had this to say:
At that time (1950) there were no Muslim families living in this area,
but Asuman felt that I needed to be instructed in the Muslim
etiquette. So I went to live with a Muslim family in Lare for several
months during which, Mama Ali instructed me on how to be a good
Muslim woman. I learnt how to pray from my husband, but Mama
All taught me how to observe tohara; how to cook good food - you see
my husband had become used to such things as rice, tea and spiced
food while living in N.F.D. Therefore, it was necessary for me to
learn how to prepare this kind of food; and also be able to host his
guests when they come during the maulid. I had to adopt a new life-
style altogether. My husband did not want me to embarrass him by
being clumsy like a mshenzi. He expected me to show that now I was
a changed person.64
The full details of this education process that she underwent for a
period of three months may not be accessible to us; nevertheless, it is clear
from these few points that observance of such outward signs as mode of
dress and food were the treasured attributes of a 'true Muslim'. Hence it
was deemed necessary for Ainina to learn the Swahili culture even before
she could live with her husband and the training she received from Mama
Au for several months was considered to be an integral part of the
Islamization process. Amina can read the Quran (though she admitted that
she can barely understand what she reads); she goes to the mosque
regularly; maintains a distinctive mode of dress; speaks Swahili and cooks
the Swahili type of food. Sarah., his younger wife, did not undergo such a
process of acculturation and the discrepancy in conformity to the external
64 visited Asumani's homestead several times during my field work. Even to
an observer, the discrepancy in the levels of Swahilization between his two wives
is striking, Amina went through a process of acculturation which is evident in her
use of external signs of compliance, unlike Sarah who did not under go such a
process and therefore shows no signs of external trappings of Swahili-Islamic
culture.
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signs of compliance between the two women is striking to an observer.
Sa1ra, like most Tabligh converts, cannot read Arabic or even perform jier
prayers correctly.
Here, I will examine the dynamics of this conversion, in particu:lar,
the reasons for and events leading to conversion. A significant proportion
of these, claimed to have been nominal Catholics prior to conversion. For
instance two of my informants said that they had failed to raise children in
their first marriages, and out of the "necessity to beget children", they left
the church in order to marry a second wife. Islamic advocacy of polygamy
offered an alternative to the Catholic ideals of monogamy. In order to
explain the significance of this claim, it is necessary for us to put it in the
relevant Meru cultural context. Children are highly valued among the
Meru. The images of procreation are reflected in every aspect of daily life
in various contexts, including jokes. For instance, it is not uncommon for
one to hear an older person shouting to a younger person: "may you
increase the others" (meaning my best wish for you is the ability to have
many children), especially when he is feigning annoyance. If an individual
dies either before child-bearing age, or as an adult without begetting
children, his name is not to be mentioned at any time. Indeed it becomes a
taboo to mention the name of such a person. They are supposed to be
forgotten. At death, the body of such a person is disposed of in a different
maimer from that of one who has descendants. It is clear therefore that no
person would wish to incur such a misfortune on themselves and their
family. Seen in this light, it was incumbent upon the men to give
themselves a second, and even a third chance, if necessary, to beget
children. The way to do this is to marry more than one wife, which one
cannot do if one is a member of the church.
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Admittedly, the Catholic and the Methodist churches are fairly strong
in Meru district.65 From the personal accounts of informants, I gathered
that a great majority of those who claimed to have been members of either
church prior to conversion, had been nominal members. However, there
were many who were not Christians and hence there are many cases which
can furnish an interesting analysis of the reasons for conversion of non-
Christians to Islam.
Nowadays the religious situation of the majority of the people in
many parts of Kenya is rather ambiguous. In Meru, it is difficult to
categorize the beliefs of many peop1e as either Christian or African
traditional. The reason for this ambiguity being that many of the traditional
Meru social-political institutions have disintegrated as a result of a rapid
process of westernization. Attitudes and values have changed - many
hitherto auspicious occasions, sacred items, places and animals,66 have lost
their sacredness. A good example is Njaambene, the sacred mountain on
which the Meru went "to pray during the most important occasions of tribal
event or need"67 but whose summit is now desacralized by the installation
of a satellite to boost telecommunications in the northern part of the
district. Similarly, the huge Meru forest, believed during the early years of
this century to be inhabited by evil spirits ,68 has been bulldozed by estate
65 It has been said that the first Methodist mission was opened at Kaaga, near
Meru town in 1910 (Nthamburi (1982:20). The first Catholic missions were opened
in Imenti and Igoji in 1911 (Catholic Directory of East Africa, 1965, TMP Book
department, Tabora). The Presbyterian Church of East Africa (P.C.E.A.) came to
Chogoria, in the southern part of the district at about the same time.
66 J M. Baikiao, 1977:129-162, in his discussion of the concept of the sacred
among the Meru, provides a detailed description of the sacred personalities, places,
colours, numbers, items, animals and plants.
67 Ibid.p. 132.
It has been said in chapter 1 (p.2'7) that when the first European
administrator arrived in Meru, he was allowed to set up in the forest which was
believed to be the abode of powerful spirits and therefore unfit for human
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developers, and so have other sacred places to make roads and room for
other modern amenities - ripped by the ineluctable forces of civilization, so
to say. The ambiguity caused by these forces of modernity, and the fact that
the notion of 'belief is alien among the Meru, became manifest when some
of the individuals who have converted to Islam were asked to say what their
beliefs were before their conversion. It was clearly difficult for many of
them to identify precisely what their beliefs were. To many people, the idea
of God has little to do with belief in the efficacy of curses69 and the power
of witchcraft, for instance. Indeed one can say of the Meru, and perhaps of
many other African peoples, the question of belief (in God) does not arise -
there is no question of whether one believes or disbelieves.70
Life among the Meru for instance, was a unitary system. This means
that if, for example, the rain failed, it was known to the society that
something must be done to bring the rain and avert possible calamity such
habitation.
69 The following case could well illustrate the belief in the efficacy of curses. A
Meru man who worked for the first colonial administrator, Edward Butler Home,
as an informer after Home's arrival in Meru in 1908, earned himself a bad
reputation throughout the region. During the course of his service, he converted
to Islam. He proved useful for the administration, especially in their relentless
determination to root out the secret societies. It was feared that secret societies
could lead to civil disobedience and therefore it was deemed necessary to curb
their activities, particularly in the northern part of the district. Something of the
nature of secret police/agent was hitherto unknown in Meru, and hence a curse
was placed on this man by the traditional supreme council of elders, Njuri, at its
grand meeting held at Miori, a few miles away from Maua. My informants did not
know the date when the curse was placed on him, but it was either in the late
1930s or early 1940s. He died in 1957, but recently, his eldest son (though a
Muslim) felt the need to appeal to the council to lift the curse on his own behalf
and that of the entire family. It was imperative for him to do that especially
because he had no son, which was an indication that the curse was beginning to
take effect on the family. Therefore, in propitiation, the first son offered a bull to
the Njuri, in which the collective will and power of the people is embodied. The
Njuri members went to this man's homestead and blessed the family.
70 L. Brenner, 1989:87-9 gives an interesting analysis of the notion of belief in
his article on religious discourse in Africa.
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as drought. The remedies were known and the relevant steps were taken
by the ritual experts without delay - sacrifices were made and surprisingly
enough rain would come. Again if an avoidance taboo were breached, the
resultant ritual impurity would be removed through a prescribed process of
cleansing of the affected persons, and there were different ways of dealing
with different taboos. To the pioneer western scholars such as Evans-
Pritchard, such practical solutions, and the value system underpinning their
application to situations in daily life, constituted the primitive religions of
Africa. These practices, which were initially regarded by western scholars
as paganism, are now termed 'African religions', but, Mudimbe argues it
should be noted that the reality of Africa has not changed, it is our kind of
analysis that has changed.7'
A Case of Witchcraft
As will be illustrated by Nchulubi's case analyzed below, sickness and
the fear of witchcraft are important factors of conversion particularly in
rural Meru. This is not peculiar to Meru (but clearly it is very much more
widespread; it has been observed among the Digo and the Giriama of the
Kenya's coast) sickness and spirit possession were significant factors of
conversion. Among the Dogo, Islam became associated with more efficacious
supernatural powers than the traditional methods of dealing with the
phenomenon of spirit possession. Therefore when a person was afflicted
with spirit possession, he was diagnosed as having "an Arab's devil" whose
only cure was conversion to Islam.72 Similarly, Parkin observed that
among the Giriama,
71 y Mudimbe, Public Lecture, S.O.A.S. 21)5/93.
72 D. C. Sperling, 1970:9-10.
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in some cases of spirit possession, divination, and cure, there is
acceptance of the superior ritual efficacy of Islam among a people
who have persistently rejected formal widespread conversion.73
Both Parkin and Sperling attribute the preference for the Muslim
resource over the traditional means of dealing with spirit possession to
what they see as the superiority of Islamic ritual over the traditional means
of dealing with the supernatural. This view can be challenged on the basis
of later studies74 which show that contrary to the classical view that Islam
was accommodated by the traditional African cultures, these cultures
invested the new religion with its African identity, and today one can even
speak of the many Islamic identities in Africa. What both Parkin and
Sperling see as superiority of Islam over traditional cultures of the Digo and
Giriama, can also be seen as attraction to the novelty of the Muslim
resource rather than its superiority over the traditional ritual. However,
incidents of spirit possession are not reported by Meru informants, but even
with a few examples, it is not difficult to confirm Lewis' suggestion that:
The appeal of Muslim therapeutic techniques and indeed of Islam
itself as a mystical defence system has... been underestimated in
analyzing the spread of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa.75
Below, I shall examine a typical case of a recent sickness-related
conversion of a non-Christian to Islam in which the fear of infliction of
harm by adversaries is an equally important factor. Nchulubi has been a
Muslim for the last five years, since 1986. In the following extract from a
lengthy interview, she narrates the circumstances leading to her conversion:
D. Parkin, 1970:224-225.
" L. Sanneh, (1985) for instance shows that Islam was not merely
accommodated in Africa.
I. M. Lewis, 1986:98.
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My daughter, I do not know why you want to know my life history,
it is a sad one. But if you really want to know, I will tell you what
happened to me. I was married to M'Akairi and lived with him for
many years in Thitha as you can see I am not a young girl. Anyway,
you want to know how I became a Muslim, so I will talk about that.
While at Thitha, I did not come into contact with Islam - it was only
M'Ibuuri and Asuman and their families who were Muslims in that
place... after my third son was circumcised, my husband was
bewitched by a jealous neighbour with whom my family had a
strained relationship. So he began to roam around the village and
finally he became completely mad. I took him to a well known diviner
who confirmed that the neighbour was responsible for what was
happening to him. So we moved away to another place where we had
a piece of land and my husband began to show signs of recovery, only
to relapse after a few months. This time, his brothers insisted on
taking him to Mathari mental hospital in Nairobi, he spent three
months. When he was discharged from the hospital, he looked well
recovered. But you know that the medicine given in the hospitals is
hopeless if the victim is bewitched - so no sooner had he shown signs
of recovery than he relapsed again and before we could do anything,
he passed away.
After that, I thought the best thing to do for the safety of my
children, was to go back to my parents and stay there. But believe it
or not, my enemy had not given up - my eldest son also became mad
within a year of settling at my parents' place. It left no doubt now
that somebody was determined to destroy us and perhaps wipe out
the whole family. At that point, I had to do something, and so I went
to see a sheikh. The sheikh said that he could treat my son and after
a month of careful treatment at the sheikh's home, the boy was well
again. All the same, the enemy had not been defeated and in all
probability, he might strike again. So the sheikh said that my
children and I could be protected against the power of those intent
on harming us, if we converted to Islam. So we 'took' Asaatu (the
shahada or confession of faith). Since then, I have not been troubled
again and my children are doing well. Of course those people (the
neighbour) are washenzi and they are powerless against us. (But they
have caused you a great deal of trouble before, why do you think that
you are not vulnerable any more? I asked.) The sheikh 'read the book'
and assured me that I am now protected. I believe that now their
power is weakened.76
76 Interview with Nchulubi, Kiengu market, 1st August 1991.
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The Meru construction of witchcraft is given in chapter 3.
Recognizing and dealing with it is a personal as well as a social affair. As
in Brantley's observation, "wherever the belief in witchcraft permeated an
African society, fear prevailed and people demanded protection and
control".77 Among the Meru as well as among other societies, sickness, and
especially the more intractable type like madness, is attributed to evil
machinations of others who may themselves be witches or seek the services
of witches and/or sorcerers to inflict harm on their victims. In this case,
Nchulubi finds the explanation for her husband's suffering in her
neighbour's envy and desire to exact revenge. Beckerleg has shown that
envy can provide strong motivation for injuring others through the agency
of witchcraft.78 Nchulubi holds the belief that the western-trained doctor
has little knowledge and skill to deal with victims of witchcraft, so she first
takes her husband to a traditional medical practitioner, whom she believes
has not only the necessary skill, but also the power to counter that of the
witch. That her husband relapses after 3 months' treatment at Mathari
psychiatric hospital, is itself a testimony to the inadequacy of modern
medicine in dealing with witchcraft. Mutungi testifies that:
It is not uncommon.., for patients who are convinced that they have
been bewitched, to be discharged from the hospital with a
prescription first to consult a native medicineman. And it has
worked.79
Similarly, in this case, it is interesting to note that the lapses into
madness are attributed to the determination of the enemy, without the
faintest idea that irregularity in the administration of the prescribed
medication may be a more plausible explanation. The first two alternatives,
C. Brantley, 1979:112.
78 S. Beckerleg, 1990:227.
K. Mutungi, 1977:xvii.
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namely, moving to a different place and seeking modern hospital treatment,
did not yield much help and she lost her husband.
Even after moving to her parents' place, the jealous neighbour is not
deterred and the threat of the whole family being wiped out looms large in
her mind. It is imperative that the power of this apparently inescapable evil
be countered with commensurate force. Conversion to Islam provides this
force. The preference for the sheikh to the church minister, is predicated on
the popular notion that Muslim magic is superior to Meru traditional magic.
Besides, the church minister is most likely to dismiss it as the work of the
devil without offering any help. Muslim magic derives its greater potency
from "reading" of the book' (Quran) written in a strange language,
Arabic.8° The sheikh's "reading" of the book can be equally to help and to
harm, for Nchulubi it provides the necessary reassurance. Thus the
"reading" can be equally to help, and to harm - the Gahazi factor again.
This notion of "reading" to harm is expressed in everyday
conversation - it is not uncommon to hear that: "...if you do that to me, I
will go to the Waswahili", meaning, I will have the book "read for you", and
the unfinished part of the sentence is "you will have only yourself to blame
for the consequences if you push me that far". It is also a common remark
that "it is not for nothing that s/he is behaving in a strange manner, s/he
has been read for", meaning that the person concerned is a victim of a
sheikh's reading of the book. The reading is said to be particularly
efficacious in cases of stealing, cheating and intent to harm others. It is a
widespread belief that once the reading has been done, the victim will
either die or become demented. The 'reading' is interpreted within the Meru
understanding of curse,8' which has the potency to incur inevitable
80 The power of the written word is discussed in chapter 2, p. 98.
81 See chapter 2 (pp . 111-114) for the explanation of the diffuse working of a
curse. It is passed on from one generation to another.
285
misfortune. In this light, when the reading is done, Nchullubi is assured
that not only the intended harm by the neighbour is averted, in addition,
the reading is retributive. In a sense, the reading reverses their roles - the
tormenter is turned into the victim and the victim the victor. It is important
to point out here that this is not the 'Islam' of Tabligh - Nchulubi did not
seek the help of one of the Tabligh Amiri. This particular sheikh she went
to was renowned for his magical powers and efficacy of his 'reading'. It is
such ideas and practices of popular Islam that the Tabligh teachers were
quick to condemn as unislamic, though this does not mean that the
practices were dropped altogether.
Nchulubi displayed considerable faith in the protection that Islam
can provide to her family. Her quest for protection was not in the least half-
hearted, hence her quest for Islam was largely a quest for protection. In
spite of her limited knowledge of Islam (if at all) she resorted th it for
protection. She could feel an almost tangible protection in the power of a
book written in a language she could not understand. This sense of
protection is concretized by the amulet that is given to her by the sheikh.
She was also given some other protective charm to keep somewhere in her
house.
Nzibo in his description of the cultural elements found among the
residents of the early Muslim settlements in Nairobi, says that:
The practice of wearing amulets was by the end of the 1950s largely
abandoned and replaced by picture frames containing verses of the
Quran.2
What Nzibo calls an abandonment of amulets can, in the contrary, be seen
as a change from amulets being held on the person to being hanged in the
wall. The written charm as Goody notes, "is considered so effective because
82 Y. A. Nzibo, 1986:145.
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it gives speech concrete embodiment", therefore the picture frame with
Quranic inscriptions on it essentially serves the same purpose as the
protective charm tied around the wrist or waist. These too, contain Qurarnc
verses. Thus it is a change from one form of amulet to a more socially
acceptable one, perhaps also as status symbol to reflect a changing (or
progressive) Muslim society. It should also be pointed out that even this
change, after 1950 as Nzibo suggests, was not universal for all Muslim
communities. In some of the homes that I visited, I observed a wide use of
protective amulets especially for young children, aged between 6 months
and 5 years. Indeed in one homestead, the small children wore their
protective amulets, hirizi, while in a corner of the wall of a large room
which served as the living-room and a bed-room, stood a fairly large picture
frame with Quranic inscriptions on it. When I enquired about it, I learnt
that it had been there for the last 30 years. Even non-Muslims take their
children to the sheikh to have these amulets made for them. The contents
of the amulets remain secret from its wearer, for it is believed that opening
it and disclosing its essence, does not only deprive it of its potency and
render it ineffective, but worse still, such profane behaviour (for that is
what it amounts to) would surely incur a misfortune. While in ordinary
circumstances, the amulet provides protection, for instance, against the evil
eye, for Nchulubi it guarantees Muslim protection against the power of her
enemies, whom she now regards as washenzi.
In a sense, the protective charm that Nchulubi is given by the sheikh
to keep somewhere in her house is reminiscent of the Meru traditional
protective symbol known as ikanda in Kimeru, kept at the entrance of a
homestead to ward off evil.M Nchulubi's limited knowledge of the diffuse
J. Goody, 1968:227.
84 It was a common practice among the Meru to place ikanda on top corner of
the gate in the belief that if any one in possession of witchcraft tried to enter
through the homestead, they would either be deterred or their power debilitated.
The contents of ikanda are unknown to the rest of the people as it belongs to the
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working of the amulet is informed by the traditional understanding of
magical protection; except in this case, Islam lends greater power and
potency to hirizi? Simmons in his study of conversion in Tonghia, a
Senegalese village, West Africa, posited the occurrence of conversion as both
continuous and discontinuous. Though the intervening variables are
different in Tonghia from what they are in Meru, Simmons hypothesis is
nevertheless instructive in Nchulubi's case. It can be seen as a case of
conversion at non-symbolic level since there is no actual change of the
convert's "mode of attachment to sacred symbols or replacement of one set
of symbols by another". Though ikanda is replaced by hirizi and
Nchulubi feels secure, to her it is the same object of protection, the only
difference between the two being the sources from where they draw their
potency - one traditional Meru, and the other Muslim.
Be that as it may, the pertinent question regarding Nchulubi's
understanding of Islam comes to the fore. Understanding Nchulubi's
perception of Islam entails an examination of the ways and means by which
she, and others like her, seek to organize their religious observance. In
other words, their perception of the priorities of religious behaviour. The
first day of our meeting was a Friday, she had walked a distance of five
miles to come to the Markaz at Kiengu. She makes this trip every fortnight
on the understanding that if she cannot read for herself, she "can listen to
those who can read", as she put it. Without knowledge of Arabic, it is
difficult for the women (and others) to verbalize the refrain after the
Imam's benediction. On this occasion, while the prayers were in progress,
Nyanya Fatuma (of whom previous mention has been made) kept urging the
women to observe the correct posture. When I asked her why this was so,
domain of the medicinemen.
The use of Islamic hiriz is not peculiar to East Africa, saphy or safi is the
Mandingo word for the written charm, J. Goody, 1968:20 1.
W. S. Simmons, 1979:303.
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she seized the opportunity to describe what she regarded as an "appalling
state of ignorance of the local Muslim women". However, one point was
clearly emphasized - that regardless of this, they were 'Muslim'. They had
'taken Asaatu' (shahackz) and they observed the distinction between halal
and haram meat.
In their perception of propriety of religious duties and obligations,
this single observance is of utmost significance. For Nchulubi and many
others like her, Muslim identity is otherwise manifested through the Friday
mosque trip; an occasional visit to the area by a prominent religious leader;
and the annual Muslim festivals 87 which bring together all the faithful at
the Markaz. At home she is surrounded by neighbours and friends, but she
believes that, having taken the shahada, she is different from them. Her
relatives see her as a Muthoiri, (a Swahili) a label usually appended not
only to local converts, but to Muslims in general. But she does not see
herself as such, partly because of the pejorative connotations of such an
appellation particularly outside the social network of Majengo and partly
because she has not undergone an acculturation process that was an
integral part of conversion during the early days. Though Nchulubi's
conversion was not directly linked with the Tabligh activities, one of the
striking features of the Tabligh-borne conversion in this area, is that it is
devoid of Swahili-Islamic acculturation, hitherto regarded as an integral
part of the conversion process. As I have said above, the emphasis on direct
unmediated (by the sheikh) contact furnishes the basis for the Tabligh
message of conversion to Islam, a message which in principle disregards
cultural transformation and focuses largely on acceptance/profession of the
faith.
87 Ramadhan is particularly important, it is the time when Muslims all over
the world fast and abstain in many ways and after the fasting, celebrations are
held. I observed that in this remote Kiengu area, the celebrations had the
connotations of a public holiday and even for those Muslims that did not observe
the fast, it was the time to feel one with the Muslim Ummah. Guests came from
as far as Pakistan and gifts and food were distributed to a large congregation.
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Many details are generally inaccessible to the majority of the
converts. For instance, I knew a teacher at one of the small mosques who
held religious instruction sessions once a week at the mosque for a group
of 8 men. There was no woman attending these sessions, neither was there
a facility for them to be instructed by a female teacher, if the reason for
their conspicuous absence was the prescribed observance of the segregation
of sexes. When I enquired what was being done about the women, the
teacher said that, even for the men attending the sessions, it was
unnecessary to go into many details about the teachings of Islam. Too many
details might be an encumbrance to the converts who are apparently
'tottering', so to say, from a condition of unbelief to belief, that is from
ushenzi to dini.
Competing Identities: the Muslim Dilemma
"...if one can be a 'practicing Muslim', one can, by implication, be a
'non-practicing Muslim': one who drinks alcoholic beverages, who does not
pray regularly or observe the fast of Raniadhan, and so forth". There are
many kinds of Muslims. The way in which this identity is translated in
terms of religious observance in the area in question, furnishes the
distinction between the two categories that I have differentiated above;
namely, it sets apart the believers from the others or washenzi. To the
Muslims themselves, the dichotomy is significant and hence in the process
of translating it into practical terms, the Muslims in the rural areas have
found themselves in a dilemma, an identity crisis.
A basic element of my interpretation of this dilemma constitutes, in
the main, an examination of the projection of self-image of Muslims and
what others make of this image. Launay has shown that, in Koko, where
Islam is much more deeply entrenched that it is in Meru, they have a
R. Launay, 1992:125.
290
legalistic conception of Islamic identity, with specific focus on
prayer... non-Muslims were (for most part) those who continued to
initiate themselves in the sacred forests, to drink and sacrifice to
fetishes.89
In Meru where Islam is a relatively recent phenomenon, such a line of
demarcation is difficult to draw. For the Muslims, it entails the
idiosyncratic struggle between dini and ushenzi, which, as I have shown in
the preceding chapters, is one of the most salient features of Islam in Meru.
First, I will present the paradox as I see it: on the one hand, it is de
rigueur for Muslims to differentiate themselves from washenzi. For the
pioneers, the adoption of Swahili Islamic cultural elements after conversion
readily furnished a means to this end. As a result, the images of Muslim
men wearing long shirts (kanzu), sandals and embroidered caps; and women
wearing ankle-length dresses and head-scarves,90 became stereotyped. This
stereotyped notion of Muslim demeanor demands tangible or external signs
of compliance. For one to be regarded as a 'good Muslim', the mode of dress,
for instance, is often enough an indication of the degree of piety as well as
a Muslim logo. One Ntomariu told me that "the kanzu is the uniform for a
Muslim" and an Amiri said that
the turban is important for Muslim because it is regarded as the
crown of the prophet. One must cover one's head before going to the
toilet because it is the abode of demons, both male and female. Also
a man must cover his head in the presence of women, an uncovered
head amounts to indecent exposure.9'
89 R. Launay, 1992:75.
90 Reference to what has come to be regarded as the traditional attire for
Muslim women, a long (usually) black gown, buibui, is made chapter 1, p. 36
(footnote 32).
91 Interview with Aslam, Amaku, 11th October 1991.
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Underlying this variety of reasons for the use of cap or turban, is the
significance attached to appropriate projection of oneself as a Muslim. On
the other hand, as I have shown in an earlier chapter,92 from the start
Muslims in general commanded little respect from the majority of the Meru
people, first because they were 'Swahili', people well known in the interior
for their proficiency in the use of one sort of magic or another. 93 Muslims
in Meru therefore, were and still are, generally associated with
manipulative magic. Second, they themselves deliberately enhanced this
notion by making ostentatious displays of somewhat strange paraphernalia.
Also some people in Meru convert to promote their own illegitimate power;
they manage to play up their reputation as men who possess supernatural
powers. Similarly, in Watamu on the coast, "self-proclaimed involvement in
Uganga is a standard means to promote one's power and to intimidate
others"94 except that in Meru an ostentatious claim to Islam is in and of
itself an adequate means to this end. The use of this manipulative magic
nevertheless is much sought after for well-intended use as treatment of
peculiar illnesses such as barrenness and madness, or for retribution or for
revenge. As a result, sheikhs and certain other individuals who claim to
possess the necessary skills are consulted and this in turn enhances their
social standing. Occasionally even individual Muslims without any
knowledge of the use of magic are able to harness the local people's fear of
it for their own good. The following potato theft case can well illustrate this
point: Mwanaidi had a piece of farmland in Ruin (one of the new farming
scheme areas) approximately seven miles from Meru town. She cultivated
the land and grew potatoes, but for two consecutive harvests, all the
potatoes were stolen. She had this to say:
92 For a fuller account of the association of Islam and witchcraft by the local
people, see chapter 2, pp. 96-100.
K. Hock (1987) has given a full account on Swahili Islam and magic. The
English summary of this book, which is written in Germany, shows that he has
devoted most of it to the discussion on Swahili magical practices.
S. Beckerleg, 1990:208.
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On the third occasion, I harvested the potatoes and left 7 sackfuls in
a store in the farm and went back to town to hire a truck to
transport them. When I returned the next day, I found the potatoes
were gone. All along, I had suspected the family living nearby was
responsible for the recurrent theft, so since I know many people
believe that Muslim magic is more powerful than Meru magic, and
are afraid of it, I took a piece of white paper and using pieces of
charcoal, made some signs on it. I cannot read or write but I knew
that they too could not read Arabic, so I made signs which I thought
looked like Arabic characters and placed the paper strategically for
all to see. When I returned two days later, I was approached by the
neighbour who confessed that her son had stolen the potatoes and
sold them. She promised to pay compensation within one week
because she now feared that her son had been affected by the Swahili
magic that I had left behind. She said that he was already beginning
to look confused, which she thought was a sign of mental disorder as
a result of the recurrent theft of my potatoes. She said that she had
warned him against stealing them because it was well known that
the owner is a muthoiri, a Muslim.95
From others' point of view being Muslim is synonymous with 'Swalihiness'.
The Muslims do not see themselves as such, and in fact detest the
appellation because of its pejorative connotations. Many of my informants
took great care to explain that they are 'Muslim' and not 'Swahili'.
magic
Generally it is detestable to be identified as practitioner of deleterious,,but
at another level, the same notion is turned by Mwanaicli into an asset. Her
bold notice written in a strange (supposedly magical) language was to her
intended audience, a confirmation of what is usually suspected of Muslims.
Since she was also aware that this suspicion looms large in the minds of
many people, by manipulating the idea that as a Muslim she was liable to
resort to the use of a deleterious magic, she was able to recover the lost
property. For her, it was the utility of this suspicion in the circumstances
that mattered, and not its implications to the rest of the people.
For the recent (after 1980) Tabligh converts, these occasional
ostentatious displays of Swahili-Islamic magic add another dimension to
Interview with Mwanaidi, Mjini, 20th November 1991.
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their identity crisis. The paradox is that on the one hand, they must
identify as Muslims; and on the other, such an identification automatically
places them squarely in the category of people like Mwanaidi who openly
admit that they are users of manipulative magic. The situation is
complicated further by a normative rule enshrined in the local custom that
reinforces the undesirability of standing out among others, which causes a
psychological conflict for a new convert living amid non-Muslim neighbours
and friends in the rural area outside the Majengo social network.
As a result, many of them, especially women, find it difficult to strike
a compromise between the desirability of sustaining a conspicuously Muslim
identity, and the absolute indispensability of good social standing, devoid
of the negative connotations that attend such an identity. For instance, I
observed that some women, in order to avoid being recognized as Muslims
and therefore branded Swahili (Athoiri sing. Muthoiri) as they walk to the
mosque on Fridays, fold their long dresses 96 up to make them look shorter,
and therefore not unfamiliar or different from those worn by other women,
until they approach the mosque. The multicolored cotton pieces of cloth,
leso, used particularly by Swahili women are also folded and hidden in the
bags, only to be used for covering one's head when they reach the mosque.
Before they enter the mosque compound, the women unfold their dresses to
full length and cover their heads with their leso. When I enquired from one
woman the reasons for doing this, she described what she termed an
"uneasy feeling if people started whispering whenever" she walked around
in her "religious dress".
96 It has become common practice for a prominent local Asian Muslim to
distribute long dresses and leso to the Muslim women in Igembe. Hundreds of
these dresses are distributed once every year. Many of my informants who receive
these clothes refer to them as 'religious clothes' to be worn when going to the
mosque. The chairman of the committee that oversees the distribution explained
that some of the women converts may attribute their failure to attend the mosque
to lack of the "recommended" form of attire, and for that reason, procurement and
distribution of blankets, leso and dresses free of charge became an important part
of sadaq.
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Their dilemma can be elaborated by examining the case of Asha,
Hisham's youngest wife. I came to know Hisham, a pioneer who goes to the
mosque five times every day. On several occasions, I found that he was the
only one praying in a large mosque. This man has earned a reputation in
the neighbourhood for regular prayer. Regularity of prayer (though itself an
obligation) is traditionally regarded as an observable sign of compliance.
Just as spittle in Koko is "turned into a tangible" sign that one is observing
the fast during Ramadhan, 97 the facial mark which develops as a result of
prostrating during prayer, is regarded by local Muslims as a sign of piety,
of Swalihina, those who pray regularly. In indeed, some people go to great
lengths to acquire this facial mark in order have a tangible proof of regular
observance of prayer. Regarding the facial mark, Fisher reports that:
There is one reference in the Quran to the facial mark of
prostration... and this passage is one of the very few which
acknowledge that such a mark in particular, or sujud more generally
is not exclusively Muslim.98
When I visited Hisham's homestead, he complained about his
youngest wife and asked me whether I could "see any signs of dini in her".
When I asked him what he meant by "signs", I was faced with a barrage of
criticism of "the manner in which she projects herself, not least to her non-
Muslim women associates; her mode of dress little reflects the prescribed
standards of modesty". 99 In his opinion, a Muslim should be "recognizable"
from others. Her response to this was:
It is difficult for rural women who have to subsist on working in the
fields, to fulfil all the obligations, for instance, if one spends long
hours in the field, it is difficult for one to observe the five prayers.
R. Launay, 1992:117.
98 See H. Fisher, 1993:17.
Interview with Hisham and Asha, Lare, 10th october 1991.
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Even if one can pray anywhere, you have to understand that the
rural woman finds herself in difficult circumstances, unlike the
woman in Majengo for instance where one is not ridiculed for
wearing different clothes or for being seen with a jug of water for
ablution.
To Asha, these are inextricable circumstances - she is aware of what is
expected of her as a Muslim, but the social implications are too much to
bear. She is worried about the Muslim stereotype and the practicalities of
farm work and the banter of other women. Thus the paradox becomes
manifest as the Muslims are caught at a crossroads, trying to meet the
criteria of the stereotyped Muslim identity (that a Muslim should be
recognizable, even at a glance); and at the same time eschew the similarly
stereotyped notion of'Swahiliness' and the negative expressions that attend
to it in this area. It emerges therefore that there is an implicit contradiction
in trying to keep the two identities: on the one hand, being Muslim with its
inexorable demand on the individual believer to distinguish herself7himself
from washenzi; and on the other, to be part of the local social network,
which makes no less demands on the individual as a participant. In other
words, to confine oneself within the parameters of the two conflicting
identities.
Conclusion
Prior to 1980, few Muslim families were found in the rural areas.
Most of those living in trade centres were traders (see Chapter 1) and hence
there was little social interaction between them and the wider majority of
the people. Without suggesting that these few Muslims were isolated, it is
necessary to point out that their urban social life was not in the least
intertwined with that of the village. For instance they did not have to
participate in the circumcision ceremonies; go to the neighbours to 'borrow'
fire or salt. Thus in a sense they remained aloof and isolated. But since
1980, thanks toTab1igh-borne wave, Islam has spread in the rural areas,
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with the result that a handful of families or individuals are now found in
the villages in many parts of Meru. What is significant for our purpose
is that the Tabligh-borne conversion that I have described above shows a




CONVERSION IN ThEORETICAL PERSPECTiVE
The Progression of Islam in Meru
Conceptually, the development of Islam in Meru can be divided into
three phases. The initial phase was the arrival of Muslims and the
formation of Muslim communities in what is now Meru town. During this
phase which lasted from 1910 to the mid 1950s, peoples of diverse social-
cultural backgrounds who accompanied the colonial administrators as
porters, soldiers in the King's African Rifles (K.A.R.), police, workers and
traders, together with the returning mahczji formed Muslim communities
with clearly defined social boundaries.
Islam provided the basis for the formation of these communities
which were mirrored on the coastal Swahili society. The appropriation of
Islam in Meru was attained through the re-enactment of the coastal social
stratification, a stratification based on the notion of inequality between
waungwana and non-waungwana classes. In this coastal meta-cosmology,
urbanity and 'civilization' were the prerogative of the waungwana and the
people from the interior were seen as washenzi, that is 'uncivilized'. These
concepts were transported to Meru in a 'fossilized' form by the Nyamwezi,
Manyema, Wadigo, Wangaziya, and many other diverse peoples who formed
the group that identified itself as the Swahili in Meru.
By re-enacting the social divisions of the coastal society, Muslim
groups in Meru were able to create and sustain separate identities.
Distinctions such as had been maintained between waungwana and
washenzi in the coastal traditional society were now reinvented in a
different cultural milieu and applied between Muslims and non-Muslims;
and the inequality such as that existing between Waungwana and non-
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Waungwana (people of slave descent, for instance) was maintained between
those "born in the Muslim faith" and the converts, mahaji. In spite of the
process of acculturation that the mahaji espoused in their effort to emulate
the Swahili who were seen as the standard bearers of the faith, the two
groups of Muslims could not be seen to be equal. Thus Islam was used to
create and sustain separate identities throughout this phase.
The cultural dimension of Islam represented as dini, was emphasized
as the Muslims endeavoured to mark themselves off from the majority of
the non-Muslim Meru people. To be seen to be Muslim gained a great deal
of significance and such external signs of compliance as "Muslim dress"
became important to the wearer as a mark of identity. Thus Muslims
dressed in a different way, prepared different types of food and even spoke
a different language (Kiswahili) from the rest of the Meru people who were
monolingual and spoke only Kimeru. The Muslims saw themselves as "dini
people", where dini exemplified the cultural dimension of Swahili-Islam, the
Arabic Quran being inaccessible except to a few individuals. In these
circumstances, Islam became mystified and the reaction of the rest of the
Meru people to the Muslim presence throughout this period was something
like "we have our own ways, keep dini to yourselves".
The second phase was ushered in by the Mau Mau cataclysm of the
early 1950s and lasted through the 1960s. The outburst of nationalism and
the escalating independence struggle shook the Muslims; they realized that
their survival as a community in the face of the sweeping social changes
depended a great deal on the notion of a common Muslim community
identity. The demolition of the old Swahili village in 1954/55 marks the
turning point - the Swahili and the Nubians were put together and the
threat of the Mau Mau movement became a reality to the Muslims. These
events triggered a chain reaction: the mahaji expressed sympathy for the
nationalist cause through the Jumuia-tu-Baladia society; and the future
was bleak for those who still clung to the notion of a separate identity for
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a small minority of foreigners based on the putative superiority of those
born in the faith over converts. Such people as the Nubians could no longer
rely on the patronage of the colonial administration to which they had
rendered a loyal service, for which they had been treated favourably.
A new basis for re-orientation of attitudes had to be found in order
for the Muslim groups to obliterate the distinctions that had kept them
apart, dissolve their separate group identities and move towards a common
Muslim community identity in the face of the influx of non-Muslims into the
town. The concept of birth in the faith that had hitherto been used to keep
the mahaji Muslims apart from the standard bearers of the faith, was now
charged with new meaning - it became a unifying factor for all the Muslims
in Meru town. The dichotomy between the mahaji and others ceased to
function as their children were now treated as equals with their cousins,
that is the children of both the Swahili and the Nubians, since, as has been
illustrated by the case of the two sisters, (Karimi and Kainda) marriage in
either group determined the status of the Meru women married to Muslims.
They were seen as either mahaji or Swahili, depending on the religious
status of their husbands.
The first step in the construction of a common Muslim community
identity was a new emphasis on unity of all Muslims in Meru. The idea of
unity was popularized in the informal gatherings (baraza) and emphasized
during the Friday sermons in the Jamia mosque. Muslims were encouraged
to realize that they had a common destiny in their struggle against ushenzi.
At the same time there was a new emphasis on identifying oneself as a
Muslim by "proclaiming" one's faith. Consequently, external display of piety
became greatly significant. Sheikh Said's sermons communicated in no
uncertain terms the need for the Muslims to adjust accordingly to the
changes taking place in Meru.
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The Sheikh's call to the Muslims at that time to promote the doctrinal
dimension of dini can also be seen as an identification of the local Muslim
community with the universal Muslim Ummah.
The third phase begins at the end of the 1970s. It has been
characterized by external influence in the form of Tabligh and at the same
time plagued by the maulid controversy. The maulid debate has given rise
to new trends, for instance, the Majengo Muslim community has been
divided into two rival groups: supporters and opponents of maulid. The
latter are referred to by the maulid supporters asbid'a people". Maulid has
come to serve as a means of expressing a particular identity within the
Muslim context in Meru with the result that it has become an important
factor in the shifting social alignments within the Muslim community. It
has hardened the existing lines of patronage to the extent that now the
choice of the mosque for Friday prayer (or even regular prayer for that
matter) is largely determined by these social alignments.
Nevertheless, this phase has seen a perceptible growth of Muslim
presence in many rural areas in Meru, particularly Igembe. The first
Tabligh teachers from Tanzania and Pakistan are said to have visited Meru
in 1979. Tabligh-borne conversion outside the Muslim enclaves in Meru
town does not entail a process of acculturation such as was required of
mahaji during the early period. What is emerging in these rural areas
which have been targeted by Tabligh activists is a category of Muslims who
exhibit no external signs of Swahilization, which was until recently an
integral (and sometimes sole) part of the process of Islamization. During the
first phase, local converts, after being given the rudimentary instruction on
the tenets of Islam, were "taught to be good Muslims", in other words,
taught to practice the local variant of the Swahili culture.
It can therefore be said that though Swahili Islam has not been static
over the years, Tabligh activity has enhanced a process of de-swahilization
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of Islam in Meru. Now there are Muslims who cannot even speak Kiswahili,
which, during the first and second phases was an important mark of
Muslim identity.
Up till recently, the concept of Mji (town and now Majengo) and the
intricate network of social ties among its residents has served to provide
what can be termed the optimal condition for the functioning of Muslims as
a community in Meru. Outside the Majengo social environment, the
Muslims in their minority status have failed to constitute themselves into
a viable community. In these circumstances recent Tabligh converts find
themselves in a dilemma as they try to maintain a Muslim identity and at
the same time retain their places in the non-Muslim social network of the
majority of the people around them. This dilemma has been illustrated by
the case of the women who either hide their long "Muslim dresses" in their
bags until they approach the mosque or fold them up to make them look
short like those worn by non-Muslim women so as to avoid being identified
as Muslims. There is a paradox in that for most other people, perhaps in
Majengo where Muslim community support is available, external display of
Muslim identity is necessary and to be seen to be Muslim is important.
Explaining Islam in Meru: A Recapitulation of Horton's
Intellectualist Theory
Muslim presence and manifestations in many parts of Africa vary in
strength and structure and therefore, any hypothesis that predicts patterns
of Muslim behaviour and the trends of Muslim growth, or decline, must
recognize the variations that exist and offer a theory sufficiently nuanced
to be able to relate the varied mode of Islamization to the African cultural
diversity.
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One approach which has occupied a prominent place in recent
anthropological perspectives of conversion' is the intellectualist theory,
championed by Robin Horton. Horton's exposition of the intellectualist
theory triggered the debate between himself and Humphrey Fisher and
elicited much criticism from a cross-section of scholars, whom Horton refers
to as members of "the devout opposition". 2
 I do not intend to get entangled
in this complex debate and therefore, reference to it will be made in so far
as it is relevantny analysis of the presence and representations of Islam
in Meru, that is the establishment of the nucleus Muslim communities in
the town and the more recent trends evident in the activities of Tabligh and
what seem to be the beginnings of a process of 'de-Swahilization' of Islam
in rural Meru.
Robin Horton postulates an intellectualist theory, which aims to
explain the adaptive potential of the African cosmology prior to the
appearance of Islam and Christianity on the scene, and in response, Fisher
proposes a three-stage theory which sees Islam as having its own momentum
that keeps it on the move in various circumstances. It is Fisher's response
(which "had its genesis" in Horton's theory) in which we are mainly
interested here, but it is useful, nonetheless, first to state briefly Horton's
position.3
1 See L. R. Rambo, "Current Research on Religious Conversion", Religious
Studies Review, Vol.8, No,2 April 1982:146.
2	 instance see R. W. Wyllie, 1980:81-90, E.Ikenga-Metuh, 1987: 13-25, P.B.
Clarke, 1987:136-141 and 1988:183-187.
H. Fisher 1973:27. I use the term intellectualist because Horton himself
applies it to his theory of how African societies sought to explain, predict and
control ideational change, R. Horton, 1971:100. For a definition of the
intellectualist theory "which has its roots in the 19th century", see E. T. Lawson
and R. N. McCauley, 1990:33-37.
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Horton begins with the premise that to the African the concept of the
Supreme Being is not an "addition" either by the Christian missionary or
the Muslim teacher, rather, at conversion, the African accepts change and
development in his concept of the Supreme Being. 4
 This, Horton sees as the
foundation of his intellectualist theory of conversion, in which he supposes
that there was a situation before the advent of both Islam and Christianity,
when the African traditional beliefs began to undergo changes. He therefore
suggests that:
acceptance of Islam and Christianity is due as much to development
of traditional cosmology in response to other features of the modern
situation as it is to the activities of the missionaries.5
Thus, Islam and Christianity were accepted only "where they happen to
coincide with the responses of traditional cosmology to other.., factors of the
modern situation". 6
 In places where there was no such coincidence, the
influence of the world religions (of Islam for our purpose) was "weakly
developed or absent".7
Horton sees religion as a system of theory to explain, predict and
control the affairs of everyday life. According to his thesis on how this
system of theory functioned among the pre-colonial African societies:
.autonomous communities lived somewhat inward-looking lives.
Nonetheless... there was also an awareness of belonging to a wider
world and to a wider humanity. Now in such areas, there was in the
typical community a two-tiered body of religious theory. On the one
hand, this body of theory postulated a set of spiritual guardians of





the community and a set of spiritual owners of the surrounding
wilds. Together these underpinned the life of the local polity. On the
other hand, it postulated a supreme being which underpinned the life
of humanity as a whole and the existence of the world at large. As
the local polity and its environs were part of the wider world, so the
lesser spirits were seen as being somehow under the aegis of the
supreme being. From these postulates, it followed that an assiduous
cult of the lesser spirits would keep the life of the local community
on course whilst attention to the supreme being would deal with
needs of the individual and of his community vis-a-uis the wider
world. However, since the life of the local community had priority...
the balance of emphasis in religious practice was typically on the
cults of the lesser and locally-based spirit forces.8
This is to say that when the small-scale African communities,
previously insulated by their own environment, were opened up to the
outside world during the last decade of the 19th century and the first half
of the 20th century, by the creation of modern means of communication -
the railways and the roads - their political, cultural and social-economic
boundaries were enlarged, with the result that their religious attention was
now focussed on the top tier, that is the Supreme Being, so as to explain,
predict and control the circumstances in which they found themselves.
According to Horton's ideas about religious thought in 'theory', though
the local community is aware of the wider world and of the forces
underpinning the life of the wider humanity, the emphasis is on the locally-
based forces that affect the local community. In other words, the network
of social ties and vital relationships among the members of a local
community are sustained within the family or group. If the social
boundaries of such a group are broken and members are no longer
enmeshed in these relationships, the orientation towards the supreme being
becomes important. Thus the move towards monotheism has to do with a
wider social integration.
8 R. Horton, 1993:359.
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From this perspective, Horton's analysis might apply to the mahaji's
initial contact with Islam. As I have shown in the thesis, the pioneer mahaji
in Meru were people who left their traditional communities, either
voluntarily as the case of Mzee Ibrahim illustrates, 9
 or through
conscription into the army or the compulsory labour which the colonial
administrators saw as the only way to force people in Meru to go out to
work. Some of these people who went out to work in distant places, found
themselves thrust against strangers in what were known as the African
locations in many towns, without the communal support that they had
enjoyed among their own people. Therefore, conversion to Islam for such
people, for instance those who went to work in Nairobi, offered an
alternative to the communal social setting from which they had been
uprooted by forces of colonialism. For these converts or the mahaji as they
were known, the members of the Muslim community became one's jamaa
or family and, as Bujra observed in Nairobi, Islam offered a complete social
system owing nothing to the rural models of life, and took no account of the
ethnic diversity of the people that came together as members of a Muslim
community. Membership to this community
provided a social framework within which people could interrelate on
a new basis, it provided an authority structure, it ordered life crises...
and it even structured the passing of time with communal
celebrations.., once having become a Muslim, all other Muslims
became one's relatives orjamaa.'°
In this sense only, Horton's theory applies to the analysis of the
initial contact with Islam, that is the circumstances in which the pioneer
rnahaji became converted into Islam. However, what Horton fails to take
into account is that Islam brings with it a specific type of monotheism other
than that of the two-tiered African cosmology. An important point for my
See chapter 1, p. 54.
10 J• Bujra, 1975:227.
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discussion is the acquisition of Muslim identity by the mahaji but Horton
does not go beyond the initial stage. His analysis does not take us further
in understanding the dynamic of Islam in Meru.
Fisher's Tripartite Model of conversion
In his response to Horton's intellectualist theory, Fisher argues that
the Africans have the ability to make "Islam their own" and sees Islam as
having its own momentum and therefore, does not depend on the
adaptability of African traditional beliefs and practices.
Furthermore, Fisher observes that absolute detachment from the
traditional beliefs and practices is not possible even after conversion to
Islam and a great deal of these practices are carried over. Contrary to the
principal idea of the intellectualist theory, he suggests that "for those people
who have transferred from microcosm to macrocosm it is the spirit cult
rather than the awareness of one God that flourishes"." On the other
hand, changes could be in the form of"encroachment of one microcosm upon
another"2
 and not necessarily of macrocosm upon microcosm.
Fisher disagrees with Horton's theory, which gives primacy to
changes that the traditional societies were experiencing from within
themselves, and attributes the progress of Islam in Africa to the
compatibility with these changes. The "main point at issue" between the two
scholars, in Fisher's words, is
whether, as Horton believes, the essential patterns of religious
development in Black Africa are determined by the enduring
influence of a traditional cosmology, which arises anew, like the
' H. Fisher, 1973:32.
12 H. Fisher, 1985:158.
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phoenix, from the ashes of colonialism and conversion; or as I would
argue, a genuine religious transference is possible, unleashing a new
force, which is neither quite like any religious expression 'outside'
before being transferred in, nor yet the same as anything already
'inside'; and which then, like a juggernaut, advances under its own
momentum.'3
In contrast, therefore, Fisher postulates a three-stage theory:
quarantine, mixing, and reform. In the quarantine stage, the faith is
represented by newcomers - traders, perhaps, from North Africa, or
refugees, or clerics employed in providing religious services such as
prayer and divination for their pagan patrons. Orthodoxy is relatively
secure because there are no converts and thus no one to bring into
the Muslim community heterodox beliefs and observances drawn
from his or her non-Muslim past. In most places, quarantine was not
maintained indefinitely, and sooner or later, as local people converted
in increasing numbers, the stage of mixing succeeded, in which
people combined the profession of Islam, and as it might be, the quite
sincere observance of many Islamic tenets, with many pagan rituals.
Finally, often after a lapse of centuries, the candle of reform, kept
alight by the written word, and perhaps also by the devotion of some
clerics who succeed in maintaining an element of quarantine against
the mixing all around them, burst into a conflagration and
established the rule of the saints.'4
Fisher states that the aim of his discussion is to provide "general
principles",'5
 whose applicability has to be tested in relation to particular
cases, and examples of which, he suggests, could be found in any period.
Patrick Ryan in his analysis of the influence of the Muslim cleric in West
Africa has given an interesting interpretation of Fisher's model, fitting
neatly the development of Islam in four ancient kingdoms into the three
stages of quarantine, mixing and reform. Ryan sees the invasion of Ghana
' H. Fisher, 1985:153.
' H. Fisher, 1973:31.
' H. Fisher, 1985:154.
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by the Almoravids in 1076 as the "point of breaking down" 6
 of quarantine,
though there was some form of social intercourse between Muslims and
Traditionalists, marking the beginning of the end of quarantine. He agrees
with Fisher that Islam emerged from the quarantine when the cleric made
petitionary prayers (which were incidentally successful) for the benefit of
the king.'7
 The transition to the next stage is marked by the cleric's
greater involvement in court affairs, resulting in alliances with the kings.
However, an almost obvious criticism of his theory, is that it may be
applicable perhaps only to the process of Islamization in the ancient
kingdoms of Ghana and Mali, where Fisher also draws most of his historical
evidence for the tenability of his model. This three-stage model fits well
such a situation as Ryan is dealing with, but it would have to be reshaped
for the analysis of not only the case under study, but much of the interior
of East Africa. The major difficulty with this theory, therefore, is not that
we can find counter examples, but that it is difficult to show how adequate
it is as an explanation for every instance of conversion in Africa. I shall
examine each of the crucial elements of the argument.
What is Meant by 'Quarantine'?
The first of Fisher's three-stage theory is designated "quarantine".
First, the notion of quarantine evokes in the reader's mind the images of
actual isolation of the Muslim newcomers from their hosts to check the
'contagion' of their faith. How does this concept then apply to the case
under study? As has been shown in chapter 2, during the first 18 years
after the arrival of Muslims in Meru, they formed separate communities in
town, geographically separated from the people around them. This
geographical separation not only generated the feeling that they were
16 P. Ryan, 1978:8.
17 P. Ryan, 1978:17.
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different, but also the geographical boundaries hardened the social
boundaries between Muslims and others. Except for occasional marriage
to local women, there was little interaction between Muslims, particularly
the foreigners and the rest of the Meru people. But since complete
separation proved iinpracticai, when they came together Muslims kept a
distance: for instance, they did not shake hands with non-Muslims
(washenzi) or eat together. At a glance, therefore, it seems as if the pioneer
Muslims in Meru had an idea of quarantine. But I must point out that their
idea of quarantine differs significantly from that which Fisher presents in
his theory.
Fisher is concerned with the question of faith and the Meru Muslim
pioneers were concerned with identity. The dichotomy was between Muslims
and washenzi and the key factor in their relationship, from the Muslim
point of view, was to keep ushenzi at bay. It was not faith that they
endeavoured to safeguard: for instance, abstaining from eating food
prepared by non-Muslims could be justified on the grounds that it might not
be halal, but there is no theological justification for serving food on banana
leaves for a non-Muslim so as not to use utensils used by believers. Ushenzi
was treated as something contagious and the explanation for this fear of
contagion at that time can be found in the urgent need for Muslims to
create and sustain a separate identity for themselves. As has been shown
by the case of the two sisters separated by marriage into different
categories of Muslims, it was not faith, that made them different from each
other - both were converts but one acquired a Swahili identity (and
therefore higher status) and the other a mahaji identity (and a relatively
lower status).
A second aspect of Fisher's concept of quarantine is the initial
interaction between the pioneer Muslims and others in the form of provision
of "religious services" by some of these newcomers for their non-Muslim
patrons. This could be seen as a form of social interaction between the two
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sides. The notion of quarantine, therefore, seems not only to ignore the
phenomenon of therapeutic Muslims, as Parkin prefers to call those who
converted to Islam in search of therapy, but also the existence of some form
of interaction which facilitated the rendering of the said religious services.
That the non-Muslim patrons, in the first place, availed themselves of these
services, is an implicit acknowledgement of the efficacy of the Muslim
clerics' prayers and divination, though not necessarily of their ascendancy
over the traditional religious resources. This recognition, however remote
it may appear to be, is nevertheless, a sign of the advancing juggernaut, to
borrow this intriguing metaphor from Fisher, upon whom it was initially
wished, as a criticism, by Horton.
To carry this idea even further, it may be suggested that the
accessibility of religious services on the one had, and the recognition of the
services of the Muslim cleric as an alternative resource can be seen as the
first movements of the imperceptible juggernaut in the direction of Black
Africa; or put in another way, the meeting point between Islam and the
potential convert.
Furthermore, the notion of quarantine neglects the evidence from the
East African coast. A brief description of the situation that prevailed in the
Swahili towns on the East African coast at the planting of Islam (though
the time when Islam came to the coast is still a matter of conjecture as are
the "identity and significance" of the first Muslims), 18 might illustrate the
inherent difficulty in the notion of a quarantine stage, that of finding a
state of affairs that can be correctly defined as quarantine, during which
Islam is practiced in a 'pure' form, before it is adulterated at the mixing
stage. This difficulty undermines Fisher's three-phase theory.
18 R. L. Pouwels, 1987:22.
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Mark Horton's archaeological work provides us with the most recent
information on the origins and development of Swahili-Islamic culture. He
proposes the "idea of a Swahili corridor that extended along the East
African Coast, linking trading communities of the Island, coast and
hinterland." This leads him to conclude that these coastal communities
"were not passive recipients of Asiatic culture",' 9
 living in isolation in their
ports - they maintained well developed trade networks, not only among
themselves, but also with traders from across the ocean.
To paraphrase Pouwels, over the centuries, the coastal societies had
developed an "identifiably 'local" culture, well adapted to the peculiar
coastal ambiance, while at the same time, this very adaptation "presented
new opportunities for a broadened world-view through the contacts with
non-African cultures which also were part of the coastal world". 20 Thus it
was the natural environment (the sea) and the whole gamut of social,
political and economic activity, rather than any one particular element
(except their ability to innovate) that was instrumental in the moulding of
a unique coastal civilization. Given this background, when new experiences
presented themselves in the form of Islam, the coastal societies easily took
them in their stride.2'
Certainly, coastal Africans were not unprepared for this, since
change, even conscious innovation, always had been as much part of
their experience as that which was occurring in the twelfth and
' Though the development of the Swahili-Islamic coastal culture remains
largely unravelled, new archaeological evidence suggests Muslim presence from
as early as the 8th century, and this "evidence", as Mark Horton says, "has
completely changed our understanding of the Islamisation of the Coast", M.
Horton, 1994:17.
20 R. L. Pouwels, 1987:24.
21 The Shanga excavation points to Muslim presence from ca.780 and other
pieces of evidence suggest "a well organized Islamic Community" by Ca. 850-900
(Mark Horton, 1994:19).
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thirteenth centuries.... Islam simply was engulfed in this wider
historical process which had started well before the twelfth century.
So when people began constructing Islamic tombs and mosques, it
was not at all surprising that they applied their own architectural
styles to them...
Given the new archaeological evidence for a much earlier Muslim
presence on the coast, Pouwels' dating may be disputable for Islam seems
to have arrived at the coast of East Africa much earlier, and according to
Allen, it "was grafted onto the local culture". To this, Horton might reply
that the development of the long-distance trade between the East African
coastal peoples and the lands across the sea, is an illustration of his
intellectualist theory - but only in some sense, for it is not known what the
religious outlook of pre-Muslim East African coast was. According to
Horton, the coastal societies should have been moving towards the Supreme
Being.
The adoption of Islam being "part of a more pervasive historical
process" in the coastal societies, it is difficult to imagine a stage of
quarantine, such as the one proposed above. The picture that both Pouwels
and Mark Horton paint of the early IsIam on the coast, is not one of a
religion of foreigners isolated in their own religious practices, or to borrow
Fisher's phrase, living in a "separate world" to which the first converts have
to pass and join "their new brothers-in-faith" 2'. Islam becomes for them
just another aspect of the on-going changes, which it seems, they are able
not only to adopt, but also to harness for their own purposes. Hence, the
speed of the juggernaut here is not the issue; in other words, what is
important is not how fast the local people were in adopting the new faith,
but rather the idea that Islam was gradually permeating the coastal
culture.
R. L. Pouwels, 1987:24.
Mark Horton, 1994: 15-19. Also see R. L. Pouwel, 1985:201-208, 1987:17-3 1.
2 H. Fisher, 1973 : 32.
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The Problem of the Reality of Unadulterated Orthodoxy
The other crucial element of the quarantine stage is orthodoxy. When
I consider the implication of Fisher's explanation of the quarantine stage,
that it is the period during which "orthodoxy is safely tucked away in the
isolation ward (for that is the image that quarantine brings to mind) before
it is adulterated, or contaminated (if I may continue in the spirit of
quarantine) while the newly arrived Islam enjoys the absence of "heterodox
beliefs and observances drawn from... non-Muslim past" the difficulty of
explaining assumed purity of Islamic worship that is ascribed to the initial
stage, in other words, the reality of orthodoxy as an attribute in itself
becomes apparent. Islam itself is inherently diverse, and renders itself open
to divergent interpretations of the scriptures; and therefore to ascribe to
Islam a monolithic orthodoxy, is, as Lewis points out, to disregard the fact
that
the vast corpus of written hadith and interpretation is regularly
accompanied by the equally extensive written apparatus of magical
and astrological Islamic lore which is regularly disseminated from
urban centres of Muslim excellence. These not only provide an
Islamic base and legitimation for pre-Islamic mystical beliefs and
rituals but actually sometimes introduce these where such 'magical'
beliefs did not exist. It is not just oral pre-Islamic culture which
dilutes the unswerving eternal truth conserved in literate
mainstream Islam, but also elements in literate mainstream Islam
which introduce and perpetuate alternative renderings of the
Prophet's message.26
We may not agree with Lewis that Islam introduces magical beliefs
even where they "did not exist", for a society which does not have any
H. Fisher, 1973. :31.
26 M. Lewis, 1983:79-80.
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magical beliefs is difficult to find; however, the point for us is to illustrate
that even what is termed 'orthodox Islam' is relative. For instance, Hodgson
writes of early Islam:
The older religious traditions made their contribution to the
spirituality which now took form within Islam...throughout the High
Caliphate period this contribution was very important. We have
noted that in law and ethics and popular lore, which concerned
everyone, both the 'ulama' and the story-tellers of the mosque drew
on the dhimmi background for their spirit and often their
materials...27
Thus the idea of the purity of orthodoxy or the absence of heterodoxy,
even that early, seems rather untenable. A Muslim past does not
necessarily imply the absence of heterodoxy. Even before we examine
Swahili Islam (and I think it is true for other varieties of Islam) in which
examples could be found of many beliefs and practices which have passed
through the ages for Islamic ones, we might follow Fisher's example of going
as far back in time as the ancient kingdoms of Ghana and Mali to find
historical evidence, and suggest that one cannot certainly vouch for the
absence of heterodox beliefs among the early Muslims from North Africa,
whom Fisher credits with the practice of pure Islam during the quarantine
stage.
Pouwels makes an interesting observation that is relevant to this
discussion on the notion of orthodoxy. He says that Islam, (defined as a
'prophetic religion' by Nock and others):
has been treated as more virile and active than traditional African
religious views which, because they are black religions, suffer from
passivity and are less vitally appealing even to the Africans. Also
these views have played a subtle part in exaggerated notions
concerning orthodoxy. Orthodoxy... sometimes has been associated
27 M. G. S. Hodgson, 1974:307.
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with a supposedly purer immigrant Islam which later became
adulterated by Mricans.
The theory of quarantine assumes that the foreigners, be they from
North Africa or elsewhere, practice a pure form of Islam. There are two
major difficulties with this supposition: first, it overlooks the fundamental
difference between Islam as it is written in the scriptures and Islam as it
is practiced by different peoples, be that in its cradle in the Arabian
Peninsula or in a remote place in Meru with a magnificent mosque and a
handful of adherents who can hardly say their daily prayers in Arabic.
What is being suggested here is that Muslims only make claims to 'pure'
practice wherever they are and whatever their form of Islamic worship.
Opposition of one group to another, seeing itself as more Islamic than the
other, is an important enough reason to make claims to orthodoxy.
The second point follows from the first - for any society to put into
practice the tenets of the faith, the tenets must be interpreted within the
cultural provisions of that society. It is not a matter of choosing what is
'good' or 'compatible' with Islam and mixing it with the local religious
practices (which is equal to unorthodoxy) as the classical view suggests,
rather, it is a matter of seeing Islam through the eyes of the local
community. As I have just shown, Islam for the societies on the East
African coast was part of a historical process, in which their 'innovativeness'
was of prime importance in creating a unique Swaihili-Islamic culture.
The process of transmitting this culture to the peoples far in the
interior, whether it occurred before or after the establishment of the colonial
rule, does not fit neatly in Fisher's schema. In the case under study, it is
R. L. Pouwels, 1978a:202.
This view is championed by Trimingham who sees the East African coastal
societies as being "largely static" prior to the reinforcement from Arabia (1964:66).
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true that the first Muslims were largely foreigners who settled in what
came to be known as the Boma in Meru and founded the pioneer Muslim
communities there. But a situation that can neatly be described as
quarantine did not arise for these were very heterogenous Muslim
communities comprising individuals who had been converted in various
places and circumstances. For instance the group generically termed
Swahili comprised such people as Wanyamwezi, Manyema, Wangaziya and
others, whose cultural beliefs and practices, as Nzibo observes, had become
part of the Swahili-Islamic tradition. 3° This tradition was passed on to the
mahaji, who in turn enriched it with the practices from the Meru culture.
The principle of orthodoxy is not useful in explaining this apparently multi-
layered Swahili-Islamic culture as, for instance,harnessed by the mahaji
in their effort to emulate the Swahili and at the same time elevate
themselves above their washenzi relatives. Their main objective was not the
achievement of the correct reading of the Quran, the correct pronunciation
of Arabic words during prayer or the observance of the correct posture
during prayer. Of prime importance to the mahaji was the acquisition of
Swahili culture in which dini was embodied. Hence the notion of a stage of
quarantine when orthodoxy was safely in the hands of foreigners supposedly
practicing a purer form of Islam is inapplicable to both the heralders of
Islam and the converts in this case.
If quarantine also means the period between the arrival of the foreign
Muslims and when the first converts are won, such a gap may not always
be there. Again if we take the example of the mission school where the first
Christian converts were trained and the mission stations where they
sometimes lived, even for these individuals who had to pass to a new world
30 See Y. A. Nzibo, 1985:121. I have shown in chapter 1 that Wanyamwezi,
Wasukuma and even Manyema from west of Lake Tanganyika who filtered to the
coast and later served in the establishment of colonial rule in various capacities
either as porters, servants or soldiers, were regarded as Swahili in the places that
they served: for instance, in Meru they were part of the generic Swahili group. For
the discussion on the process of Swahilization, see chapters 2 (p. 80).
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of their brothers in faith, complete detachment was not practical. If that
was so, then one wonders how purity of orthodoxy could have been
guaranteed. To go back to the pioneer Muslims in Meru, the majority of the
askaris were young men, who on settlement intermarried with the local
women. Again these women were converted to Islam and indeed they helped
to swell the Muslim population.3'
Also it is not necessarily the case that the bearers of Islam were
foreigners or 'outsiders', and Fisher's model does not account fully for
fluidity in different places. There were many instances where the nucleus
Muslim communities, as I have already mentioned, were founded by
individuals returning to their villages from the coast, Nairobi, or N.F.D. in
the case of Meru, where they had come into contact with Islam during a
long stay away from home or even through a brief encounter with Muslims.
It is evident, therefore, that in the first place, there was no 'orthodoxy'
either to be maintained by the foreigners and other pioneer Muslims, or to
be jeopardized by the new converts. The emergence of the mahaji in Meru
could well illustrate this point.
Theoretically if we accept the argument that the coastal societies
indigenised Islam in the first place, should we then maintain that the faith
that they took to the interior was pure orthodoxy during the quarantine
stage, before the Meru mahaji, for instance, emerged and started the
mixing stage? The answer to this may be found in Pouwel's suggestion that
coastal Islam
be regarded holistically, that is to say as a totality which includes
elements commonly found in African religions, without passing
judgement as to the orthodoxy or propriety of such Islam. The key to
understanding the African role in these developments lies in
' The high rate of growth of the women population in the boma has been
alluded to in chapter 1, pp. 3 1-32.
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appreciating that the Islamic tradition had ties of continuity with
previous, non-Islamic tradition.32
This supports my assertion that Muslims only argue about orthodoxy
among themselves, as do those scholars who attribute vitality to 'prophetic
religions', and passivity to African (or should we term them 'unprophetic'?)
religions. Similarly, much less is said about unorthodoxy in Christianity
(yet it incorporated a whole complex range of Greco-Roman values, not to
mention the corollary of Western culture with which it was infused by the
missionaries) until it comes to the conversion of African peoples.
Sowing of the Seed: The Beginning of the 'Mixing' Stage?
The second stage of Fisher's theory of analyzing the development of
Islam in Africa is what he terms "mixing". It is difficult to distinguish just
where quarantine ends and 'mixing' starts. The point of departure between
Horton and Fisher is that the one attributes the weakening of the
boundaries to factors intrinsic to the cosmology; and the other extrinsic to
it: for monotheism to be felt, the "microcosmic boundaries must have begun
to weaken".33
 Attraction to and imitation of the outward elements of Islam:
prayer, distinct or different mode of dress, etc., are a manifestation of a
weakness in the cosmic boundaries. Also the nature of the human condition
- its "pains" and "hazards", for which solutions must be sought, sometimes
by all means available, paves the way for certain social agents whose
attendance inevitably weakens the microcosm.
R. L. Pouwels, 1978:203-204.
H. Fisher, 1985:156.
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The most outstanding of these examples is the role of healing as an
agent of conversion.' Nchulubi's case of witchcraft is a typical example
- for Nchulubi, the cure of her son's mental disorder, and protection for the
remainder of her family, were the most urgent needs whose fulfillment was
found in converting to Islam. For her, Islam provided the much needed
protection against the destructive power of witchcraft. These two factors,
namely, the inescapable conditions of the human experience, such as the
one in which Nchulubi found herself and her family; and the phenomenon
of an alternative (Muslim) resource, to which the individual can turn in
search of remedies, are equally important in bringing about the weakening
of the cosmic boundaries. On this, we are in agreement with Fisher - the
lead that he provides for us is
that the Muslim cleric is accessible and is consulted, to that extent
the seeds of religious change, of a new cosmology, have been sown.36
This takes us back to the quarantine proposition - in some sense the
presence a Muslim cleric at a court of some West African non-Muslim chief
or king, could be an illustration of the quarantine proposition, but only in
some sense. The presence and accessibility of the Muslim influence in the
form of the religious services rendered by the cleric and that the king (his
African religious traditional background notwithstanding) enlists these
services illustrates the difficulty of making a good case for a 'vacuum' period
before the 'seed is sown'. It is to be noted here that Fisher defines 'mixing'
from a particular Muslim point of view, it is a Muslim concept, which I
would say is specific to West Africa. He applies it as an analytical concept
The role of Muslim healing in conversion is well documented, see D.Parkin
1970: passim, 1972:40-41 and D.C.Sperling, 1976:70, 1989:126 on the Miji Kenda
of Kenyan coast, for instance.
Nchulubi's case of witchcraft is discussed in detail in chapter 6 pp. 283-285.
H. Fisher, 1985:158.
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which becomes tainted, there is a significant weakness in that it becomes
an issue only in certain cases. I will elaborate on this point below, but what
I want to suggest here is that this stage, which I prefer to designate
'borrowing' rather than 'mixing', starts with the presence of Islam
"somewhere within reach" 37 of a given society; and that the recognition of
the efficacy of the remedies prescribed by the cleric, is a manifestation of
the seed that is about to be sown. These remedies become useful additions
or supplements, and occasionally even replacements but again this process
differs not only from place to place, but also time to time. It can therefore
be said that there are no quarantine barriers to be broken for 'borrowing'
to begin and even the people themselves do not see it as borrowing.
This line of argument would suggest that 'borrowing' may occur
without conversion or even precede it: some individuals might seek the help
of the sheikh for a variety of needs, for instance, to improve their
businesses, enhance their luck in matters of love, or even for general
protection against 'evil eye'. Some of these may convert to Islam, some
may not. This may be seen as a case of people turning to a particular
alternative religious resource (we must remember that the individuals
appreciate, or at least are aware of the Muslim resource from which they
derive) for their benefit. The search for a different remedy indicates an
openness to the possibility of exploring the available alternatives rather
than a purposeful 'mixing'.
African traditional perspective is not exciusivistic; it is from a Muslim
point of view that to resort to other alternatives can be seen as borrowing.
Illustrative of this point is the case of M'Ibuuri described in chapter 6. In
H. Fisher, 1985:156.
In many places, particularly where Muslim learning is inaccessible, the
sheikh or the teacher (often the same individual) usually combines his regular
religious duties with divination and treatment of the sick. For more information,
see S. Beckerleg (1990:203).
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this case, M'Ibuuri, a pioneer Muslim resorted to the traditional nthenge
oath, which to him (and others) was the most viable solution to his
immediate land problem. But from the point of view of his fellow Muslims,
he had profaned his faith by taking of the oath whose method of
administration they considered to be unislamic (since the goat is struck to
death by the person taking the oath). Indeed my informant said that by
taking the oath, M'Ibuuri behaved like a mshrikina39 (one who associated
God with others) which was considered to be worse than a mshenzi because
a mshenzi is an unbeliever for whom the question of shirk is irrelevant. In
solving one problem, M'Ibuuri created yet another and therefore he had to
find a solution. So he approached the sheikh who suggested a cleansing
ritual with two other Muslim men in attendance. Paradoxically, the ritual
was reminiscent of a traditional Meru cleansing ritual. Thus the case of
MIbuuri went a full circle from what Fisher's proposition would term
'mixing' to cleansing and back to mixing again. It illustrates that people
proffer a cultural explanation to social phenomena and 'mixing' does not
exist to the people on the ground or, it exists only for some who are of
theological orientation. This explanation is achieved, as Horton suggests,
through a theoretical abstraction, through a social projection into the
invisible world. In a later work in which he restates his earlier position to
answer his critics, Horton sees the African societies as much more open
than he originally thought.4°
This is one of the few occasions when my informants made references to the
concept of shirk in relation to the Meru traditional practices. While in Meru the
emphasis has been on the concept of ushenzi as opposed to dini, the cultural
duality that exists among the Mijikenda Muslims is termed ushirikina.
"Witchcraft, herbal and magical medicine, spirit possession, oath-taking - all
conveniently summarized in the term ushirikina (broadly, 'superstition' and
deriving from an Arabic term, shirk, meaning to share other gods with God and
so polytheism) as well as by more specific terms - are denounced as anti-Islamic.
Yet they are the normal explanatory recourse for most people at some time" (D.
J. Parkin 1985:235).
4° R. Horton, 1994:316-323.
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It is difficult to document an indigenous non-Muslim concept of
'borrowing' or 'mixing' in the traditional society. But then how can these
cases of different people who resort to the sheikh for help be explained
rationally? As the two cases (of Nchulubi and M'Ibuuri) cited above
illustrate, the people try various alternatives that are available to them
without recourse to religious beliefs. They are not interested in the
structure and knowledge of Islam, theirs is not a search for salvation. They
are concerned with the gratification of their immediate needs.
For those who convert at this point, "detachment, even of so rude a
kind as enslavement, is rarely absolute";4' and therefore, 'borrowing'
continues progressively as the list of more "useful supplements" grows
longer. Once again this undermines Nock's dichotomy between prophetic
and non-prophetic religions, and between conversion and adhesion. The one
demands that the individual cross from one religious frontier to another, by
placing before them a stark choice between salvation and damnation; the
other does not presuppose "the taking of a new way of life",42 with the
result that adherents are left with "one foot on each side of the fence"."
This dichotomy does not stand the test of time, though Islam is a truly
prophetic religion, the data presented above shows that converts in Meru
were won through what Nock terms adhesion. Again those who seem to an
outsider to be sitting on the fence, as has been shown above, have sought
Islam earnestly and in their own way hold onto what they understand by
it.
' H. Fisher, 1973:32.
42 A. D. Nock, 1969:7.
Ibid., p.7.
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Those sitting on the fence are, I suppose, in Fisher's 'mixing' stage,
in which the "cumulative impact" keeps the juggernaut on the move,"
while the observance of Islam continues together with that of"many pagan
survivals".'5
 Thus the two crucial points of this stage are the aggregate
effect of Muslim presence among a group of people; and the survival of some
of their 'so-called' "pagan survivals". To me, it seems as if we are dealing
with two juggernauts here: the Muslim one and the African one! While the
latter is presented as the ineluctable victim of the former, its elements
resist, rather stubbornly, being blotted out. It is from this point of view that
the resilient elements of African cultures are seen as survivals. Lewis
comments that:
It is of course generally assumed that elements of belief and practice
which are not officially recognized as part of the international
orthodoxy represent local survivals from pre-Islamic times.'6
Whether an international 'orthodoxy' exists or not is another matter.
However, if we accept that Islam cannot be practiced in a cultural vacuum
in other words, it manifests itself "in the beliefs of living Muslims, who
interpret the Quran as they see fit"47 and that therefore purity of
orthodoxy is untenable and that detachment, such as the one engendered
by enslavement, which uproots a people from both their physical and
cultural environment, is "rarely absolute",'5
 then the African cultural
elements should not be seen as 'survivals'. The interpretation which
ascribes a great vitality to Islam and inertia to the African religious beliefs
H. Fisher, 1985:159.
H. Fisher, 1973:31.




and practices, fosters the notion of 'survival' of these elements in African
Islam. Hence the crucial point that runs implicitly through the definitions
of conversion that I have examined in the introduction, is the power of
Islam (supposedly irresistible) over the African religious beliefs - Africans
are 'mixers' because they retain some of their cultural elements alongside
Islam or Christianity, as the case may be.
This is consistent with the emphasis placed on the 'mixed' Islam in
Black Africa. Fisher, notwithstanding his recognition of the Africans' ability
to "make even rigorous Islam... their own" 49 sees the period of "mixing" as
characterized by "watered-down Muslim presence" 5° manifesting itself in
"prayers, dress, food and so on". An explanation which sees this mode of
Islam as "watered-down" overlooks the fact that these external signs of
compliance are, to their holders, the most important hallmarks not only of
Islam, but also of true or 'good' Muslims. Therefore, the notion of "watered-
down Muslim presence" is not justifiable and it leads to further difficulty
in devising a gauge for Muslim presence. The case of the Arab Muslim
woman living in one of the trade centres in Igembe could well illustrate this
point. Being Arab, she considers herself to be a better Muslim than the local
converts, and indeed one day she said that one of the local women, named
Mariam, had more faith, was a better Muslim than she herself.5'
What the Arab woman meant to emphasize is that the other woman,
though a convert, has a strong faith and is a good Muslim. Given the
background of the underlying concepts described in chapter 2, such a
H. Fisher, 1973:27.
5° Ibid., p.33.
51 Samira and her family are the only Arabs now living in this particular trade
centre. She said that she prays in the mosque which was built with funds donated
by her family members, five times a day. The other woman (the local convert) tries
to emulate Samins example and she leads a pious life. (Interview 10th October
1991).
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comparison, from the Arab woman's point of view was quite appropriate.
The case of this woman (the convert) who faithfully and sincerely believes
in a religion about which she knows little or nothing, and that of Nchulubi
(discussed in chapter 6) who similarly earnestly sought protection in Islam,
are typical examples of the local Muslim representations, which, from
Fisher's point of view, would be termed "watered-down". But is the faith of
these two in Islam watered down? This phenomenon is akin to what Fisher
fits into Nock's definition of adhesion, and not conversion, as if it were a
matter of fact that conversion of any African people to Islam, should take
the conventional form prescribed by Nock, and that the absence of this
particular form requires explanation, if not justification. As I have shown
in the introduction, conversion of African peoples to Islam has been
variously defined and if for instance we accept a definition such as Nock's,
that lays emphasis on the "reorientation of the soul" and a "deliberate
turning" from the past, we run into a logical difficulty of defining as
converts those who have adopted Islam as a result of the process that has
been going on in Meru since the beginning of the 1980s. I would therefore
argue that these two and many similar cases where an individual or a
group accepts Islam and seeks a Muslim identity as opposed to other forms
of identity, whether or not they discard the old for the new, are cases of
conversion.52
Reform is the third of Fisher's three stages of the development of
Islam in Black Africa, examples of which he suggests could be found at any
time. In the case of West Africa on which his analysis is based, literacy
played an important role first when the answers given by the scholar Al-
Maghili to questions set by the emperor of Songhay, Askiya Mohammed
were used to justify reform against what was considered to be mixed Islam
52 H. Fisher (1991:5-8) has recently pointed out what he sees as Nock's tidy
distinction between conversion and adhesion, and the difficulty arising from this
distinction, "if the local people stubbornly persist in merely adhering to the
conversion-demanding religion".
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at the time. Al-Maghili's answers, written about AD 1500 were used once
more as the basis for revolution which flowered into the 19th century jihads
such as the one of Uthnian Dan Fodio. According to Fisher, literacy in
Africa
has served as a time-bomb of reform ... When the time comes for
explosion, this too is a form of conversion, for the concept applies to
two distinct crises of religious development: exchanging one faith (or
none) for another, and exchanging indifference and dilution for
fervency within the same faith.53
From one perspective the anti-maulid movement might be termed
reform. Theological arguments against the celebration of maulid question
the religious value of the celebration which, they argue, is more a social
function than a form of worship, ibadah. Mixing of men and women and the
appropriateness of playing ngoma, drum, and other musical accompaniment
are also questioned by the opponents of maulid. To this extent it is a kind
of reform, though it is neither the exchange of one faith for another nor the
exchange of dilution for fervency that Fisher proposes above. Beneath the
theological questions there is the issue of identity and for the majority of
the people, it is not the theological arguments that are disputable, but who
the personalities supporting the anti-mautid campaign are and for what
motives. The Asian sector of the community is accused of using fiscal power
to force the rest of the 'African' Muslims to abandon their traditions. Thus
their motives are not considered to be religious and the fact that the Asians
are said to be behind the ant-maulid movement, it has triggered a sort of
reaction from the maulid supporters. The conifict remains unresolved and
maulid in Meru is considered both joy (farah) and obligation (faradh) and
therefore left to the discretion of the individual believer. Indeed from the
point of view of the majority of the people, the controversy is externally
instigated for reasons other than religious reform. Therefore an analysis
H. Fisher, 1973:36.
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that sees maulid movement in Meru only in terms of reform fails to take
account of this other and perhaps more important dimension to the
controversy.
Tabligh activity in Meru is perhaps closer to what Fisher sees as the
crisis of exchanging indifference for fervency than the aims of the maulid
debate are. To all intents and purposes, Tabligh at the national level aimed
to "draw out the Muslims", kuzidua watu, particularly in the rural areas
where, leadership and guidance were considered to be lacking. The
controversy between Sheikh Shariff and the Tabligh protagonist in Igembe
can be explained in terms of reform of local Islamic practices. But again the
growing tension between the Tabligh activists and the local Muslims adds
a different dimension to the phenomenon of Tabligh in Meru. It points to
struggle between two strands of Muslim influence drawing from different
sources: the sheikhs from the north, and the active Tabligh missions from
outside the country. It has also been noted that Tabligh activity in this
area, has been more a conversion of non-Muslims to Islam than a re-
conversion or a "drawing out" of the lax Muslims as was initially stipulated
to be the sole aim of Tabligh.
Both the ann- maulid and the Tabligh movements in Meru, have an
element of reform but they go in a different direction than that predicted
by the three-stage theory that sees Islam in Africa as progressing from a
period of quarantine, when orthodoxy is still tucked away safely before the
local people enter Islam bringing with them 'heterodox' practices which lead
on to a mixing stage, a stage that is brought to an end by an "explosion" of
reform.
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Concluding Remarks: Conversion, Adhesion or De-Swahilizing
Islam?
One strand of Fisher's argument emphasizes the importance of the
Muslim cumulative impact, hence the consistency of Muslim witness, which
he suggests, builds up a "decisive advantage".5' The notion of 'birth in the
faith' and the re-orientation of the Muslim community in both Majengo and
Mjini enclaves within Meru municipality that I have discussed in chapter
5, can be compared to the Muslim cumulative impact.
At the first level are the pioneer mahaji, who, as has been shown in
chapter 2, were converted in different places and returned to Meru and
founded the Majengo Muslim community. Of prime importance at this
initial stage, was the distinction between themselves as Muslims and their
non-Muslim relatives, whom they considered to be washenzi (uncivilized),
a 'fossilized' notion of the coastal dyad of 'civilization' (Muslim/town) versus
savage/bush. The 'Swahili' disdain for the mahaji forced them to espouse
their own identity as mahaji.
Their descendants (at the second level) were considered to possess a
higher religious status than their parents and therefore equal to their
cousins (the descendants of the Swahili group), since they had been born
into the faith and not converted. These second generation Muslims,
unlike their fathers who had been converted, were born and brought up as
Muslims in the town's Muslim social network and therefore, in many ways
they were considered to be different. Illustrative of a form of cumulative
H. Fisher, 1985:158-159.
See the case of the two sisters described in chapter 2 (pp. 8 8-89) Karimi and
Kainda whose separate identities kept them apart - one in Majengo and the other
in Swaliili village, as determined by their marriage to a Swahili and a mahaji
respectively. This shift of emphasis and its role in the consolidation of a common
Muslim identity in the town is discussed.
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Muslim impact is the pattern of their names - while their fathers acquired
Arabic names in addition to their Kimeru names which they retained, the
latter acquired two or more Arabic names, without retaining Kimeru names.
This can be seen as conscious effort on their part to obliterate traces of their
mahaji descent. They could now claim Swahili status, like their cousins
living in the Swahili village. Kiswahili was their first language and the
majority of them married within the Muslim community. Accordingly, their
faith was considered to be purer than that of their fathers who were
accused by the 'exemplars' of the faith (that is the Nubians and the
heterogenous group that identified itself as the Swahili in Meru) of
retaining many Meru traditions and mixing them with Islam.
The youth in the third generation of Muslims, as the analysis of
mosque attendance revealed, tend to show a greater laxity in religious
observance than the older generation. They are complacent about their
Muslim inheritance - they feel that their 'Muslimness' cannot be lost since
it is not acquired through conversion. But the older members of the
community who are obviously aware of an increasing laxity on the part of
the younger people, attribute it to the contemporary social-economic
pressures with which the youth have to cope. The significance of this trend
for our purpose is that the cumulative Muslim impact is leading the
community in a different direction than that predicted by Fisher, and in
spite of Tabligh influence, concern for the pervasive indifference and laxity
was expressed in the mwiko-handing over ceremony that has already been
discussed in chapter 5.
In the 1960s, a single standard of piety was held to apply not only to
the Muslims in the town but effectively to all Muslims in Meru; for
instance, failure to observe such ceremonies as 'circunibulation of the
settlement', Kuzungua mji, was considered portentous to its residents. Now
there ceases to be any a priori reason why such a practice, which was
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anchored in Swahili Islamic tradition, should be deemed necessary for
Majengo or Mjini.
Outside the Majengo and Mjini Muslim enclaves, the progression is
towards de-Swahilization of the faith. What I mean by 'de-Swahilization' is
that emphasis is shifting from the importance of acquiring Swahili customs
at conversion. This has been illustrated by the case of Asumani's first wife
Amina and that of Hisham's wife, Asha, discussed in chapter 6. Also it may
be that this process of acculturation is no longer necessary, and perhaps
much less practical nowadays.
It can also be argued that this self de-construction or discarding
much of the Swahili cultural external trappings on conversion to Islam
(though, as it has been shown throughout this study, certain 'fossilized'
coastal Swahili concepts have continually tempered the local perceptions of
Islam and are still extant) is part of a self-reconstruction of Islam in a
changing social environment. Geertz observes that religious belief and
practice are "inescapably dependent upon the utilization by individuals of
socially available 'systems of signiflcance"'. These systems of significance
change with time, for instance at the planting of Islam and Christianity in
Meru, the missionaries propagated the notion of the superiority of western
culture over that of the Meru. Hence those who adopted the new religions
were supposed to be 'enlightened' while their kinsmen were seen as
'backward'. Now the value system has changed so that enlightenment is no
longer gauged by the use of chinaware,57
 for instance. Similarly, as part
of this self de-construction and reconstruction of Swahili Islam, many of the
C. Geertz, 1968:18.
It has been shown in chapter 2 ( p. 92) that the use of Chinaware by the
Muslims in Meru was a sign of civilization, and indeed that was the basis for the
practice of serving food on banana leaves for non-Muslims when they visited their
relatives in the town. J. de V. Allen (1975:122) has also mentioned that use of
chinaware was a sign of a cultured Swahili.
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features introduced by the Muslim pioneers have gradually disappeared, for
instance, the method of conversion up till the mid 195Os is no longer
practiced. Conversion to Islam does not free an individual from the
traditional social obligations any more.
The Muslim influence that has been prevalent in Meru since the mid-
1970s is not aimed at changing the way of life of the individual converts.
Conversion of such individuals as Nchulubi 59
 does not reflect a progression
of faith - a reorientation and crossing of religious frontiers as Nock
suggests. Illustrative of this continuity was the difficulty experienced by my
informants (Muslim converts) when trying to define their beliefs prior to
conversion. As I have said before, when asked to say what their beliefs were
before they converted to Islam or Christianity, my informants were unable
to do so. A factor contributing to this ambiguity is that among the Meru
(and many other African peoples) religion is not divorced from everyday life.
As Horton says, the traditional societies in the search for a causal
explanation of the incomprehensible, the misfortunes, in other words to
penetrate behind the facade of the observable in their everyday life,
developed a theoretical representation through spirits, ancestors and
deities.
In the traditional scheme of things, problems were solved as they
came through a wide range of practices by the experts; for instance if the
rain failed, the people consulted their diviner/oracle to diagnose the cause
of the rain failure and the same or another expert would suggest the
necessary course of action. A case in point is the Njia curse discussed in
chapter 2. The explanation for the prevalence of a thorny weed which could
make the land barren and unproductive was found in the curse laid on Njia
The process of choosing a name for a new convert and the cleansing ritual
of symbolic bath is described in chapter 2, pp. 106-107.
See the case of witchcraft discussed in chapter 6, pp. 282-289.
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people by the Redille.6° Sickness was also treated by experts after the
diagnosis was made and the necessary measures were taken. For instance
if a certain taboo had been broken and the culprit or their relative(s) were
suffering as a result, the prescribed cleansing ritual would be performed to
restore their ritual purity and treatment would be administered either
before, after or at the same time as required. In the traditional
understanding, these solutions to everyday problems were not perceived as
'religious' activities. Such solutions and remedies did not constitute a
systematic set of beliefs and this explains the absence of the word for
'religion' in many African languages.6'
As I have just said above, the gradual process of the spread of Islam
set off by the Tabligh in the beginning of the 1980s, is not a reorientation
of the ideas emanating from this traditional scheme of things. Simmons'
observation is in his study of conversion in Tonghia, a Senegalese village,
West Africa, is useful for our analysis of the Tabligh-borne conversion.
Simmons posited the occurrence of conversion as both continuous and
discontinuous, at both the symbolic and the non-symbolic levels. 62
 The
symbolic level entails change in the converts "mode of attachment to sacred
symbols". This means that converts experience a change in their notions
of the sacred values and symbols. In this event, conversion is discontinuous
as old symbols are discarded and new ones introduced in their stead. At the
60 The colonial District Commissioner did not see the sense in the story about
a Rendille trade party who had laid a curse on Njia people because they had been
attacked and lost their donkeys and goods. But the seriousness with which the
people of Njia treated the matter, convinced him of the gravity of the situation,
forcing him to make arrangements for the said curse to be lifted. See chapter 2,
pp. 113-114.
61 L. Brenner (1989:87) acknowledges the problem of analyzing "'religion' in a
society in which the concept of 'religion' is absent".
62 W. S. Simmons 1979:303.
Ibid., p.303.
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other level, it is continuous if the converts see their conversion as leading
to yet new methods and rituals and new symbols of communicating with the
same deity as before conversion. Simmons found that in the Senegalese
village of Tonghia, conversion was both continuous and discontinuous.
Similarly, in Meru (though as I have shown in chapter 6 the factors for
conversion were different from those in Tonghia), conversion can be said to
be both continuous and discontinuous. The discrepant levels of Islamization
between the pioneers in Majengo and Mjini within the municipality, and the
Inshallah can be understood in terms of the difference between these two
levels of conversion. For the pioneer mahaji who formed a Muslim
community in Majengo, conversion was in a sense continuous, only in a
sense because a complete detachment from their traditional culture was not
possible. It was meritorious to emulate the Swahili culture, therefore,
conversion was continuous only in so far as they could go in their emulation
of Swahili culture and thus change in the mode of attachment to certain
sacred symbols. To this extent only, Islam can be said to have been
continuous.
In contrast, the situation of the Inshallah conforms to the
discontinuous level - for instance, Nchulubi's case, (if I can refer to it once
more) shows no signs of discontinuity. In her perception of the propriety of
religious duties and obligations, observing the distinction between halal and
haram meat is sufficient. Also she goes to the mosque on Fridays, though
this is not possible every Friday because she has to make a long and
tortuous journey to the Marikaz. A distance of 10 kilometres has to be
covered on foot! From an outsider's point of view, her religious experience,
and that of many others like her, is limited to the occasional Friday mosque
trip; an occasional visit to the area by a prominent religious leader; and the
annual religious festivals, which bring together all the local faithful at the
Markaz.
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In his study of the expression of Islamic identities among the Dyula
in Koko, northern Cote d'Ivoire, Robert Launay suggests that ethnic
differences, class differences, and many other differences among people are
relevant to different conceptions of Islam wherever such differences are
socially salient. These different conceptions of Islam define and express the
nature of communities and the roles and places of the individuals who form
those communities. Within these communities therefore "hierarchies of one
sort or another are legitimated or contested".' Seen in the light of
Launay's analysis, the differences between the Muslim communities in
Meru during the first phase, the process of constructing a common Muslim
identity during the second phase, and the dilemma of sustaining the
Muslim identity facing the Inshallah Muslims in the rural area during the
third phase were relevant in the local conception of Islam as a struggle
between dini and ushenzi. Dini defined and helped to sustain the social
boundaries between the various groups in Meru. Dini legitimated the
superiority of "birth in the faith" over conversion on the one hand, and the
superiority of Muslims in general over washenzi on the other.
On the one hand, the Muslims in Meru are aware of themselves as
members of a local community and of the wider ummah, an awareness
which they express in the phrase "Islam ni moja", Islam is one. On the
other, they espouse the expression of separate identities within Islam.
Launay explains this duality thus:
the local community.., is a highly personal realm, governed by
regular face-to-face interaction. Within such communities, the
differences between members, rather than their equality before God,
are of paramount importance. Those distinctions that, if recognized,
are at least relativized at the global level - male and female, adult
and child, slave and free - are of primary importance within the local
community. To these, each local community may add a host of
distinctions... In a fundamental sense, the global community
R. Launay, 1992:30-32.
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postulates the essential equality of all humans, the local community
their essential difference.65
He goes on to explain that ritual provides the medium for expressing
and sustaining these differences. An important point to note is that
different communities have different types of distinctions and apply similar
forms of distinctions in different ways, for instance the distinction between
the 'Swahiliness' and the 'mahajiness' in Meru, cannot qualify either as
ethnic or as class distinction, yet it was fundamental to the expression of
the identities of the two groups of Muslims.
Although this study builds on the ideas outlined to explain the
presence and representation of Islam in Meru, it departs from these
explanations by focusing on the importance of such local factors as the
process of the formation of the nucleus Muslim communities in Meru, the
process of transmuting certain 'fossilized' elements of Swahili coastal
concepts of civility; and the response of the Meru people, deriving from such
structural factors as the clan, Njuri and curse, and particularly the
incentives that these create for conversion. What the Meru case shows is
the critical importance of such local variables that have nothing to do with
the choice of 'compatible' Muslim elements by the converts.
Fisher's explanation notes quite correctly Africa's ability to make
even rigorous Islam its own, but while he acknowledges selectivity in the
process of adopting Islam, he offers few explanations of how this has been
done in a variety of ways and places, (such as those of East and West
Africa) from essentially the same 'core' Islam. Yet even within the same
region, there are regional cultural and historical variations that defy
sweeping generalizations. Accounting for each case therefore requires an
R. Launay, 1992:107.
336
excursion into the ways in which Islam shapes group formation and
facilitates expression of separate identities.
The various manifestations of Islam therefore are shaped by local
factors: cultures and historical processes. These various manifestations of
Islam are akin to Launay's "multiple Is1ams", which in their multifarious
dimensions are part of the one universal Islam, summed up in the





A/il al-Sunnah - Those who adhere to the Sunnah, that is the sayings and
deeds of the prophet as expressed in the Hadith.
Aiim (plur. ulama) - Scholar, one who possesses knowledge.
Amiri - Commander, leader. Tabligh leaders are also known as Amiri.
Arubaini - Forty. It is the term used for the rememberance feast forty days
after a person's death. Arubaini is also the term used for the period
of forty days after a woman has given birth, during which period she
is considered to be unclean and she does not perform her customary
household chores until she goes through the prescribed rituals of
purification. This custom is also found among the Meru where the
mother of a new baby is kept in seclusion for a month before she
could resume her normal life.
Askari - Soldier, police or any paramilitary person.
Ayaana - Ayaana is the name of a cult. In everyday language among the
Borana, ayaana is used in relation to the traditional lunar calendar
which has 27 days.
Baraka - Blessing, God's blessing, favour or prosperity.
Baraza - Place of public audience or reception, members of a council,
cabinet or a committee of elders. In the thesis it is used to refer to
the informal gatherings where the elders usually sit to discuss the
current affairs and issues affecting the Meru Muslim community.
Bid'a - Religious innovation.
Boma - Any kind of raised structure for defensive or protective purpose. It
also means homestead and cowshed or kraal. The term was used
throughout Kenya for the colonial government administrative
centres, many of which gradually developed into towns.
Bui - A black garment covering from head to toe, worn by Muslim women
outdoors.
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Dewe - A derogatory term used by the Swahili Muslims for the Meru
pioneer Muslim converts whose ears had been pierc&I and earlobes
prolonged in the Meru traditional way.
Dhikr - To mention the name of God. It may be performed as a group ritual
which occasionally induces a state of trance. Dhikr is a significant
aspect of sufism.
Dini - Religion, worship or creed. In the thesis dini means Islam, the
Swahili-Islamic cultural values and external trappings.
Falak - Astrology, cast a horoscope, take the omens by observing the stars.
In the thesis the term is used with reference to the some of the
readings used in the treatment of the sick.
Haji - Pilgrimage to Mecca. It is also a title for a Muslim male who has
made a pilgrimage to Mecca. A female pilgrim is Hajah, but seldom
used as a title.
Halal - Permissible, lawful, allowed, rightful.
Haram - Forbidden, unlawful, prohibited by Muslim law or custom.
Harambee - The term means to pull together (usually to lift up something).
It became not only a rallying call for the newly-independent Kenyan
state late in the 1960s, but also a powerful political philosophy
through which many development projects were and still are
implemented throughout the country.
Hirizi - Charm, amulet to wear on the person. Often a smalleather case
containing a verse from the Quran, though it is only the
medicineman who knows the contents of the amulet.
Hishima - Honour, dignity, position or rank, reverence, modesty or curtesy.
Ibadah - Worship.
Ichiaro - This Kimeru term could be rendered as ritual alliance that exists
between certain sub-sections and clans. It defines and regulates
relationships, for instance it determines which clans are endogamous
and which are not.
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Id-ui -fitr - The feast at the end of the Ramadhan fast observed by Muslims
all over the world.
Id-ul-Haji - It is celebrated in commemoration of Prophet Mohanimad's
journey to Mecca.
Ijtmai - It means meeting. However, Tabligh ijtmai discussed in the thesis
were not ordinary meetings, they could be described as conventions
or symposia.
Ikanda - It was a kind of charm placed by the entrance to the homestead
to deter anyperson who passed through the entrance with intent to
harm those living in the particular homestead. It was believed to
work in the same way as an amulet worn on the wrist, waist or any
other part of the body.
Jamaa - Family, society, assembly, gathering or meeting.
Jamatkhana - Shia Imami Ismailia mosque.
Kaiimah - The profession of faith, the first pillar of Islam.
Kanzu - It is an outer garment for men, a long sleeved calico gown, reaching
from the neck to the ankles, usually plain white or beige, with or
without decorative stitchwork on the neck, wrist, and front. It is
fastened with a small button at the neck, and worn over the trousers.
Khutba - Friday sermon, speech.
Kiama - The traditional council of elders, usually the executive council of
elders among the Meru.
Kiaro - It was the term used for the forced labour (and also porterage) that
was introduced by the early colonial administrators in Meru. It was
the young warriors who went on kiaro.
Kilemba - Turban
Kufuru - To treat with mockery or contempt, to blaspheme or commit
sacrilege, to become an unbeliever.
Kusiiimishwa - To be converted to Islam.
Kuzidua - To extract or draw out, but its use with regard to people, it
means to draw them or awaken them to their religious obligations.
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Leso - Multicolored cotton cloth worn by Swahili (Muslim) women. One
piece is wrapped around the waist and the other over the head and
shoulders.
Lugha - Language
Madebe - (sing.debe) Tins
Madrasa - Quranic school
Mahaji - Term used by the Swahili for pioneer Meru Muslim converts.
Matanga moja - A ritual of observing mourning period together in groups
related through marriage in the traditional Lamu society.
Matanga - Formal mourning, lasting three or four to ten days, during which
period friends and relatives sleep in the mourner's house.
Mau Mau - It was the liberation movement which rallied the Kenyan people
together to fight for their freedom from the British colonial
government. It started in 1952 and ended in 1960.
Maula - A place in the homestead set apart for prayer.
Maulid - The annual celebrations of Prophet Mohammad's birthday.
Miraa - A kind of plant grown in Meru as a cash crop sold largely in
Nairobi, Mombasa and North-Eastern Province. The young shoots are
chewed as a habit.
Mtaa - A part of a town, a row of houses in a Majengo.
Muiro - A condition of ritual impurity resulting from a breach of an
avoidance taboo in the traditional Meru society.
Mungu - The Swahili term for God.
Murungu - Kimeru term for God.
Mwiko - A large wooden instrument resembling a spoon, used for preparing
food.
Mwiria(ga) - Clan
Nafsi - The self.
Nairuzi - A festival observed on the first day of the new year. It has its
origin in Persia but it was observed by Swahili Muslims along the
coast and later imported into the interior.
Ngai - Kimeru term for rain. It also means God.
341
Ngai-e-Kirimara - The God of Mount Kenya to whom the Meru people made
sacrifices during national calamities, for instance.
Ngai-e-Njaambene - The God of Njaambene whom a section or the
entire people of Meru invoked during times of need, for instance
when the rain failed. Njaambene as a sacred place was particularly
significant for the Igembe section of the Meru people.
Ngoma - Drum, song and dance, music in general. Ceremonial ngoma is
extended to include any kind of dance and the usual accompaniment
in merrymaking.
Njaamba - Kimeru term for male.
Njuri - The council that constituted the Meru traditional government. It
comprised of various councils (Njuri impingiri), Njuri ncheke, Njuri
imbere) whose membership was through the achievement of rank and
high social status.
Njuri-e-Kauku - This was the derogatory term given to the Christians whom
the colonial government, in an attempt to neutralize the powers of
this traditional institution, insisted should be allowed to participate
in Njuri activities on condition that they were sworn on the Bible
rather than the traditional process of initiation into the Njuri ranks.
Nthenge - Kimeru term for he-goat.
Nyika - Open, bare forest or bush. It was used by the coastal people
to refer to the peoples living inland, who were regarded as
uncivilized. So the term also connotes backwardness, ushenzi, as
opposed to the coastal Swahili-Islamic civilization, ungwana.
Pepo ya jinn - Jinn spirit.
Posho - Rations, daily supply of food, clothing or maintenance given to
porters, soldiers or labourers.
Rubadiri - Incense.
Sadak - Religious offering, sacrifice, act of charity done for a religious
motive.
Shemeji - Relation by marriage, brother-in-law, but also frequently used
loosely of any particular friend of the husband.
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Shifta - An Amhanc word meaning bandit.
Shirk - Associating God with others. It is the deadliest sin a Muslim can
commit.
Sijda - A callosity made on the forehead by prostration during prayer.
Siku ya mwaka - The first day of new year.
Somo - In the traditional coastal Swahili society, the term was used for a
woman, usually an elderly woman, who attended a young girl during
her first menstruation and instructed her in matters pertaining to
marriage and adult life.
Swalihina - Those who observe regular prayer. Among Meru Muslims, the
term is used for those who have the sijda on their foreheads.
Tabligh - In Arabic the term means to be informed, told, notified,
communicated. Tabligh is an Islamic reform movement which
originated in India sub-continent during this century and spread to
many other parts of the world.
Tafsir - Exegesis, interpretation, explanation.
Tamko la Kiarabu - Arabic accent.
Tariqa - Way, path with reference to religious and particularly sufi order.
Tasbih - A kind of rosary used by Muslims when chanting praises to God.
Tohara - Cleanliness, ceremonial cleansing especially of circumcision as
practiced by Muslims.
Ua moja - An enclosure, an open court or backyard attached to a house and
fenced off.
Ungwana - Condition of high status or rank of a freeman contrasted
formerly with that of a slave in the traditional coastal social
stratification. In the thesis the term is used in the context of the
coastal Islamic civilization as opposed to the non-Muslim peoples of
the interior.
Ushenzi - Barbarity, uncouthness, savagery, formerly used contemptuously
by the coastal people for those who come from the interior. While
such terms are seldom used in the coastal region, in Meru they are
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used in everyday conversation by Muslims with reference to non-
Muslims.
Ustaarabu - Being like an Arab. Like ungwana it implies civilization as
contrasted with ushenzi.
Vikundi vya Fisabi-Liahi - groups of those 'in the path of God'.
Vitumbua - A kind of home-made doughnut.
Wallahi - By God.
Wangaziya - People from Comoro Islands. They have a long Islamic
tradition due to their long association with the East Africa coast.
Mshenzi (sing. Mshenzi) - Non-Muslim, 'uncivilized', bush people.
Washenzi wasio na dini - Barbaric people without religion, non-Muslims.
Watu wa mashambani - Rural people, people from the countryside as
opposed to town residents.
Watu wa murid - Adherents of Murid.
Watumwe - Slaves.




(I) Kenya National Archives (K.N.A.)
Material in the Kenya National Archives (K.N.A.) was used particularly to
provide the historical background in the first chapter. This material is
mainly in form of District Annual reports and other correspondence written
by the district administrators: the District Commissioners (D.C.) and
Provincial Commissioners (P.C.). There are other files containing useful
information on the Swahili and Nubian Villages, to which reference has
been made in the thesis.
Political Recordbook 1908, K.N.A. DCIMRU/1J1.
Annual Report 1908, KN.A. DCIMRU/1i1.
Annual Report 1912/13, K.N.A. DC/MRU/iJ1.
Annual Report 1914/15, KN.A. DC/MRU/iJ1.
Annual Report 1916/17, KN.A. DC/MRU/iJ1.
File with information on construction of roads and buildings in the
township, 1911-25, K.N.A. DCIMRU/4/1.
Townships and trade centres, 1923-1938.
Meru Political Recordbook 1924, DCIMRUI4/4.
Chuka Political Recordbook 1925-57, DCIMRU/4/5.
Annual Report 1925, KN.A. DCIMRUIiJ2.
Annual Report 1926, KN.A. DCIMRU/]12.
Medical Officer of Health on Sanitation, Annual Report 1926, K.N.A.
DCIMRU/iJ2.
E.B.Horne, Senior Commissioner Kikuyu to D.0 Meru 14/111929,
DC/MRU/4/2.
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Fountaine, S.H., 13/3/1931, K.N.A. ADM/7/31.
D.C. to The Hon. Ag. Provincial Commissioner, Central Province, Nyeri, 2nd
March 1939, K.N.A. DCIMRU/219/2.
Annual Report 1939, KN.A. DCIMRU/114.
Provincial Commissioner Nyeri to D.0 Meru, 9/6/1948, K.N.A. DC/
MRU/2/9/2.
Osman Yakub to the D.C., 9th March, 1949, DC/MRU/2/9/2.
D.C. Meru to P.C. Nyeri, 12th February,1949, DC/MRU/2/9/2.
File on Nubian Village, DCIMRTJ/214/1O.
Kileleswa Files, K.N.A. PC/CP/9/15/3.
(H) Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library Archives, University of
Nairobi.
Lambert Papers are a collection of papers and notes on the Meru written
by H.E.Lambert who served as a district commissioner in Meru for a long
time. These papers are held in Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library, University
of Nairobi. Refence was made to papers LAMB/iJ2/1-1O.
(HI) Public Records Office, London.
Some information was obtained from the documents relating to Kenya
during the colonial period that are held in the Public Records Office in
London. The following have been cited:
Deputy Governor of Kenya to the Secretary of State for Colonies, 11th
August, 1936 on "Clearance of Pangani Village", CO 533/462/8.
Proposals to Deal With the Disturbances Arising From the Activities of the
Mau Mau, CO 822/437.
Pastoral letter from John J McCarthy, C.S.Sp., Titular Bishop of Cercina
and Vicar Apostolic of Zanzibar, to the Bishop's house, Nairobi. 26/8/1952,
CO 822/438.
346
Sir Everlin Baring to Secretary of state for the Colonies, 29/12/1952 CO
822/465.
Mr. Gerald Casey of Beale Farm, Timau, to Mrs. Barbara Castle, M.P.
October, 1957, CO 822/1240.
Ag. Governor to the Secretary of State for Colonies,"Mau Mau Oathing
Ceremonies in Meru", 24/1/1958, CO 822/1254.
B Reports and Correspondence
"Jumuia-Tul-Baladia Muslim Missionary of Kenya of Kenya Established in
1909", document showing the achievements of Jumuia-tul-Baladia from
1911 to 1973 in the minutes of the meeting held on 18th January 1973,
Nyeri.
"Constitution and Rules of Meru Muslim Community Madrasa Association",
drawn in 1979.
"Katiba ya Baraza Kuu la Waislam wa ya Kenya".
"Baraza Kuu La Waislam Wa Kenya: Mwongozo Na Shabaha".
Minutes of meeting held by Muslims in Meru, 6th, July 1980.
Letter of Director of Tabligh and Daawa to Meru Muslim leaders, 30th
October, 1980.
Letter from director of Tabligh, Kenya Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims,
15th November, 1980.
"Ripoti Ya Mwaka Kutoka Kwa Naibu Wa Mwenyekiti, Mkoa wa
Mashariki", December, 1980.
"Baraza Kuu La Waislam Wa Kenya: Id.ara Ya Tabligh Na Daawa, Ripoti
ya Mwaka, 1982".
"Memorandum" of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims to the President
of Kenya.
"Report Ya Idara Ya Tabligh Na Daawa Kuanzia 1983 hadi 1984".
Letter from the Secretary, Directorate of Tabligh and Daawa, to provincial
leaders.
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Letter from Secretary-General to all provincial representatives, 14th
December, 1981.
"Expanding Nature of Tabligh Work", Director of Tabligh.
Letter from Director of Tabligh and Daawa to Meru Muslim leaders, 30th
October 1980.
"Mkutano Wa Kwanza wa Mji wa Makandune Jumuiatil Baladia", minutes
of meeting held on 8th March, 1981.
"Kazi Zilizofanywa Na Idara Za Baraza Kuu", 14th April, 1981.
"Repoti Ya Naibu wa Mwenyekiti, Mkoa wa Mashariki", 1981.
"Answer to Allegations by (Mr.O.A) to the executive Committee of the
Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims", 12th June, 1982.
"Rep oti Ya Mwaka Kutoka Kwa Naibu Wa Mwenyekiti, Mkoa Wa
Mashariki", 1982.
"Tasjili Za Mkutano Wa Kamati Ya Utendayi", 16th December, 1984.
"Kutayarisha Development Plan Ya Miaka Mitatu".
Letter of Appeal for funds for the Meru Muslim Primary School and
Madrasa, Chairman of the Joint Board of Governors, 12th November, 1990.
"Meru Town Mini-Project Proposal for Majengo-Erinda Village
Electirfication", November, 1990.
"Constitution and Rules of Meru Muslim Development Association", 29th
July 1991. A copy obtained from the Associations chairman.
Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims Treasurer's Report.
"The Background of Development".
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